Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, August 10, 2010

Tall order: Drilling pipes loom large on an oil platform. A CDC report showed fatality rates on rigs at about seven times higher than that for all workers. (Gerald Herbert/Associated Press)

After a 10-hour ride over choppy seas, a crew of welders arrived just before midnight at an oil rig in the waters off Galveston, Tex. The eight men were briefed on rig evacuation plans and assigned bunks, where they slept for two or three hours before being awakened for work.

They were at their job to cut a 60-inch hole in a thick piece of metal well before dawn. A safety and planning meeting was held around 5 a.m. but, according to an investigation by the Minerals Management Service of the 2008 accident, none of the men from the crew were in attendance.

Confusion reigned for the next two hours: At one point, an oil rig worker told the men to stop cutting; at another, a man from the welding crew left the site to tell the rig crew that he feared the metal slab they were cutting would break loose and they would fall to their deaths. He returned to his work just in time to watch as the metal gave way and a co-worker, unable to regain his balance, fell 50 feet to a deck below, and then into the Gulf of Mexico. At 10 a.m., the report said, the man was declared dead.

On more than 4,000 platforms and exploration rigs in the gulf, workers are asked daily to do very arduous work under difficult conditions — often with little sleep and sometimes with limited instructions and inadequate training. According to scores of accident reports and panel investigations by the MMS in recent years, the stressful and sometimes confused working conditions played a significant role in the accidents and deaths that have occurred in the gulf. In the past two years, federal rig inspectors have warned their bosses of a looming safety crisis because of workers’ minimal training. But little changed.

Factories out at sea where work commonly goes on 24 hours a day, seven days a week, drilling rigs and platforms are among the more dangerous places in the country to work. A 2008 Centers for Disease Control report said that the overall fatality rate for workers in the oil and gas extraction industry was “approximately seven times the rate for all workers” between 2003 and 2006, with many deaths caused by accidents involving machinery and pipes and overexertion. Injury rates, which are more complex and controversial, were not included in the report.

Statistics from the Minerals Management Service, now renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy (BOE), show that 1,298 accidents on rigs and platforms were reported from 2006 through 2009 in the gulf, as well as 30 deaths. The accident statistics are significantly higher than in the five years before 2006, when a new definition of “accident” went into effect. In the five years before 2006, MMS logged a total of 252 gulf accidents and 30 deaths.

“It’s clear to me there are a number of things that can be done to enhance safety,” the new BOE director, Michael Bromwich, said in an interview. The accident reports tell him the industry’s safety program “wasn’t as strong as it should have been.”

At many sites, company spokesmen say, safety is a top priority and men get detailed training. For instance, Noble Corp. spokesman John Breed said that its crews are instructed for six months on the rigs before they’re ready for work. He said the jobs are highly paid and in great demand. Some regulators fear, however, that the federally required training is bare-bones, and they have pushed in recent years for the power to audit company training plans.

On many rigs, with the weather often harsh, the work dangerous and the shifts sometimes lasting 12 hours or more — accidents are a constant worry. Many believe the actual number is considerably higher than reported.

Frank Spagnoletti, a Houston lawyer who has represented many rig workers, said clients were often injured in accidents that either the rig operator chose not to report to regulators or that MMS inspectors knew about but decided not to investigate. Spagnoletti said the chumminess of the regulators with industry operators is well-known on the Gulf Coast, adding that the agency’s tepid accident reports and rare, meager fines leave workers unprotected.

Gary Arsenault, a Louisiana personal injury lawyer who has sued oil companies on behalf of workers, said the most common rig denizen is a burly high school dropout.

“They’re hiring these guys for their bodies, and when they get hurt, the company throws them away,” Arsenault said.

“You have a bunch of people out there who are green and don’t know what they’re doing. They’re working 12 on and 12 off, sometimes 18s, sometimes 24s. Accidents happen, and it’s the ultimately the almighty dollar that drives it all.”

One of his clients was Garold Bates, a contractor who was injured in January 2004. He had been sent to an Energy Partners oil rig to unload supplies, but found crashing waves were ramming his boat up against the platform pilings like a toy. A co-worker warned the company foreman back on the coast by radio that unloading the supplies was not a good idea due to the rough seas. The foreman ordered the pair to “go ahead and put it on there.” Bates’s leg was crushed between the platform and the boat, requiring emergency medical treatment and subsequent therapy for his injuries.

“The man that told [us] to do it, he wasn’t there,” Bates said in his deposition. “There probably wasn’t any seas kicking up where he was at on the land.”

The incident was never reported to the MMS; an Energy Partners spokesperson said it is not necessary to report incidents that are initially classified as a “first aid” problem. Lawyers said companies often avoid reporting accidents to win bonuses and future work because of their clean safety records. Bates’s injury lawsuit ended with a judge mediating a settlement in which the company paid Bates an undisclosed sum and admitted no fault.

Lee Hunt, director of the International Association of Drilling Contractors, says the view of rigs as unsafe and exploitative is “a total fabrication, a kind of dream scenario for an injury lawyer.

“Crews offshore are well fed, well housed, well paid, and very proud to be working the rigs,” he said. “These are incredibly well trained crews, and to say they’re treated so badly is terribly offensive.”

As the rigs become increasingly sophisticated and computer-guided, he said, the need for well educated, experienced and highly paid professionals has grown. An entry-level roustabout or maintenance worker will make $50,000 to $60,000 a year, and professionals substantially more.

A former senior MMS supervisor said that in 2007 and 2008, a handful of senior managers in the agency pushed the MMS Office of Safety Management to automatically fine operators when a worker was killed in an accident on its rigs or platforms. But “that ran right into the culture, a lot of opposition,” said the supervisor, who was familiar with the effort.

“It was like pushing Jell-O uphill.”

The issue of worker safety is playing a role in the follow-up to the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout. Rep. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) championed a bill that would prevent companies from firing employees who report safety violations and allows whistleblowers to appeal perceived retaliation to the Secretary of Labor.

“We have heard that the workers aboard the [Deepwater Horizon] rig had safety concerns, but in the end they were powerless to stop the cascading string of bad decisions by BP that led to the disaster,” Markey said during debate. The bill passed the House by a vote of 315-93 and was incorporated into a larger energy bill that passed the House on a far closer vote.

The legislation, however, stalled in the Senate.

Staff writer Juliet Eilperin and researcher Madonna Lebling contributed to this story.

SOURCE ARTICLE

Comment on leaked Corrib emails from a former Shell employee.

There is some discussion in the emails of a production string connector failure triggering a potential underground blowout.

It is an issue. That was what happened to Shell on their Gulf of Mexico Bourbon platform in late 1987, I believe. A failure in the production string of a gas well compounded by parted casing and a poor cement job.

The end result was an underground flow of gas between the casing and the well bore into shallow porous sands. Once the sands were charged with high pressure gas there was a sudden eruption of a ‘gas volcano’ under one corner of the platform. Ruined everybody’s day.

Shell fixed the problem, at a cost of $275,000,000.

By John Donovan

I have published below Shell internal emails and minutes of a meeting, all relating to the Shell led Corrib Gas Project in Ireland.

All of the items been supplied by a group of Shell Corrib employees who wish to be known as “Celtic Tiger 5″.

This is what they claim:

We are Celtic Tiger 5 who are current shell employees working in/or for Shell Ireland. We represent HSE, Commercial, IT, Construction and are interested in spreading correct information to the outside world and our fellow citizens in the West. Please feel free to publish this information on your website…

As previously indicated, Shell will be concerned about the prospect of another active subversive employee group within the company following the leak to us in February of the Shell Global Address Book in what was described as the worlds biggest breach of employee details. The leak turned into a global PR black-eye for Shell.

Relevant email correspondence today with Richard Wiseman, Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer of Royal Dutch Shell Plc.

Email from John Donovan to Richard Wiseman

From: John Donovan [mailto:john@shellnews.net]
Sent: 09 August 2010 09:15
To: Wiseman, Richard M RDS-LSX
Subject: Corrib Gas Project: More leaked Shell internal emails

Dear Mr Wiseman

The trickle of leaked Shell insider documents and internal communications from the Corrib Gas Project in Ireland seems to have turned into a flood.

Please see three further leaked Shell internal emails printed below involving high level employees, including the Project Director in 2007, Mr Tom Hooft van Huysduynen.

Please let me know by 4 pm today if there is any reason why we should not publish the emails and minutes as proof that the leaks situation is self-evidently out of Shell’s control. This is despite the global spying operation against Shell employees by Shell Global Affairs Security (CAS) designed to prevent such information from reaching us.

I have given a deadline because you have not responded to my recent emails containing no deadlines. I tried the no deadline approach after your complaint about the imposition of deadlines – “I can by no means guarantee always to receive your emails within 24 hours of your sending them…”
Please let me know if you need more time to deal with the matter.

If you indicate that any email is a fake, it will not be published.

Any comment you wish to make will be published on an unedited basis.

Regards
John Donovan

REPLY FROM RICHARD WISEMAN

From: richard.wiseman@shell.com
Date: 9 August 2010 11:07:55 GMT+01:00
To: john@shellnews.net
Subject: RE: Corrib Gas Project: More leaked Shell internal emails

Dear Mr Donovan

We do not propose to respond to the allegations and our refusal to do so should not be taken as an admission that any of the assertions is true.

Regards

Richard Wiseman

Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer
Royal Dutch Shell plc
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA

Registered in England and Wales number 4366849
Registered Office:  Shell Centre, London, SE1
Headquarters: Carel van Bylandtlaan 30, 2596 HR
The Hague, The Netherlands

Email: richard.wiseman@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com

LEAKED INFORMATION IN DATE ORDER

—–Original Message—–
From:     Hooft van Huysduynen, Tom SEPIL-EPE-T-IP
Sent:   05 July 2007 16:16
To:    Cetti, Julian A SEPIL-EPE-C-R; Murphy, Conor SEPIL-EPE-C-D; Costello, Gerry J SEPIL-EPE-T-IP; Uglow, Susannah M SEPIL-LSEP-E-I; Pieren, Marcel SUKEP-EPE-T-D; Barrett, Thomas W SUKOP-DIC/713
Cc:    Pyle, Andy C SEPIL-EPE-T-I; Nolan, Terry J SEPIL-EPE-T-IM; McLaverty, Agnes K SEPIL-EPE-T-IP; Hamilton, Ann M SEPIL-EPF-E-C
Subject:    Annual Lease return

Ladies & Gents,

We have had a very very long session on the 2006 ALR. We have agreed that it is key that we listen and take on board formal remarks on reserves made by PAD. The PAD wants to see 785 Bcf reserves and he tells us in no uncertain terms what format this should take. Marcel will do a QA/QC check on what wording will be acceptable to Shell, but it is critical to SEPIL we do find acceptable wording to PAD. Also I stated I do not intend to risk relationships with BGE and PAD on the basis of stand alone Flow Assurance results. I see FA as an important planning, engineering and operational tool, but not as an absolute tool; it is only a prediction. Only after production start up will we be able to calibrate the model to actual performance. In other words, it is stupid if we stick to the 739 Bcf (or worse) to the Government at this stage and we are shooting ourselves in the foot. So we are all very clear why it is so important to revert to the 785 BcF (by the way note 783 BcF is the 10% cut off requiring a new PoD). Equally, we are not running back to the Government if P6 results indicate downside rather than upside (or the other way around for that matter). P6 results will be formally reported back via the formal process of the 2007 ALR, which we should try to issue as soon as possible after the re-modelling has taken place, somewhere early Q2 next year. If the 2007 ALR indicates reserves changes in excess of 10% (up or down), there is an existing proces via the ALR on how to initiate a PoD change on reserves, somewhere in 2008.

The atttached ALR, with the exception of the subsurface Chapter 4, has now been throughly revised and rewritten, inlcuding partner and legal checks. The attached ALR now follows exactly the recommendations issued by the PAD. Gerry Costello will now informally test this with PAD after receiving wording from Mrcel on reserves. Gerry will also ask PAD whether we can issue teh document except Chapter 4.

As we mention reserves in this report, Marcel will deal with Group Disclosure Standards.

Ann, can you please find out whether we need to disclose to the Group the publication of Capex, Opex and Abandonment Cost as well before issuing ?

Principles.

•    2005 ALR to be accepted before 2006 ALR to be submitted
•    Satisfying the Government of Ireland is a higher priority than satisfying Shell
•    A revised PoD should include just those sections which inlcude new information or modified proposals
•    The ALR format follows official guidelines, nothing else
•    The ALR wil not contain any information outside the related calendar year
•    The ALR will not volontuur information not requested, but follow the PAD recommended format
•    The forward planning in the ALR is looking forward from 31/12 of that year
•    Additional information can be provided in the cover letter, not in the ALR
•    We use 2005€, MoD € and RT 2006 €, in various parts of the report, intentionally
•    The document, we understand, does not fall under the freedom of information act, and can only be made public via the courts.

Planning

•    Late submissions can be and will have to be regularised by letter requesting approval. Gerry please issue this letter on late 2006 ALR submission (draft by James)
•    Marcel Pieren will review wording on reserves for the 2005 ALR submission by next week.
•    The wording should cover 785 Bcf reserves. Expectation reserves are 739, with 46 Bcf reserves to be added at a later date by engineering solutions, primarily the change out of a pipeline, would that make commercial sense at the time a decison is required.
•    Resolve 2005 ALR by August 2007, formal acceptance by PAD
•    Submit 2006 ALR by August 2007, after formal acceptance by PAD
•    Submit a new section in the POD for the pipeline re-route, at the time of submission to PAD for Section 40, and ABP for SIA, planned 31 October 2007
•    The cover letter to the 2006 ALR return will state that in September 2007 SEPIL plans to complete Flow Assurance work and plans to drill into P6 reservoir. The PAD wil be informed by letter of any early hard results. The PAD will be informed of all consolidated results, including new reservoir models based on P6 data, in the 2007 ALR, planned for issue April 2008 (planned end of reservoir re-modelling).

Tom Hooft van Huysduynen
Project Director
+353 1 669 4159
+353 (0) 876 603 940
Shell E&P Ireland Limited
Registered Office
Corrib House
52 Lower Leeson Street
Dublin 2
Ireland
Registered in Ireland Number 316588
Directors: AM Hamilton, TJ Nolan, AC Pyle (British)

****************************************
—–Original Message—–
From:     Uglow, Susannah M SEPIL-LSEP-E-I
Sent:    06 July 2007 11:37
To:    Hooft van Huysduynen, Tom SEPIL-EPE-T-IP
Cc:    Cetti, Julian A SEPIL-EPE-C-R; Murphy, Conor SEPIL-EPE-C-D; Costello, Gerry J SEPIL-EPE-T-IP; Pieren, Marcel SUKEP-EPE-T-D; Barrett, Thomas W SUKOP-DIC/713; Pyle, Andy C SEPIL-EPE-T-I; Nolan, Terry J SEPIL-EPE-T-IM; McLaverty, Agnes K SEPIL-EPE-T-IP; Hamilton, Ann M SEPIL-EPF-E-C
Subject:    RE: Annual Lease return

Tom,

To pick up on one of the points made in the Principles section of your email, it is not the case that the Annual Lease Return falls outside the Freedom of Information Act.

The ALR does constitute a record held by a public body (ie. the Department) which falls within the FOI Act.  However, the Act says that where information has been obtained by the public body in confidence or where it is commercially sensitive, the public body has the discretion to refuse to give access to the information.  Prior to making a decision to release the Department would have to consult with SEPIL (as provider of the information), although the Department would consider SEPIL’s views it would not be bound by them.  The  Department could release the information where, on balance, it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so.
In summary, the Department could release the ALR to a member of the public if it thought that would be in the public interest.
It is important that SEPIL denotes the ALR as a confidential and commercially sensitive document so that if a FOI request is made, the Department knows to consult SEPIL on its possible release.
Regards
Susannah

****************************************
From: Hamilton, Ann M SEPIL-EPF-E-C
Sent: 10 July 2007 16:48
To: Hooft van Huysduynen, Tom SEPIL-EPE-T-IP
Cc: Uglow, Susannah M SEPIL-LSEP-E-I; Mc Brien, James M SEPIL-EPE-T-PC; Pyle, Andy C SEPIL-EPE-T-I
Subject: Annual Lease return

Tom,

We made some slight adjustments to the numbers ( with Jims involvement).

We have an obligation under our Petroleum Lease to disclose our Total Expenditure amounts ( I have checked the guidelines with James and this is quite clearly stated).

In answer to your specific question to me, given that SEPIL will denote the submitted ALR as confidential and commercially sensitive so that if a FOI request is made the Department will consult SEPIL in its possible release. Therefore, in my view we do not need to consult Group on this issue.

Regards
Ann

****************************************

—–Original Message—–
From:     Murdoch, Jim SUKEP-EPE-T-WP
Sent:    05 September 2008 15:04
To:    s711dsv SUKEP-EPE-T-WM; s711ndsv SUKEP-EPE-T-WM; S711WSS SUKEP-EPE-T-WM; 711 OIM (E-mail)
Cc:    Kazi, Mudassar SUKEP-EPE-T-WP; Christie, Steven SUKEP-EPE-T-WS; Keith Miller (E-mail); Morrice, Chris SUKEP-EPE-T-WS
Subject:   Corrib P5 deviation

Boris, Brian, Graham, Graeme

suspect you’re not fully aware but during some productioncasing design validation checks an issue arose surrounding the 20″ connector tensile/compressive capacity.  Due to thermally induced loads there is a modeled scenario (Wellcat) that results in connector failure and a leak developing across the connector.  Structurally there is no risk to the well but it potentially opens up the “B” annulus.  This would not normally be a problem but there are potentially some exposed (hydrostatically pressure) sands in the B annulus that are not isolated by the 9 5/8″ cement job.  Fluid type is uncertain but in the event that there is loss of hydrostatic head, (due to mud degradation), there are hydrocarbon present (low probability) and the sand can flow there is a risk that hydrocarbons flow to the failed/leaking connector resulting in flow from the B annulus.  For this to happen the cement that was seen to surface of this string would also have to have failed.

As you can see a number of failures have to occur before this could actually happen hence it is considered a very low risk.  This said we have captured within the attached deviation form and by limiting the flowing period during the clean up phase the thermal loads that the connector will be subjected will not exceed the connector rating envelope.  Further modeling done to date has shown that the connector should not have been subjected to thermal loads that would have failed the connector during the well test with Enterprise in 1999.

This said we should monitor the wellhead both prior to and during the well test with the ROV (see mitigation measures #3 2nd page of the attached document) for bubble generation indicating that we have failed the connection and that fluids are migrating through the B annulus.  Acknowledge will be difficult to monitor and assess as we do anticipate some release around the wellhead which is not untypical due to thermal expansion.

Have a look at the attached and we can discuss, taken the liberty of checking for additional ROV crew although realise that bedding is an issue.

Cheers

Jim/Mudassar

Jim Murdoch
Senior Well Engineer
Shell U.K. Limited
1 Altens Farm Road, Nigg, Aberdeen, AB12 3FY, United Kingdom

Tel: +44 1224 88 2983
Email: jim.murdoch@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com/eandp
****************************************

From: Taylor, Ian C SUKEP-EPE-T-D
Sent: 18 September 2008 15:35
To: GX EPE ALL PTs and WAs
Cc: McRobbie, Ian I SUKEP-EPE-P-SD
Subject: Revised UK Well Failure Model – rev 3 now out !!

Dear All

The UK well failure model (as used in eWIMS) has been updated.  It can still be found under the following link

http://knowledge.europe.shell.com/GetDoc?documentnumber=EP200512206208&VerType=PDF&instance=glasepns&language=English&guest=true

As always, all Well Failure Models can be accessed from the TS09 webpage :

http://sww.shell.com/ep/epe/wells/standards/ts09.html

Main Changes :-

·         New failure code for control line failure.
·         Introduction of new well type – subsurface abandoned.
·         General tidying up of wording !

Please destroy your old printouts.

Ian Taylor
Production Technologist
Well Integrity Team Leader – EPE

Shell U.K. Limited
Registered in England and Wales
Registered number: 140141
Registered Office: Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA

Correspondence Address :
Shell U.K. Limited
1 Altens Farm Road, Nigg, Aberdeen, AB12 3FY, United Kingdom

Email: ian.a.taylor@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com/eandp

****************************************

—–Original Message—–
From:   Kedian, Matt MJ NORSKE-EPE-T-D
Sent:    26 March 2009 10:20
To:       Argo, Douglas W SUKEP-EPE-T-D
Cc:       Taylor, Ian C SUKEP-EPE-T-D; Thomas, Vaughan NORSKE-EPE-T-D
Subject:           Corrib Well Ownership

Douglas,

At the VR BPR in February we mentioned that it does not appear that there is a clear owner of the existing Corrib wells.

Nothing is happening with the wells at the moment but in the event an issue arose it is not clear to me who would be responsble now that Stephen Castle has left.

Would you be able to give some steer on who should be responsible, or if the current status is acceptable.

Thanks
Matt

****************************************

Corrib Asset team Meeting 26 March 09

Attendees
OR&A team: Mark Carrigy, Stuart Basford, Mike Fraser
EPE-P-SO: Simon Fisher, Bill Leyshon, Iain Barraclough
Corrib asset : Aad Allard
X border: Matt Kedian, Vaughan Thomas

Apologies: Charles Churchfield, Steve Jeans
Not required to be present this meeting: Tom Hooft van Huysduynen

1) HSSE area remains a resource gap. Agency staff has now been identified to fill gap and will shortly be on seat. No risk identified of HSSE deliverables being delivered late.

2) OR&A plan now compiled as one plan: all resources except for HSE resource above believed to be satisfactory to deliver this plan.

3) Spares: insurance spares not yet ordered, but catalogued. WIll be ordered on Just in Time basis. Delivery within 9 to 12  months.

4) Irish government requirements for introduction of hydrocarbons are : i) Independent Safety Audit has to give the OK . ii) The ‘letter of acceptance’ to be in place. Both of these are independent of Shell requirements eg Pre Start Up Audit .

5) The Back Feed of gas by BGE has been proposed to the Irish authorities as ‘functional testing’ rather than commissioning. The Irish authorities have yet to confirm their agreement to this proposal. Main issue relates to when the IPPCL (Pollution Control Limits) comes into  effect , this cannot come into  effect while backfeeding gas as we will have no way of disposing of surface water run-off. That is a discussion Corrib still needs to have with the Authorities.
Question: If this request is refused and the period has to be treated as commisioning can any additional requirements (eg additional permits /consents etc) be  accommodated? (Action MC)

6) The current asset ownership of the wells is not clear. Wells or Operations? (Action MC)

7) The surface start up team is agreed and is being trained and mobilised. The start up team for the wells, subsea and pipelines is not agreed. It is agreed between Corrib and PT discipline that a PT resource is required. X border team believe that additional gaps exist which need to be filled by staff experienced with the OL start up.
Simon to send slide pack from Vaughan / Matt  to Aad Allard and Mark C. (Action SF)
Aad Allard to take early view on start up team for the wells, subsea and pipelines in time for GIP submission (mid April) and  next meeting (29 April) and initiate resourcing if necessary including for PT position. (Action AA)

Gap analysis will take place in mid 09 to ascertain whether there are any gaps in compliance with requirements of AIPS including DEM2, Blade 24 of OE. Main areas of uncertainty (eg through unclear definition) are currently Alarm Management and OE. (Info)

****************************************

—–Original Message—–
From:   Argo, Douglas W SUKEP-EPE-T-D
Sent:  26 March 2009 19:10
To:       Kedian, Matt MJ NORSKE-EPE-T-D
Cc:       Taylor, Ian C SUKEP-EPE-T-D; Thomas, Vaughan NORSKE-EPE-T-D; Siemers, Gertjan GJT NAM-EPE-T-D
Subject:           RE: Corrib Well Ownership
Importance:     High

Matt, thank your for this prompt. My thoughts below, which I suggest you follow up in a meeting with those copied:

I think the relevant TA’s need to decide on responsible actions first, and then recommend ownership, rather than becoming bogged-down the other way around.

ACTIONS:
1. Check for precedents, standards, previous guidance on long term suspension (eg see extract below).
2. Summarise barrier status (as left – the ones I looked at are newly-perfed with SSSV shut, no plug).
3. Is there any protection in the field – eg boat deterring trawlers from exclusion area?
3. Agree suitable monitoring method and frequency  (eg ROV, annually), given long term suspension (to date and future), which we would be responsibly happy with. In this case, risk may be mainly reputational rather than safety or environmental (subsea gas wells).

In my mind, some form of monitoring action is required.

Ownership:
1. Of the above, initially PT, rather than debate Wells vs PT vs Ops vs Project.
2. Legally/organisationally, I would think accountability lies with Project team, with advice from TA’s. Project team presence in Ireland would also support this. Can you confirm that Terry Nolan reports to John Gallagher rather than Cross-Border, and that no handover to X/Border has taken place? Has Nicola stated any position on ownership?

Regards,
Douglas
The Revised CoP for Well Integrity  For wells that are suspended (i.e. isolated from the reservoir by a plug, either permanent or retrievable), and a wellhead and tree or a suspension flange is still in place, all the valves shall be operated and maintained on an annual basis (or bi-annual for sub sea and NUI wells where this is the established test frequency), as per closed-in wells above. Suspension plugs shall be tested as leaktight unless specified otherwise in the Suspension programme.

****************************************

—–Original Message—–
From:   Thomas, Vaughan NORSKE-EPE-T-D
Sent:    03 April 2009 10:01
To:       Argo, Douglas W SUKEP-EPE-T-D
Subject:           RE: Corrib Well Ownership

X-Border has never taken ownership, and we are not the future asset – so will never own it here in VR. This is Nicola’s view, and no-one in Ireland reports to her as far as I know.

It was “believed” that WE in Dublin owned the wells as part of the project, but they have now left. There has been no monitoring of the wells to date.

Matt is looking at Corrib for the time being – so can do the practical stuff over the next few months. Ian is the TA-2 for Ireland I believe. None of the wells are in any system, such as e-WIMS. The well files are poor and scattered.

Maybe we need to formalise this. Gert-Jan send a note to Dublin stating that they are the owners, but that EPE PT will provide the technical support (Matt, you or otherwise). The other model is to have a PT in the project team – which is not currently the case.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

AUGUST 6, 2010

SAN FRANCISCO -(Dow Jones)- Alaska Gov. Sean Parnell said Friday that Royal Dutch Shell Plc (RDSB, RDSB.LN) and other companies can proceed with seismic testing for oil and gas in Alaska’s Chukchi Sea after a federal judge agreed that such activities aren’t restricted by an injunction on offshore drilling.

In addition to Shell, the judge’s ruling on Thursday allows other companies to pursue seismic testing in Arctic waters, including Norwegian oil producer Statoil ASA (STL.OS) which had proposed doing offshore seismic testing this summer, Parnell said.

Meanwhile, the state has asked the court to lift the injunction entirely.

“The state of Alaska continues to advocate for responsible offshore development, so that we can generate and retain jobs in the current harsh economic climate,” Parnell said in a statement.

In response to a lawsuit filed by environmental groups, a federal judge in Anchorage issued an injunction July 21 halting offshore oil and gas drilling off Alaska’s North Coast pending further environmental review by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement.

The federal government recently formed that agency to oversee offshore oil and gas exploration and development, replacing the Minerals Management Service, which was dismantled under heavy criticism following the April 20 explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico.

On July 27, Shell asked the court to reconsider or clarify the injunction, arguing that it unfairly barred nondrilling activity such as seismic testing.

On Thursday, the court clarified that the injunction did not apply to seismic testing in the area, according to Parnell.

A telephone call to Shell wasn’t immediately returned.

-By Cassandra Sweet, Dow Jones Newswires; 415-439-6468; cassandra.sweet@ dowjones.com

(END) Dow Jones Newswires
08-06-101514ET
Copyright (c) 2010 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

We are Celtic Tiger 5 who are current shell employees working in/or for Shell Ireland. We represent HSE, Commercial, IT, Construction and are interested in spreading correct information to the outside world and our fellow citizens in the West. Please feel free to publish this information on your website with our introduction…

By John Donovan

We have received several Shell internal emails and the minutes of the Corrib Asset team Meeting held on 26 March 09.

The source claims to be a group of Shell Corrib employees who wish to be known as “Celtic Tiger 5″.

Printed immediately below is an extract from the covering email received:

We are Celtic Tiger 5 who are current shell employees working in/or for Shell Ireland. We represent HSE, Commercial, IT, Construction and are interested in spreading correct information to the outside world and our fellow citizens in the West. Please feel free to publish this information on your website with our introduction…

We have already published an article based on emails supplied by one of the individuals involved with the “Celtic Tiger 5″ group.

Leaked Shell internal emails reveal concern over Corrib subsea wells

Thus far there is nothing damaging to Shell. Employees involved in the email correspondence and the meeting appear to be carrying out their work with due diligence by internally raising issues of potential concern e.g. legal ownership of subsea wells.

We have however been promised that further information, more sensational in nature, will follow. For example, we understand that internal warnings about safety issues have been suppressed.

Even more significant are allegations of collusion between Shell and the Irish Government.

I have supplied all of the emails and minutes of the team meeting to Richard Wiseman, Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer of Royal Dutch Shell Plc. He has not replied to my most recent email dated 30 July 2010.

I have also passed the same information to contacts in Ireland who are much more familiar with the various matters discussed by Shell employees in the leaked documents.

Over 5 years ago I published an article predicting a public relations disaster for Shell in Ireland in relation to the Corrib gas project being imposed against the wishes of local people gravely concerned by environmental and safety issues.

I also made the same prediction in a live interview on Dublin Radio in August 2005 when I also predicted Shell would use undercover agents to gather intelligence and engage in other sinister activities against the protest group. The latter prediction has also come to pass.

Shell will be concerned about the prospect of another active subversive employee group within the company following the leak to us in February of the Shell Global Address Book in what was described as the worlds biggest breach of employee details. The leak turned into a global PR black-eye for Shell.

Shell lease blocks in Chukchi sea

What makes the oil companies think they can produce oil and gas safely in the very harsh world of the Arctic oceans?

Our article The Arctic and Shell addresses this important subject. We have added more links to associated information.

Shell Chukchi Sea Application 2010 Application for Incidental Harassment Authorization for the Non-Lethal Taking of Whales and Seals in Conjunction with Planned 2010 Exploration Drilling Program Chukchi Sea, Alaska: April 2010

(IF SHELL WISHES TO EXPLAIN HOW YOU “TAKE” A WILD MULTI -TON WHALE IN A “NONE LETHAL” FASHION, WE WILL HAPPILY PUBLISH THAT INFORMATION HERE – I HAVE CHECKED THE 50 PAGES IN THIS SHELL DOCUMENT AND CANNOT FIND AN EXPLANATION?)

Shell Chukchi Sea Application 2010 Application for Incidental Harassment Authorization for the Non-Lethal Taking of Whales and Seals in Conjunction with Planned 2010 Exploration Drilling Program Chukchi Sea, Alaska: April 2010

The Biggest Oil Spills in History
Arctic Melting and Oil: Countries Stake Claims as World Faces Environmental Disaster
Chukchi Cap
Recent blowout is one of only 18 in Alaska: 18 December 2008
Arctic Governments And Industry Still Unprepared For Oil Spills 20 Years After Exxon Valdez: 19 March 2009
Arctic Oil: A Boon For Nest Predators: 9 September 2009
Low Concentrations of Oxygen and Nutrients Slowing Biodegradation of Exxon Valdez Oil: 18 January 2010
Arctic Voyage Illuminating Ocean Optics 26 July 2010
Alaska’s Arctic Seas: Court Ruling Halts Offshore Lease Sale 27 July 2010
U.S.-Canadian mission set to map Arctic seafloor: 1 August 2010
Chukchi Sea Planning Area: Draft Environmental Impact Statement by Minerals Management Service Volume 1 (pending)
Chukchi Sea Planning Area: Draft Environmental Impact Statement by Minerals Management Service Volume 2
Undiscovered oil resources in the Federal portion of the 1002 Area of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: an economic update: 2005-1217 Open-File Report 2005
ALASKA FEDERAL OFFSHORE: Descriptions of Geologic Plays 1995 U.S. Minerals Management Service
Last hope in the last frontier: offshore development key in Alaska.: March, 2007
Digital terrain mapping of the underside of sea ice from a small AUV: 2008

More information which might be of interest to the WWF. This data set consists of upward looking sonar draft data collected by submarines in the Arctic Ocean. It includes data from both U.S. Navy and Royal Navy submarines.

Submarine Upward Looking Sonar Ice Draft Profile Data and Statistics

This is a photo from the Beaufort Sea, c. 1949 of a typical ‘sea ice terrain’. What is important is that the ‘hill’ and ‘ridges’ are representative of only 10% of the underlying ice. In other words, the ‘hill’ and ‘ridges’ projecting down into the ocean are almost 10 time greater. This is due to the small difference in buoyancy between ice and sea water. This is the problem oil companies will have to deal with in trying to produce oil in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas. It is these underwater ‘mountains’ of ice that Shell precluded development in the Chukchi in the 1980′s. A picture speaks a thousand words. The WWF might find this photo, and others like it, useful and instructive in illustrating the problem of sustained oil production in the offshore Arctic.

Financial Times

By Sheila McNulty in Houston

Published: August 5 2010 05:19 | Last updated: August 5 2010 05:19

EXTRACTS

Investors managing over $2,500bn in assets are pressing the world’s biggest oil and gas companies to disclose their spill prevention and response plans for offshore oil operations.

The letters, which have been sent to chief executives at 26 energy companies, including ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Petrobras, were signed by more than 50 investors, according to Ceres/Investor Network on Climate Risk.

Signatories include such leading investors as the UK-based Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF), the California State Treasurer (who sits on boards of CALPERS and CalSTRS) and the Florida state retirement system (known formally as the Florida State Board of Administration).

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010.

FULL FT ARTICLE

THE NEW YORK TIMES

By Thom Weidlich – Aug 4, 2010 8:16 PM GMT+0100