In my recent article “Climate of fear at Shell Nyhamna Gas Plant in Norway” I made reference to a 144-page survey report commissioned by the SAFE union.
According to the survey report, Shell has introduced a company policy of encouraging a culture of informants. This policy is in force at Shell Nyhamna Gas Plant. In fact, Shell employees of “most of the group” are required to observe and inform on one another. Seems incredible, but apparently it is true. A witch hunt culture totally at odds with Shell’s claimed ethical code.
This is a related damning comment quoted in the survey made by one downtrodden employee representative: “At Nyhamna, it is rotten – hawk of hawks – I’ve never been in a workplace where it is so rotten as here.”
The research project seems to have been triggered by serious allegations made by a former elected Main Saftey Delegate at the plant, Runar Kjørsvik.
The academic background of the researchers responsible for the SAFE survey report is supplied below.
Interviews were conducted on an anonymous basis with safety officers, employees and management of Shell. The researchers had access to 1,200 different documents.
Since the report is in Norwegian, I obtained an English translation by an automated document translation facility, which provides some reasonable understanding of the content.
Nonetheless, it is safe only to draw a general impression as it is not always obvious who is actually making a comment.
My impression is that comments made most employees interviewed seem to support the claims made by Runar Kjørsvik.
I did run a word count on certain words in the report. It generated the following uncomfortable results for Shell’s authoritarian regime:
Termination – 55 times; Bullying – 14 times; Harassment – 17 times; Fear – 20 times; Discipline – 14 times; Punishment – 6 times; Informant – 8 times; Investigation – 33 times; Conflict – 31 times; Distrust 5 times; Inquisitorial – 6 times; Authoritarian – 12 times; Control 45; Reprisal – 2; Interrogation – 3 times; surveillance – 2:
The results and the informer culture partly account for my reference to a client of fear at the plant – what I have described as a faint echo of the tactics used by the Gestapo during the Nazi occupation of Norway.
Printed below is further information about the SAFE Survey Report and a link to download the original version. It is all translated into English by an automated process, with some tweaks by me. It is not a professional translation, so please take that into account.
The bold text is by me.
The researchers reached some rather frightening conclusions.
SAFE Association survey in 2016
Work Research Institute (AFI)
Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences, POBox 4 St. Olav plass, N-0130 OSLO
AFI-report 2017: 01
MAIN ARTICLE ENDS
The remainder consists of translated extracts from the SAFE report to be used as a reference source by John Donovan for further articles.
This report presents findings from the SAFE membership survey and a comprehensive case study at Norwegian Shell plant at Nyhamna in Molde.
Basically observations over time that suggests that employee participation and involvement workplaces deteriorate, especially in the oil and gas industry.
At Nyhamna there is great disagreement between management on one side and SAFE members, officers and safety representatives on the other on how participation and involvement of employees shall be practically mated. How cooperative model practised interrelated with the management principles introduced and how management practice these. At Nyhamna disagreements have led to conflicts that
became personalised and ended in a dismissal of the Head Safety Delegate. The resignation was reported before the labor law as unfair, but was settled before the process was started.
For us, this work has provided new insight into how the new organisational and management principles can affect practice of the Norwegian cooperation model.
Method and Data
Case study by Nyhavna based on two different methods and data sets. We have access to written documentation of the safety service at the facility and SAFE archives. In all, we have gained access to more than 1,200 different documents. In the review of the documentation we have been able to cross-check the documents against each other. This has provided opportunities to confirm or deny the various statements and descriptions. We have also been able to follow a time and changes in some individual cases.
We have interviewed 14 employees at its plant in Nyhamna. 10 of them were members of SAFE, four other unions. The 14 consisted of current and former safety representatives, officers and ordinary members.
The management of AS Norwegian Shell was interviewed on two occasions.
Summary of case study
Cooperation between management and SAFE their representatives, safety officers and members at Nyhamna has not been the best for years according to both parties.
Extracts from the report…
Elected officials have expressed major concerns for safety after the number of incidents and accidents in the North Sea has increased in 2016.
page 4 (first two words) running on to page 5
…interviews were conducted for the project by Bitten Nordrik and senior Eivind Falkum in AF1. Both were with the all the interviews and have been joining forces to apply them in the case study.
We assembled document analysis and interview material in a draft chapter of this report. Thereafter we got the interview with the CEO of Shell Norway and one from the HR department head office in Stavanger. In this interview, also attended six leaders at the plant in Nyhamna in video transfer to the meeting venue in Stavanger. In this interview, we presented some findings from documentation – lights and interviews with employees/officers/safety representative. Management got this way opportunity to meet specific conditions, descriptions of events and statements about collaborative relationships participation and involvement in social service by Nyhavna. This interview took place on 15 November
asks 2016. It was conducted a follow-up interview with the CEO of Shell Norway and HR manager at Nyhavna at AFI December 15, 2016.
…Norwegian Shell’s plant at Nyhamna in Molde. There is a landing plant gas including Ormen Lange field. The plant has about 700 employees currently.
We interviewed representatives, safety officers, employees and management of Shell…
Employee representatives believe that management has not complied with the rules of the Norwegian cooperation model…
After a status meeting between PSA management and the senior safety representative at Nyhamna experienced HVO that conflict escalated. Disagreement in case was contradictions between people. HVO did PSA note that he feared reprisals from management. The psychological pressure is described as large, and in consultation
with protective service were mailed a concern to management about this. This was never intended that notice of the harassment but a lack of worker participation.
…external lawyer… should have informed HVO on the right to professional assistance in order to safeguard their interests. This to ensure that the inquisitorial process does not lead to self-incrimination.
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Neither former HVO or HTV had confidence in the process, or ability to understand that information given to the expert psychiatrist and external lawyer could be self- incriminating.
It sets according to Endresen, external lawyer in a situation where he received information that neutral and independent investigator, which he later used in the subsequent oppsigelssak against one of the concerned in the investigation. When external lawyer acting as counsel, believes that the rule Endresen over broken and that it has caused a great strain and sick leave with a serious diagnosis.
In AS Norwegian Shell, contributed investigation to designating HVO as a scapegoat and it was part of the foundation when former HVO was dismissed. In discussing the meeting, emphasis was placed on an alleged accusation of experienced bullying and harassment investigation report should have refuted that took place.
That previously newly affected criticism of management not ceased after the investigation was seen as conflict behavior put safety at the plant at Nyhamna in danger.
We disagree with the facts conclusions of the examination since both sides had inconclusive the knowledge per the party cooperation, which we believe is reflected in unclear internal instructions and practices has resulted in the representatives ‘and safety representatives’ influence weakened. A recent example of this is “Complaint process in Norwegian Shell,” which we believe limits the shop steward and safety representative role in pursuing employees’ comments and concerns pertaining to the operation. What we believe are unclear and often incorrect instructions may be an explanation for role conflicts, not least among management.
Cooperation between management and SAFE their representatives, safety officers and members at Nyhamna has not been the best in years. This is expressed by both parties, both in the documentation (see Appendix 1) and interviews with us.
The investigation leading to the notice of termination of evasion of Main Safety Delegate at Nyhamna. The resignation was enrolled as unfair to labour law, but was reconciled in a process where the external consultant acted as attorney for the employer.
SAFE has members mostly in oil and gas, with the majority relating to production in the North Sea.
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5.2 Understanding of organisation and management in Shell Nyhamna
Management systems Shell introduced in Nyhamna (and most of the group) builds on ideas about why organisations can and should be controlled and managed. The main idea is that organisations are managed best by
• define and specify the individual tasks in detail
• prepare specifications, instructions, procedures and standards for how they should be performed • teach the individual what standards he should follow and how
• measure and verify that tasks are performed in accordance with standards
• sanction measured deviations from standards
Put simply: organisations are managed best by controlling individual behaviour. The instructions are very comprehensive and also contains general behaviour. The control of the individual employee is extensive, it builds on colleagues’ observations of each other. The colleagues and in principle all employees in the plant can observe and report each other to their immediate supervisor. Reporting of observed deviation becomes a form of notification where it is observed reprehensible individual behaviour is notified. One of them psychological theories behind this is that performance measurement and various control systems creates competition between employees, that competition will improve the performance of each individual and thus results in production. Moxnes (2012) argues that moderate anxiety can promote competition and achievement in businesses.
Control of individual behaviour were also the main principle of scientific management, as Frederick Taylor defined it and Henry Ford practised it in their assembly lines. In Nyhamna this organising principle wrapped in modern individually oriented rhetoric.
There are good reasons to argue that employees’ right to be consulted is circumvented by the introduction of Shell’s management at Nyhamna.
I used to work at a different location and the climate there, between management and employees, were completely different than at Nyhamna. We had our sword battles there as well, but we were much more united, in certainly we on the floor, and we cooperated in an entirely different way. There was a good working environment. At Nyhamna, it is rotten – hawk of hawks – I’ve never been in a workplace where it is so rotten as here (employee representative, August 2016).
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For example, a former HVO on several occasions pointed out that the composition of the AMU operation has not been in compliance with applicable regulations l.! , and name of the currently rendering representatives confirms that there may still be a problem.
In an interview with employee representatives confirmed HVO’s request and the reasons for it, but the dispute over the composition of the AMU is not shown by the minutes...
For protection service was a problem that the reports came late and that they were often flawed and manipulated so that what really was said in the meetings No such of the reports (employee representative, 2016).
Management acknowledges that there has been disagreement about the content of the minutes and they show that the minutes now printed and signed before the meeting repealed.
According to two of our informants were given informed that it was HR to govern elections;
When I gave a clear message that HR can not control the election and asked them to show me where in the law it says HR can do it. I got nowhere, management had decided that Shell should have more control over the choice of safety representatives …. It all ended with the HR self-selected candidates and large set all had positions higher up in the system. This I protested about. I reiterated that HR could not control this and turned to law.
Anyway, this shows how strong HR wants to manage safety service and AMU (by the employees Representative, August 2016).
The episode is confirmed by several.
Both union representatives and safety delegates we interviewed believe that management in general and HR more specifically, have no respect for conservation work at Nyhamna:
… Protection service pointed out that the company has been absent in their own safety inspections in the period over several years and that it is protected service alone having organised, performed, written referrer and further followed any findings.
Employee representatives are concerned about what they describe as “cultural differences.” At some locations in A / S Norwegian Shell cooperate better than the others, which they believe are related to the club strength.
IA / S Norwegian Shell experiencing employee representatives that BHT did not respect, and sometimes opposing, interaction between safety service and the greatest union SAFE.
It is frightening to see how Shell opposes systems with union and safety service next. They work systematically to weaken and gag the influence workers should have. The also try to isolate safety representatives from the union. All this is in violation of applicable legislation, regulations and agreements. In addition, contrary to the political preconditions for three- Party work and the Norwegian model that underlies our trust-based regulatory and supervisory regime. It’s not such a society we should have.
In December 2014, changes were made in A / S Norwegian Shell staff regulations, in that Article 9 (disciplinary close reactions in employment) were included. Employee representatives say that they neither received adequate information about the changes, or an opportunity to discuss them before new regulations existed. The added rules that are then sent to the authorities for approval. However, it was not done and Regulations signed by the CEO alone…
The management explains it as follows:
It is true that labor regulations in 2014 were only signed by the CEO.
It’s amazing to see that a company like Shell, chose to break the law to perform tricks in place a fictitious staff regulations full of force and disciplinary punishment systems. That they dare to manipulate
workplace regulations behind the back of the shop stewards, testifies to a total contempt for the Norwegian cooperation model (Comment, 2nd Deputy SAFE 2017).
Y.3 gap between word and deed
When we heard about the major cost reductions that they planned, we would have the most information and come together to find alternative proposals to cutting. We were willing to lift every stone to avoid downsizing. But management had decided and everything they did in relation to us, we experienced as leather actions.
In connection with an initial meeting in February 2014, put forward by one of the managers there are several perceived as implicit threats if confidentiality was breached:
In that meeting, we were told that what was discussed in the meeting were not going out to the employees in the organisation. Everything that was said was to be regarded as confidential, because it was an initial meeting and nothing was quite specific. It was said it would create turmoil if we went out with what we learned. In fact it was stated that ‘if anyone here ruined my project by releasing information so I take it very personally, you have been muzzled! ‘(Employee representative, 2016).
In the minutes that were penned by management, did not reflect the strong disagreement and often heated slips of the tongue.
It became personal for several managers, not because the HVO was any harder than us others but because HVO, who appeared on behalf of us all, was designated as the reason NYH2016 not put in place soon enough for bonus payments.
The above and other similar statements expressing mistrust between management and employee representatives at this time.
Fear Culture under development
The more who learn the systems, the more they will be a topic and contribute to a growing fear culture, believes stewards and safety representatives. More speaks of “a fear culture in development” (ansattrepresen- aunts, 2016). This includes employees, but also among employee representatives, which we ask them deepen.
Management has overall introduced systems that force employees to choose between the plague and cholera. When it approaches the “milestones” so increases the pressure on the bottom line. PST” feel pressured to find solutions within the deadlines, for them are the leaders and pusher. Press, press, pressure, I do not think management understands how big security risk becomes of it. Employees put in situations where they fear to be reported as uncooperative, virtually forced to breaking rules. When rules are broken, they still live in fear, then to have been observed and reported commented as they broke the rule.
VI Concern regarding chemical storage and exposure
In an interview, several employee representatives described ves protection service and the WEC’s sphere structure and function of forward 2014, was severely lacking. Then again HVO took the fall 2013 started gaining structures place.
VI.1 Audit of hazardous substances
Employees of Shell operations, registered on several occasions that the bottles with flammable gases and oxygen stood stored improperly, and wrote observations on this !IT , without it being addressed. The 01/13/14, implemented leads Molde municipality, Fire and Rescue Service audit of hazardous substances at Nyhamnaj, and the depreciation covered violating regulations for handling hazardous substances.
V1.2 Benzene Exposure
Work Act § 3-1, the requirements for systematic HSE work, including mapping of several factors.
Upon review of the regulations on measures and limits for physical and chemical factors in labor environment g , The safety service attentive to what they interviewed characterise as very inade-
full measurements of emissions/exposure to chemicals in AS Norwegian Shell, department Nyhamna. After registered that employees over a 7 year period may have been exposed to higher Benzene values 2!! than the An- commanded, in areas where maintenance work was done, they made themselves aware of this. IN that context, they expressed that employees were not made aware of the high value one neither had been able to take the necessary precautions by donning the necessary protective equipment. Since Benz exposure increases the risk of various forms of cancer, the case was reported for LPU Operations meeting in December 2014:
Measurements by changing filters on vreskefangere shows much higher values than previously assumed. This means that the personnel may have been exposed to benzene …
SPS is developed globally and is part of the corporate management system. Compared with an organizational and psychosocial working environment survey, it has a narrow focus. Employee representatives have the anyway been perceived as corporate working environment survey as this is the only investigation late such as addresses the issues of freedom climate, inclusion, bullying and harassment, “free from harassment & discrimination “and” free to speak my mind. Regarding these variables employee representatives have long expressed concern because the trend has been in a negative direction.
VII Summary: employee representers distrust of management and experience fear culture in protection service and steward wrist
The administration recognises that the climate of cooperation between them and the employee representatives at Nyhamna, has been and are at times, challenging. They believe, however, that this has improved over the past year and that labor taker participation practiced in a better way. Reference is made to the strategy ‘fit for the futures. Of stewards and safety representatives that we interviewed only one thought that the relationship had improved somewhat, albeit not significantly. A short time ago was the second deputy chairman of the SAFE in the face of employee representatives and top managers of Shell and he summarises the experiences as follows:
Shell introduces one after another management system under the guise that it is security style-roof. The so-called lifesaving rules, hearts and minds, behaviour based safety, underperformance,
div intoxicant policy introduced without real participation is not about safety and work environment. This is disciplining and authoritarian systems is about power over labor beidstakerne. They are designed to create fear, and under-reporting of incidents. such indi-vidrettede systems are inconsistent with the regulatory requirements for collective security systems, including management regulations and regulations on organisation leadership and participation requires.
In interviews with employee representatives and safety delegates recounted a deep distrust of management and more mean management has set an example of how far they are willing to go to get rid of those who are “Bothersome. u This has created a fear among those who today has assumed office; “Now we know that the lead are serious when they threaten ‘to-take-one Kjorsvik.’ “The employee representatives here refers to is how the longstanding conflict over employer’s managerial prerogative versus Worker participation was solved by former HVO was dismissed. That neither the authorities intervened facing business after repeated accordance inquiries, have further reinforced the feeling that they are relatively unprotected in the office of safety Ombudsman/chief.
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In management’s previously mentioned attempt to insert their preferred candidate in K-VO enlisted took who was then rendering HVO on new contact with the PSA.This time will also be sent a worry message via email, where the Council expressed its anxiety over the management’s attitude and behaviour toward safety service. IN this context, points out that the protection service to work freely and independently of management, but that it is made more difficult by Shell’s management at Nyhamna. Protection Service also says that they are troubled safety and what they believe is an alarming number of incidents. concern message followed up with a phone call to ensure that the PSA representative has understood the content and how serious they experienced the situation. It was also requested assistance. Towards the end of the conversation in- propagated it that connected SAFE is contacted and that they may come up in an emergency meeting.
Then took HVO up momentum and it was pointed out that Shell management in project and operations, not respected safety service and thus did not take their feedback regarding events and NES
tenulykker seriously. PSA showed then that the management was of a different opinion and that management felt they controlled. Also Benzene case was discussed. In conversation with PSA showed former HVO to a meeting with the management, the 09/04/14, in which he had stated that the cooperation with the management was so difficult that he could no longer work in his office:
I had repeatedly tried to lift it challenging cooperation in line, but without success. It was an uncultured that I meant that the organization could not continue to have, where leaders opptro in threatening ways to put employees’ representatives under undue pressure. manage- Late unable to distinguish between cause and person, and while they had no respect for my role that HVO made me as a difficult person. I am told that both members of the safety service almost and SAFE representatives, so they felt watched and persecuted and that this created fear. Fear to stand as candidates for elected office, fear of management and fear of HR.
In this context showed HVO also to what he thought was the planting of false information about him Shell deviation system.
We’ve simply got an incredible authoritarian system. Royal Duch Shell, does not care about the Norwegian model, and probably they do not know what participation means. However, when neither the Norwegian management seems to know, or think that they can work for it, then it becomes difficult to travel us who take office. This must be spoken about so no more see it as our former HVO experienced, for it was just awful. (Long pause). Sometimes things so terrible that you can not find words that fit, so it is in this case (employee representative, 2016).
It was further pointed out that the annual Shell People Survey was not an adequate the conditions that they believe have increased risk of incidents and major accidents at Nyhamna. their concern is reflected by the way not the PSA audit report which states that: “It was not made observations relating to the theme of the audit.
Fear of being labelled as a trouble maker. Most of mistrust and
negative attitudes from management, with little opportunity for involvement and participation is feedback we have received from others.
For each sword stroke increases frustration among managers and employee representatives at Nyhamna. Temperature described by several employees and officers as high, and in fact the investigation, which we see here out, describes a leader “overheating” in connection with a meeting at the Ormen Lange.
After status meeting between PSA management and the HVO experienced former HVO conflict escalated by disagreement in case was contradictions between people. At this time did former HVO also
make PSA aware that he feared reprisals from management. At this time described the psychological pressures as large, and in consultation with conservation service was emailed a concern to Management:
This I had to exemplify referring to episodes in which both I and others, world safety representative and shop steward, had experienced management behaviour as threatening. HR representative asked several times if I thought that I was harassed, something I first disproved. After I have had described the episodes addressing HR at new to me and said; “But, what you describe here are the examples of bullying and harassment. When I answered that; “Yes, if you think it is perhaps it ‘. In the minutes and subsequent correspondence was why I like HVO notified bullying and harassment, but it was never what I did.
Former HVO and other representatives of the employees believe that management of this frarnpro-Voser a notification of bullying and harassment, which the leaders we interviewed refute: “We received an alert on bullying and harassment that we were forced to take on.
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that through conversations with several claims to have uncovered “an uncultured at the plant where methods as fear of layoffs, threats, verbal abuse in meetings, accusations of disloyalty, untimely use of taus- secrecy and harassment is part of everyday life.
The implication and sometimes bullying of HVO is rough and must taken with the utmost seriousness. It is the untimely interference, or attempt to control safety service, which in Basically, the main problem, and “sometimes the bullying of the HVO.” It is suggested however that problem is so large that it can or should entail investigation and disciplinary actions. Instead concludes
that most problems are due to “lack of knowledge about the Working Environment Act and internal culture how to cooperate with employee representatives and safety service. “This is also emphasised by SAFE representative.
It is only under pressure from the HR, and promises of anonymity that steward sends the minutes, then with the following text: “Hey, here’s the report. Note this is for you and nn their eyes. Incidentally,
it shared with HVO and steward Nyhamna, under the same conditions. u The assumption of anony-formities was however broken, and with it mean more staff representatives that management also broke with Shell core values of “honesty”, “integrity” and “respect for people.” Of core values has ordered operations derived following requirements for management:
As part of this system, it is also the responsibility of management to ensure that our employees with safe and confidential channels to raise concerns and report on missing
IX.4 investigation and due process
Bar Association guidelines for private investigations specifically requires the rule of law and per- protection of privacy, as they stipulate that:
Generally, it is assumed that the interests of due process and privacy must be given a more central place the stronger investigation character of investigation for mapping An- response relationship, including offenses.
The wording of the mandate, according to Endresen suggests that external lawyer have designed it. If it is correct, argues Endresen that there are violations of the Guidelines, point 2.1 as specifies that “It rests with the principal to determine the mandate for the investigation and the scope for investigation committee’s work. u Unless this point followed the connection with mission and mandate relation to the requirement of independence in the Guidelines, point 3.2, will be wrong.
I experienced having to ask for questioning by a psychologist. Under the guise of a corporate HR representatives should learn the methodology of facts investigations, she too was present during interrogation. The two started to tell me how confident and impartial investigation was, and how safe it was to share information with them. I said I was not comfortable with that HR was present because this was not in accordance with the guidelines for factual investigations, but it was not taken into account. Initially, the psychologist exceptionally responsive, and he spent a long time to make me safe by listening to my story. After 1.5 hours of interrogation, we took a coffee break, and when we came back was the tone another. The interrogation was more direct and questions came fast. There was no room to think about the questions that were style. This applies particularly to questions complicity, working law and management rights. There and then I experienced the methodology totally conscious effort to get me out of composure that I might give the wrong answer. I felt completely terrible mistreatment.
NN presented in meeting 04/09/14 complained of perceived bullying/harassment from several leaders at Shell plant Ormen Lange (Nyhamna).
Former HVO experienced this as surveillance, adding that it also went beyond his mother who also live on the property.
Colleagues were ultimately afraid to be seen with me.
,,,but were reconciled in a process where the external consultant acted as attorney for the employer.
Regarding the current situation, the management of Shell stated that:
We have – and have had – a strong desire to improve the climate of cooperation at Nyhamna. We agree in that in recent years has been characterised by periodically strained relationship and that we forward divided have challenges to work with – despite clear improvements over the past year (November ask / December 2016).
When we ask the employee representatives there is one who expresses what he believes are attempts at improvement while others believe cooperation conditions still difficult. We believe the parties
are still subject has a very different understanding of reality and that there is still a long way to an agreed agreement on the current challenges and solutions. More employee representatives are concerned that management set an example by depositing former HVO, and that it has created fear among both officers and safety representatives. More expressing “distrust of management,” and some refer to recent lever-see when they say that “the leadership is only concerned to refurbish the facade”:
Layoffs enhanced secrecy and all that the officers and employees want answers to be attempted hushed up. Monitoring, use of consequence management with punishments, against a Labour Regulations that are cheated in place, scaring both trust instrument and the employees. More and several questions about what management really are doing, and there is very little confidence in manage- action. Management conceals information and blurs his purpose so that afterwards when the truth emerges, they can say “we have told you,” or “when you have misunderstood”. The management put a lot of energy in looking for “sinners” ie those who see the madness and that manifests itself. We no longer safe settings to express ourselves in because management plants her to elicit statements, some managers call it to “smoke out the fox den.” current situation is pressures and uncertain and the new proposals of conflict procedures could result in the was made with former HVO is not left as an exception but as a daunting standard, where HR can freely vent to their madness. All this makes it difficult to recruit for key honorary, one must almost be willing to provide both health and career. Occupational health is supposed to be neutral and ensure safety, but acting attacking and it shows how wrong this HR system. The company says one thing but does something else, and they are faithful to almost anything. More fears for executives who jokes that they can find the “take-one new-Runar Kjørsvik”.
Today’s condition at Nyhamna, may well more or less said to be characterised by fear both management and what reorganisation “fit for the future” l.:l!! and the introduction of new labour regulations should entail. Management has to some extent succeeded with its “divide and rule philosophy”, while they talk so nice that now goes collaboration so much better.
Witch hunt is on, and the inquisitorial systems soon installed.