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Posts from ‘July, 2010’

A close call for Shell on North Sea platform

On 11 May 2010, just weeks after the Gulf of Mexico disaster, Shell had a very narrow escape on the NAM-L13-FE North Sea platform that could have killed many people. There were 71 persons present at the time of the incident. Fortunately, none were injured. There was however significant damage to the platform.

Article by John Donovan including current related email correspondence with Royal Dutch Shell Plc

On 20 April 2010 an explosion and fire took place on the BP-licensed Transocean drilling rig Deepwater Horizon, located in the Gulf of Mexico. As we all know, the fall out from the explosion has been earthshaking in its ramifications in many directions.

On 27 June 2010, the Guardian published a related article “Shell: deep-water oil drilling will go on” featuring an interview with Peter Voser, the CEO of Royal Dutch Shell Plc. It contained this boast attributed to Mr Voser:

We would not have drilled the well in the same way. We have got other safety procedures across the globe. But I think for some companies there will be some learning from this as well…

In other words, Shell has nothing to learn from the BP disaster.

On 2 July we published an article”Voser claims Shell has nothing to learn from the BP disaster: Is this really true?“and this was followed the next day with an article “Expert educates Shell CEO Voser on oil rig blowouts”authored by the retired HSE Group Auditor of Shell International, Mr Bill Campbell.

Voser claimed that blow-outs like the Macondo well could not happen in Shell. But they have. On 11 May 2010, just weeks after the Gulf of Mexico disaster, Shell had a very narrow escape on the NAM-L13-FE North Sea platform that could have killed many people.  The platform located about 50 kilometers west of Den Helder produces natural gas. Next to the platform was a mobile platform, the “Sea Fox 4”, carrying out the maintenance work.

During maintenance work to an existing well a number of pipes, which at that time were being lowered into a well, were blown out. The pipes subsequently fell on the deck of the platform. The safety valves in the well saved the day and ensured that there was no leakage of gas from the existing well.

There were 71 persons present at the time of the incident. Fortunately, none were injured. There was however significant damage to the platform.   The maintenance work and production of gas was shut down.

Part of a tubing string being blown out of a hole is something that should never happen. A most serious breach of safety had taken place and it was deliberately underplayed.

The facts of the incident which did not make news headlines completely undermine the claims made by Peter Voser.

RELATED SELF-EXPLANATORY CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC CHIEF ETHICS & COMPLIANCE OFFICER, RICHARD WISEMAN

From: John Donovan [mailto:john@shellnews.net]
Sent: 23 July 2010 16:46
To: Wiseman, Richard M RDS-LSX
Subject: A close call for Shell on North Sea platform

Dear Mr Wiseman

Printed below is a self-explanatory draft article.

Please feel free to point out any inaccuracy for removal.

Please feel free to supply comment for unedited publication with the article.

I look forward to receiving a response next week.

Have a good weekend.

Regards
John Donovan

REPLY FROM RICHARD WISEMAN

From: richard.wiseman@shell.com
Date: 26 July 2010 18:08:24 GMT+01:00
To: john@shellnews.net
Subject: RE: A close call for Shell on North Sea platform

Dear Mr Donovan

I will not be responding to the contents of your email, except to remind you, as ever, that nothing should be inferred from this lack of response.

Regards
Richard Wiseman

Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer
Royal Dutch Shell plc
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA

Registered in England and Wales number 4366849
Registered Office:  Shell Centre, London, SE1
Headquarters: Carel van Bylandtlaan 30, 2596 HR
The Hague, The Netherlands

Email: richard.wiseman@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com

RESPONSE FROM JOHN DONOVAN

From: John Donovan <john@shellnews.net>
Date: 27 July 2010 12:35:54 GMT+01:00
To: richard.wiseman@shell.com
Subject: Re: A close call for Shell on North Sea platform

Dear Mr Wiseman

Thank you for your response.

That you have seen the article and had the opportunity to comment is sufficient.

Regards

John Donovan

EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE ENDS

THE DRAFT ARTICLE WAS AS PUBLISHED ABOVE

Photo shown above is of the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM) offshore gas-production platform L15, situated in the North Sea.

Hayward Fell Short of Modern CEO Demands

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

JULY 26, 2010

By PAUL SONNE

LONDON—In three short months, BP PLC Chief Executive Tony Hayward learned what it meant to become the face of disaster.

Until this spring, Mr. Hayward was a brainy geologist leading a seemingly successful turnaround of BP’s sluggish operations and positioning it to compete more effectively with rivals such as Royal Dutch Shell.

But that fell by the wayside on April 20, when the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, drilling a well for BP, exploded, eventually sending hundreds of millions of gallons of oil spewing into the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven workers died in the catastrophe.

Now, as BP’s board meets Monday to decide Mr. Hayward’s fate, his story serves as a cautionary tale to CEOs everywhere of how a single mishandled crisis can eclipse an entire career and of the multiplying demands on the top corporate job.

Chief executives must placate a wider variety of constituencies than ever before, making the job’s symbolism nearly as important as its substance. Mr. Hayward’s various gaffes—saying he wanted his “life back”—and sour appearance before legislators showed a degree of tone deafness that is no longer acceptable for corporate leaders, management experts say.

Chiefs must recognize “the inextricably intertwined roles of symbolism and substance in the office of CEO today,” said Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, a senior associate dean at the Yale School of Management.

After two years of horrific failures in industries like autos and banking, taxpayers are more cynical about business leaders and less willing to forgive big corporate blunders. Government is playing a much bigger role in the boardroom after pumping in billions of dollars to bail companies out, sometimes calling the shots about who leads them

Amid the rapidly changing notions about the job of the chief executive, Mr. Hayward became CEO of BP— a little over three years ago. He promised to reverse the mistakes of his predecessor John Browne, who departed amid personal scandal and left a legacy of lackluster performance and poor safety practices. The firm’s reputation had been shaken by the 2005 explosion at the company’s Texas City refinery that left 15 people dead.

Although he 53-year-old Mr. Hayward brought in a system to enforce safety standards across the company just months after becoming CEO, his vision did not always trickle down. The company saw continued leaks in its pipeline in Alaska, and problems persisted with pressure-relief valves at its refinery in Toledo, Ohio.

BP has said that Mr. Hayward’s cost-cutting drive—$4 billion in reduced costs in 2009 alone—allowed the company to put more resources into operations, including safety. Yet critics have asked whether the aggressive internal trimming also nurtured a culture of cutting corners.

Mr Hayward was subjected to just that criticism during an acrimonious Congressional hearing last June.

By most accounts, it was Mr. Hayward’s inability to generate much empathy from the U.S. public that led to calls for his ouster. Besides his unfortunate public comments, as when he initially described the spill as “relatively tiny,”

He also opted in June to attend a yacht race, even as the oil slick continued to spread across the Gulf of Mexico and engineers struggled to plug the gusher.

Robbie Vorhaus, a crisis expert at Vorhaus Communications Inc. in Sag Harbor, N.Y., said that in such crises CEOs face the task of becoming human.

“All of a sudden you have an event where you are now standing in the spotlight among shrimp fisherman and local politicians and people who maybe make 20 or 30,000 dollars a year,” Mr. Vorhaus said. “A true leader needs to be able to come from the heart and make these people feel that there is a connection.”

Mr. Vorhaus said that’s where Mr. Hayward failed.

Mr. Hayward had experienced little that would have prepared him to adopt the populist touch.

He joined BP in 1982, not long after he received a Ph.D. in geology from Edinburgh University in Scotland.

He worked as a rig geologist in the North Sea, then flew around the world testing rocks for oil—from Papua New Guinea to North Yemen.

Mr. Hayward moved from specializing in science to understanding business in 1990 when he became the assistant to John Browne, then head of exploration and production who five years later became CEO.

Mr. Hayward eventually replaced Mr. Browne, who left amid a scandal connected to his personal life.

But three years on, Mr. Hayward finds himself in the midst of a different kind of scandal.

“Maybe he would have had a chance if he had been just really spectacular on his feet as the crisis manager, ” said Sydney Finkelstein, a professor at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College. “but he was so abysmal at that, there was no way out.”

—Erin White and Guy Chazan contributed to this article.

Wall Street Journal Article

Shell CEO speaks out on safety and reputation

By John Donovan

Printed below is a leaked 2007 Shell internal email from the then CEO with a bike, Jeroen van der Veer. He sent it to all Shell employees in an attempt to burnish and promote Shell’s reputation just a few years after his involvement in the Shell securities fraud, which put more nails in Shell’s atrocious reputation. Must have been hoping Shell employees had a short memory about his own track record of covering up management misdeeds. No wonder one high level insider branded him “demented and delusional”.

From:  Jeroen van der Veer, Chief Executive
To:  All Shell employees
Date:  10 May, 2007

Subject: Shell’s Reputation – and our role as ambassadors

This letter has been translated into twelve languages.  Please click here for a translation.

Dear Colleagues,

As I said in my first-quarter note last week, this letter is about reputation, and about the role we all play as ambassadors for Shell. I will deal with four key aspects related to nurturing a good reputation. 1. Perceptions about reputation. 2. Things we should realise. 3. What can we do? 4. What should we not do?

Firstly, I see reputation as the trust we have gained with our customers, business partners, governments and other stakeholders. We earn a good reputation by doing what we say – by how we act and talk, both in good times and when we are under pressure.

Our brand is the promise we make – how we live the purpose of Shell, our values and commitments. Reputation is the result of keeping that promise. It is clear that a company can’t build its reputation on what it says it is going to do. And that it is impossible to “talk your way” out of a situation you have “behaved yourself” into.

I admit that I – and my family – get irritated when we see stories in newspapers, magazines and on television that show Shell in a way that we can’t recognise. Such stories portray us as disregarding the expectations of society. We all have examples.

Secondly, let’s not forget, Shell is often a convenient target. We have a high profile, as a hundred-year-old brand with operations in more than a 100 countries. And, due to our values, we actually engage with stakeholders more than most of our competitors.

To manage our reputation, we must be prepared to listen, and to understand what others expect and why they see us the way they do. But we must also actively tell our own story, because we “are” what people know about us.

If the public record in the media paints a picture of Shell without our input, we have left it to others to tell our story. We all know that a negative media picture can over time build political pressure that will affect our ability to do business.

Many groups with a local or single-issue agenda act with this in mind. They try to shape opinion and foster support for their goals by linking developments to build their “case”.

As an energy company, we will always be in the spotlight. It can be as simple as people in your street not wanting a gas station built on the next corner, or as complex as concerns over climate change – and who should do what about it.

We must also realise that we are not always perfect. Remember my message about safety. And that people in general – unlike those with an engineering background – don’t accept even the lowest level of probability that things can go wrong. I’m thinking about the neighbours of a refinery, for example.

Throughout my career in Shell, I have had good and bad experiences in my engagements with groups and individuals who are critical. The good experiences usually resulted from situations where we were prepared to listen to each other. We were able to establish mutual respect, agree on broad shared goals, even agree to disagree – but in the end to achieve a win-win outcome.

So, thirdly, what can you do, as ambassadors for Shell?  And we all are ambassadors, whether we realise it or not. You can listen, to understand the other point of view. And you can provide Shell’s point of view in the clearest possible way. Be succinct.

This means you have to make sure you are informed. You have to think about the Shell position and come up with short and simple explanations, which, of course, must be fact-based. Examples from your own experience will help.

I will give you an example from my experience – when I was a refinery manager people criticised us for not following the rules and regulations. So I studied all the laws and regulations myself. Based on a personal understanding of the facts, I realised that most of the criticism was wrong. It made me a better ambassador, and I took action to change what was not right.

What can the company do to keep you informed? It does a lot, but it can’t replace your own initiative. Do you read the intranet? Do you read the Annual Report, which has just been published? Do you read the Sustainability Report, released on May 8 this year? Do you look up facts to learn about our issues that play a role in your situation? Do you compare with Shell colleagues how to answer “difficult questions”?

I’m a big fan of bringing stakeholders into Shell’s operations, including the media, so they can see for themselves what we do.  But once, during my time at the Pernis refinery, a journalist wrote after a visit that it looked like “a high-tech ghost town where I saw steam and other dangerous gases escaping”. Clearly, you can’t convince them all (I’m still angry about this fellow).

But visits to operations, labs, terminals, retail stations and projects show people that Shell employees are normal people – and often truly environmentally and socially conscious and committed to the triple bottom line.

Finally, what should we not do? If Shell is criticised, we should not react with anger. We should try, by asking questions, to find the real objectives behind the criticism, and react with passion – but not with anger.

We should never over-promise. And we must never forget that although we are a company committed to securing a responsible energy future, we can’t solve all the problems of the world. Example: we share the concern over climate change, but we focus on mitigating CO2 and on reducing flaring – that is our responsibility.

So, my request to you is that you see yourself as a Shell ambassador. I think you will agree, 110,000 good ambassadors will make a real difference.

Best wishes,

Jeroen van der Veer
Chief Executive
If you have feedback, please use the feedback form

EMAIL ENDS

From a high level ‘Shell insider’: Clearly in the mind of that demented and delusional soul Jeroen van der Veer he is innocent…: 6 November 2007

Court document revelations damage Shell CEO, Jeroen van der Veer: 5 November 2007

Jeroen van der Veer cuts a deal with U.S. Attorneys: 12 February 2008

Jeroen van der Veer and the Shell reserves fraud: 22 May 2008

The Arctic and Shell

Updated August 5, 2010, with extensive related links.

What makes the oil companies think they can produce oil and gas safely in the very harsh world of the Arctic oceans? They cannot do in the Gulf of Mexico, or the Niger River delta, or anywhere else for that matter.

This article is authored by a former employee of Shell Oil. His identify and background is known to us.

Back in the early mid-1980’s Shell Oil began to take a serious look at the hydrocarbon production potential of the Chukchi Sea. They formed an operating division and staffed it with management, albeit with no staff, except secretarial support for the managers. (These guys were referred to ‘managers without portfolio’).

Shell’s exploration and production research division began to investigate the regions of the Chukchi Sea where potential lease sales were likely to occur. Of interest were the basic oceanographic parameters; water depths, under topography, sea floor surface geology, ice pack characteristics, etc. The basic surveys revealed some interesting results. The sea flow was basically covered fairly deeply with soft sediment (marine mud) but the topography was highly unusual. Acoustic mapping revealed an ocean bottom that was scarred by all sorts of crisscrossing trenches from a meter or so in depth, to almost 20 meters in depth.

At first these surface trenches were thought to be remnant features from the last ice age. But they appeared to relatively young. Arguments about their age and origin could not be settled with then available data. So, Shell obtained the cooperation of the US Coast Guard and ‘borrowed’ one of their icebreakers for a summer to do some detailed ocean bottom surveys and surface mapping. In addition a pattern of acoustic buoys were left upon the ocean bottom.

The next year the icebreaker with its compliment of Shell ‘boffins’ remapped the ocean bottom surface and set about looking for the acoustic buoys. They found some, many were never found. Those that were found had been displaced. And the topography of the ocean bottom had change completely. The old ocean bottom topography was gone, replaced by a new topography that had been sculpted by the dragging of the previous winter’s pressure ridges across the ocean bottom by surface winds and ocean currents. Some of the new trenches were almost 20 meters deep.

This news came as a very rude surprise to Shell’s leaders. Shell’s head office management turned to its talent pool at its research labs for an answer. Surely there must be an answer. Shell management wanted an engineering solution to the problem posed to development of oil and gas reserves by the Arctic ice.

After some degree of consideration it was recognized that the ice sheet itself posed problems, but those problems could probably be handled with creative design features to platforms or man-made islands. The pressure ridges however, were a whole different problem. Their size and extent made them a force of nature that could not be defeated. In shallow waters it might be possible to build rock and gravel production ‘islands’ that could be repaired after each winter’s battering by the ice. However, in deeper waters construction of these islands this was not a feasible solution. Man-made platforms of some sort would be required.

Short of the use of small nuclear weapons to ‘vaporize’ the problem posed by pressure ridges there was no ‘rational or practical’ engineering solution.

Fixed platforms would not work. The use of mobile floating production platforms that could be towed away each winter was also examined. This would require the development of subsea well head assemblies that rested upon the ocean bottom, and the temporary abandonment of the wells each winter. However, there was no way to protect these assemblies from the mountains of ice that scraped across the ocean bottom every winter.

Building pipelines from a production island or a platform was also a problem. Again there was no way to protect a pipeline setting on the ocean bottom from the ice. And the technology to dig a 30 meter trench in the ocean bottom to bury a pipeline did not exist.

So, raw crude or gas would have to be processed through floating production platforms like Shell used elsewhere in the world. These would be especially adapted ships that would moor near the production platform. However, oil and gas would also have to be transported by ship because pipelines to onshore facilities were also not feasible.

Well, none of this was feasible. However, Shell management was not to be deterred.

After the off-shore lease sale in the Chukchi Sea in the mid-1980’s I received a call from a buddy of mine that worked for BP. He was curious about Shell’s intent and wanted to know if Shell’s senior management was ‘on drugs or something’. Shell had left $300 million on the table at that lease sale and surprised the other majors with its aggressive bidding for that acreage. BP, Exxon and Arco all had years of experience operating in the Arctic at Prudhoe Bay. Shell had no such experience. My BP friend asked if we at (Shell) had collectively lost our ‘frigging’ minds. In BP’s ‘humble opinion’ there was no way that production was possible from those leases, no matter how much oil and gas was found.

Shell drilled those leases and found considerable amounts of oil and gas. Of course, the judgment of BP, Exxon and Arco was correct. The leases were eventually abandoned.

Shell did have some experience in operating the near off-shore environment. In the mid-1980’s, at a place called ‘Seal Island’ Shell and its partner, Amoco, built large gravel islands in shallow off-shore waters east of Prudhoe Bay to several drill exploratory wells. Oil was discovered. About 400 million bbls of recoverable oil. However, that was not enough oil to allow economic development of the discovery. Shell temporarily abandoned its exploration wells, shut them in, and ceased operations. Shell did not permanently plug those wells, and cut and pull casing, because management had ‘booked’ the recoverable oil in the discovery as reserves. Plugging and abandonment would have meant relinquishing the lease and ‘writing off ‘ 400 million bbls of oil from from Shell’s reserve listings.

Several years passed and then Shell had a ‘minor’ crisis to deal with. The ice pack had beveled off the top of their gravels islands and had sheared the production well heads (called ‘Christmas trees’) off the wells. Because the wells had been temporarily abandoned the well casing had been filled with diesel fuel above the temporary plugs in the well. When the islands were destroyed the well heads were ripped off the well and the diesel fuel in the well’s (thousands of gallons) leaked into the Arctic Ocean. Shell had to clean up the mess, but head office still didn’t want to permanently plug the wells because of the reserve write down that they would have to take.

So, Shell knows quite well what operating in the Arctic environment entails, and is fully aware of the hazards of Arctic operations.

So, what is Shell now up to? They have again spent several billion dollars on lease acquisition. What it the plan this time? Well, the environmental situation in the Arctic has change somewhat in the last 25 years. The Arctic Ice cap is no longer what it once was. Climate warming has caused it to very rapidly retreat further and further each year. In a few decades it may disappear completely during the summer months. The ice cap that does then form in the winter won’t be as formidable as it was in the 1980’s. And the pressure ridges that form may become ‘manageable’, if not all the time then most of the time. With the modern industrial world set on a course to consume as much coal, oil and gas in the next 30 years as it has since the beginning of the industrial revolution it is a good bet the Arctic ice cap will continue to diminish in size. With that diminishment in the ice cap comes a diminishment of the impediment to oil and gas production in the shallow Arctic seas of world.

Never-the-less, production in the Arctic is still an extremely difficult proposition. In my opinion the Federal judge that ruled that a proper environmental impact statement had not been filed and that more study is required was absolutely correct. It is doubtful that the environmental problems that prohibited development of oil and gas reserves in the shallow Arctic seas have changed all that much in the last 25 years. Those old studies done by Shell research that showed production was not feasible need to be pulled off the shelf and updated. And this should be done by Federal court order. And the studies should be done by entities not allied with ‘big oil’. While the Federal government reaps billions in off-shore sales to the oil companies, the ability of those oil companies to safely exploit and produce in the Arctic offshore environment has not yet been demonstrated.

What makes the oil companies think they can produce oil and gas safely in the very harsh world of the Arctic oceans? They cannot do in the Gulf of Mexico, or the Niger River delta, or anywhere else for that matter. Shell wouldn’t do it at Seal Island in the mid-1980’s, despite the known risks. BP didn’t inspect its pipeline and do required repairs for corrosion, and the end result was a major land spill. The failure to do timely inspections on the pipeline was a conscious decision on the part of BP management in order to save money.

The sad fact of the matter is, that is most cases failure to operate safely and responsibly is not due to the lack of the necessary technology, it is due to a; ‘we don’t really give a crap attitude’ on the part of oil company management. One need only look at how ‘big oil’ operates in Nigeria to understand the true attitude.

And this is ironic because taking the necessary measures to prevent major failures, like blowouts or pipeline rupture, are extremely cost effective. The math is extraordinarily simple and straight-forward.

Exxon had their ‘black swan’ event in the late 1980’s. BP’s most recent ‘black swan’ problem is another classic example. BP will never recover what they have lost in the Gulf of Mexico. The value of the lost resource, the oil flowing into the Gulf of Mexico at 80,000 bbls/day is about $5 million/day at current well head prices. So, BP has lost somewhere on the order of  $400 – $500 million in wasted resource value alone. But that is a drop in the bucket compared to cleanup costs which could exceed $20 billion.

How much would it have cost BP annually to operate at the highest of safety standards? An additional $20 – $50 million/year perhaps? $20 – $50 million vs $20 billion. It would take 400 – 1000 years of $20 – $50 million in additional expenditures for safer operations to match what they have lost in the last few months from one incident of incompetent operation. And make no mistake, that blowout in the Gulf of Mexico was the end product of indifference and incompetence on the part of BP drilling and production engineering operations leadership. That failure was in turn the consequence of irresponsible operational policies. These policies were in turn the result of poor leadership, and irresponsible and incompetent management at the highest levels of the company.

Exploitation of oil and gas in the Arctic must be a zero tolerance affair. If you want examples of the environment disasters that will be encountered by a failure to produce safely and responsibly go visit and inspect the Arctic oil fields, gas fields, and pipelines in Russia. We don’t need to speculate about those possible consequences. The Russians are living with that issue now.

By the way, the information about the oceanographic surveys done by Shell is important information. Shell has probably forgotten about them because their corporate memory has either been ‘retired’ or ‘released’. The World Wildlife Fund should raise the issue directly in court. The courts could, in fact, seek subpoenas for that data from Shell, or if it no longer exists, and that could be the case, then order new oceanographic surveys and ice studies. This is basic information that is needed before any kind of production should be allowed. One would think the oil companies themselves would want that kind of information.

RELATED INFORMATION:

Shell Chukchi Sea Application 2010 Application for Incidental Harassment Authorization for the Non-Lethal Taking of Whales and Seals in Conjunction with Planned 2010 Exploration Drilling Program Chukchi Sea, Alaska: April 2010

The Biggest Oil Spills in History

Arctic Melting and Oil: Countries Stake Claims as World Faces Environmental Disaster

Chukchi Cap

Recent blowout is one of only 18 in Alaska: 18 December 2008

Arctic Governments And Industry Still Unprepared For Oil Spills 20 Years After Exxon Valdez: 19 March 2009

Arctic Oil: A Boon For Nest Predators: 9 September 2009

Low Concentrations of Oxygen and Nutrients Slowing Biodegradation of Exxon Valdez Oil: 18 January 2010

Arctic Voyage Illuminating Ocean Optics 26 July 2010

Alaska’s Arctic Seas: Court Ruling Halts Offshore Lease Sale 27 July 2010

U.S.-Canadian mission set to map Arctic seafloor: 1 August 2010

Chukchi Sea Planning Area: Draft Environmental Impact Statement by Minerals Management Service Volume 1 (pending)

Chukchi Sea Planning Area: Draft Environmental Impact Statement by Minerals Management Service Volume 2

America’s petro-state

EXTRACTS:

Americans may be torn up by the BP oil spill and its destruction of the Gulf of Mexico’s natural habitat – and torn up we should be – but that habitat has not been pristine for decades. In many ways, Louisiana made its deal with the devil long ago.

“big oil plays an unnatural role in our politics. … Oil elects presidents, drives our foreign policy, our domestic policy, our climate change policy. … It’s led us to terrible energy policies and a breakdown of regulation. We look to the Niger Delta as an example of what an oil state does to its own environment, but it’s precisely what we’re doing to our own environment.”

Louisiana has paid a steep price for its bargain with the oil industry

By STEVEN MUFSON
Washington Post

July 24, 2010, 3:54PM

Huey Long, the famous Louisiana populist, launched his political career by waging war on the big oil companies, especially what he called Standard Oil’s “invisible empire.”

“I would rather go down to a thousand impeachments than to admit that I am the governor of the state that does not dare to call the Standard Oil Company to account,” he declared in a 1929 campaign circular.

But the threat of a thousand impeachments notwithstanding, Long later built his own invisible oil empire: In 1934, while he was a senator, he and his political associates formed the Win or Lose Corp. The company — which had a reputation of never losing – bought up state mineral leases and resold them to oil companies at a healthy profit, while keeping a share for itself. Although Long died in 1935, his family and friends received royalties for decades.

This dividend came at a price for the rest of Louisiana. The oil leases Long and his associates sold were generally in wetlands; in the process of tapping the oil and gas below, oil companies built a sprawling network of roads and canals, leaving behind a trail of damaged marshes. Wildcat wells came to dot the state’s landscape, and refineries and port facilities followed. Today, thousands of wells have been drilled within three miles of the far-from-pristine shoreline.

But it was a price Louisianans went along with: Since oil was first discovered there, the state has produced 159.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 17.5 billion barrels of oil, according to the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources. That’s as much oil as the entire United States has produced over the past nine years.

Americans may be torn up by the BP oil spill and its destruction of the Gulf of Mexico’s natural habitat – and torn up we should be – but that habitat has not been pristine for decades. In many ways, Louisiana made its deal with the devil long ago.

And what a bad deal it was. Long before the oil spill, the state’s embrace of the petroleum industry cast it under what economists call “the resource curse”: the paradox that countries rich in minerals or petroleum tend to grow more slowly and have lower living standards than other nations. Simply put, Louisiana is the closest thing America has to a petro-state.

Instead of blessing Louisiana with prosperity, the oil industry fostered dependency, corruption and an indifference to environmental damage. Our bayou sheikdom’s oil and gas riches – like those of the Niger Delta, the Orinoco belt in Venezuela and the Iraqi marshes – also stunted its development, leaving it far behind states with fewer natural resources.

According to the Census Bureau and Harvard University health data, Louisiana ranks 49th among the states in life expectancy, has the second-highest rate of infant mortality, comes in fourth in violent crime, ranks 46th in percentage of people older than 25 with college degrees, and ties for second in percentage of people living below the poverty line.

Oil riches didn’t create these problems, of course, but it is striking that they didn’t ameliorate them. “We’ve always been a plantation state,” said Oliver Houck, an environmental law professor at Tulane University. “What oil and gas did is replace the agricultural plantation culture with an oil and gas plantation culture.”

Even though Louisiana’s oil and gas production peaked in 1970 and many companies moved their offices to Houston, refineries, oil import facilities on the coast and a web of thousands of miles of pipelines continue to make the industry a powerful force in the state. It is embedded in Louisiana’s mental and economic infrastructure, and remains one of its leading employers. The recent development of shale gas in the northern, poorer part of the state will bolster its influence even further.

All this explains why, even as the oil spill threatens Louisiana’s tourism, fisheries and shoreline, local politicians have continued to speak up on behalf of continued offshore drilling: They, and their state, are addicted to oil.

“There are no risk-free ways of producing the energy we rely on today,” Sen. Mary Landrieu, D-La., wrote in a June letter asking President Barack Obama to lift his moratorium on deepwater offshore drilling. She said the impact of idling 33 deepwater exploration rigs was “like closing 12 large motor vehicle assembly plants, all at once.”

Like Landrieu, Gov. Bobby Jindal and Sen. David Vitter, both Republicans, have called for an end to the moratorium, and Vitter has warned that the drilling halt “could kill thousands of Louisiana jobs.”

It’s an argument with rare bipartisan support in an age of bitter division. A Rasmussen Reports poll last month showed that 79 percent of Louisiana voters think offshore drilling should continue, far higher than the 60 percent who say the same nationwide.

Some of these voters will undoubtedly be among those who turn out to celebrate the 75th annual Louisiana Shrimp and Petroleum Festival in Morgan City this fall. The festival’s Web site says it is “an event that will prove that oil and water really do mix.”

Louisiana’s dysfunctional relationship with oil dates to 1901, when a farmer near Jennings noticed some bubbles in his rice field. He took an old stovepipe out to the field, threw a match inside and the bubbles ignited. With that, the rush was on. As word of his discovery spread, local businessmen bought up adjoining property, brought in a Texas driller and struck oil – so much that it flooded the farmer’s field, creating a small oil lake and ruining several acres of rice.

This pattern of rich oil and gas rewards coupled with environmental damage continued. “The oil and gas industry basically crisscrossed our wetlands with canals to make it easier to go out with service rigs and explore,” said Adam Babich, a law professor and director of the Tulane University environmental law clinic. Babich said the companies left dredged material “piled up on the side of the canals, making little berms all over the place, which has completely screwed up the hydrology of the wetlands.”

As the companies continued to develop the wetlands, more and more land was lost. The disposal of chemical drilling materials and equipment further polluted the state’s delicate ecosystem.

“We got all this great oil and gas production and we’ve let those guys rape our state,” says Foster Campbell, Louisiana’s public service commissioner. “They say they gave us jobs. Yeah, but they made billions.”

As in foreign petro-states, those billions have sparked quarrels over tax and royalty revenues. When Harry Truman was president, Louisiana powerbrokers rejected a revenue-sharing deal on offshore oil extracted from federal waters; after a lengthy court battle, the state ended up with nothing.

So Louisianans believed they got their due when they extracted a deal similar to the one the state rejected half a century ago. In 2006, in negotiations over drilling in a new section of the Gulf’s federal waters, Landrieu got the federal government to give 37.5 percent of the royalties to Gulf states to preserve and restore coastal habitats.

This time it was lawmakers from other states who were upset about the government giving up tens of billions of dollars of future revenue. The whole revenue flap echoed, in a more civil manner, the disputes between the Niger Delta states and Nigeria’s central government, or between the Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis over the division of oil revenue in Iraq.

Although the oil industry plays an outsized role in Louisiana’s economy, the money it brings in has decreased in recent years, and the state has struggled to make up for the resulting shortfall. The Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association says that the industry accounts for 13 percent of state revenue, down from 40 percent when oil and gas output was higher. And unlike oil-rich nations such as Norway, which has squirreled away about $437 billion from its oil sales in pension and sovereign wealth funds, Louisiana has no stash of money for investments or rainy days.

Nor have Louisianans managed to diversify their economy. There is no Silicon Valley here, no northern Virginia tech corridor. In the 1990s, when Louisiana realized it needed new sources of tax revenue to make up for declining oil receipts, the best idea it could come up with was to expand riverboat gambling.

The economic reach of the oil industry has helped it win over the state’s political establishment, which has supported the industry and been supported by the industry in return.

“There is certainly a friendly relationship between elected officials and the industry,” former senator Bennett Johnston, D-La., told me. “The fact that you were a friend of an industry that is important to your state doesn’t mean you didn’t believe it,” he said. “I think the oil and gas industry is very important to my state and, I think, to the country.”

After Johnston retired in 1996, he became more than a friend of the industry: He joined the boards of Chevron and Columbia Energy Group, a natural gas transmission company. In 2009, his lobbying firm, Johnston & Associates, received $160,000 from the American Petroleum Institute, according to data collected by the Center for Responsive Politics.

For his part, former senator John Breaux, D-La., says that the relationship is no different than those between Michigan politicians and auto companies or California politicians and the entertainment or high-tech industries. “We supported them and they supported us,” he told me.

After he left office in 2005, Breaux formed a lobbying firm with Republican Trent Lott. In 2009, the firm was paid $530,000 by Chevron, $330,000 by Royal Dutch Shell and $600,000 by Plains Exploration and Production, an independent oil company.

Because energy holdings are such a common presence in the investment portfolios of Louisiana’s leading citizens, including members of the judiciary, it can be hard to find an impartial judge to hear an oil case.

In late June, the New Orleans federal judge who suspended the Obama administration’s moratorium on offshore drilling disclosed that he had bought and sold shares of a variety of oil and gas companies. He hurriedly sold off shares of Exxon Mobil after realizing that the company was affected by the freeze.

And last October, the plaintiffs in an unusual case about global warming couldn’t get enough impartial appellate judges to hear their case, which alleges that, in emitting greenhouses gases, energy and chemical firms added to the “ferocity” of Hurricane Katrina, thereby inflicting extra damage on the plaintiffs’ property.

Half of the 16 judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit in New Orleans recused themselves because of conflicts of interest. Moreover, disclosure forms show that four of the judges who did not recuse themselves had investments in energy partnerships or companies. One judge owned shares in five firms: BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Devon Energy and Diamond Offshore Drilling.

At times, the industry’s influence has been even more brazenly displayed in the Louisiana legislature, as the recent experience of Tulane University’s environmental law clinic suggests. Students working there have won a range of cases involving coal plants, wetlands and landfills – and the oil industry. In one suit Tulane students filed, a judge found that a refinery operated by Exxon Mobil had 2,600 violations of the Clean Air Act.

Earlier this year, the Louisiana Chemical Association – whose members include Exxon Mobil, Shell and Chevron – supported a bill that would have blocked state funding for any university whose legal clinic sued a government agency, a business or an individual.

During hearings, the association’s president, Dan Borné, sat side by side with the bill’s sponsor, Republican state Sen. Robert Adley, who also owns Pelican Gas Management.

The measure, debated shortly after the BP spill began, died in committee. But before the legislative session ended, oil industry supporters did succeed in blocking a bill that would have allowed the state to retain outside counsel against BP.

In the 1970s, Venezuela’s oil minister predicted that oil, which he called “the devil’s excrement,” would lead his country to ruin. More than a generation later, the nation is ruled by a mercurial leader who doles out cheap gasoline in an effort to paper over persistent social inequality.

While Louisiana is a far cry from Venezuela, does it have any better chance of breaking free from its oil addiction?

According to Jeffrey Sachs, an economist who heads Columbia University’s Earth Institute and who has written about the resource curse, a better question is whether the rest of the country will. Sachs is no expert on Louisiana, but he says that the United States, once the world’s biggest oil producer and exporter, itself exhibits all the symptoms of “a pretty classic oil nation.”

Louisiana, in other words, is not alone in suffering the pathologies of oil dependence.

“We have lots of the characteristics of petro-states ourselves even though we use that term for others,” he says. He cites our overdependence on oil and a tax policy that keeps oil relatively cheap. Moreover, he adds, “big oil plays an unnatural role in our politics. … Oil elects presidents, drives our foreign policy, our domestic policy, our climate change policy. … It’s led us to terrible energy policies and a breakdown of regulation. We look to the Niger Delta as an example of what an oil state does to its own environment, but it’s precisely what we’re doing to our own environment.”

Mufson covers energy for The Washington Post. This article is reprinted with permission from the Post.

SOURCE ARTICLE

‘The Well From Hell’

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Published: July 24, 2010

Derick E. Hingle/Bloomberg News

LOCKED DOWN TIGHT

The News BP and the government decided to leave the cap closed on the company’s stricken oil well on the Gulf of Mexico’s floor, preventing any oil or gas from escaping the well.

Behind the News Initially, the cap’s valves were closed as a test to see if the well was intact below the sea floor, and the plan was to reopen them afterward to relieve the pressure, with escaping oil collected at the surface. Methane gas was found seeping up two miles away, but scientists concluded it was a natural occurrence. With the well apparently holding tight under the pressure, Thad W. Allen, the retired Coast Guard admiral in charge of the federal response, approved keeping the cap closed.

‘STATIC KILL’

The News BP said it was looking into an alternative approach to sealing the well permanently: a “static kill,” which could get the job done much sooner than the relief wells the company is drilling, which still won’t yield results for at least several weeks.

Behind the News The static kill calls for pumping heavy drilling mud into the well, forcing the oil and gas back down and sealing the well bore. Engineers said it had a much better chance of working than the “top kill” BP tried in late May. That attempt depended on pumping in mud faster than the gushing oil and gas could expel it, which proved impossible. Now, with the well cap closed, there is no flow to fight.

RED FLAGS

The News In the weeks before the fatal April 20 explosion and fire on a drilling rig that left the well gushing out of control, some pieces of equipment were in poor condition, others had gone uninspected for years, and workers were worried about unsafe practices but were afraid to speak up, according to confidential reports to Transocean, the owner of the rig that BP leased.

Behind the News Former rig workers testified before an investigating panel that the well had been plagued with problems from its inception — one called it “the well from hell” — and that a culture of fear and of putting cost control ahead of safety prevailed on the rig. The company denied the accusations.

READY FOR NEXT TIME

The News Four giant oil companies said they would commit a total of $1 billion to create a rapid-response system that could deal with future deepwater oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico.

Behind the News The companies — Exxon Mobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips and Royal Dutch Shell — said the system would take six months to set up. The idea is to be able to cope with a blowout under 10,000 feet of water (twice the depth of the stricken BP well), recapture up to 100,000 barrels of spilled oil a day, and reach a spill within 24 hours. The plan is part of an effort by the oil industry to influence federal regulation by showing that it can improve safety procedures on its own.

WEATHER DELAYS

The News Most work at the well site was halted and ship and rig crews prepared to evacuate the area, about 50 miles off the Louisiana coast, after Tropical Storm Bonnie formed off the Bahamas and started heading west toward the Gulf.

Behind the News The storm’s path and eventual intensity were far from certain, but forecasters said that rough weather seemed likely to reach the well area over the weekend. Rather than risk being caught while performing a critical procedure, BP suspended work on its relief wells on Wednesday and began the long job of disconnecting the drilling rig. Officials said the cap on the blown well would be left shut.

RETIRED SHELL OFFSHORE EXPERT SPEAKS OUT AGAIN ON GULF OF MEXICO DISASTER

I believe you are seeing the early unravelling of this affair pointing more and more towards the owner and operator Transocean, the US legislators, and the US Oil Industry.

EMAIL TO JOHN DONOVAN FROM BILL CAMPBELL, RETIRED HSE GROUP AUDITOR, SHELL INTERNATIONAL, AN EXPERT ON OFFSHORE PLATFORM SAFETY ISSUES

John

It appears I was right in my analysis, your website was the first to present this data – its a pity that your journalist friends did not pick it up.

It was the 25th June that I passed the analysis to Professor Bea, and the 28th June to the Chemical Safety Board. They have indirectly at least thanked me for that input via my friend Raymond Holroyd.

My analysis raised concerns that platform alarms and gas detection alarms appeared to be inhibited according to testimony by the survivor Mike Williams (CBS 60 minutes).  – you covered this on your website.

It would appear that my early analysis was correct. See below.  I believe you are seeing the early unravelling of this affair pointing more and more towards the owner and operator Transocean, the US legislators, and the US Oil Industry.

See below from the Washington Post picked up by you on your website and who were also copied on my analysis on the 18th of July.

Raymond, not that I need it, but it would be nice if your friends at the Chemical Safety Board would give me some credit, I am beginning to see my words being fed back to me in various articles, namely the Washington Post and the New York Times.

Extract from Washington Post…

The chief engineer on the Deepwater Horizon tells a government panel that warning systems on the drilling rig were inhibited because the crew did not want to be disturbed in the middle of the night.
» LAUNCH VIDEO PLAYER

By David S. Hilzenrath
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, July 23, 2010; 10:56 AM

KENNER, LA. — Long before an eruption of gas turned the Deepwater Horizon oil rig into a fireball, an alarm system designed to alert the crew and prevent combustible gases from reaching potential sources of ignition had been deliberately disabled, the former chief electronics technician on the rig testified Friday.

Michael Williams said he understood that the rig had been operating with the system in “inhibited” mode for a year to prevent false alarms from disturbing the crew.

EXTRACTS END

Years before friend Malcolm TFA Brinded was discounted as the Heir to the Throne at Shell, you informed the World that he had no chance of following on from the little cyclist.

Months before the World knew what caused the explosion on Deepwater Horizon and that alarms had been inhibited you published my analysis, much to your credit.

You need to get your friends to pick up more on what you publish. It appears they would not see a scoop unless it hits them on the face.

Hope you and Alfred are well.

Kind regards

Bill

Shell toxic chemical legacy in USA

By a Former Shell Employee

The articles and comments below pertain to Shell’s role and subsequent liabilities arising from deadly contamination at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado.

The Washington Post: Shell Oil Found Liable for Pollution Cleanup; Insurers Win; Rocky Mountain Arsenal Project May Cost $2 Billion: December 20, 1988

Shell Oil Co. is responsible for cleaning up three decades worth of pesticide pollution at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, a San Mateo County Superior Court jury decided today. The project could cost as much as $2 billion.

The verdict was a victory for 250 insurance companies, which argued that Shell knew of the pollution at the facility northeast of Denver and so was not covered by its 800 different policies any more than a homeowner who set fire to his own home.

The trial, which began in October 1987, was held in a makeshift courtroom at a high school to allow room for dozens of …

Time Magazine: Environment: The Dieldrin Dilemma (extracts)

Monday, Sep. 02, 1974

Nearly 10% of the U.S. corn crop is treated with aldrin, a highly effective pesticide. Both the manufacturer, Shell Chemical, and the Department of Agriculture consider the substance essential to control insect damage in the Midwest corn belt. Recently, after a year of still-unfinished hearings, the Environmental Protection Agency announced that it plans to order a halt in the production of aldrin and a related Shell pesticide, dieldrin. Reason: the chemicals present “extremely high cancer risk.”

After it is applied, aldrin gradually breaks down into dieldrin, a durable chlorinated hydrocarbon; the pesticide is long-lasting and requires only one application per year. That makes it more popular with farmers than shorter-lived, less potent pesticides that must be used more often and only at specific stages of the corn plants’ growth. Dieldrin’s impressive durability, says the EPA, is the very quality that makes it an increasingly serious threat.

From cornstalks and from soybeans raised in fields previously treated with the chemical, dieldrin finds its way into animal feed. Then, because it is readily retained in fatty tissues, it accumulates and becomes concentrated in farm animals. Millions of chickens had to be destroyed last March in Mississippi because their feed had been contaminated with dieldrin. The chemical also washes into rivers and lakes and is ingested by fish. In fact, dieldrin is now found in nearly every edible product in the supermarket. A 1973 market-basket sampling by the Food and Drug Administration shows 96% of meat, fish and poultry was contaminated, and tests by the EPA have found that 99.5% of the population have some dieldrin in their body fat with an average residue level of 0.3 parts per mil lion. Levels build up faster among infants, because the chemical is concentrated in milk.

No one disputes the fact that by now most Americans have a significant amount of dieldrin in their bodies, but there is still debate about whether the levels are sufficient to cause cancer. Mice given food with levels of dieldrin similar to those in human foods have developed cancer, especially of the liver. Shell says that there is no evidence that those results apply to humans; the EPA insists that dieldrin has “unreasonable and adverse effects on man.” In addition to the cancer risk, says EPA Administrator Russell Train, dieldrin has been found to hamper reproduction in birds and to cause birth defects and mental impairment in monkeys.

With its 1975 production of aldrin scheduled to begin on Sept. 1, Shell has been granted a hearing on the ban order and hopes for a quick final decision by the EPA. But at week’s end, it seemed all but certain that next year corn growers will no longer have aldrin/dieldrin to kill their bugs.

And of course, Shell considered the production of that particular doublet of pesticides vital to preserving corn crop yields. 35 years later we get along without those very dangerous chemicals just fine. It is amazing how the ‘profit motive’ tilts one’s objectivity.

Enclosed is a file of a legal ‘consent decree’ between the State of Colorado and Shell. ConsentDecree

Shell was the defendant in this civil lawsuit. The agreement was entered into in 2008.

Attached is a file on Shell’s production of the three ‘..drins’. aldrin-dieldrin-eng

Apparently, Shell UK was the last known producer of these pesticides, and production ceased in 1989. However, stocks of the chemical were shipped to third world countries. These guys are truly ‘good citizens’.

RELATED WIKIPEDIA ARTICLE: Pollution at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Denver, Colorado

Toxic Shell

By a Former Shell Employee

We have already discussed failed Shell Gasoline brands Formula Shell and Shell SU 2000.

Do you recall ‘Shell Pest Strips’? These were insecticide laced things you hung in your house, kitchen, etc., and they were very popular in the 1960′s and 1970′s. The FDA forced the recall of those things. It turns out the stuff they were putting in those things could be about as harmful to humans as they were to the bugs.

Extracts from a related article published in 1993:

Shell Chemical had to take its “No-Pest-Strip” off the market back in ’79 because . . . well, there was that unfortunate incident of the young man dying. Shell settled out-of-court with that family, but the Environmental Protection Agency was finding hundreds of other cases of poisoning by DDVP–the cancer-causing stuff in Shell’s strip that kills pests . . . and some people. So Shell withdrew the product. But they didn’t withdraw it far . . . Just across the Mexican border.

When a Shell representative was asked if he felt guilty about endangering Mexicans, including children, he said: “Speaking as a human being, sure you feel bad. But I’m not being paid to be a human being.”

And extracts from another article:

Soon the spring-summer mass advertising campaign for the Shell no-pest strip will be urging consum­ers to hang these silent insect hunt­ers in their homes.

Don’t buy — unless, that is, you be­lieve a product which vaporizes a nerve poison 24 hours a day in your bedroom, living room or family room is a necessary ingredient of modern living.

Just a few weeks ago, Dr. Law­rence R. Valcovic of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, told the EPA:

“There is sufficient evidence from non-mammalian systems to indicate that DDVP has the intrinsic potential for inducing genetic alteration . . . I would recommend that human exposure be avoided if possible.”

Shell, on the other hand, does not seem to be as concerned. It pays its laboratory testers and gets its com­forting interpretations while the cash registers merrily ring up millions in annual sales.

And then there was the flexible polypropylene piping scandal of the 1980′s. It was supposed to revolutionize the household plumbing business. But there was a ‘problem’. Unlike conventional PVC piping the stuff was mechanically unstable and quickly developed leaks. The class action lawsuit over that cost Shell (and du Pont) several hundred million dollars. The damage the stuff caused to homes when water piping failed was in the billions.

Canadian $50 million settlement

In the US, the Polybutylene Pipe Settlement Fund has spent more than $976 million to provide relief to homeowners. Shell has also settled several major lawsuits.

I find it interesting that Shell’s actions could have affected the health of virtually every American.

Shell should stay out of the consumer products business. They don’t really know how to get it right.

Anything for a buck.

Shell gasoline debacles

By Former Shell Employee

Formula Shell was not the only failed Shell gasoline.

Here in the States Shell marketed ‘Shell SU 2000′, at the same time they marketed that ‘other’ failed formula. It too was pulled from the market when it was discovered to degrade engine oil.

As I recall, Shell also marketed it in the Scandinavian countries, and that is where the problems with the stuff began showing up first.

Shortly after it was pulled from those markets it was pulled from the US market. I also think there was a ‘cold weather’ issue associated with the stuff. That is why it first showed up in Northern Europe.

For those of us in the ‘business’ the company with the best reputation for quality control over their gasoline is Chevron.  Exxon is second best. I never purchased Shell gasoline, even when I worked for Shell.