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Posts Tagged ‘Jeroen van der Veer’

Do shale right, former Shell official says

Published: Oct. 4, 2011 at 7:55 AM

BERLIN, Oct. 4 (UPI) — Executives in the energy industry need to invest more in shale gas while advancing environmental issues, an official said from Berlin.

The United States is examining its shale gas potential as a way to address energy security issues. European countries like Poland and Ukraine are doing the same, though France has enacted a moratorium on shale gas exploration because of environmental concerns.

Jeroen van der Veer, a former chief executive officer at Royal Dutch Shell, told delegates at a petrochemical summit in Berlin, that shale could be a “game changer” if managed effectively, the Platts news service reports.

“Personally, I’m in favor of full transparency and I think Shell will very soon come out with announcements in this direction,” he said.

Van der Veer was referring to chemicals used in the extraction of shale gas. Critics note that some of the chemicals used in the extraction process, known as fracking, pose a significant risk to underground water resources.

Energy companies counter that fracking, if done correctly, doesn’t pose a significant environmental threat. Some environmental regulators in the United States note that shale gas exploration has a long safety history.

© 2011 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved.


Gazprom Sees LNG Plant Expansion Backed By Sakhalin-2 Fields

That’s in marked contrast to Shell, which while operating Sakhalin-2 in 2006, was forced to execute a below-market sale of its operating position at bargain prices to Gazprom, the country’s giant gas gathering and distribution company.

By Anna Shiryaevskaya – Sep 14, 2011 4:04 PM GMT+0100

OAO Gazprom expects the Sakhalin-2 venture to produce enough fuel to support the expansion of Russia’s only liquefied natural gas plant as its partner Royal Dutch Shell Plc (RDSA) seeks resources outside the project.

The partners plan to extend the Piltun-Astokhskoye field to feed Sakhalin-2’s liquefied natural gas plant, Vsevolod Cherepanov, head of Gazprom’s gas, condensate and oil production department, told reporters today in St. Petersburg. Additional volumes from producing fields may feed the plant’s expansion or be shipped via the Gazprom-owned pipeline network, he said.

There will be enough gas for a third LNG train “if there is such a will,” Cherepanov said. The project’s two LNG units, called trains, are working at their full capacity, producing more than 9.6 million metric tons of liquid fuel a year.

Shell has been pushing to add a third LNG production unit at the $22 billion Sakhalin-2 venture north of Japan as the Hague-based producer seeks to boost gas production worldwide. Gazprom hasn’t yet agreed as it tries to balance its obligations to supply gas domestically against the attractiveness of exports to Asia’s growing markets.

Cameron in Moscow

Expansion of the LNG plant, which was designed to accommodate a third unit, was on the agenda for talks between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron in Moscow earlier this week. Shell Chief Executive Officer Peter Voser met with his Gazprom counterpart Alexei Miller yesterday, the Russian company said in a statement.

Producing gas at the southern part of Piltun-Astokhskoye, one of the two offshore fields that feed the plant, may be challenging as it lies under layers of oil and condensate, Cherepanov said. Gazprom, Shell and its partners in Sakhalin-2 Mitsubishi Corp. (8058) and Mitsui & Co. will seek to develop the extension as “the next stage,” boosting profitability, Cherepanov said.

Output at the Lunskoye field may be increased, a Kremlin official said ahead of Cameron’s visit.

The two producing fields may boost output by 4 billion cubic meters a year for as long as five years, Cherepanov said. The additional gas may be supplied to the LNG plant or into the pipeline system to supply to domestic consumers, he said. That volume would be sufficient for about 3 million metric tons of LNG, while the additional LNG unit may have a capacity to produce almost 5 million tons.

Supply Sources

“Sources of supply will be discussed by Gazprom and Shell as part of a protocol signed in November 2010,” Vera Surzhenko, a spokeswoman for Shell in Russia, said by phone today. They will include existing fields and potentially new fields, she said.

Gazprom and Shell in November agreed to expand cooperation in Russia and abroad. Shell may offer Gazprom assets in Asia in exchange for a deal to expand Sakhalin-2, people with knowledge of the negotiations said in February.

Gazprom last week opened a domestic pipeline from Sakhalin Island to the port city of Vladivostok on Russia’s Pacific coast under government orders to build pipelines and supply gas to Russia’s infrastructure-poor eastern regions.

Output from Gazprom’s Kirinskoye field, part of the neighboring Sakhalin-3 project, will be the main field feeding the link after production starts next year. Reserves at Yuzhno- Kirinskoye, also part of Sakhalin-3, may rise by as much as 100 billion cubic meters to 360 billion cubic meters this year after new exploration data, Cherepanov said.

Shell looked at Gazprom’s nearby Sakhalin-3 development for reserves on concerns the Sakhalin-2 fields may not be sufficient for the expansion. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin invited Shell to participate in Sakhalin-3 during a meeting in 2009 with outgoing CEO Jeroen van der Veer and his replacement Voser. Gazprom has since said it wants to develop Sakhalin-3 without foreign partners.

Gazprom, Russia’s biggest gas producer and export monopoly, agreed in 2006 to buy just more than 50 percent of the Sakhalin- 2 venture for $7.45 billion. Shell controls 27.5 percent of the Sakhalin Energy Investment Co. operator, and Mitsubishi and Mitsui hold the balance.

To contact the reporter on this story: Anna Shiryaevskaya in Moscow at ashiryaevska@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Torrey Clark at tclark8@bloomberg.net

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Will Exxon Be Safe in Russian Hands?

That’s in marked contrast to Shell, which while operating Sakhalin-2 in 2006, was forced to execute a below-market sale of its operating position at bargain prices to Gazprom, the country’s giant gas gathering and distribution company.

Banter with Michiel Brandjes of Royal Dutch Shell Plc

By John Donovan

On Friday I sent an email to Mr Michiel Brandjes (right), Company Secretary & General Counsel Corporate of Royal Dutch Shell Plc. It had a subject – “Gannet Oil Spill: Document Authenticity” – but no content.  It was sent by mistake.

It prompted the subsequent self-explanatory email correspondence.

EMAIL RESPONSE FROM MR MICHIEL BRANDJES, COMPANY SECRETARY OF ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC

From: michiel.brandjes@shell.com
Date: 12 September 2011 08:00:54 GMT+01:00
To: john@shellnews.net
Subject: RE: Gannet Oil Spill: Document Authenticity

Dear Mr Donovan,

You email below is the shortest and least objectionable email I have received from you to date.

Best Regards,
Michiel Brandjes
Company Secretary and General Counsel Corporate
Royal Dutch Shell plc

Registered office: Shell Centre London SE1 7NA UK
Place of registration and number: England 4366849
Correspondence address: PO Box 162, 2501 AN  The Hague,
The Netherlands

—–Original Message—–
From: John Donovan [mailto:john@shellnews.net]
Sent: vrijdag 9 september 2011 17:38
To: Brandjes, Michiel CM RDS-LSC
Subject: Gannet Oil Spill: Document Authenticity

Dear Mr Brandjes

ENDS

REPLY BY JOHN DONOVAN

From: John Donovan <john@shellnews.net>
Date: 12 September 2011 16:29:25 GMT+01:00
To: michiel.brandjes@shell.com
Subject: Re: Gannet Oil Spill: Document Authenticity

Dear Mr Brandjes

I am pleased that the brevity of my email apparently brightened your start of a new week.

I had intended to complete and send the email after receiving analysis of the leaked document by experts.  Seems that I sent it without realising.

Not as amusing as when Mr Wiseman mistakenly sent us an email about our objectionable activities, which he had meant to send only to Jeroen van der Veer and Malcolm Brinded.

With regards to the leaked document, the collective expert opinion available from our Shell related sources is that although it may contain clues to the origin of the Gannet Alpha oil spill, without further facts or information, there is not enough evidence to warrant further comment by us at this time.

In view of the following paragraph of your email dated 22 December 2009, I am never sure whether we will receive a response from you:

It is in my DNA indeed to respond to all and everything as appropriate. However, while that is the starting position please note that I can not be held to always respond to everything as a Company Secretary. There are messages which do not call for a response or not by me, there are matters in which a further response can not serve any purpose, and there are persons with whom I do not or no longer communicate for justified reasons. I intend to continue to help genuine third parties whom you refer to me and do not fall in the earlier mentioned categories.

It is not quite as mind-bending as the explanation by Donald Rumsfeld of known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns.

For the record, we do still receive email meant for Shell every day.

As per your standing request, I weed out what I consider to be junk mail, which appropriately is mainly from China.  Much of it is addressed to my father, probably because he is perceived, perhaps because of his WSJ image displayed on our website, as being the supreme leader at Royal Dutch Shell. We direct enquiries about “Shell” lottery scams to the Shell Fraud/Scam Alert on your website. All job applications/CV’s which arrive from around the world are directed to the appropriate page on your website.

All other enquiries and business proposals meant for Shell are passed to you.

Best Regards

John Donovan

CORRESPONDENCE ENDS

Can BP’s investors give oil giant the time to learn from Shell’s mistakes?

Results clouded by rivals and identity crisis! Titanic court battle looms for oil company! Executives may face charges!

By Rowena Mason: 9:33PM BST 30 Jul 2011

If those headlines were meant for readers in 2011, the subject could be only one sorry corporate story: BP and its $40bn (£24bn) Gulf of Mexico oil disaster.

However, the real answer lies six years earlier in another just as painful oil scandal that hit BP’s nearest rival, Royal Dutch Shell. This was the heated reaction to news that Shell had over-stated its oil reserves by a third in the years leading to 2004.

Downgrade after downgrade kept hitting the company’s share price until matters came to a head over an email from Shell’s head of exploration to the chief executive.

“I am becoming sick and tired of lying about the extent of our reserves issues and the downward revisions that need to be done because of far too optimistic bookings,” it said.

Chief executive Sir Phillip Watts resigned and was escorted from the premises. No further action was taken against management, with official Financial Services Authority and US Securities and Exchange Commission inquiries into their roles dropped.

For a short period, this corporate giant, on which 1m people rely for employment, was run by just three interim leaders while there was a management clear-out at the top and merger between its Dutch and British divisions with Jeroen van der Veer taking the helm.

An array of authorities started launching investigations and the company began an amnesty, where all departments could take a cold hard look at their numbers and declare any discrepancies.

By its own admission, the energy major has really only just recovered from the scarring restructuring, cultural change and executive hand-wringing that ensued.

Now powering ahead of BP with profits of $8bn in the past three months alone, Shell is the largest oil company in Europe with an enviable pipeline of new oil and gas projects due to boost production this year. Lauded by investors and analysts, these are the same City faces who were back then pressing for the company to be taken over or split up – much like for BP today.

Although BP’s accident is a completely different, more expensive problem, there are still parallels with Shell’s historic corporate scandal – most notably its probable longevity. Herein lies the tale of how Shell regrouped from one scandal, to transform itself into a company that is today worth twice as much as BP, even though the pair are often mentioned in the same breath.

Despite today’s differences, industry insiders argue that both companies began to lose their way years before their respective disasters struck.

According to former Shell executives at the time the scandal hit, the seeds of the crisis were sown when the company started to base its business around trading and becoming more “asset-light”, cutting costs aggressively and setting tough bonus-related targets. The focus had shifted away from its historical expertise in engineering and operations, in much the same way that BP has been criticised for neglecting its traditional strengths.

What’s more, one disaster followed another, much like BP stumbled out of the Gulf of Mexico straight into an almighty row with its Russian billionaire partners and Kremlin-backed oil company Rosneft.

“Do we spy another PR disaster on Shell’s horizon after Nigeria, Brent Spar and the reserves debacle?” one Sunday newspaper asked in 2005. Environmental and security problems in Nigeria followed hot on the heels of the reserves scandal in the wake of greater public scrutiny and mistrust.

Shell’s ultimate solution for regaining the trust of the market was to go back to basics – investing billions of dollars in new production of oil and gas, particularly in “unconventional” extraction. Its management repeated buzz words such as “technology” and “engineering” to reassure investors the company was going back to its dependable core strengths.

It pushed into North American deepwater, pioneering liquid gas projects in Australia and Qatar, plus development in Russia’s remote Sakhalin region. All were technically complex, some suffered delays and cost over-runs, and in total, they needed $150bn of capital, but the gamble, supported by oil prices at near record highs, is on the brink of paying off.

Insiders say investors were not always supportive, pushing for immediate improvements and near-term returns, but in the end, Shell’s new management persuaded the market to endure years of patient faith in its turnaround.

The question is now whether BP’s shareholders, bewitched by the possible £180bn break-up value of the company, will be willing to grant it such leeway. BP has promised “consolidation” and extra capital investment in exploration and production, having completed a promising $7bn deal in India.

Yet some analysts are sceptical that BP has acted quickly enough in clearing out the old management and realising the scale of its problems, which could hinder any attempts to keep the 100-year-old corporate behemoth in one piece.

“It took Shell a long time to recover, but the Shell machine went into action quickly,” says Malcolm Graham-Wood, a long-time BP watcher from VSA Capital. “They found out what was wrong and they rectified it. The depth and breadth of management within Shell sorted it out. What’s a shame is that BP have not got depth or breadth of management and they’re making a mess of it. I think it will take them years to get back to the state they were in before. The Shell story is, and has been to me for a couple of years now, about the huge projects which have come on stream in this quarter,” he adds.

“Shell has not been distracted by any of the self-inflicted grief affecting BP and has outperformed accordingly.”

Stuart Joyner, analyst at Investec, agrees that it will take years for BP to recover.

“I think we have to be patient. In fact management has been quite explicit about telling investors that at least for the remainder of this year, and possibly into next year.

“In terms of when BP will organically start to improve, I think we’re looking at a couple of years out. It could take even longer than that if you look at the two key strategic plans [CEO Bob] Dudley has made. By their very nature they are very long-term, which is not to criticise, but realistically it means that anything they do in India and Russia will probably not impact the portfolio for the best part of a decade.

“Shell has really only just – in 2011 – started to reap benefits from what it put in place after the reserve scandal. It’s taken the best part of a decade for them to change the portfolio and that’s partly because their strategy was to invest in long-lived assets like Qatar, and obviously that has taken longer for them to turn around. But they are producing an enormous amount of cash at the moment and we saw that in both quarters.”

Now that Shell has won round its critics, the challenge will be to keep up the momentum and stave off those who believe BP’s crisis has exposed cracks in the over-sized, integrated oil major.

Shell’s chief executive, Peter Voser, argues that the company has proved the worth of owning both production and refineries through projects like the Canadian oil sands and Qatari developments. These look after oil and gas from extraction to point of sale. And he claims national oil company partners value the versatility of Shell’s skills across upstream and downstream and ability to invest in both areas.

The question now for oil investors is whether BP’s depressed share price offers more of an opportunity for increasing value than Shell, which must keep up its production growth and reserve replacement.

The jury is still out in the City, with little faith in BP’s management team in evidence at this early stage in its turnaround.

BP vs Shell

2000 BP unveils its new sunflower logo to symbolise “dynamic energy” and green sympathies, after a period of acquisitions and quick profits. Shell cuts costs, makes record profits.

2002 Low oil prices and new North Sea taxes hit profits at both companies. Shell says it is “uncertain about meeting output targets”.

2004 Shell reveals that reserves have been over-stated and merges its Dutch and UK divisions, with Jeroen van der Veer taking the helm. BP buys back $5bn (£3bn) of shares after moving into Russian oil with TNK-BP partnership.

2005 BP and Shell conduct secret early merger discussions, revealed years later by former BP chief Lord Browne. BP suffers blast at Texas refinery, which kills 15 people.

2006 Russia seizes Shell’s oil assets at Sakhalin. BP suffers oil leaks in Alaska and Lord Browne fights push for his retirement.

2007 Investigation into Texas blast points to serious safety failings at BP and Lord Browne steps down after lying about how he met a lover. Shell pays $350m to settle reserve scandal cases.

2008 Shell sets new record for company profits. New BP boss Tony Hayward embarks on round of cost-cutting.

2009 Shell suffers revolt over high executive pay. Plunge in oil prices prompts job losses at both companies. BP overtakes Shell to be biggest European major.

2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill floors BP, as share price dives and losses accrue. Shell sheds more jobs and focuses on big projects coming on stream.

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Oil and gas spills in North Sea every week, papers reveal

Shell has emerged as one of the top offenders despite promising to clean up its act five years ago after a large accident in which two oil workers died.

More than 100 potentially lethal oil and gas spills took place on rigs in the North Sea in 2009 and 2010. Photograph: Alamy

Documents list companies that caused more than 100 potentially lethal – and largely unpublicised – leaks in 2009 and 2010

Serious spills of oil and gas from North Sea platforms are occurring at the rate of one a week, undermining oil companies’ claims to be doing everything possible to improve the safety of rigs.

Shell has emerged as one of the top offenders despite promising to clean up its act five years ago after a large accident in which two oil workers died.

Documents obtained by the Guardian record leaks voluntarily declared by the oil companies to the safety regulator, the Health and Safety Executive(HSE), in a database set up after the Piper Alpha disaster of 6 July 1988 which killed 167 workers. They reveal for the first time the names of companies that have caused more than 100 potentially lethal and largely unpublicised oil and gas spills in the North Sea in 2009 and 2010.

They also deal a significant blow to the government’s credibility in supporting the oil industry’s fervent desire to drill in the Arctic. Charles Hendry, the energy minister, has said operations to drill in deep Arctic waters by companies such as Cairn Energy off Greenland are “entirely legitimate” as long as they adhere to Britain’s “robust” safety regulation.

Shell has been at the forefront of plans to drill in the Arctic waters of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.

The documents, released under freedom of information legislation, record leaks classed by the regulator as “major” or “significant”, which, if ignited, could cause many deaths.

The two rigs with the most frequent oil spills are owned by Shell and the French conglomerate Total. Shell executives regularly claim in public that safety is their most important commitment. Last November, Peter Voser, the Shell chief executive, said: “Safety is, has been, and forever will be, our number one priority. It is our core value.”

The Shell-run platform responsible for the most spills, Brent Charlie, first began pumping oil in 1976 from its location 115 miles (180km) north-east of Scotland.

The documents record seven leaks on it over the two-year period, with the worst happening on 26 April last year when four tonnes of leaked gas from one of its columns led to a shutdown of production.

On another occasion, on 30 September 2009, safety inspectors ordered Shell to stop producing oil from Brent Charlie after gas leaked from its ventilation system. Last Friday, the HSE formally threatened to close down some operations on Brent Charlie within two weeks over undisclosed safety issues. Since January this year, Shell has stopped exporting oil from the rig and three others in the Brent oilfield as the company struggles to put right safety problems.

Critics say the oldest rigs, built in the 70s when oil was found in the North Sea, are the most dangerous and fear safety is neglected as the platforms come to the end of their productive commercial life. Shell came under intense criticism over its safety record in 2006 when a judge ruled that it could have prevented the deaths of two men if it had properly repaired a hole in a corroding pipeline on a platform in the Brent field. In the same year, one of Shell’s own safety consultants, Bill Campbell, alleged that safety procedures in the North Sea had been ignored for years.

Shell’s then chief executive, Jereon van der Veer, admitted in a private email at the time that the company had a second-rate safety record and pledged to spend substantial sums of money to improve it.

A Shell spokesman said: “No spill is acceptable and we have made progress. We work closely with regulators and invested over a billion dollars in recent years to upgrade facilities across the North Sea to continue this improvement of our performance.”

Other major oil companies which are high in the spills league include the Danish conglomerate Maersk and Canadian firm Talisman, which both have a rig with five leaks. Four spills came from a rig known as Mungo Etap, which is owned by BP.

Whistleblowers have told the Guardian that the list of spills recorded in the documents is the tip of the iceberg.

Other accidents are kept quiet, they claim, because workers fear they cannot report them in case they lose their jobs. One veteran said that although everyone is formally told to report anything that goes wrong, staff adhere to an informal code to remain silent to avoid a halt in drilling that loses money for the companies.

The HSE documents also undermine claims by the major oil companies that last year’s Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico that killed 11 workers was unlikely to ever happen to them.

Jake Molloy, general secretary of the Offshore Industry Liaison Committee (OILC), a union representing North Sea workers, said Deepwater Horizon showed that “even the most up-to-date, cutting-edge safety technology can go wrong if it is not maintained properly and not operated by competent people”. He added: “We have been very lucky in the UK that we have not had another major incident with multiple fatalities. We have come very close on several occasions, very, very close. It is more luck than good management in some cases. Some operators don’t give a damn. Because of the high price of oil, they are cutting corners. Some of them are overdue for prosecution.”

Robert Paterson, health and safety director of the Oil & Gas UK, which represents the industry and aims to make Britain’s oil industry the safest in the world, said oil companies last year agreed to “redouble efforts to reduce the number of leaks by 50% over three years and many companies are building this target into their business plans”.

He rejected the whistleblowers’ concerns: “We believe there is a very high standard of compliance when it comes to companies reporting offshore incidents to the regulator and a constructive culture in the workforce when it comes to reporting health and safety concerns.”

The disclosures have provoked criticism of the government over its claims that regulation of the oil industry in the North Sea is one of the toughest in the world. Chris Huhne, the energy secretary, claimed in January that the UK’s safety and environmental regime was “one of the most robust in the world.”

Frank Doran, Labour MP for Aberdeen North, said: “Chris Huhne needs to have a rethink. There is a continuing problem, of particularly gas leakages, and that is a sign that the infrastructure in the North Sea is ageing and that maintenance and investment is still not sufficient to ensure the safety of offshore workers. There is still a long way to go.”

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Shell, Rosneft in talks for Russian arctic

Published: June 1, 2011

THE HAGUE, Netherlands, June 1 (UPI) — Royal Dutch Shell said Russian oil company Rosneft was interested in jointly exploring the hydrocarbon potential in Russia’s arctic waters.

Shell Chief Executive Officer Peter Voser said following talks with Rosneft last week that both could look at “a multitude” of opportunities in the Russian arctic. Some of the blocs included in the talks had been set aside by Rosneft for British energy company BP, the Financial Times reports.

A proposed $16 billion deal between Rosneft and BP from January collapsed last month after TNK-BP, a joint venture between BP and four Russian billionaires, interrupted the measure after claiming it violated the shareholder agreement with its British counterparts.

Voser was quoted as saying it was still “too early to say” what would happen with any future Rosneft partnership, however.

Rosneft and Shell under the terms of a 2007 agreement could outline individual projects in the arctic. Shell said it wasn’t interested in an asset swap, however.

Rosneft in May had said negotiations between the Russian billionaires and BP resulted in the company receiving proposals that went “beyond the scope” of the original January proposal.

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BP should look to Anglo-Dutch rival Shell to help refine the way forward

One of the most striking features of the oil industry in recent times has been the divergent fortunes of Royal Dutch Shell and BP.

BP has well-publicised problems that explain its recent under-performance, such as uncertainty over its future in Russia and the shock of last year’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico’s Macondo area, which left 11 workers dead. Photo: REUTERS

Damian Reece
By Damian Reece, Head of Business: 29n April 2011

The past two years has seen Shell outperform the All-Share index by 7pc, while BP has under-performed by 58pc.

Results on Thursday from Shell once again underlined the companies’ differences, such as profitability and prospects, which are driving investor sentiment.

BP has well-publicised problems that explain its recent under-performance, such as uncertainty over its future in Russia and the shock of last year’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico’s Macondo area, which left 11 workers dead.

Going further back, under Lord Browne’s regime we had his own troubled exit, the Texas City refinery blast, the Prudhoe Bay spill, problems in the Gulf’s Thunder Horse field and price-fixing allegations in New York.

If you consider the Texas City blast, which killed 15, was back in August 2005, BP has been beset by serious problems for nearly six years. This begs the question, can BP ever really change?

However unpalatable it might be, chief executive Bob Dudley could look across at his age-old rival, Shell, for the answer. Shell had its own Macondo moment back in 2004, with its reserves scandal. For nearly 10 years prior to that, Shell had been trying to change its culture, a process that had been largely ineffective.

Since the reserves scandal, under chief executives Jeroen van der Veer and latterly Peter Voser, it has changed tack, focusing on more investment upstream in exploration and production, more investment in OECD countries to reduce political risk and to replace its declining heart lands, more investment in gas and more large projects.

It has developed four key strategic partners in PetroChina, Gazprom, Aramco and Qatar Petroleum and shaken up its downstream refining and retail operations. Internally, Shell workers are now subject to a continuous improvement programme that stresses the speed of decision-making, the operational effectiveness of its assets and their integrity in terms of safety.

Another crucial difference has been the creation of the modern BP from a strategy of acquisitions (Amoco, Arco and Burmah Castrol, to name a few) bequeathing different cultures within the group.

Shell, an Anglo-Dutch construct, was a federal structure that found it difficult to issue shares to pay for deals, so stuck to organic growth. Even since adopting a unified structure it has avoided major deals. It is arguably a more unitary culture than BP.

This, then, is all the boring nitty-gritty behind Shell’s numbers on Thursday. But it goes a long way to explaining the increasingly marked difference between Shell and BP.

Oil investors rank companies in terms of what they deliver today in terms of earnings, the prospect of improving on that with more assets and management’s credibility and strategic vision. BP is struggling in all these departments. Maybe Bob Dudley should consider what he can learn from the way Shell has learned from past problems before deciding on how BP moves on from its own.

damian.reece@telegraph.co.uk

SOURCE ARTICLE

Shell fat cat Peter Voser highest earner in NL

FROM A DUTCH SHELL INSIDER

Hello John

The newspapers and some TV programmes are harping again on the bankers that have reduced bonuses but scandalously increased the ‘basic salary’ and all are back to levels of before the crisis.

So has Shell, it is mentioned several times. Voser is the highest earner in NL with 12 million Euros. What will he do with it apart from making his kids or grandchildren spoiled brats. It is the equivalent of 185000 bbls oil. These are significant numbers. And that against a background of v.d.Veer stating he would not have done one thing different or worked less hard if his salary and/or bonus would have been halved or much lower.

So, salaries are a wrong tool to get the correct behaviour at the top. And we minions are taught to tender and take the best quality for the lowest bid. If we assume that every multinational has talent in the level below the top, it stands to reason these all want the top job, even if they would have to do it for half the money. Status is genuinely important. But somehow it does not happen. Presumably too many snouts in the trough, all scratching each other’s back!

I am sure there must be similar articles in the English press. It proves the current multinationals are taken over by people who have the wrong make-up: they are driven by status and the only metric for this status (in their eyes) is money. This is dangerous. I am sure you can rattle that cage on this topic more!

Collusion between Shell and HSE in Brent Bravo cover-up

One of the examples of collusion between Shell and HSE was that HSE were aware that the Press Releases by Shell were false.  From the feedback from the CPS investigation they confirmed that the CEO of the HSE was aware that the statements made by Shell in the Press Releases in 2006 were totally false and misleading.

Bill Campbell, retired HSE Group Auditor of Shell International.

SELF-EXPLANATORY EMAIL TO SHELL:

From: John Donovan <john@shellnews.net>
Date: 4 March 2011 16:23:35 GMT
To: michiel.brandjes@shell.com
Cc: peter.p.voser@shell.com, malcolm.brinded@shell.com, Jorma.Ollila@shell.com, Cambellxxx.xxxxx.com
Subject: Fwd: Criminal Investigation uncovers lies and deceit and potential corruption

Dear Mr Brandjes

I have forwarded to you an email received from Mr. Bill Campbell. I have deleted part of the first sentence, which commences: “This is a shortened version…”

I have already published the short version of his statement.

Please see:
Shell Brent Bravo Deaths: Criminal Investigation uncovers lies, deceit and potential corruption

Shell is invited to supply for unedited publication within the brief version and for inclusion with the full version, when published, any comment/rebuttal you wish to make.

If Shell fails to do so, visitors to our website, including the mainstream news media, will be entitled to draw their own conclusions i.e. that Shell accepts the facts, as stated by Mr Campbell.

Best Regards
John Donovan

THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE

A day earlier, on 3rd March, Royal Dutch Shell made a blanket denial in response to our account of Shell’s support and encouragement for Hitler and the Nazis based partly on evidence in “A History of Shell Dutch Shell” gathered by Shell’s paid historians. This time there is no denial of any kind.

THE FULL STATEMENT/ARTICLE BY BILL CAMPBELL

Information from Meeting Held with CPS on 18th February, 2011

Criminal Investigation uncovers lies, deceit and potential corruption

Introduction

This is a modern day story of new Shell.  New Shell is an organisation that you can’t be sure about anymore.  An organisation which in the dangerous and unforgiving North Sea, allowed over a prolonged period from1999 till 2003, a negative safety culture to develop offshore which flourished and was sustained within a hostile environment of extreme denial.  In this environment, the hideous Touch F-All policy led to the degradation of installation equipment through neglect of maintenance across the oil field.  When employees were killed as a result of all this, Shell Director(s), whose failures may have led to charges of corporate homicide against them, colluded with the Industry safety regulator to cover these failures up.  This cover-up has been aided and abetted up the organisational line to the CEO and non-executive Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell.  All this has been exposed by an ongoing investigation by Scottish authorities.

The investigation process

Some time ago the police in Aberdeen passed a report to the Procurator Fiscal (public prosecutor).  The report provided evidence alleging that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), who regulate health and safety of persons at work in the UK, including offshore, may have been compromised, bribery and corruption, by Shell.  The allegations relate to a fatal accident offshore on Brent Bravo on 11th September 2003 and the subsequent Fatal Accident Inquiry into the fatalities.  A criminal investigation commenced based on these allegations. The Procurator Fiscal are part of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), reference to the Crown is simply because UK has a monarchy.

The investigation has focussed to date on the role of HSE officials. These officials are UK Government employees.  Since the investigation is ongoing it is inappropriate to comment on what has, or has not been established with regards to HSE.  The CPS investigation to date however has confirmed that Shell repeatedly made false and misleading statements about its part in these affairs.

The Fatal Accident Inquiry into deaths on Brent Bravo

What has been established is that the HSE, whether in collusion with Shell or not, failed to pass vital evidence to the CPS in 2003 prior to the Fatal Accident Inquiry.  HSE had obtained this evidence directly from Shell only days after the fatalities.  This evidence given to HSE was from Greg Hill, the Production Director in Aberdeen, and was from his internal Technical Integrity Review implemented immediately after the deaths. Hill implemented the Review to ascertain whether Brent Bravo was an unfortunate, but isolated incident, or was there a general malaise offshore.  The Review found chronic weakness in management controls resulting in the deaths on Brent Bravo, for which Shell were prosecuted.  The Review confirmed that Brent Bravo was not an isolated incident as similar conditions were found on many of the Shell North Sea installations.

What were the consequences flowing from this?

My most recent meeting with CPS was on the 18th February.  The CPS position is that if they had been in possession of the evidence given by Greg Hill to HSE in 2003, as they should have been, this would most likely have led to a more general Inquiry into how Shell had operated across the oilfield and over the prolonged period from 1999.  There was considerable public interest in the Brent Bravo fatalities, and this combined with the evidence of a negative safety culture, may have influenced the Lord Advocate (in US parlance an Attorney General) who heads up the CPS in Scotland, to order such Inquiry.

This Inquiry would have covered how technical and operations integrity of Shell facilities, not just Brent Bravo, had degraded over a prolonged period, and how this degradation had not been halted or reversed, despite many HSE enforcement actions being applied on Shell over this period.  From 1999 to 2003, enforcement notices were issued to counteract 33 serious breaches of legislation.  It appears that the Safety Case regime, put in place post Piper Alpha, had failed to ensure the health and safety of the many hundreds of Shell employees offshore over this prolonged period.

2006 – After the Fatal Accident Inquiry into Brent Bravo

When the Sheriff (a Judge) reported the results of his Inquiry there was significant public concern from Trade Unions and politicians, The Sheriff had determined how the deaths had taken place by after a 38 day Inquiry had made no recommendations.  He did however make the significant suggestion that factors he had not covered, because of the restrictions of the relevant Act concerning such Inquiries, could merit a more General Inquiry, but to date no such Inquiry has taken place.

BBC Scotland encapsulated the public concerns on a programme aired on 14th June 2006.  Prior to the programme going on air BBC offered both Shell and HSE right of reply but they declined to comment despite the programme content being critical of both parties.  On the 16th June 2006 significant media interest was stirred up by the oil industry Magazine Upstream articles.  Shell issued a rebuttal in the form of press releases by their Crisis Management Team which were also copied internally to its employees across the World.

The rebuttal stated that Safety is Shell’s foremost priority at all times and we absolutely reject any suggestion that we would compromise safety offshore. In 1999, Shell initiated the Platform Safety Management Review (PSMR), in which Mr Campbell was asked to participate, and responded vigorously to its findings. A follow up implementation audit conducted at the end of 2000 confirmed significant progress had been made on both asset integrity and management systems. This contributed to the continuous improvement in Shell’s safety performance that has been achieved since 1999 in the North Sea.

With the Press Releases the cover-up commenced

It was Greg Hill who led the Crisis Management Team and it was he who way back in 2003 had presented the evidence of the appalling conditions on many of his offshore installations to HSE.  The press release also ignored the findings of their own internal investigation completed in 2005, into the conduct of Directors in 1999.  This investigation concluded that the 1999 PSMR follow-up was ineffective.  The investigation was critical of Malcolm Brinded for dispensing with the services of the SIEP Lead Auditor of the PSMR in 1999 which effectively halted the PSMR in midstream.   Brinded was also criticised for not taking the immediate actions, as recommended by his Platform Safety Management Review (PSMR) in 1999, to reduce the risks on Brent Bravo, which was operating in a dangerous condition.

Why did Greg Hill lie?

Greg Hill was put in charge of the Crisis Management Team in June 2006 with instructions from above to sort this problem out or else!  As evidence of a hostile environment of extreme denial Hill was given no choice being intimidated to lie, and lie again, do anything that was needed to protect Shell from public ridicule and potential prosecution. Jacob Stausholm, the SIEP Chief Auditor who had led the 2005 internal investigation into the behaviour of Brinded and Finlayson at the time of the PSMR, was also threatened.  He was to bury his report and raise no objections to the press releases.  Within a few years both Hill and Stausholm had left Shell.   Hill went to the Hess Corporation to Head their EP division and Stausholm to Statoil Hydro as a non-executive Director.  Both these organisations raised no legal or other objections to the comments made about their employees.

Why did the HSE not respond to the Shell Press Releases?

One of the examples of collusion between Shell and HSE was that HSE were aware that the Press Releases by Shell were false.  From the feedback from the CPS investigation they confirmed that the CEO of the HSE was aware that the statements made by Shell in the Press Releases in 2006 were totally false and misleading.  His defence apparently was that the Shell statement put HSE in a difficult position as their Policy does not allow them to comment of the performance of individual organisations.  A pretty lame excuse.  So the CPS accept that the public statements made by Shell did not reflect the reality of the situation and that HSE allowed these comments to go unchallenged, all this still subject to investigation.

So what lies have been uncovered?

1.    It is not contentious that Shell neglected to inform HSE about the 1999 PSMR and its findings.  In 2006, Shell defended this by stating that the PSMR was just a Review and not an audit.  The facts established and accepted by the CPS is that the PSMR was conducted by Auditors, was based on seven offshore audits, the PSMR report was issued by the Internal Audit Manager and was ipso facto an audit.  Not to inform HSE and the offshore workers about the results of a health and safety Audit is an offence under Safety Case Regulations.  The PSMR produced many recommended actions, these were accepted by Shell Expro, but not effectively implemented.  This contributing to the deaths on Brent Bravo and to the chronic weaknesses in essential controls across the oilfield as witnessed in 2003

2.    It is not contentious that rather than a continuous improvement from 1999 till the deaths there had been continuous degradation of standards due to the imposed negative safety culture and the failure to implement the PSMR findings.  In the words of the Lord Advocate, it was clear from the conditions on Brent Bravo, that the deaths had resulted from ineffective management of Shell’s offshore operations over a prolonged period of time

3.    In 2006, under intense media pressure van der Veer responded to critical media comments, and separately in correspondence with me (held by the CPS), that there was no evidence that the performance results of ESD valves had been falsified in 1999.  Another blatant lie now uncovered

4.    Asked to investigate the role of van der Veer and Brinded by me, the RDS Chairman Jorma Ollila in writing replied that he was satisfied with the statements made in the 2006 Press Releases and the Shell position was supported by their internal investigation.  He now accepts that his statements were not factual.  Although he has been bestowed with nine badges of honour this does not stop him to lie at will to protect the Shell reputation.

In conclusion

It is hoped that this article will be seen and widely circulated by Shell employees.  New Shell is an organisation in decline with all the usual symptoms of an organisation where power corrupts.  Lies, deceit, potential corruption, hypocrisy, self-delusion with a loss of reality, criminal negligence and gross intimidation of its employees who must lie to cover up wrongdoing of Directors, or suffer the consequences.

Post the reserves scandal new Shell placed great emphasise in media releases that honesty and integrity were to be at the core of everything they did in the future.  The non-executive governance was to be beefed up along with improvements to the internal audit process, but we observe from the evidence a powerless and compliant Chairman, and an Internal Audit system that is a sham.

The principal learning point from this is that new Shell is an organisation that Society can not be sure of anymore and whose statements can not be trusted. It is an organisation prepared to condemn others to gain commercial advantage, as it did with BP over Deepwater Horizon well, whilst covering up its own criminal neglect.

RELATED AUGUST 2008 LETTER FROM THE HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE

Shell Brent Bravo Deaths: Criminal Investigation uncovers lies, deceit and potential corruption

Introduction by John Donovan

I have published below a self-explanatory statement by Bill Campbell (right), the retired HSE Group Auditor of Shell International. I will email this statement and a more detailed version to Michiel Brandjes, the Company Secretary of Royal Dutch Shell Plc and forward the same information to the senior Shell executives and the non Executive Chairman, Jorma Ollila, named in the statement.

The more detailed version will be published on this website after Shell has had an opportunity to comment and/or take legal action. Shell issued threats of legal action against us yesterday and may wish to add this matter if briefing Counsel.

STATEMENT BY BILL CAMPBELL, RETIRED HSE GROUP AUDITOR OF SHELL INTERNATIONAL

Some time ago the police in Aberdeen passed a report to the Procurator Fiscal (public prosecutor).  A criminal investigation commenced based on these allegations. The Procurator Fiscal are part of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), reference to the Crown is simply because the UK has a monarchy.

The investigation has focused to date on the role of HSE officials. These officials are UK Government employees.  Since the investigation is ongoing it is inappropriate to comment on what has, or has not been established with regards to HSE.  The CPS investigation to date however has confirmed that Shell repeatedly made false and misleading statements about its part in these affairs.

The Fatal Accident Inquiry into deaths on Brent Bravo

What has been established is that the HSE, whether in collusion with Shell or not, failed to pass vital evidence to the CPS in 2003 prior to the Fatal Accident Inquiry.  HSE had obtained this evidence directly from Shell only days after the fatalities.  This evidence given to HSE was from Greg Hill, the Production Director in Aberdeen, and was from his internal Technical Integrity Review implemented immediately after the deaths. Hill implemented the Review to ascertain whether Brent Bravo was an unfortunate, but isolated incident, or was there a general malaise offshore.  The Review found chronic weakness in management controls resulting in the deaths on Brent Bravo, for which Shell were prosecuted.  The Review confirmed that Brent Bravo was not an isolated incident as similar conditions were found on many of the Shell North Sea installations.

What were the consequences flowing from this?

My most recent meeting with CPS was on the 18th February 2011.  The CPS position is that if they had been in possession of the evidence given by Greg Hill to HSE in 2003, as they should have been, this would most likely have led to a more general Inquiry into how Shell had operated across the oilfield and over the prolonged period from 1999.  There was considerable public interest in the Brent Bravo fatalities, and this combined with the evidence of a negative safety culture, may have influenced the Lord Advocate (in US parlance an Attorney General) who heads up the CPS in Scotland, to order such Inquiry.  This Inquiry would have covered how technical and operations integrity of Shell facilities, not just Brent Bravo, had degraded over a prolonged period, and how this degradation had not been halted or reversed, despite many HSE enforcement actions being applied on Shell over this period.

2006 – After the Fatal Accident Inquiry into Brent Bravo

When the Sheriff (a Judge) reported the results of his Inquiry there was significant public concern from Trade Unions and politicians, The Sheriff had determined how the deaths had taken place by after a 38 day Inquiry had made no recommendations.  He did however make the significant suggestion that factors he had not covered, because of the restrictions of the relevant Act concerning such Inquiries, could merit a more General Inquiry, but to date no such Inquiry has taken place.

BBC Scotland encapsulated the public concerns on a programme aired on 14th June 2006.  Prior to the programme going on air BBC offered both Shell and HSE right of reply but they declined to comment despite the programme content being critical of both parties.  On the 16th June 2006 significant media interest was stirred up by the oil industry Magazine Upstream articles.  Shell issued a rebuttal in the form of press releases by their Crisis Management Team which were also copied internally to its employees across the World.

How did Shell respond to the critical media coverage?

Their Press Releases on 16 June 2006 stated that

Safety is Shell’s foremost priority at all times and we absolutely reject any suggestion that we would compromise safety offshore. In 1999, Shell initiated the Platform Safety Management Review (PSMR),  and responded vigorously to its findings. A follow up implementation audit conducted at the end of 2000 confirmed significant progress had been made on both asset integrity and management systems. This contributed to the continuous improvement in Shell’s safety performance that has been achieved since 1999 in the North Sea.

With the Press Releases the cover-up commenced

It was Greg Hill who led the Crisis Management Team and it was he who way back in 2003 had presented the evidence of the appalling conditions on many of his offshore installations to HSE.  The press release also ignored the findings of their own internal investigation completed in 2005, into the conduct of Directors in 1999.  This investigation concluded that the 1999 PSMR follow-up was ineffective.  The investigation was critical of Malcolm Brinded for dispensing with the services of the SIEP Lead Auditor of the PSMR in 1999 which effectively halted the PSMR in midstream.   Brinded was also criticised for not taking the immediate actions, as recommended by his Platform Safety Management Review (PSMR) in 1999, to reduce the risks on Brent Bravo, which was operating in a dangerous condition.

Why did Greg Hill lie?

Greg Hill was put in charge of the Crisis Management Team in June 2006 with instructions from above to sort this problem out or else!  As evidence of a hostile environment of extreme denial Hill was given no choice being intimidated to lie, and lie again, do anything that was needed to protect Shell from public ridicule and potential prosecution. Jacob Stausholm, the SIEP Chief Auditor who had led the 2005 internal investigation into the behaviour of Brinded and Finlayson at the time of the PSMR, was also threatened. He was to bury his report and raise no objections to the press releases.  Within a few years both Hill and Stausholm had left Shell.   Hill went to the Hess Corporation as President of their EP division and Stausholm joined Statoil Hydro as a non-executive Director.  Both these organisations raised no legal or other objections to the comments made about their employees.

Why did the HSE not respond to the Shell Press Releases?

One of the examples of collusion between Shell and HSE was that HSE were aware that the Press Releases by Shell were false.
From the feedback from the CPS investigation they confirmed that the CEO of the HSE was aware that the statements made by Shell in the Press Releases in 2006 were totally false and misleading. His defence apparently was that the Shell statement put HSE in a difficult position as their Policy does not allow them to comment of the performance of individual organisations.  A pretty lame excuse.  So the CPS accept that the public statements made by Shell did not reflect the reality of the situation and that HSE allowed these comments to go unchallenged, all this still subject to investigation.

So what lies have been uncovered?

Lie 1

It is not contentious that Shell neglected to inform HSE about the 1999 PSMR and its findings.  In 2006, Shell defended this by stating that the PSMR was just a Review and not an audit.  The facts established and accepted by the CPS is that the PSMR was conducted by Auditors, was based on seven offshore audits, the PSMR report was issued by the Internal Audit Manager and was ipso facto an audit.  Not to inform HSE and the offshore workers about the results of a health and safety Audit is an offence under Safety Case Regulations. The PSMR produced many recommended actions, these were accepted by Shell Expro, but not effectively implemented.  This contributing to the deaths on Brent Bravo and to the chronic weaknesses in essential controls across the oilfield as witnessed in 2003.  As previously stated if the full facts had been known by the CPS at the time it is likely that a more general Inquiry would have been held.

Lie 2

It is not contentious that rather than a continuos improvement from 1999 till the deaths there had been continuos degradation of standards due to the imposed negative safety culture and the failure to implement the PSMR findings.  In the words of the Lord Advocate, it was clear from the conditions on Brent Bravo that the deaths had resulted from ineffective management of Shell’s offshore operations over a prolonged period of time.

Lie 3

In 2006, under intense media pressure van der Veer responded to critical media comments, and separately in correspondence with me (held by the CPS), that there was no evidence that the performance results of ESD valves had been falsified in 1999.  Another blatant lie now uncovered.

Lie 4

Asked to investigate the role of van der Veer and Brinded by me, the RDS Chairman Jorma Ollila in writing replied that he was satisfied with the statements made in the Shell 2006 Press Releases and the Shell position was supported by their internal investigation.  He now accepts that his statements were not factual. Although he has been bestowed with nine badges of honour by various agencies this did not stop dispensing with the truth to protect the Shell reputation.

STATEMENT ENDS

THE EVIDENCE ASSEMBLED BY BILL CAMPBELL: READ

SELECTION OF ARTICLES RELATING TO BRENT BRAVO FATALITIES: READ

RELATED EMAIL/LETTER SENT TO MEMBERS OF THE UK HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT: READ

THE FULL FILE OF BRENT BRAVO ARTICLES