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Posts from ‘January, 2011’

Shell to Stop Fuel Output at Hamburg Refinery for Conversion to Terminal

By Brian Swint and Rachel Graham – Jan 12, 2011 2:02 PM GMT+0000

Royal Dutch Shell Plc said it plans to stop fuel production at its refinery near Hamburg and turn it into a terminal after a two-year search failed to find a buyer.

The company is still looking to sell the lubricant production unit at the Harburg refinery in Germany. It will maintain the refinery in its current form until the second quarter of 2012, The Hague-based company said in a press release on its website in German today.

“We will make every effort to minimize the effects on workers and to maintain the same good level of service and quality products for our customers,” said Peter Seifried, head of Shell’s German business.

The Harburg refinery can process 110,000 barrels a day, according to Bloomberg data.

Shell decided in December to keep its Stanlow refinery in the U.K. running even if a sale to India’s Essar Oil Ltd. falls through.

To contact the reporter on this story: Brian Swint in London at bswint@bloomberg.net. Rachel Graham in London at rgraham13@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Will Kennedy at wkennedy3@bloomberg.net

SOURCE ARTICLE

Bill Campbell quoted in Final Report on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

Under the heading of “Learning from Accidents:”, page 231 of the Final Report published by the U.S. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling

Extract from Chapter 8, page 233

Shell’s safety response. Shell, a long-time leader in Gulf of Mexico operations (before BP surpassed it, as described in Chapter 2), has had its own safety problems. Two men died in a gas leak on the company’s Brent Bravo platform in 2003; former Shell senior manager Bill Campbell, who had earlier led a safety review, said after the accident that his 1999 warnings had been ignored by the company.99 Shell denied that it operated at high levels of risk.100

Shell subsequently tightened and simplified its safety rules.101 Shell also has promoted the use of the “safety case” worldwide (a risk-management approach to regulation described in Chapter 3).102 It has adopted the safety-case approach even in the United States, where it is not required to do so, and has promoted it for the industry more broadly.103 Marvin Odum, president of Shell Oil Company and director of Shell’s Upstream Americas business, told the Commission’s November 9 hearing that “the safety case in deepwater drilling shows how we identify and assess the hazards on a rig; how we establish the barriers to prevent and control those hazards; how we assign the critical activities needed to maintain the integrity of these barriers.”104

Odum said that Shell also encourages workers to call for work to stop when they suspect that something is proceeding improperly, and gives awards to these “Goal Zero Heroes” (referring to the corporate goal of zero accidents).105 He added that audits are key to system safety and that “in 2009, DuPont administered its safety and culture survey in our drilling organization, comparing us to the world’s best across a range of industries. While we ranked world-class overall, improvement areas were identified.”106

http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/final-report

(No mention of Shell’s “Touch Fuc* All” safety culture?

BP oil spill report: Oil firms face big bills to raise safety standards

Safety standards in the global oil industry are “compromised” by political lobbying and sweeping reforms must follow BP’s Gulf of Mexico spill, the official US report has concluded.

BP oil spill report: Oil firms face big bills to raise safety standards

Rowena Mason

By Rowena Mason, Energy Correspondent 8:57PM GMT 11 Jan 2011

Companies from oil majors like BP and Exxon to minnow explorers will all have to pay more for insurance, spill prevention, better equipment and more thorough safety standards under new recommendations by the Oil Spill Commission. For example, they will need to demonstrate they have the technology to control an underwater blow-out before being given permits to drill

The report also strongly criticised the powerful American Petroleum Institute (API) – an industry-funded body responsible for setting standards for equipment across the world, not just the US – saying its expert advice was biased.

“It is clear that API’s ability to serve as a reliable standard-setter for drilling safety is compromised by its role as the industry’s principal lobbyist and public policy advocate,” the report said. “Because they would make oil and gas industry operations potentially more costly, API regularly resists agency rulemakings that government regulators believe would make those operations safer.”

Investigators had already released a chapter of the report blaming BP, Transocean and Halliburton for a series of “management failures” leading up to the explosion on April 20. It also found the companies cut costs and corners in their operations.

On Tuesday, the full inquiry warned the entire industry that it would have to improve its standards. The panel in particular recommended that regulations from the North Sea in the UK and Norway should be adopted in America and as a global benchmark.

William Reilly, co-chair of the panel, cautioned that a second accident like the Deepwater Horizon explosion could end offshore drilling for good.

“We recognize that the improvements we advocate all come with costs and all will take time to implement,” he said. But inaction runs the risk of real costs too – in more lost lives… and in further tens of billions of dollars of avoidable clean-up costs. If the clear challenges are not addressed and another disaster happens, the entire offshore energy enterprise is threatened.”

BP’s share price rose 3pc to 500p on relief that the report did not contain worse criticisms of the oil company. The report acknowledges any legal findings of gross negligence could increase fines on BP to $21bn, but does not accuse the oil company of such a charge – which it strongly denies.

However, it did find that out of nine key decisions that increased risk, BP was responsible for seven, Halliburton for one and Transocean for another. Seven of those decisions saved time and money.

A spokesman for BP said: “Given the emerging consensus that the Deepwater Horizon accident was the result of multiple causes involving multiple parties, we support the commission’s efforts to strengthen industry-wide safety practices.”

However, the API and other oil companies were less sympathetic to the findings.

“This does a great disservice to the thousands of men and women who work in the industry and have the highest personal and professional commitment to safety,” said Erik Milito, an API director. “We hope that the administration recognizes the work already done and the need to rapidly restore vibrancy to the nation’s offshore oil and gas production programme.”

SOURCE ARTICLE

RELATED ARTICLES

Gulf of Mexico oil spill: timeline: 11 Jan 2011

Oil spill commission urges dramatic overhaul: 11 Jan 2011

North Sea oil safety report: main points: 11 Jan 2011

US oil spill panel finds BP guilty of mistakes: 11 Jan 2011

Obama oil spill commission’s final report blames disaster on cost-cutting by BP and partners: 11 Jan 2011

Shell may face more delays drilling off Alaska

Jurjen van de Pol – Jan 12, 2011 7:02 AM

Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Europe’s biggest oil company, may face delays in drilling off Alaska after a presidential panel investigating BP Plc’s oil spill said more research is needed on risks to Arctic wildlife.

To contact the reporter on this story: Jurjen van de Pol in Amsterdam at jvandepol@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: John Buckley in Amsterdam at johnbuckley@bloomberg.net

Nigeria: Maybe Shell isn’t that bad

By Emily Grainger

I am currently investigating Shell’s position within Nigeria, more specifically the Delta; when I came across your website. It is crammed with an insane amount of information I can’t even begin to take half of it in, it’s a great resource, thanks.

Something I never thought I would say before investigating their operations in the war zone that is the Delta is that maybe Shell isn’t that bad. I am more than sure this comment will rub a few backs up – passionate is an understatement for the debate established on here! I don’t think I’ll ever be able to say categorically whether or not as a company I think they are ethical or not. YES they chose the Nigerian Government over local communities as their key stakeholder, but that’s because without them they wouldn’t be able to operate at all within the region let alone country.

Growing up I always thought in the back of my head: Shell… they are bad. I remembered vaguely at the age of 7 hearing about the Ogoni activists executed because of their protests for basic human rights to the wealth of their countries resources and since then have avoided buying their products. BUT 98% of all the oil spills occur because of militant activity and the volatile environment of the country. It’s a war zone! Global compact says you must deal with local communities responsibly (in which I 100% agree with) but I can see the other side of this very complicated/controversial coin. Shell could say that this works within a functional society but law and order has broken down to such a catastrophic state in the area that the rule of Govn. and law – does not apply.

I can’t help but think that no matter what they do (PR wise) to try and portray their efforts to make a difference the media will always screw them. Negative coverage is SO MUCH more interesting to read and we all love a good rant.

It would be great to hear what everyone thinks of my views.

Feel free to read more on my blog (if of interest) – http://prforyourinformation.blogspot.com/

With regards to Shell – What happens when you are doing your best but the media screws you? Instead of trying to do good your just painting yourself green?

COMMENT BY A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF SHELL OIL USA

I have a comment for Ms. Grainger:

Shell not so bad? Ms. Grainger is going to get an education. In all honesty I too thought Shell was a great company when I first went to work for them. Boy did I get a surprise. I almost quit the first month I worked for them. However, I decided I was dealing with an localized ‘aberration’ and not the corporate ‘norm’. I was wrong, once again. The ‘aberration’ was better than the ‘norm’.

It is not a question of the rank and file employees being ‘bad’, that is not the issue. The issue is the policy decisions made by senior management.

When she finishes in Nigeria perhaps she would also like to assist the US Dept. of the Interior and the US Dept. of the Navy, NCIS, in their espionage investigations of Shell USA. Perhaps she might find the answer to RD Shell’s interest in, and efforts (alleged) to obtain access to, highly classified military technology that as a matter of law, the US espionage statutes to be exact, Shell was prohibited from having access to.

Maybe she might want to help Donna Getz obtain some degree of justice and compensation for the permanent physical harm Shell did to her and other members of her family.

And then there is Dr. Huong. Let’s not forget this poor man.

And on it goes. Just a thought and a suggestion.

I wish her well in her endeavors.

Deepwater Horizon Regulatory Failures

By W M Campbell – 12th January 2011 (Retired HSE Group Auditor, Shell International)

Regulatory Failures

As the queue begins to form of those who would sue BP and others for the failures that caused Deepwater Horizon, it appears, from the early release of the findings of the Presidential Commission published last week, that it was the negligence of multiple parties that caused the multiple failures.  Negligence also extends to the present and previous US Government administrations, their agencies and members of Congress.  To put the Commission Report in context we need to go back in time to 1982, and take in some history.

Two World events that were never to be repeated

The Ocean Ranger was a semi-submersible rig drilling an exploration well offshore Newfoundland with 84 crew on board when it sank on 15th February 1982. There were no survivors.  A Canadian Royal Commission spent two years looking into the disaster, a disaster not unlike many in that it was totally and utterly avoidable.

  • The Royal Commission concluded, amongst other things, that inspection and regulation of the offshore oil industry by the US and Canadian government was, in their words, ineffective.

Things would require to improve and both Governments made significant commitments including that of improving the regulatory framework for their offshore oil industries.

Six years later in 1988, an explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha platform caused the deaths of 167 persons.  The Public Inquiry into that event led to revolutionary changes to the way the industry was regulated in the UK and how the risks to persons offshore were to be assessed and reduced to acceptable levels.

  • Although the post Piper Alpha Safety Case culture was adopted widely both in Europe and around the world it was virtually ignored in the US.  For example, at the time of the Deepwater Horizon accident there was no requirement in the US to develop or submit Safety Cases to any Government agency.

The Presidential Commission Preliminary Findings into the Deepwater Horizon – a case study in lessons unlearned and actions undone

Despite the disasters that happened so many years ago, the lessons they brought forward it would appear were largely ignored.  According to the findings of the Commission over the years not much changed for the better with regards to the regulation of the offshore oil industry in the US.

  • The Presidential Commission found that the US Government failed to provide the oversight necessary to prevent lapses in judgement and management by a private industry.
  • Industry regulations were inadequate to address the risks of deepwater drilling. Many critical aspects of drilling operations were left to industry to decide without agency review.
  • They explain that the root cause for the Disaster can be better found by considering how efforts to expand regulatory oversight, tighten safety requirements, and provide funding to equip regulators with the resources, personnel, and training needed to be effective were overtly resisted.
  • Over many years it appears that Regulatory improvements were not supported by the Oil industry, members of legislature in Congress, and several administrations.
  • As a result, neither the regulations nor the regulators were asking the tough questions or requiring the demonstration of preparedness that could have avoided the disaster.
  • They say that even if the industry Regulator MMS had the resources and political support needed to promulgate the kinds of regulations necessary to reduce risk, it would still have lacked personnel with the kinds of expertise and training needed to enforce those regulations effectively.

This was an industry that appeared so out of touch with reality or ingrained with subterfuge that it presented its case for deepwater drilling almost totally on the argument that blowouts were rare events.

The US Government it appears accepted this with no background checks of the historical data.  In fact, prior to Deepwater Horizon the Gulf of Mexico as a region had the biggest share of the world’s blowouts.  It was in fact a hotspot for blowouts.  Since the sixties the Gulf suffered 11 notable blowouts (a frequency of recurrence of less than 4 years) with 31 associated fatalities and massive pollution. The lack of confidence in the Regulator MMS by the Administration was obvious as witnessed by the sacking of the Head of MMS and the demise of that organisation.  It took Congress only a few days of scrutiny to unearth that the emergency oil spill response plans for BP and others were not worth the paper they were written on.

Prior to giving agreement to issue leases to allow drilling in deepwater, if the Administration and Congress had used even the slightest amount of care and attention to detail, the Disaster may have been avoided by these actions alone.

No doubt, at least some of the Congressmen and administrators who were so energetically calling for the blood of the BP CEO way back in June last year, have over the years been motivated, not by safeguarding the health and safety of their citizens, but by their own selfish interests.  And no doubt in the process lining their pockets.

As the first Governmental body, the Environmental Protection Agency, makes public it intention to sue BP and others, the question needs to be asked – Where is the legitimacy of a Government and its legislature that allows it to take and support legal action for gross negligence against others in a matter where its own negligence has been clearly established?

Dr Huong defence against Royal Dutch Shell defamation action

It will soon be apparent to our readers from the extracts below, why Shell settled the Dr Huong litigation out of court. A very considerable pile of extremely smelly internal dirty laundry that Shell definitely did not want aired in open court, even in Malaysia.

By John Donovan

Dr John Huong, a former Shell geologist of almost 30 years standing was the FIRST SHELL employee to blow the whistle on the Shell reserves fraud (and other important issues relating to the misdeeds of Royal Dutch Shell management). He was not prepared to tolerate  the lives of Shell employees being recklessly put at risk.

As a result Shell was determined to silence him at all costs. Hence the unprecedented spectacle of EIGHT Royal Dutch Shell companies collectively bringing a defamation action against one former employee – an unemployed Malaysian who had no prospect whatsoever of finding alternative employment in his profession while the litigation cloud hung over the heads of himself and his family for several years.

Dr Huong made the mistake of believing in Shell’s STATEMENT OF GENERAL BUSINESS PRINCIPLES and in particular the pledges of “honesty, integrity, respect for people” in all of Shell’s dealings. He was also impressed by Shell’s philosophy in the claimed new ways of working, including the promotion of trust, openness, teamwork, professionalism and pride in what Shell does.  He did not realise until more recent years that all of the pledges and claims were purely hype and spin meant for use in global PR campaigns such as “Profits and Principles” i.e. for the consumption of gullible consumers and stakeholders.

Dr Huong filed a Defence containing a staggering array of allegations, facts and evidence directed against Royal Dutch Shell Group. It represented a devastating indictment of Shell by a conscience driven former Shell insider. If filed today, much more evidence could be included about Shell misdeeds, including its involvement in murder, torture, corruption, spying inside the Nigerian government and even spying on Shell’s own employees in association with a specialist unit partly funded and staffed by the FBI.

It will soon be apparent to our readers from the extracts below, why Shell settled the Dr Huong litigation out of court. A very considerable pile of extremely smelly internal dirty laundry that Shell definitely did not want aired in open court, even in Malaysia.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN KUALA LUMPUR

(CIVIL DIVISION) SUIT NO.S2-23-41 OF 2004

BETWEEN

SARAWAK SHELL BHD. (71978-W)

SHELL MALAYSIA TRADING SENDIRIAN BERHAD (6078-M)

SHELL REFINING COMPANY (FEDERATION OF MALAYA) BHD. (3926-U)

SHELL TIMUR SDN. BHD. ( 113304-H)

SHELL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION MALAYSIA B.V. (993963-V)

SHELL OIL AND GAS (MALAYSIA) LLC (993830-X)

SHELL SABAH SELATAN SDN. BHD. (228504-T)

SABAH SHELL PETROLEUM COMPANY LTD. (993229-W)

In the event that the Alleged Defamatory Statements, in their natural and ordinary meaning, mean or are capable of conveying the meanings pleaded in paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim and are found to refer to the Plaintiffs and/or the Shell Group, the Defendant avers that the Alleged Defamatory Statements are true in substance and fact.

23.1  Particulars the Defendant repeats the particulars pleaded in paragraph P6 above;

23.2  on 9.1.2004, the Shell Group disclosed to the public that in the period from 1997 to 2003,the Shell Group had deliberately and falsely made misleading statements by over declaring the quantities and/or values of their petroleum reserves. The Shell Group subsequently made 5 announcements on the devaluation of their petroleum reserves. The first announcement alone devalued the said petroleum reserves by at least 20%. As a result of the false and misleading declarations, the Shell Group was fined by the Securities & Exchange Commission in the United States of America and the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as “the Reserves Scandal”);

23.3  as a result of the Reserves Scandal, shares of the Shell Group being publicly traded dropped in value substantially, thus causing their shareholders to suffer very considerable losses;

23.4  shareholders of Royal Dutch Petroleum, a company within the Shell Group, in the United Kingdom are threatening legal action in regards to tax penalties arising from the unification of Shell Transport and Trading Company plc and Royal Dutch Shell, both companies within the Shell Group. This said unification was due to the restructuring of the Shell Group following the Reserves Scandal;

23.5 the Shell Group is faced with a continuing criminal investigation by the justice Department, United States of America into the actions of former and current members of the senior executives o f the Shell Group;

23.6  the Shell Group is faced with a public inquiry after the deaths of two workers in an accident on the Brent Bravo offshore platform in the United Kingdom, for which the Shell Group has already admitted liability and paid a record high fine;

23.7 the Shell Group has agreed to a proposal to pay a USD90 million settlement in respect of a class action lawsuit in relation to the Reserves Scandal, which was brought against the Shell Group by its own employees who were prejudiced by the materially false and misleading statements of the of the Shell Group on the reported proven oil and natural gas reserves;

23.8  on 31.8.2005, the Shell Group had announced a USD9.2 million dollar settlement of a shareholder derivative class action lawsuit in the United States of America, in relation to the Reserves Scandal. The lead plaintiffs therein are the Unite National Retirement Fund and the Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension Fund. The action is against named individual defendants including current directors of the unified new company, Royal Dutch Shell plc – including its CEO Jeroen van der Veer, Executive Director Malcolm Brinded and Maarten van den Berg. The plaintiffs allege that the said persons acted in breach of their fiduciary duties owed to companies in the Shell Group, abused their control over the said companies, aided and abetted breaches by others, and/or committed gross mismanagement and/or constructive fraud;

23.9 the Shell Group is facing another class action in the United States of America in relation to securities fraud, which has been granted leave to proceed by a Federal Judge, who has made a finding that the She11 Group and certain named directors including Jerocn van der Veer have a case to answer for alleged securities fraud in relation to the Reserves Scandal. The lead plaintiffs are the Pennsylvania State Employee Retirement System and the Pennsylvania Public School Employees Retirement System;

23.10 the Shell Group is also facing another class action lawsuit in the United States of America for alien tort, where 14 individual plaintiffs therein are suing the Shell Group for violations of customary international law in relation the She11 Group’s petroleum producing operations in Ogoniland, Nigeria. The plaintiffs allege that the Shell Group engaged in militarised commerce in a conspiracy with the former Military Government of Nigeria and that the Shell Group knowingly instigated, planned, facilitated, and participated in unprovoked attacks by the Nigerian military against the unarmed residents of Ogoniland, resulting in extrajudicial murder, crimes against humanity, torture, rape, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced exile and the deliberate destruction of private property. The Shell Group had admitted after the leaking of an internal report that the corporate behaviour of the Shell Group in Nigeria fed a vicious cycle of violence and corruption;

23.11  the Shell Group is also facing a class action in the United States of America by 26 plaintiffs, mostly Dutch pension funds, in relation to the Reserves Scandal, where the plaintiffs therein are suing in respect of losses suffered as a result of the purchase of shares in the Shell Group at artificially inflated prices and the subsequent drop in value of their investments when it was discovered that the Shell Group had deliberately and falsely over declared the quantities and/or values of their petroleum reserves;

23.12  legal proceedings have been commenced against the Shell Group and its senior executives in the District Court for the District of New Jersey, the United States of America for remedies under the Security Exchange Act of 1934 in relation to the Reserves Scandal, where the plaintiffs complain that the She11 Group had violated federal securities law by issuing material misrepresentations on the quantities and/or values of their petroleum reserves and that the Shell Group had violated accounting rules and guidelines relating to the declaration of oil and gas reserves, resulting in a material over declaration of oil and gas reserves and causing its shareholders to suffer loss when the Reserves Scandal occurred and the value of publicly traded shares of the Shell Group fell;

23.13 the Shell Group is also facing various other lcgal proceedings in the United States of America in relation to the Reserves Scandal;

23.14  AE Donovan, JA Donovan and/or Don Marketing Limited had commenced court proceedings against the Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom by in respect of breaches of confidence and/or breaches of contract in respect of 4 marketing proposals forwarded by Don Marketing Limited to the Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom, which the Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom had made use of without the consent or knowledge of Don Marketing Limited. The Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom eventually settled the said 4 court proceedings brought by AE Donovan, JA Donovan and Don Marketing Limited by making payments of substantial sums in respect of the claims and costs;

23.15  in or around 1 994, AE Donovan, JA Donovan and Don Marketing Limited has commenced court proceedings against the Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom by in respect of the breach of the terns of a mediation agreement by the Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom. The Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom settled this court proceedings by making payments of substantia1 sums in respect of the claim and costs;

23.16   in or around 1994, AE Donovan had also sued the Shell: Group companies operating in the United Kingdom for libel, which suit was also settled by the Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom by making payments of substantial sums in respect of the claim and costs;

23.17 JA Donovan had also sued the Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom for libel, which suit was also settled by the Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom by making payments of substantial sums in respect of the claim and costs;

23.18 the Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom had admitted to hiring a private security firm which engaged in undercover activities against AE Donovan, JA Donovan and Don Marketing during the course of the litigation between the parties;

23.19 the Shell Group companies operating in the United Kingdom had admitted to hiring a private security firms which engaged in undercover activities against environmental groups active in the United Kingdom and in other countries;

23.20 the Shell Group had been fined a substantial sum by the United Nations when it was found that an oil tanker chartered by the Shell Group had violated the international trade embargo against Iraq by transporting petroleum which had originated from Iraq;

23.21 a prosecution that was brought by the Department of Justice of the United States of America against the Shell Group in respect of the Shell Group having repeatedly and deliberately under declared the value of natuml gas extracted in the Gulf of Mexico to avoid the payment of royalties, was settled by the She11 Group by making a substantial payment;

23.22 the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights of Santa Monica of California, the United States of America has accused the Shell Group o f deliberately taking action to reduce its production of petroleum fuel products during periods of high demand so as to cause a shortage of fuel in California;

23.23  while the Shell:Group have at various times publicised that they operate and manage their businesses subject to their Statement of General Business Principles, the Shell Group has also subsequently denied that the said Statement of General Business Principles were intended to be enforceable against the Shell Group;

23.24 the Shell Group had settled class actions in British Columbia and Ontario, Canada in respect of damage suffered by vehicles which had used petrol sold by the Shell Group which contained an additive that caused the said damage;

23.25 the Shell Group faced a claim in Florida, the United States of America in respect of damage suffered by vehicles which had used petrel sold by the Shell Group which contained sulphur that caused the said damage;

23.26  in or about December 2002 in Nicaragua, the Shell Group was ordered by a court to pay substantial compensation to banana plantation workers who had suffered permanent and serious injury and/or disease and/or death as a result of being exposed to a pesticide which was sold by the Shell Group in Nicaragua subsequent to the banning of the said pesticide in the United States of America in 1979, with full knowledge that the said pesticide would cause permanent and serious injury and/or disease and/or death to persons exposed to it;

23.27  at various times, the Shell Group had caused and/or allowed petroleum producing and/or storage and/or transporting and/or processing and/or refining facilities,which are owned by the Shell Group and/or partly owned by the Shell Group, to cause wide spread pollution, resulting in damage to the environment and/or illness and disease to the local populations and/or destruction of property, in the following places:

23.27.1 Norco, Louisiana in the United States of America;

23.27.2 Port Arthur and Texas Deer Park, Texas in the United States of America

23.27.3 Rukpokwu and various petroleum production facilities in Nigeria;

23.27.4 Vila Carioca, San Paulo in Brazil;

23.27.5 Curacao;

23.27.6 Durban in South Africa;

23.28  at various times, the Shell Group, by their activities in petroleum-producing and/or storage and/or transporting and/or processing and/or refining facilities, which arc owned by the Shell Group and/or partly owned by the Shell Group, continued to put the local population at risk of damage to the environment and/or illness and disease and/or destruction of property, in the following places:

23.28.I    Pandacan, Manila in the Philippines;

23.28.2    Sakhalin IsIand in Russia.

In the alternative, the Defendant avers that the Alleged Defamatory Statements constitute fair comment on matters of public interest, namely that the Shell Group has been involved in numerous scandals and/or controversies and/or prosecutions worldwide, including the Reserves Scandal.

Particulars

24. 1  the Defendant repeats the particulars pleaded in paragraph 16 above;

24.2 the Defendant repeats the particulars pleaded in paragraph 23 above.

25. Paragraph 21 of the Statement of Claim is denied. The Defendant avers that by reason of the facts and matters pleaded in paragraphs 9 to 24 above, the Alleged Defamatory Statements have not caused any further damage and/or injury to the reputations of the Plaintiffs and/or the Shell Group.

26. Paragraph 22 of the Statement of Claim is denied. The Defendant avers that:

26.1    AE Donovan and JA Donovan had sole control over the contents of the said Website and had thc right to decide on the contributions that were to be posted on the said Website and also to edit any contribution received before posting the same on the said Website;

26.2    the Defendant did not publish the alleged posting on 16.6.2004 on the said Website or any other Internet website;

26.3    the alleged posting on 16.6.2004 was published by AE Donovan and/or JA Donovan on the said Website;

26.4    the alleged posting on 16.6.2004 was the result of AE Donovan an#or JA Donovan having edited and added their own comments to the correspondences between the Defendant and AE Donovan and/or JA Donovan, before posting the same onto the said Website;

26.5    the Defendant had absolutely no control over the contents of the alleged posting on 16.6.2004 on the said Website.

27.  Paragraph 23 of the Statement of Claim is denied. The Defendant avers that by reason of the facts and matters pleaded in paragraphs 9 to 24 above, the Alleged Defamatory Statements have not caused any further damage and/or injury to the reputations of the Plaintiffs and/or the Shell Group and have not Further caused the Plaintiffs and/or the Shell Group to be brought into any further public scandal, contempt nor odium.

28. Paragraph 24 of the Statement of Claim is denied. The Defendant repeats paragraph 26 and 27 above.

29. Paragraphs 25 to 29 of the Statement of Claim are denied. The Defendant avers that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to the remedies claimed therein.

30.  Save as hereinbefore expressly admitted, the Defendant denies each and every allegation of fact contained in the Statement of Claim as if the same were specifically set forth seriatim herein and specifically traversed.

Dated this 25th day of January 2006.

The above is a scanned copy, so there may be mistakes. The original can be viewed via this link.

COMPLETE DEFENCE DOCUMENT INCLUDING ABOVE INFORMATION

BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING

Final Report (Released 01/11/2011)

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Full Final Report (16.76 MB)

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Chapter 1 (2.25 MB)

“Everyone involved with the job…was completely satisfied…”
The Deepwater Horizon, the Macondo Well, and Sudden Death on the Gulf of Mexico
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Chapter 2 (4.02 MB)

“Each oil well has its own personality”
This History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States
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Chapter 3 (1.05 MB)

“It was like pulling teeth.”
Oversight–and Oversights–in Regulating Deepwater Energy Exploration and Production in the Gulf of Mexico
The Cause and Consequences of Disaster
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Chapter 4 (3.22 MB)

“But, who cares, it’s done, end of story, [we] will probably be fine and we’ll get a good cement job.”
The Macondo Well and the Blowout
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Chapter 5 (3.77 MB)

“You’re in it now, up to your neck!”
Response and Containment
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Chapter 6 (4.92 MB)

“The worst environmental disaster America has ever faced”
Oiling a Rich Environment: Impacts and Assessment
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Chapter 7 (3.94 MB)

“People have plan fatigue . . . they’ve been planned to death”
Recovery and Restoration
Industry, Government, and Energy Policy
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Chapter 8 (3.49 MB)

“Safety is not proprietary”
Changing Business as Usual
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Chapter 9 (2.33 MB)

“Develop options for guarding against, and mitigating the impact of, oil spills associated with offshore drilling.”
Investing in Safety, Investing in Response, Investing in the Gulf
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Chapter 10 (1.01 MB)

American Energy Policy and the Future of Offshore Drilling
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Back Matter (875.83 KB)

Shell whistleblower Dr John Huong and freedom of speech on the Internet

Extracts from comments by Dr John Huong regarding Alfred Donovan and the right to criticize Royal Dutch Shell on the Internet

I am baffled why Shell allows him to comprehensively tear Shell management to pieces on countless postings all over the Internet, including Shell’s own website – while I am not allowed the freedom to make criticism on Shell, my former employer of 29 years.

For anyone who doesn’t know, it is a matter of public record that I am currently the subject of a High Court Injunction and a Retraining Order obtained collectively against me by eight Royal Dutch Shell Companies. As far as I know, I am the only person on the entire planet whose freedom of expression is being curtailed by a multinational Goliath. It’s a strange feeling.

…why is it that Mr Donovan’s astonishingly candid and damaging commentary about Royal Dutch Shell is allowed by Shell lawyers? I have a copy of the legal statement made by Shell International Petroleum Company Limited in May 2005 recognising HIS rights to say anything he likes about Shell on his website. This just happens to be the same website where the posting of articles under my name led to Shell commencing proceedings against me. As indicated, for some unknown reason I do not enjoy the same basic human rights as Mr Donovan.

Does he get special treatment because of his age (88), race, nationality, or perhaps because he is a Shell shareholder? I am baffled. Is it proper that his rights are deemed to be different and superior to mine? I am not criticising the fact that I am being penalised because it would be dangerous for me to say anything about Shell – merely trying to fathom out why I have been singled out. There must be some valid reason which has not occurred to me although I cannot imagine what it could be.

The above are extracts from published comments by Dr John Huong on 1 October 2005 regarding Alfred Donovan and the right to criticize Royal Dutch Shell on the Internet

Shell, Cnooc Parent in Talks on Refinery Deal, China Daily Says

By Bloomberg News – Jan 11, 2011 3:21 AM GMT+0000

Royal Dutch Shell Plc is in discussions with China National Offshore Oil Corp. to participate in the second phase of the Huizhou refining project, the official China Daily reported.

A chemicals venture by Shell and China National Offshore is keen to join in the refining project in southern China, the newspaper reported, citing Zhu Mingcai, deputy chief executive officer of the venture. The second phase of the plant will require more than 50 billion yuan ($7.5 billion) of investment, China Daily said, citing unidentified company officials.

Li Lusha, Shell’s Beijing-based spokeswoman, declined to comment on the report. Liu Xiaobiao, the spokesman at China National Offshore, didn’t answer calls to his office and mobile telephones seeking comment.

The parent of Hong Kong-listed Cnooc Ltd. started operations at the refinery in Guangdong province in 2009. China National Offshore plans to almost double the plant’s capacity to 22 million metric tons a year, or 440,000 barrels a day, by 2013 in its second phase of development, according to President Fu Chengyu.

–Winnie Zhu and Baizhen Chua. Editors: Ryan Woo.

To contact the Bloomberg staff on this story: Winnie Zhu in Shanghai at wzhu4@bloomberg.net; Baizhen Chua in Beijing at bchua14@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Jane Lee at jalee@bloomberg.net.

SOURCE