

- 1 A map of refinery in Gerretson, *History I*, 141. According to him, the prison served to house forced labourers lent by the Government to the company in an effort to alleviate the chronic labour shortage: *ibid.* 143. However, one would assume it was also used to punish recaptured indentured labourers.
- 2 Gerretson, *History I*, 123 (400 labourers required), 130 (American technicians), 142 (housing); *ibid.* IV, 77 (shipping of women). SHA 190C/266, giving twelve Europeans and four Americans working at Pangkalan Brandan in 1891.
- 3 A vivid description of life at Pangkalan Brandan and the momentous event of February 1892 is given in SHA 190D/789, the memoirs of W. H. du Pon, who worked there at the time. Extracts from these memoirs were published in the staff magazine *Olie* 8 (1955) 82-5, 204-7, 296-9, and subsequently collected in a booklet entitled *Terugblik van een pionier*.
- 4 *The Times* reported the launch erroneously as having happened on 27 May, whereas because of the tide it had happened at 4 a.m. on the 28th. A facsimile of the launch report in the *Northern Daily Mail* in Howarth, *Sea Shell*, 14-5.
- 5 The official letter dated 18 April 1890 in Gerretson, *History I*, 99; J. R. van Zwet, 'Hoe de "Koninklijke" Koninklijk werd', De Nederlandsche Bank, Onderzoeksrapport WO&E No. 670, December 2001. Contrary to common opinion, the royal family did not buy or receive shares in the Royal Dutch at the IPO, but acquired them later: Gerretson, *History I*, 177.
- 6 For a modern overview of early prospecting for oil in Indonesia, see Poley, *Eroica*.
- 7 Gerretson, *History I*, 69.
- 8 Gerretson, *History I*, 64, 67, 103-9; *Jaarboek voor het Mijnwezen in Nederlandsch Oost-Indië* 25 (1896) 70; Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1895, 16; 1898, 24; 1904, 23.
- 9 Voorst Vader-Duyckinck Sander, *Stoop*, 56-65, 73-4, 81-95. The Dordtsche's initial nominal capital was 150,000 guilders, with no more than 35 per cent actually paid up: Gerretson, *History II*, 205, 227 with a typo giving the wrong figure of 15,000 guilders.
- 10 Gerretson, *History I*, 83-7; *Jaarboek voor het Mijnwezen in Nederlandsch Oost-Indië* 19 (1890) pt II, 10-91.
- 11 Gerretson, *History I*, 93; for a biography of Van den Berg Van Zwet, *President*.
- 12 Van Zwet, 'Koninklijke', 1-2; Gerretson, *History I*, 97, 102.
- 13 Gerretson, *History I*, 98-100.
- 14 Gerretson, *History II*, 243. To counter price fluctuations and keep shares in trusted hands, Royal Dutch board members actively traded in shares themselves. Such practice appears to have been regarded as perfectly normal. Cf. SHA 3/186, letters Kessler 19 February, 13 May, 1 October 1894, 9 September 1895, 7 November 1897; SHA 3/208, correspondence Lane, letters 9 June 1903, December 1904.
- 15 Cf. Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1890, 9-10.
- 16 Cf. Gerretson, *History I*, 189-90.
- 17 Gerretson, *History II*, 209-10.
- 18 Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1890, 10.
- 19 The plans in SHA 190C/230.
- 20 Gerretson, *History I*, 119-20.
- 21 *Research aan het IJ*, 10-11; the engineer hired, W. L. Sluyterman van Loo, initially concentrated on designing a lamp burner for optimum performance with Langkat oil: Homburg/Rip/Small, 'Chemici', 302-3.
- 22 SHA 190D/687, contract A. Gideonse, June 1890.
- 23 Cf. Gerretson, *History I*, 115 (plans sent out in October); Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1890, 11 (most stores in Langkat by December 1890).
- 24 These conditions were more or less similar on the Sumatran tobacco plantations. Gerretson, *History IV*, 75-6.
- 25 On the indentured labour system, see Breman, *Koelies*; Kampues, 'Na Rhemrev', Langeveld, 'Arbeidstoestanden'.
- 26 Cf. Gerretson, *History I*, 128-9, 255-7.
- 27 Gerretson, *History I*, 129-30; Royal Dutch board minutes, 14 March 1891.
- 28 Cf. for instance Gabriëls, *Koninklijke*, 28.
- 29 On Kessler, Gerretson, *History I*, 126-31, 179-80; De Vries, 'Kessler'; SHA 190D/733, with a brochure about his leaving the merchant firm.
- 30 Cf. SHA 190D/733, containing a letter from Kessler's father-in-law and Royal Dutch chairman De Lange with detailed calculations about the company's position.
- 31 Cf. Fennema's report in *Jaarboek Mijnwezen*, 70.
- 32 The text in Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1891, 25-30.
- 33 SHA 190D/766, draft contract between Royal Dutch and Martijn, April 1892; letter from a Yokohama firm to Martijn, 24 June 1892.
- 34 Gerretson, *History I*, 158, 168.
- 35 Gerretson, *History I*, 150-2, 196-7. Prices began to drop from May 1892.
- 36 SHA 190D/789, memoirs Du Pon, appreciates Waddell more than Gerretson's history.
- 37 Gerretson, *History I*, 147-9, 161-2, 260-1. On pp 147-9, and again on 161-2.
- 38 Kessler's calculations in Gerretson, *History I*, 162-4.
- 39 Gerretson, *History I*, 168-9, 173; *Jaarboek Mijnwezen*, 65.
- 40 Gerretson, *History I*, 169.

- 41 Royal Dutch, Annual Reports.
- 42 Gerretson, *History I*, 163, giving total cost as 1.45 guilders; however, Gerretson here omits to include the Sultan's royalties, which should be put at 0.10 guilders.
- 43 Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1891, 17-18; Gerretson, *History I*, 218.
- 44 Gerretson, *History I*, 206, 218-21.
- 45 SHA 190D/789, memoirs Du Pon.
- 46 Unfortunately only a fraction of the correspondence has survived. Cf. for instance SHA 3/186, Kessler to board, 2 September, 1 October, 28 October 1894; Kessler to Wakkie, 14 May, 11 July, 2 and 28 October 1894; Kessler to Capadose, 19 February 1894.
- 47 Gerretson, *History I*, 174; II, 41, 94-6; SHA 3/192, Kessler to Deterding, 8 December 1897, 20 December 1897. Standard Oil took secrecy so seriously that the company published its first full Annual Report only in 1918: Wall/Gibb, *Teagle*, 127-8.
- 48 SHA 3/186, Kessler to the board, 13 May 1894; SHA 3/191, Kessler to Loudon, 9 September 1895; Kessler to Deterding, 20 December 1897. A fifty-man police force suggested by Fennema in his report: *Jaarboek Mijnwezen* 19 (1890), 71. Gerretson, *History I*, 244, 282; II, 46-8; Voorst Vader-Duyckinck Sander, *Stoop* 127-32.
- 49 Cf. Henriques, *Samuel*, 149, 158, 179-80, 182, 184, 189-92, 195, 199, 209, 218-9, 221-2, 226, 229-30, 233, 234, 237, 239, 243-7, 293, 326, 389.
- 50 On Loudon, see Gerretson, *History I*, 236-40; Kessler at first thought Loudon would not have the required toughness and stamina: SHA 3/186, Kessler to Wakkie, 2 and 28 October 1894. He criticized him rather severely in letters to his wife, but by 1898 he clearly appreciated him: R. A. Alkmaar, De Lange papers, (no inventory numbers available at the time of writing) Kessler to Kessler-De Lange, 29 April, 2 July, 3 September, 13 November 1894, 3 January 1898. Typically, before his departure from The Hague to take up his job Loudon had had the tact to visit Kessler's wife so he could bring fresh news from home, Kessler to Kessler-De Lange, 29 April 1894. Loudon was appointed in February 1894, promoted to acting manager in January 1895 and to manager in February 1896.
- 51 Gerretson, *History I*, 277-8.
- 52 Royal Dutch, Annual Reports 1892-98; SHA 3/191, Kessler to Loudon, 9 September 1895.
- 53 Gerretson, *History I*, 227; cf. Van Driel, *Veembedrijf*, 79-80.
- 54 SHA 3/186, Kessler to The Hague, 28 October 1894; Henriques, *Samuel*, 176-9; Gerretson, *History I*, 280; II, 119-20.
- 55 Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1894, 10-1; 1898, 19; SHA 195/16, Deterding to Kessler, 22 February 1895 (first plans and expectations), Kessler to Deterding, 31 January 1896 (calming his dynamic approach to the business); SHA 102, Loudon papers, Kessler to Loudon, 1 September 1896 (Deterding's Asian market survey and plans for building installations); Gerretson, *History I*, 239. Kessler had wanted to raise finance and reduce the company's exposure by reorganizing it into a holding company controlling separate operating companies for the concessions and the refineries, but the board did not want to accept his scheme: cf. SHA 102, Loudon papers, Kessler to Loudon 23 August, 1895; board minutes Royal Dutch, 3 December 1895.
- 56 SHA 190D/759, Kessler to Loudon, 29 March 1900; 190A/116-2, report J. Pesch about a shooting incident involving Chinese labourers which left several dead.
- 57 Gerretson, *History IV*, 60.
- 58 Gerretson, *History I*, 264, and map on 257; cf. Royal Dutch board minutes, 3 December 1895.
- 59 Gerretson, *History II*, 46-7; cf. SHA 190D/759, Kessler to Loudon, 29 March 1900.
- 60 Gerretson, *History I*, 262-70; correspondence in SHA 3/186; Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering*, 264.
- 61 Gerretson, *History I*, 280-86; Hidy/Hidy, *Pioneering*, 265-6; SHA 190B/211-1, memo Kessler; SHA 102, Loudon papers, Kessler to Loudon, 2 September 1897.
- 62 Gerretson, *History II*, 42-6, 79. Cf. Henriques, *Samuel*, 221-2; Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering*, 265-6.
- 63 Gerretson, *History II*, 57-76; SHA 3/192, telegram Deterding to Kessler, February 1898 (no precise date given on the transcript), depicting the Dutch reaction on the Standard take-over threat as a national danger.
- 64 Gerretson, *History II*, 76-82, 94-7. Deterding was very much in favour of the prefs construction, but Kessler, away on a visit to Indonesia, did not like the idea at all: SHA 3/192, Kessler to Deterding, 4 January 1898; R. A. Alkmaar, De Lange papers (no inventory numbers available at the time of writing) Kessler to Kessler-De Lange, 15 and 24 January 1898.
- 65 According to Gerretson, *History II*, opposite 207 and 217, Dordtsche had a production of 80,000 tons, or 2 million cases, in 1896.
- 66 Henriques, *Samuel* 74-5, 367; 'Frederick Lane', in: Jeremy, *Dictionary*, III, 652-4; SLA GHS/2B/72 Working Papers Group Personnel, reminiscences T. E. S. Pate, T. Perry, H. S. Plante; photos of Lane in Howarth, *Century* 36, dated 1890; id. in Henriques, *Samuel*, dated 1920s, which would appear a bit late.
- 67 Gerretson, *History I*, 163, 169, 240; Chernow, *Titan*, 180.
- 68 'Frederick Lane', in: Jeremy, *Dictionary*, III, 652-4; Jones, *State* 32-46; Van Driel, *Veembedrijf* 79; Gerretson, *History I*, 227; II, 277-82. Hidy/Hidy, *Pioneering* 144-54.
- 69 Gerretson, *History I*, 214.
- 70 Henriques, *Samuel* 80-1.
- 71 Henriques, *Samuel*, 60-1, picture opposite p 21; SLA GHS/2B/72 Working Papers Group Personnel, reminiscences T. E. S. Pate.
- 72 Gerretson, *History III*, 213.
- 73 Henriques, *Samuel*, *passim* and 52-4.
- 74 Forbes/O'Beirne, *Technical development*, 529; Henriques, *Samuel*, 79, 91-5; Gerretson, *History I*, 233-4.
- 75 Henriques, *Samuel*, 32, 164.
- 76 SLA GHS/2B/72 Working Papers Group Personnel, reminiscences H. S. Plante.
- 77 Ibid., reminiscence T. E. S. Pate.
- 78 Gerretson, *History I*, 240.
- 79 Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering*, 259.
- 80 Henriques, *Samuel*, 90-2, 100-2, 105-10.
- 81 Gerretson, *History II*, 222-4, 230; Henriques, *Samuel*, 104, 113.
- 82 Gerretson, *History I*, 112; Korthals Altes, *Prices*, 68-9.
- 83 Hidy/Hidy, *Pioneering*, 259; Gerretson, *History II*, 147.
- 84 Henriques, *Samuel*, 138-9; Gerretson, *History II*, 214-7. However, as late as 1897 Tank Syndicate sales in India were handicapped by difficulties in providing tins: SHA 3/192, Kessler to Deterding, undated, probably December 1897.
- 85 Suzuki, *Japanese issues*, 66-8, 70, 98, 151-2, 158, 200-2.
- 86 Henriques, *Samuel*, 159, 198; Chapman, *Merchant enterprise*, 210, 270, 313.
- 87 SLA MR/84 for a record of Group-owned

- ships from 1892 to 1986 and includes details of building, dimensions, names and dates, with copies of the builders' certificates for *Trocas* (1892) and *Spondilus* and *Trocas* (1893); GHS3H/4-1, a folder with details about Shell Transport ships and the number of passages through the Suez canal.
- 88 One ton of carrying capacity equalled 333 Imperial gallons of kerosene: Samuel, 'Liquid fuel', 385; Gerretson, *History II*, 241 gives 35 cases per ton, or 350 gallons. At 4,000 tons the *Murex* could transport 1.3 million gallons, that is to say, the equivalent of 133,200 cases of kerosene, for there were two four-gallon tins to the case. There is confusion about the capacity of the six *Murex*-class tankers, which is variously put at either 4,000 tons (Henriques, *Samuel*, 119), 4,200 tons (Gerretson, *History I*, 217) or even 5,000 tons (Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 539; (Howarth, *Century*, 36; id., *Sea Shell*, 28). We have chosen to use the figures given in SLA GHS3H/4-1, which put the *Murex*-class tankers at 3,500 GRT, and assumed that the tankers would have carried 90% of their capacity. Cf. SLA 141/25/1, ledgers Shell Transport, book 2, 1899 fo. 17. If one takes a higher figure, the estimated volume of kerosene carried of course goes up (Figure 1.2), but the trend remains the same, and the sales performance of the Tank Syndicate/Shell Transport drops accordingly (see the discussion of Table 1.2).
- 89 Gerretson, *History II*, 147.
- 90 Cf. Henriques, *Samuel*, 140; Gerretson, *History III*, 135-6.
- 91 Gerretson, *History III*, 213; Sam Samuel's imports into Japan mainly consisted of Anchor brand tins, and the Bombay oil trade also appears to have continued taking a large volume of Anchor tins.
- 92 SLA 141/35/10-11, minutes committee meetings 31 December 1897; SLA 141/25/1, ledgers Shell Transport fo. 17.
- 93 Gerretson, *History I*, 233-4; idem, II, 307; cf. idem IV, 54. SLA 141/25/1, ledgers Shell Transport book 2, fo. 17.
- 94 Henriques, *Samuel*, 259.
- 95 In the summer of 1893, Marcus Samuel was diagnosed (wrongly) with cancer and given a year to live by his doctor, which must have given him an additional wish for consolidation: Henriques, *Samuel* 122-3.
- 96 SLA 141/35/10-11, minutes committee meetings, valuation committee 31 December 1897, 14 May, 25 June, 14 July, 17 August, 15 September, 5 November, 10 December 1898; Henriques, *Samuel*, 198; Howarth, *Century*, 46.
- 97 Gerretson, *History III*, 213.
- 98 Henriques, *Samuel*, 227-9, erroneously identifying the 5,000-ton tanker *SS Pectan* as a tug. According to SLA GHS/2B/72, working papers group personnel 1900-55, reminiscences T. E. S. Pate, Marcus Samuel wanted to claim heavy compensation, but his solicitors persuaded him to waive it and earn a title. The *Pectan* was indeed spelled like that; it was only in 1927 that the Group gave the same name to another ship, this time correctly named *Pecten*: Howarth, *Sea Shell*, 32.
- 99 Henriques, *Samuel*, 176-9, 223-6; Gerretson, *History II*, 119-20. The two men discussed a collaboration agreement in December 1896 and January 1897, but the outcome of these talks is unknown. The fact that Marcus Samuel initiated the talks by travelling to The Hague suggests that the initiative came from him: SHA 102, Loudon papers, Kessler to Loudon, 19 and 27 January, 23 April 1897.
- 100 SHA 3/192, Kessler to Deterding, 6 March 1898; Kessler expected a production of 10 million units a year and a potential of double that, plus 3,000 tons of liquid fuel.
- 101 Gerretson, *History I*, 276.
- 102 Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1898, 11.
- 103 SHA 102, Loudon papers, Kessler to Loudon 13 May 1897; Gerretson, *History II*, 46-8.
- 104 Voorst Vader-Duyckink Sander, *Stoop*, 149.
- 105 Gerretson, *History II*, 89-92; Wouters, *Shell tankers*, 16, dating the ship's arrival on 23 May; Henriques, *Samuel* 236, and no doubt following this Yergin, *Prize*, 118, wrongly situate the scene on New Year's Eve 1897. Cf. Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1897, 11. According to a speech by C. M. Pleyte to Loudon in 1913, the festivities and the discovery of water both took place in the night of 16 to 17 April: SHA 190D/757. Pleyte worked at Pangkalan Brandan at the time.
- 106 Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1898, 10-1, 15; Gerretson, *History II*, 95-6; the Kesslers had just inherited a considerable fortune from G. A. de Lange, the Royal Dutch commissaris who died in 1897. Kessler may also have hesitated because he had just invested a considerable sum in the syndicate which had vainly attempted to support the Royal Dutch share price: Geljon, *Algemene banken*, 372.
- 107 Gerretson, *History I*, 69-71; II, 122-4; Smits and Gales, 'Olie en gas', 68-72.
- 108 Gerretson, *History II*, 125.
- 109 Gerretson, *History II*, 93, Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1899, 9.
- 110 Gerretson, *History II*, 101-2.
- 111 Annual Report 1899, 14-7; Annual Report 1900, 16-19. Cf. SHA 8/1365, giving shipments of Russian bulk oil by Royal Dutch as 36,955 tons for 1901.
- 112 SHA 3/192, Kessler to Loudon, 13 August 1899, instructing him to keep the Russian contract secret so as not to let the Samuels know.
- 113 Gerretson, *History II*, 114-21, terming it a godsend on 118.
- 114 Henriques, *Samuel*, 296-7.
- 115 Gerretson, *History II*, 124.
- 116 R. A. Alkmaar, De Lange papers (no inventory numbers available at the time of writing), Kessler to Kessler-De Lange, 27 October 1899.
- 117 Gerretson, *History II*, 125-6; Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 65; Smits and Gales, 'Olie en gas', 68-72.
- 118 Royal Dutch Annual Report 1899, 12; Gerretson's special pleading in *History II*, 139-42; correspondence with Van Heutsz, SHA 3/209.
- 119 Gerretson, *History II*, 95, 126-38.
- 120 Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1901, 9; SHA 190C/266, memorandum history geological service. Expert advice was of course no guarantee for success, since even professors of geology would come to diametrically opposed conclusions, with one Royal Dutch manager complaining that even eminent geologists understood nothing of oil geology: cf. SHA 102, Loudon papers, Pleyte to Loudon, 3 June, 11 October 1900.
- 121 SHA 102, Loudon papers, Kessler to Loudon, 21 May 1896, asking Loudon to stop selling gasoline to India, since the fire risks were too great and the revenues negligible.
- 122 SHA 102, Loudon papers, Kessler to Loudon, 21 May 1896; Gerretson, *History II*, 254.
- 123 Contrary to Gerretson, *History II*, 73 (presumably on the strength of Deterding, *Oilman*, 62), Kessler did not leave instructions that he was to be succeeded by Deterding. Indeed, on his

- deathbed in Naples he thought Loudon would succeed him, and worried that he would not be ruthless enough: R. A. Alkmaar, De Lange papers (no inventory numbers available at the time of writing) note dated Naples December 1900. Cf. SHA 190D/728 and 190D/733. The board nominated Deterding in its meeting of 15 December 1900.
- 124 Menten had offered them to Royal Dutch in 1892: Gerretson, *History* II, 161. Cf. SHA 190A/115, Kutei correspondence and deeds. A provisional agreement between Samuel & Co. and Menten covering his Borneo concession was signed on 12 September 1895, but in 1934 the document was reported as lost: SLA 141/11/15 Shell Transport board memos, folder 17-35, memo about the contents of the company's deed box.
- 125 Henriques, *Samuel*, 167-71.
- 126 SLA GHS/2B/72, working papers group personnel, reminiscences T. E. S. Pate.
- 127 Henriques, *Samuel* 155; SLA 141/11/1, Shell Transport Board memos 1901-02, letters 1 February 1897, 3 March 1897; Henriques, *Samuel*, 441, letter Lane in SLA 141/11/2, Board memos 1902, No. 1.
- 128 SHA 190A/115, contract between Menten and Samuel & Co., 12 September 1895.
- 129 Cf. Henriques, *Samuel*, quotes extensively throughout from the correspondence between the Samuels and Abrahams in SHA 190A/107.
- 130 SHA 190A/115, documents pertaining to Kutei.
- 131 Henriques, *Samuel*, 227, 239, 242-3.
- 132 Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1892; Shell Transport, Annual Report 1899; Henriques, *Samuel*, 259.
- 133 SHA 190A/116-2, an envelope with various documents about the early days of Group companies in the Dutch East Indies, one of them describing Sanga Sanga crude.
- 134 The 20-80 ratio given by Boverton Redwood, SLA 141/11/3 1905 Board memos vol. 3, 20-32. The practice of importing Devoes continued at least until 1914, when an enraged Deterding instructed Colijn to put an end to it: SHA 195/28, Deterding to Colijn, 30 November 1914.
- 135 Gerretson, *History* II, 320.
- 136 Gerretson, *History* II, 168.
- 137 SHA 190A/116-2, report Abrahams 1898-99, claiming KPM had bought a total of 36,000 tons by September 1899.
- 138 SLA GHS/B/72, memoirs James Kewley.
- 139 Henriques, *Samuel*, 306-13; SLA GHC/ID/BZ/1, Report Jago to NIIHM for 1905.
- 140 Samuel, *Liquid Fuel*, 393; Shell Transport, Annual Report 1899, 1; Henriques, *Samuel*, 315; Voorst Vader-Duyckink Sander, *Stoop*, 125.
- 141 Gerretson, *History* II, 171.
- 142 Gerretson, *History* II, 171, 315-6.
- 143 Published as Samuel, *Liquid Fuel*; about the campaign in detail, see Jones, *State*, 9-31, 38-43; id., 'Lost Cause', 139 (1902 publicity pamphlet for fuel oil); Henriques, *Samuel*, 387.
- 144 Gerretson, *History* II, 328. When Bataafsche took over Balikpapan after the 1907 merger, some 8m guilders were needed for the most urgent repairs and alterations in order to meet the company's safety criteria: R. A. Alkmaar, De Lange papers (no inventory numbers available at the time of writing) Dolph Kessler to Kessler-De Lange, 24 February 1908, published in *Tussen moeder en zoon*, 99.
- 145 Shell Transport, Annual Report 1905; SLA 141/11/3, Board memos 1905 vol. I, Production Figures Borneo 1904 (plus earlier years); SLA 141/11/3 Board memos 1905 vol. II, cost accounts Borneo 1904; SLA 141/11/3, Board memos 1905 vol. I, memo NIIHM 6 March 1905.
- 146 SLA 141/11/2, Board memos 1903, Report Sutherland, 10 September 1903; SLA 141/11/4, Board memos 1906, Jago to Benjamin, 26 July 1906; GHC/ID/BZ/1, Report Jago to the NIIHM, January 1906.
- 147 Henriques, *Samuel*, 227, 239, 242-3.
- 148 *Petroleum Review and Mining News*, 26 March, 2 April 1904, interview Gurgonian, in SLA GHS/2B/18, Group History Borneo; SLA GHC/ID/BZ/1, reports Kutei, report Jago January 1906. In 1908, working conditions at Balikpapan were still more relaxed than those at Pangkalan Brandan, work starting there at 8 o'clock rather than the 6 a.m. on Sumatra: R. A. Alkmaar, De Lange papers (no inventory numbers available at the time of writing) Dolph Kessler to Kessler-De Lange, 24 February 1908, published in *Tussen moeder en zoon*, 99.
- 149 SLA 141/11/1, Board memos, 1901-02, statement loans outstanding 9 July 1901; Henriques, *Samuel*, 348, giving an erroneous £132,000; id., 235.
- 150 SLA 141/25/1, ledger 1899 fol 226; 141/25/2, ledger 1901, fo. 367.
- 151 Gerretson, *History* III 260 puts the extra cost at 20 per cent.
- 152 Henriques, *Samuel*, 354-5, 366, 386-7 (gasoline attempt); ibid., 310, 387-8, 402, 438, 442 (Australia, with specific charges from Lane's December 1902 resignation letter); Murray, *Go Well*, 3, 13-4.
- 153 Annual reports; Gerretson, *History* II, 197 (sales 1902).
- 154 Annual Reports.
- 155 Sir Marcus still referred to his company as the Shell Line in the summer of 1898: Gerretson, *History* II, 120.
- 156 SLA 141/35/10-11, Minutes valuation committee 31 December 1897, calculation profits on steamers M. Samuel & Co., 1895-7. Samuel & Co.'s low profitability on shipping oil conforms to the general experience of British overseas trading firms engaged in trade and shipping: Jones, *Merchants*, 81-3.
- 157 Gerretson, *History* II, 101.
- 158 Freight rates on Russian oil were more than double that on Eastern oil: Archives Nationaux CAMT Roubaix, Banque Rothschild archive (hereafter AN/CAMT) 132 AQ 154, bundle March-May 1904, Deterding to Baer, 11 May 1904, taking freight on Russian oil shipped by Asiatic at 25 shillings per ton, against Eastern oil 11 shillings per ton. On the royalties see for instance Langeveld, *Colijn* I, 190-1.
- 159 Deterding to Pleyte, 18 August 1909, quoted in Gerretson, *History* IV, 167-8.
- 160 Shell Transport's tank terminals had 215,600 tons capacity, against 96,000 tons for Royal Dutch, so Royal Dutch pushed more kerosene through its installations, for at 1,680,000 cans Shell Transport's canning works had a similar capacity to those of Royal Dutch, i.e. 1,650,000. Gerretson, *History* II, 196. In 1903, Shell Transport sold or leased 44 ocean terminals and 190 subsidiary depots to Asiatic, with a further 48 under construction; Royal Dutch transferred only 22 terminals and 20 depots, plus 6 under construction: AN/CAMT 132 AQ 152, bundle Asiatic, definitive contracts and schedules of transfer, 1903.
- 161 Henriques, *Waley Cohen* 94; id., *Samuel*, 348.
- 162 Cf. SLA 141/11/1, Board memos Shell Transport 1901, committee reports 12 June 1901, 18 June 1901; SLA 141/3/2, board minutes, Shell Transport 26 February 1901. Henriques, *Samuel*, 437, 442-3; Lane's

- December 1902 resignation letter in SLA 141/11/2, board memos, Shell Transport 1902, No. 1.
- 163 Henriques, *Samuel*, 444-5, for a description of the administrative arrangements in 1901.
- 164 SHA 190C/266; the exact years were 1902 for the head office and 1905 for the count in Asia.
- 165 Gerretson, *History* IV, 244-5.
- 166 Gerretson, *History* III, 296-8; Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering*, 633. Standard began publishing regular accounts only in 1918.
- 167 Cf. the correspondence between Lane and Aron during December 1906-January 1907 in AN/CAMT 132 AQ 198.
- 168 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 199, bundle correspondence 1913, Lane to Baron Edouard de Rothschild, 13 October 1913.
- 169 Henriques, *Samuel*, 361; Gerretson, *History* II, 183-7; SHA, Board minutes Royal Dutch, 1 August 1901, termination contract association.
- 170 Gerretson, *History* II, 166-7.
- 171 Henriques, *Samuel*, 320; Gerretson, *History* II, 239.
- 172 Henriques, *Samuel*, 322-3; Gerretson, *History* II, 189-91; *The Statist*, 26 December 1903.
- 173 SHA 8/1365, letters of Lane and Emile Deen to Deterding, both 4 October 1901.
- 174 Gerretson, *History* II, 82-6; cf. Voorst Vader-Duyckink Sander, *Stoop*, 146-7.
- 175 Henriques, *Samuel*, 296-7.
- 176 Howarth, *Century*, 56, erroneously taking the AGM to have taken place on 19 June; Sir Marcus to the Shell Transport AGM on 18 June 1901, quoted in Henriques, *Samuel*, 353.
- 177 Henriques, *Samuel*, 355-6; Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering*, 554; Seidenzahl, *Deutsche Bank*, 213-4.
- 178 Gerretson, *History* II, 197.
- 179 Henriques, *Samuel*, 355, 386-7.
- 180 SLA GHS/3F, a report by the Russian oil expert Gulishambaroff in *Petroleum Industrial and Technical Review*, 26 July 1902.
- 181 Henriques, *Samuel*, 355-6, 360-1, 369, 395-6, 407-8, 451; AN/CAMT 132 AQ 152, Lane to Aron, undated but written towards the end of January 1903.
- 182 Gerretson, *History* II, 193-4; SHA 8/1365, Loudon to Deterding, 4, 8, 9, 22, 23, 25, 28 October 1901.
- 183 SHA 8/1365, correspondence Lane, Deterding, and E. Deen.
- 184 SHA 8/1365, Emile Deen to Deterding, 4 November 1901, Lane to Deterding, 4 November 1901; Gerretson, *History* II, 197; Henriques, *Samuel*, 370.
- 185 Gerretson, *History* II, 118, 197-8; Henriques, *Samuel*, 372; the 7 shillings a ton a breaking point for Samuel, Deen to Deterding, 7 December 1901, SHA 8/1365.
- 186 Henriques, *Samuel*, 369.
- 187 Gerretson, *History* II, 171, 201, 230; Henriques, *Samuel*, 362.
- 188 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 3 December 1901.
- 189 SLA 141/11/1, Board memos 1901, letter Walton, Johnson, Bubb & Whatton 6 November 1901.
- 190 Henriques, *Samuel*, 373.
- 191 Henriques, *Samuel*, 373; Howarth, *Century*, 57; Shell Transport Annual Report 1901, the dollar taken as 4.87 to the pound.
- 192 Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering*, 633.
- 193 Shell Transport Annual Report 1899; *The Statist*, 14 December 1901; Henriques, *Samuel*, 373; SHA 8/1365, Emile Deen to Deterding, 6 and 9 November, 11 December 1901.
- 194 Henriques, *Samuel*, 372-3, 380.
- 195 As early as 30 December 1901, he suggested bringing liquid fuel into the agreement: Henriques, *Samuel*, 377.
- 196 *The Financier and Bullionist*, 16 December 1903.
- 197 Henriques, *Samuel*, 392.
- 198 Gerretson, *History* II, 238, 241; SLA 141/3/3, board minutes Shell Transport, 29 April 1902; Dordtsche joined on special terms in September 1903, SHA 190C/64, minutes Syndicate 11 September 1903. The Syndicate met for the first time on 28 August 1903, so only after Asiatic had been formally constituted. Royal Dutch had 263 votes out of 391; SHA 190C/64 (minutes Syndicate).
- 199 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 154, bundle Asiatic 1902-03.
- 200 In September 1904, Deterding was glad to let a chartered ship take 3,000 tons of liquid fuel off his hands at cost price as a favour to the owners agreeing to a low charter rate: AN/CAMT 132 AQ 155, bundle July-December 1904, Deterding to Bnito, 19 September 1904.
- 201 *The Statist*, 28 June 1902, p. 1127-8; Deterding to Lane on 19 June quoted Gerretson, *History* II, 238.
- 202 Gerretson, *History* II, 238-9; SHA 8/1365, Lane to Deterding, 20 June 1901 bringing the news of Sir Marcus's agreement. Henriques, *Samuel*, 397-400 gives the erroneous impression of Sir Marcus signing because the navy fuel oil trial on the 27th had gone wrong, whereas he had already agreed a week earlier. Sam Samuel & Co. in Japan again remained out of the arrangements: Gerretson, *History* III, 213.
- 203 A map in Gerretson, *History* II, facing 173.
- 204 SHA 8/1365, Lane to Deterding, 25 September 1902.
- 205 Sales prices of case oil from the Straits Times, published at <http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/singapore/prijs-east.xls>; Gerretson, *History* II, 344.
- Estimated sales from AN/CAMT 132 AQ 156, R2/154, Deterding to Bnito, 7 August 1903; Gerretson, *History* III, 50 for market shares in Asia; Gerretson, *Geschiedenis* IV, 76, 80, for a comparison of brands.
- 206 SLA GHS/28/72, memoirs S. A. Ensor.
- 207 Cf. the correspondence in AN/CAMT 132 AQ 154, correspondence Asiatic 1902-3. Thus when in 1903 Deterding sidestepped Marcus Samuel's attempt to settle the dispute over tanker rates by arguing that Asiatic did not yet formally exist, so that this particular clause in its draft articles of association did not apply, he may have been right in law, but not in fact. He even went so far as to return letters from Samuel & Co. addressed to Asiatic, pretending that the company did not exist and that he traded as director of Royal Dutch: AN/CAMT 132 AQ 154, Samuel & Co. to Deterding, 9 January 1903.
- 208 Gerretson, *History* IV, 56-7; SLA 120/3/1, minutes board Asiatic, 4 August 1904; AN/CAMT 132 AQ 154 a heated correspondence between Deterding and Sir Marcus about the former's failure to produce accounts. SLA 141/11/4 board memos Shell Transport, 45-56 vol. I, 32/L, NIIHM to Asiatic, 28 February 1906 with angry queries about the accounts for 1902, 1903, and 1904. SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 16 May 1903, 13 June 1904; 190C/64, minutes meeting Syndicate Eastern Producers, 14 January 1904. Shell Transport's 1902 accounts were only published in December 1903. The board blamed Asiatic's procrastinations in producing its accounts, which Henriques sees as another one of Deterding's ruses to undermine Shell Transport's position. The Royal Dutch 1902 accounts were published in June 1903, as usual, using

- estimates of expected Asiatic proceeds, so it appears rather more likely that Sir Marcus's preoccupations as Lord Mayor delayed the production of Shell Transport's disastrous 1902 accounts.
- 209 A contemporary catalogue of Asiatic's failings in AN/CAMT 132 AQ 195, folder correspondence Royal Dutch, unsigned memo 25 January 1906. The rows can be followed at close range from the Asiatic board minutes in 132 AQ 153 ff and SLA 120/35/1 ff.
- 210 SLA 120/3/1, minutes board of directors Asiatic, 14 June 1905.
- 211 SHA 190D/766, correspondence with the Penang agent Martijn.
- 212 SLA 102/35/1 Asiatic Committee Minutes vol. 1, 14 July 1903, 15 July, 21 July 1903.
- 213 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 156, No. 155, Lane to Baer, 3 February 1906; SLA, 120/3/1, Minutes board Asiatic, 1 June 1906.
- 214 Wouters, *Tankers*, 20.
- 215 Gerretson, *History* II, 316-7.
- 216 SHA 190C/64, the first meeting of the producers' Syndicate on 28 August 1903 already considered a draft scheme for gasoline gravity standards plus incentives to producers for supplying the right quality.
- 217 Gerretson, *History* II, 305-6; Benjamin to Deterding, 29 May 1905, accepting the discount in SLA 141/11/3; Shell Transport's board approval in 141/3/4, minutes 30 May; AN/CAMT 132 AQ 156, No. 155, kerosene bulk proceeds 18.3 pence per unit in 1905. NIIHM sought to defend itself by lodging its own complaints; in an entertaining pot-and-kettle correspondence, the company accused others of supplying substandard kerosene, letter to Asiatic 12 September 1905, SLA 141/11/3, board memos 1905, vol. 3.
- 218 SHA 190C/64, Minutes Syndicate, 19 February 1904, 22 April 1904, 31 May 1905. The lab does not appear to have been an initiative of Royal Dutch. Submitting products to the lab became a standard precondition for Asiatic giving an advance on shipments. Gerretson, *History* II, 304.
- 219 Gerretson, *History* II, 236; cf. also III, 266. Cf. 190D/763, correspondence Macdonald-Deterding, 1900-06.
- 220 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 156 No. 154, memo Baron Edmond de Rothschild, 12 February 1906.
- 221 By 1922 it was still no more than a quarter: Fletcher, 'From coal to oil', 6-7. In 1898, Shell Transport had taken delivery of its first tankers capable of using either coal or oil, subsequently converting some, though not all, of its tankers in a similar way: Middlemiss, *Tankers*, 19.
- 222 Deterding wrote to Lane about bad news from Texas on 19 June: Gerretson, *History* II, 238.
- 223 Lane's letters of 11 and 29 December 1902, detailing a list of complaints, in SLA 141/11/2, No. 1.
- 224 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 156 No. 155, producers' account, division of kerosene bulk proceeds 1905; the same documents in SLA 141/11/4, board memos 1906, vol. I. AN/CAMT 132 AQ 156 No. 198, folder correspondence Royal Dutch 1906, Aron to Baer, 30 May 1906, 1905 a poor year. Asiatic sold 17.5 million cases in 1906: idem, statement sales and returns 1906.
- 225 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 155, folder comptes 1905; 132 AQ 156, folder correspondence Royal Dutch 1906, Aron to Baer, 30 May 1906; ibid. folder 1907, Baer to Lane 15 January 1907, estimate 40 dividend over 1906.
- 226 Gerretson, *History* 285-6, 351.
- 227 SHA 8/1365, E. Deen had applied for a permit to build the tanks with the Rotterdam city council, after having checked with Lane that he had no objection to Royal Dutch starting to sell gasoline: E. Deen to Deterding, 7 October 1901. The lab run by Sluyterman van Loo at the The Hague head office transferred to the new location of the tank farm at Rotterdam Charlois in 1902.
- 228 SHA 190B/138, memoirs Späth; *Shell Spiegel* July 1951, page 9 (obituary Rudeloff); SHA 102, Loudon papers, Deterding to Loudon, 2 February 1906, with copies of the proposed agreement, which originally was to embrace all Western Europe; Gerretson, *History* II, 343-4, with the footnoted Dutch edition referring to an August 1906 deal with Standard about the German market which lifted profits from gasoline sales by 4.7 m. guilders; Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Oel*, 88-9; Michielsen, *Van Ommeren*, I, 81-3, 85-93; Boele and Van de Laar, *Van Ommeren*, 22-3. Rudeloff had repatriated after a commercial career in China, where he had worked for Royal Dutch in expanding its sales network. SHA 190C/67A contains correspondence about the setting up of the Charlois gasoline installation; cf. De Goey, 'Deterding', 60-7 about Royal Dutch's entry into European gasoline sales, with particular attention to the Netherlands. AN/CAMT 132 AQ 155, folder correspondence 1906, Lane to Aron, 7 September 1906, a formal arrangement with Standard for Germany and an understanding for other countries not to compete on price.
- 229 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 156, minutes executive committee Asiatic, 23 April, 15 October 1906; Asiatic to André Fils, 18 and 26 September 1907. Lane was against collaborating with the cartel since he thought it more profitable for Asiatic to operate on its own: ibid., Lane to Aron, 23 September 1907. Talks with an Italian group led by Agnelli appear to have stalled: ibid., minutes executive committee 25 April, 27 June 1906.
- 230 In 1899 there were already six Dutch companies working in Romania. Kessler had already visited the country in February 1900 to survey oil prospects there: R. A. Alkmaar De Lange papers (no inventory numbers available at the time of writing) letters Kessler 10, 12, 16 February 1900, Gerretson, *History*, II, 289, 290. Loudon was rather annoyed at Deterding's secretive and really clandestine Romanian operations: SHA 102, Loudon papers, Loudon to Deterding, 13 August 1906; reports by P. A. de Lange on Romania in SHA 3/209 and by E. Deen to Deterding 31 October and 1 November 1901 in 8/1665; Gerretson, *History* II, 293-7.
- 231 *Morning Post*, 10 October 1903, referring to the overdue payment of interest on the prefs: SLA, file news clippings. The 1903 profits were boosted by including an £80,000 interest charge on the NIIHM's debt for 1901 and 1902, with the company's debt to Shell Transport rising by the same amount, so there had been no payment at all, only a shift in balance items to create a false impression of revenues. The call for Sir Marcus's resignation in the *Financial Times*, 20 August 1903. The company ran a campaign to counter the negative publicity. During 1904 and 1905, the *Petroleum Review and Mining News* published illustrated articles about the Kalimantan enterprise and its liquid fuel. Other papers published stories about Shell Transport's heroic contest with Standard Oil in Europe. Clippings in the same file; Henriques, *Samuel*, 478-80 for quotes.
- 232 SLA 141/11/2, board memos Shell Transport

- 1903 Vol. 1, detailed costs and benefits Sanga Sanga; in December 1904, 141/11/3, board memos 1905, vol. 2, *ibid.* 1905; 141/11/3 vol. 2, and 141/11/4, vol. 1, estimates wax factory.
- 233 SLA 141/11/3, board memos 1905 vol. III, estimate of shipping revenues during January-September 1905.
- 234 Gerretson, *History* II, 328-30; Dutch control over Kalimantan figured prominently in the Admiralty's objection to Shell Transport as fuel supplier: Jones, *State*, 23. Middlemiss, *Tankers*, 20.
- 235 SLA 141/11/2, board memos Shell Transport, bundle 1, draft agreement between NIIHM and Royal Dutch, 3 November 1903; bundle 2, draft agreement ditto 1 December 1903. Henriques, *Samuel* 457, erroneously assumes the management of Balikpapan having passed to Royal Dutch.
- 236 Sir Marcus to the 1904 AGM in April 1905, a clipping in SLA 141/11/3, board memos Shell Transport 1905; Rudeloff to Shell Transport, 2 February 1906, in SLA 141/11/4, board memos Shell Transport 1906 vol. 1; Gerretson, *History* III, 92-4.
- 237 Seidenzahl, *Deutsche Bank*, 213-4; Gerretson, *History* III, 86-8, 92-4; Henriques, *Samuel*, 489-91.
- 238 SLA 141/11/4, board memos Shell Transport, estimate debt 12 March 1907 giving a total of £580,000; the same amount given by Lane to Aron, 17 May 1906, in AN/CAMT 132 AQ 155, bundle correspondence 1906.
- 239 SLA 141/3/5, board minutes Shell Transport 12 December 1905.
- 240 Minutes Royal Dutch board, 25 May 1905.
- 241 SHA 102, Loudon papers, Deterding to Loudon, 26 and 27 March 1906, writing in the latter that the Shell Transport board had accepted the proposed 60-40 that morning, though the day before Sir Marcus had favoured merging on principles of profit sharing, each company getting half of the first £300,000, the rest to be split 35-65 between Shell Transport and Royal Dutch. The 10 per cent represented 25 per cent of Shell Transport's 40 per cent share in the Group. The point was not lost on the Paris Rothschilds, though elsewhere few people appear to have noticed it: AN/CAMT 132 AQ 197, bundle 1903-09.
- 242 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 155, folder correspondence 1906, memo Baron Edmond de Rothschild, 12 February 1906.
- 243 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 155, folder correspondence 1906, Lane to Baer, 10, 30 January 1906. Deterding made a tentative offer of £ 1.5 m. claiming that on the basis of an understanding with the Dutch bank NHM he could raise the money within 24 hours. No further negotiations about price or conditions with Royal Dutch or with Deutsche Bank are mentioned in the correspondence between Rothschild and Lane, but the antagonism between Germany and the other European powers at the Conference of Algieras in the spring of 1906 probably forestalled the possibility of selling Bnito to Deutsche Bank.
- 244 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 195, folder correspondence Royal Dutch, unsigned memo 25 January 1906.
- 245 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 282, comptes Bnito 1903-11.
- 246 SHA 102, Loudon papers, Deterding to Loudon, 27 March 1906.
- 247 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 282, comptes Bnito 1903-11. Dividends during the years 1887-98 averaged 5.5 %.
- 248 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 155, folder correspondence 1906, Lane to Baer, 30 January 1906.
- 249 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 156, folder correspondence 1907, Lane to Baer, 5 and 11 June 1907, Lane to his solicitor Colt, 5 June 1907.
- 250 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 155, folder correspondence 1906, undated memo written by either Aron or Baer. The memo calculated that, on the basis of an average 40% profit, the Rothschilds' share in Asiatic was worth four times its nominal amount of £300,000. The records do not show whether there were ever negotiations on this basis.
- 251 See for these negotiations AN/CAMT 132 AQ 198, folders correspondence 1906 and 1907.
- 252 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 155, folder correspondence 1906, Lane to Baer, 20 April 1906, with a scheme of the proposed amalgamation. The provisional merger agreement of 12 September 1906 still kept open whether Shell Transport and Royal Dutch would transfer their properties to one or more companies.
- 253 SLA GHS/3A/6, Royal Dutch Special Letter Book, 1906-07, gives a good impression of the huge amount of administrative details to be sorted out. This time, the firm of Sam Samuel in Japan was included in the merger: Gerretson, *History* III, 219.
- 254 Cf. e.g. Gerretson, *History* III, 239, quoting Embden, *Money powers* 385.
- 255 AN/CAMT 132 AQ 156, folder producers' accounts 1906; Gerretson, *History* IV, 56-7.

## Chapter 2

- 1 Henriques, *Samuel*, 509-10.
- 2 He for example co-signed the Annual Report of Shell Transport from 1910 onwards.
- 3 Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 79-143.
- 4 Ibid. 141.
- 5 Waley Cohen maintained in 1951 that votes were never taken, but that is an exaggeration; see Beaton, *Enterprise*, 54.
- 6 Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 151-3.
- 7 Ibid. 142.
- 8 The joint bonus from the two companies was according to the initial proposal of February 1907 limited to £40,000 or, in fact, £80,000 during a period of two years; SLA 141/11/4, board memos Shell Transport, February 1907. In 1913 this ceiling was lifted, SHA board minutes Bataafsche, 23 September 1913, a copy in 3/209, correspondence Lane.
- 9 The sums involved were initially not very big about 30,000 guilders between 1907 and 1911 but increased strongly after 1911 and would amount to almost 3 million guilders during the 1920s; see Ch. 5, for more details.
- 10 *Financial News*, 24 June 1909. This criticism led to some changes; in particular the bonuses of the non-executive members of Royal Dutch were limited in 1911.
- 11 Henriques, *Samuel*, 496, 506.
- 12 Henriques, *Samuel*, 499.
- 13 Ibid. 507.
- 14 Ibid. 506.
- 15 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 3 May 1913.
- 16 Gerretson, *History*, II, 348.
- 17 Deterding thought that Erb had worked so hard for the Group, visiting almost all continents for his geological surveys in a few years, that he was seriously overworked, and asked him to take four months' leave immediately after he received his 'definite arrangement' in January 1911; SHA 195/115, Deterding to Loudon 29 January 1911; the following year four recently graduated Swiss geologists were hired; SHA 195/119, Deterding to Loudon 29 February and 14 March 1912; see also Gerretson, *History*, IV, 3.
- 18 SHA 195/33-7 and 174-7, the Deterding-Gulbenkian correspondence is a fascinating source for the many and varied transactions arranged between the two men.
- 19 Deterding considered Gulbenkian a good negotiator but unsuitable as a manager: SHA 195/92, memo Deterding for Gerretson, 1932.
- 20 Staff numbers for The Hague in SHA 190C/266. Only a few of the clerical staff have left any traces in the records. A striking exception is Hendrika Troelstra, Deterding's secretary between 1903 and 1906, when she returned to the Netherlands to become the wife of a farmer in Drenthe; she was also the sister of Jelle Troelstra, the famous leader of the Socialist Party in the Netherlands, and became a well-known writer on socialist and feminist issues (see Meertens, *Biografisch woordenboek*).
- 21 SHA 195/112, Deterding to Loudon, 24 June, 2 July 1907.
- 22 SHA 190A/116; the Asian employees together earned 5.3 million guilders, the Europeans 3.6 million.
- 23 Gerretson, *History* IV, 60.
- 24 SLA GHS/3A/6, Royal Dutch special letter books, memo Benjamin.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 SLA GHS/3A/6, Royal Dutch special letter books, memo Benjamin.
- 27 SHA 195/28, Deterding to Loudon, 9 August 1915.
- 28 SHA board minutes Bataafsche, 7 February, 20 December 1912, 10 August 1916.
- 29 SHA 195/113, Loudon to Deterding, 30 April 1909.
- 30 SHA 190C/64.
- 31 Gerretson, *History*, IV, 74-5; labour contracts with Chinese labourers remained important on Kalimantan, however.
- 32 Gerretson, *History*, IV, 60; it is unclear how the labour conditions of the labourers were affected by this change.
- 33 The net debts of NIIHM amounted to more than £108,000, almost 20 per cent of the negative balance of £557,000 buried in the accounts of Shell Transport; SLA 141/11/4, board memos Shell Transport, 12 March 1907.
- 34 SHA 195/112, Deterding to Loudon, 3 January 1907.
- 35 R. A. Alkmaar, De Lange papers (no inventory numbers available at the time of writing) Dolph Kessler to Kessler-De Lange, 24 February 1908, published in *Tussen moeder en zoon*, 99.
- 36 SHA 195/12, Deterding to Loudon, 26 March 1908.
- 37 SHA 195/113, Deterding to Loudon, 23 January 1909.
- 38 Royal Dutch Annual Report 1913, 15-6.
- 39 SHA board minutes Bataafsche 14 December 1911, 195/28, Deterding to Loudon, 23 November 1914, Deterding to Colijn, 15 February 1915.
- 40 SHA 195/12, Deterding to Loudon, 26 March 1908.
- 41 Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 112.
- 42 SHA 195/113, Deterding to Loudon, undated memo about Penang and Java, (May) 1908.
- 43 Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 112, 119.
- 44 Ibid. 110, 118.
- 45 Van der Putten, *Corporate Behaviour*, 72.



- 46 Ibid. 73.
- 47 SLA 120/35/1, Asiatic minutes executive committee, 14, 21 July 1903.
- 48 Van der Putten, *Corporate Behaviour*, 74.
- 49 Ibid. 75.
- 50 SLA 119/3/1, board minutes Anglo Saxon, 4 December 1907; Van der Putten, *Corporate Behaviour*, 76.
- 51 Van der Putten, *Corporate Behaviour*, 80.
- 52 SHA 190G/64, memos Dordtsche Petroleum Co.
- 53 SHA 195/113, Deterding to Loudon, undated memo about Penang and Java, (May) 1908.
- 54 One of the reasons for setting up the British Imperial was that the name of Asiatic 'did not apparently go down very well in Australia', Murray, *Go Well*, 20.
- 55 Henriques, *Samuel*, 594.
- 56 De Goey, 'Henri Deterding', 67.
- 57 SLA 141/11/4, board memos Shell Transport, Cohen Stuart to Benjamin, 7 June 1906.
- 58 Wouters, *Shell Tankers*, 32-3.
- 59 Ibid. 26.
- 60 Schenk, *Mergers*.
- 61 The strong increase in share prices of Shell and Royal Dutch was clearly linked to the merger in those years, and cannot be explained from the general prosperity of the oil business. Perhaps the best benchmark to compare with is the other oil company from the Dutch East Indies, the Dordtsche Petroleum Maatschappij; its share prices did not change much between 1905 and 1908 (May 1905: 125 per cent; December 1908: 127), and only began to move up in 1909.
- 62 This episode in Deterding, *Oilman*, 72-4.
- 63 Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering*, 504-7.
- 64 Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering*, 495; SHA 195/113, Deterding to Loudon, 31 May 1908.
- 65 SHA 195/113, Deterding to Loudon, 31 May 1908. Deterding added that '25 m. would be accepted', which meant that an even higher bid had been suggested. See also Gerretson, *History*, III, 297.
- 66 SHA 195/113, Deterding to Loudon, 31 May 1908; he also speculated on a weakening of Standard's power due to the anti-trust proceedings against them.
- 67 R. A. Alkmaar De Lange papers (no inventory numbers available at the time of writing) letters Kessler 10, 12, 16 February 1900, Gerretson, *History*, II, 289, 290, 293-7. Reports by P. A. de Lange on Romania in SHA 3/209 and by E. Deen to Deterding 31 October and 1 November 1901 in 8/1665.
- 68 Gerretson, *History*, II, 292-3.
- 69 Loudon did not like these really clandestine operations: SHA 102, Loudon papers, Loudon to Deterding, 13 August 1906.
- 70 Two Dutch banks, the NHM and the Twentsche Bank, also participated in the Consolidated: Gerretson, *History*, III, 107-8.
- 71 SHA 195/114, Deterding to Loudon, 24 February 1911.
- 72 SHA 195/113, Deterding to Loudon, 23 January, 14 April 1909.
- 73 AN CAMT 132 AQ 157, Lane to Aron, 12 and 22 August 1909, the quote is from the former.
- 74 Both quotes AN CAMT 132 AQ 157, Lane to Aron, 29 July 1909; only the UK was not covered by the alliance.
- 75 SHA 195/60, Deterding to Cohen Stuart, 18 June 1909 ('hooglopende ruzie met de Standard').
- 76 Hendrix, *Deterding*, 134.
- 77 Gerretson, *History*, IV, 130-1.
- 78 Hendrix, *Deterding*, 136-7.
- 79 SHA 195/115, Deterding to Loudon, 29 July 1910.
- 80 Gerretson's assessment (*History*, III, 304) that the price war did not lead to a decline in share prices is therefore not correct.
- 81 Shell's dividend: 22.5% in 1910, 20% in 1911; Royal Dutch: 1910: 28%, 1911: 19%; it had an immediate impact on share prices (see Figure 2.1) and Deterding was very unhappy with the decision of the Shell board, see SHA 195/117, Deterding to Loudon, 3 June 1912.
- 82 SHA 195/115, Deterding to Loudon, 10 November 1910.
- 83 Hidy/Hidy, *Pioneering*, 502.
- 84 SHA 195/113, Deterding to Loudon, 14 May 1908.
- 85 SHA 195/113, Deterding to Loudon, 2 July, 1 and 17 November 1909.
- 86 SHA 195/114, Deterding to Loudon, 27 and 28 July 1910.
- 87 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 64-5. Asiatic registered the Shell name and Pecten brand in the US for gasoline in June 1909, extending it in 1914 to cover a range of other products including kerosene, lubricants, greases, candles and wax: Shell Oil Houston, 'Legal Memorandum, Shell Oil Company/Scallop Corporation Trademark Matter; Use of the Pecten Symbol', by James J. Mullen, 3 September 1980, 1.
- 88 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 12 April 1912, 'en erop aan te dingen, dat noch Jambi noch een van de andere gereserveerde terreinen eventueel aan een andere maatschappij dan de Koninklijke worden uitgegeven en althans niet aan Maatschappijen die onder de invloed staan van de S.O.C.'
- 89 SHA 195/117, Rudeloff to Deterding, 28 March 1912. As early as 1911, Deterding stressed the strategic importance of Mesopotamia, SHA 195/117 Deterding to Loudon, 16 November 1911.
- 90 Gerretson, *History*, IV, 136-9.
- 91 The capitalized value of the Group had increased to the equivalent of about \$250 m at this stage; \$45m in 1912/13 would represent almost \$900m in purchasing power in 2007 (using the cost of living to convert 1913 dollars to those of the present day; see <http://eh.net/hmit/compare/>)
- 92 SHA 195/37, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 3 and 4 May 1913.
- 93 SHA 195/37, Gulbenkian to Lane, 3 September 1913.
- 94 A good overview of the question in Jones, *State*, 191 (in 1913 Fisher called Deterding 'Napoleon and Cromwell in one. He is the greatest man I have ever met!').
- 95 Cf. DeNovo, 'Petroleum'.
- 96 SHA 195/117, Deterding to Loudon, 19 December 1911.
- 97 Jones, *State*, 143-4.
- 98 Jones, *State*, 151-5.
- 99 Henriques, *Samuel*, 572-89. Churchill was too good a politician not to realize that he might need Deterding at some point in the future, so he let Deterding know, via his brother who spoke to Gulbenkian, that what had been said in parliament was not directed at him, and that there was no reason to be insulted; SHA 195/37, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 23 June 1914.
- 100 Henriques, *Samuel*, 515-6. Lane was also an ardent promotor of the experiments to use the residue in diesel engines; see SHA 3/209, Lane to Loudon, 7 October 1912.
- 101 Net losses due to the price war in 1911 were generously estimated at £660,000; see Henriques, *Samuel*, 542.
- 102 In 1914 no more than 3 per cent of BPM's total income consisted of dividends from its subsidiaries.
- 103 SHA 195/60, Cohen Stuart to Deterding, 5 November 1909; by contrast, factoring the hidden items back into Anglo-Saxon's

- profits raised them by only 25 per cent.
- 104 SHA 195/121, Deterding to Loudon, 8, 11, 15 July 1913; see also Gerretson, *History*, IV, 3.
- 105 Henriques, *Samuel*, 457; Gerretson, *History*, IV, 22-3; the most important publication about this research appeared in 1907: H. O. Jones and H. A. Wootton, 'The Chemical Composition of Petroleum from Borneo', *Transactions Journal of the Chemical Society*, XCI, 1907, 1146.
- 106 Gerretson, *History* IV, 25-7.
- 107 Cf. SHA 190Y/293, 190D/792, 49/160.
- 108 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 90. See SHA 195/117, Deterding to Loudon, 27 November 1911, Loudon to Deterding, 28 November 1911. On De Kok's involvement *De Bron*, December 1940, obituary De Kok.
- 109 SHA 195/209, copy of board minutes Bataafsche 12 February 1914; it was small consolation that of the total invested amount 'various outfits to a total amount of 425,000 guilders can be used for the Edeleanu plant'.
- 110 Schweppe, *Research aan het IJ*, 12, 19.
- 111 SHA 195/120, Deterding to Loudon, 28 and 29 April 1913, mentioning the resistance by board members and by the Shell board: 'also the Shell gentlemen (...) were not enthusiastic about the big expansion' ('ook de Shell heeren niet zeer enthousiast waren over de groote uitbreiding').
- 112 SHA 195/37, Gulbenkian to Loudon, 3 April 1913.
- 113 SHA 195/120, Deterding to Loudon, 1 May 1913.
- 114 SHA 195/37, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 9 October 1913, for the quote. During one of his visits to Paris, Sir Marcus Samuel visited Gulbenkian who 'again and again used [his] best endeavours to prevent him seeing anybody or from speaking to anybody'; SHA 195/37, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 9 April 1913.
- 115 The story of this share issue can be followed almost day by day in the correspondence between Gulbenkian and Deterding in SHA 195/37. Deterding's analysis of what went wrong in his letter to Gulbenkian, 15 November 1913.
- 116 SHA 195/37, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 28 November 1913.
- 117 SHA 195/119, Deterding to IJzerman, 10 October 1912 'In de eerste plaats spijt het mij meer dan ik u zeggen kan, dat, al zou *après tout* iedereen het met mijn betoog eens zijn, ik toch wel heftig geweest ben, en door mijn temperament heb ik toch steeds weinig vrienden, en kan dus slecht een der weinigen missen. Ik hoop dan ook, dat U mijn heftigheid vergeeft en vergeet'. That Deterding still wrote such a letter is a significant difference from the 1920s and 1930s when similar outbursts occurred quite often.
- 118 SHA board minutes BPM in 3/209, letter to Lane, 27 November 1911, and 195/121, Deterding to Loudon, 11 June 1913; also Gerretson, *History*, IV, 146-7.
- 119 SHA, Board minutes Royal Dutch, 3 May and 23 June 1913; CAMT Rothschild 132 AQ 199, bundle 1913, Lane to Baron Edmond de Rothschild 30 September 1913, emphasizing Sir Marcus's unease at what he regarded as an overly rapid expansion; Lane received English translations of Bataafsche board minutes since February 1913, which he passed on to Paris. The first batch included the minutes for September 1911 to October 1912: CAMT Rothschild 132 AQ 195, bundle Bataafsche, Lane to Aron, 13 February 1913.
- 120 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 29 October, 20 November 1913.
- 121 SHA 195/119, Deterding to Loudon, 29 October 1912, and 195/120, Deterding to Loudon, 7 January 1913; 195/66, Cohen Stuart to Loudon, 19 June 1913.
- 122 SHA board minutes Bataafsche, 26 May 1913 in 195/209, stating only that 'Loudon and Cohen Stuart have expressed their desire to retire as delegate members of the Board of Bataafsche and respectively Managing Director of the Anglo Saxon on the 31th of December next and are therefore withdrawing from the daily management'. In August 1913 Cohen Stuart wrote to Loudon that his English doctor had told him to rest: SHA 195/66, Cohen Stuart to Loudon, 24 August 1913.
- 123 SHA 195/117, Deterding to Loudon, 24 February 1912 contains a letter apologizing for 'misunderstandings'; Hugo Loudon was not the kind of person who let himself be insulted by Deterding.
- 124 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo Saxon, 26 November 1913.
- 125 In June 1914 the Anglo-Saxon board suggested another joint meeting to review the Group's prospective financial commitments in Mexico and the US, but this did not materialize due to the outbreak of the First World War: SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 24 June 1914.
- 126 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo Saxon, 17 December 1913.
- 127 In 1911 Anglo-Saxon had acquired a controlling interest in Kotuku Oilfields which owned concessions in New Zealand, but the drilling there was unsuccessful, as a result of which exploration was discontinued in 1914; see SLA 119/3/1-2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 13 June, 18 July, 1 November 1911, 29 April 1913.
- 128 Pyzel's career as chief engineer is an interesting case in point. After his appointment in 1911, he immediately went on a world tour to visit all Group refineries to compare their design and suggest improvements. Arriving in California, he prolonged his stay on finding his know-how required for the design of the Martinez refinery. As a consequence, Martinez became the first continuous refinery in the US. Beaton, *Enterprise*, 90.
- 129 Deterding, *Oilman*, 77-80; the term merger appears on p. 79.

- 1 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon 29 July, 4, 5, and 26 August, 1 November 1914; *ibid.* 2 June 1915 (dismissal Asiatic employees). Cf. SLA 120/3/1, board minutes Asiatic, 4 August 1914, with an equal decision for employees regardless of their nationality. Archives Nationaux CAMT Roubaix, Archives Rothschild (hereafter AN CAMT) 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1914, Lane to Weill, 4 and 17 August 1914; Michielsen, *Van Ommeren*, i. 114; Karlsch/Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 96. Asiatic also cancelled the agency of E.G. Rudeloff for Belgium and the Netherlands: SHA 190C/136, Asiatic to Colijn, 12 August 1914. In September 1914 there was a sudden panic on the discovery that Anglo-Saxon's shares in the German bulk installations were about to be sequestered in Germany, prompting Colijn to urge London to have them transferred in the name of Dordtsche: SHA 5/335, Colijn to Deterding, 8 September 1914.
- 2 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 24 June 1914.
- 3 SHA 190B/137, Colijn to Rhenania, 17 August 1914. Asiatic had offered the load to Rhenania on 31 July; SHA 190D/637-1, Deterding to Colijn, 13 August 1914, Colijn to Asiatic, 13 August 1914, Waley Cohen to Colijn, 13 August 1914. Gerretson, *Geschiedenis* IV, 64-7.
- 4 The correspondence between The Hague and London in SHA 190D/637-1; AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1914, Lane to Weill, 26 August 1914; correspondence 1915, Lane to Weill, 19 July 1915; for the Dordtsche arrangement see 132 AQ 198, bundle 1912, Lane to Aron, 3 June 1912.
- 5 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, 92; Bérenger, *Le pétrole*, 177-8, mentioning gasoline supplies from October 1914; the Reisholz nitration installation was also shut down: SHA 190B/138, memoirs Späth, 12; SHA 49/567, internal memo Bataafsche, 17 August 1916.
- 6 SHA 190B/137, Colijn to Späth, 17 August 1914; *ibid.* 195/25, Colijn to Deterding, 17 August 1914, 'and I thought it better not to tell them the true reason [for sending no more gasoline]'. Cf. SHA 8/1866, memo Bataafsche Oil department, 17 August 1916, suggesting that Bataafsche's gasoline trade with Germany had come to a stop.
- 7 Michielsen, *Van Ommeren*, i. 126-128.
- 8 Import data in Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 55; cf. *ibid.*, 78, for vital lube oil supplies reaching Germany in barrels from neighbouring countries; SHA 195/167, Pyzel to Deterding, 28 January 1914, describing the system and the arrangement with the Stoomvaartmaatschappij Nederland through the shipping brokers Van Ommeren. The outcome of talks with two German shipping lines mentioned by Pyzel are unknown. Only heavy oils could be carried in this way, and not volatile products such as gasoline.
- 9 SHA 195/28, Deterding to Bataafsche, 10 December 1914, Bataafsche to Deterding, 14 December 1914, accepting the statement and assuring assent; 190A/146, Pleyte to Rudeloff, 23 February 1915 (Deterding resigns from Astra); Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 198-9; AN CAMT 132 AQ 195, board minutes Bataafsche 11 March 1915; *ibid.* 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, 12 June 1916; *ibid.* 132 AQ 200, bundle 1918-19, Lane to Weill, 23 April 1919. Cf. SHA 190D/637-1, Colijn to Pleyte, 8 April 1915.
- 10 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon 31 March, 23 and 30 June, 7, 14 and 21 July, 4 and 11 August 1915; SLA 119/11/3-4 bundle S-TU, memo 17 April 1917; the correspondence with the Foreign Office in National Archives Kew (NA Kew) FO 382/320; Jones, *State* 183-4.
- 11 Jones, 'British Government', 659-61, 667-8; *ibid.*, *State* 182-6; Ferrier, *British Petroleum*, 244; rumours about the Group being German-controlled resurfaced as late as 1917 in Australia and the US, cf. for instance 141/3/7, board minutes Shell Transport, 7 March 1917.
- 12 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 23 April 1918; SHA 3/83A, Pleyte to Colijn, 29 March, 10 April 1915 (Deterding's involvement with decisions regarding the Ploesti lube oil factory); SHA 195/28, Deterding to Pleyte, 29 June and 22 July 1915 (discussion about merits of taking over the Roumanian Consolidated Oil Company); Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 170-1, for Colijn consulting Deterding over Romanian affairs in April 1918. SLA 141/3/7, board minutes Shell Transport, 21 November, 19 December 1916 (instructions to Jacobson and board informed by Bataafsche about Astra stocks); SLA 141/11/9, board memos Shell Transport (Commons questions). Cf. Jones, *State*, 187-8.
- 13 SHA 3/209, Lane to Royal Dutch, 7 July 1916; SHA, board minutes Royal Dutch 25 July 1916
- 14 AN CAMT 132 AQ 195, board minutes Bataafsche 1 March 1915; cf. SHA 3/209, correspondence Lane with copies of Bataafsche board minutes in English circulated to Paris. On 12 March 1915 Colijn wrote a long letter to Deterding about the factory and the reasons for the large budget overrun, also omitting any direct reference to its location: SHA 190D/637-1. The same file has a letter from Colijn in London to Pleyte, 8 April 1915, instructing him to suspend sending the Bataafsche minutes. On 28 April, Colijn wrote to

- Deterding that he had informed 'the gentlemen of the lub oil factory' of Deterding's decision: SHA 5/335.
- 15 Cf. for instance SHA board minutes Bataafsche 23 January, 3 March 1913, decision to begin the lube oil factory and Loudon replying to a question by Sir Marcus about the Monheim works and the Group's lube oil policy; SHA 8/1154, reference to the contract between Anglo-Saxon and Bataafsche, 24 March 1916. The German Government refused to accept this transfer, however: SHA Country Files Germany vol. III. s.v. Fusion. In July 1915 Pleyte had a meeting with Späth and Rudeloff about the German operations, at which A. de Jongh, an Asiatic employee entrusted with its German business, was present to liaise with Deterding: SHA 190D/637-1, Pleyte to Colijn, 9 July 1915.
- 16 NA Kew FO 382/320, minute 15 June 1915; FO 382/792, minute 29 September 1916.
- 17 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 64-9; SHA 195/25, Colijn to Deterding, 13, 15, 17 August 1914; *ibid.*, 190A/146, Colijn to Rhenania, 12 August 1914; cf. Jones, *State*, 182-9.
- 18 Sparse details on Pleyte in SHA 190D/787; Van Soest, *Olie*, 181.
- 19 On 26 February 1916, Colijn reiterated his pledge and wrote to Deterding that he could count on him until 1925: SHA 5/335.
- 20 Gerretson's protestations that hiring Colijn had nothing to do with his political background simply fail to convince: Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 53, echoed by Gabriëls, *Koninklijke Olie*, 64-5; cf. Langeveld, *Colijn*, 180-2.
- 21 Langeveld, *Colijn*, I, 199-203; Vrije Universiteit HDNP Colijn papers no. 352 box 1, Colijn to the British envoy Johnstone, 25 February 1916.
- 22 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 64-6, 68-9.
- 23 NA Kew FO 382/792, No. 163006, No. 165258.
- 24 SLA 119/3/2, 3 and 4, board minutes Anglo-Saxon with weekly statements of the investments held for Bataafsche; SHA, board minutes Royal Dutch, 12 August 1915 (surplus cash sent to London), 29 June 1916 (decision to invest in Treasury bills), 8 August 1916 (lombard loan on collateral of £1 million of Treasury Bills, and £500,000 worth of bills received from British Legation); AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, 28 April 1916 (£7 million of bills sold in the Netherlands); *The Times*, 21 June 1918, for Sir Marcus parading at the Shell Transport AGM with the Group holding £20 million of British Government paper. Some correspondence between The Hague and London went by the Dutch diplomatic bag, cf. for instance SHA 190D/637-2, Colijn to Deterding, 22 November 1916.
- 25 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, between the pages with the minutes for 29 June and 13 October 1915 a summary of the Bataafsche minutes for 12 August 1915 with the formal decision to transfer all Group funds in the Netherlands to London for Anglo-Saxon to manage.
- 26 Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Carbochemie', 335-6; SHA 190B/138, memoirs Späth has 1911 as the year in which the factory came on steam, but this must be earlier since building started in the summer of 1908; SHA 8/1585, board minutes Bataafsche, 28 November 1907, 12 May, 14 July, 5 August, 8 September 1908.
- 27 According to Béranger, *Le pétrole*, 177-8, supplies started in October, but Gerretson, *Geschiedenis* IV 88-91, puts the first talks with the refiners in December.
- 28 Lévy, *Commerce*, 37. French coal output amounted to 41 million tons in 1913, of which the provinces occupied by Germany produced 30 million tons; Jensen, 'Importance of energy', 539; Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 95, for import data. De Kok was first entrusted with overseeing the toluol operations in France; he subsequently transferred to Britain: SHA 3/83A, Deterding to Pleyte, 22 July 1915; Waley Cohen to Pleyte, 9 July 1915. For Italy SLA 119/11/3-4, board memos Anglo-Saxon, bundle N-P, memo 23 May 1917; Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 100.
- 29 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon 27 January, 17 March, 7 July 1915; AN CAMT 132 AQ 195, board minutes Bataafsche, 11 February 1915; Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 92-3, 200-7 and *id.*, *Samuel*, 597-601, drawing rather heavily on the propaganda brochure by Smith, 'Shell', but see Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 190-9 for the tussles between the Group and the Admiralty over chartering conditions; Homburg, Rip and Small, 'Chemici', 302-303; cf. especially note 13; Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 22-6, 86-93; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Carbochemie', 336-7.
- 30 Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 202; Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 92; SHA 190D/637-1, Colijn to Van Karnebeek, 3 February 1914.
- 31 Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Carbochemie', 338; the stills were quite solid, two of them being used until the 1950s; SLA Sc46/1, typescript J. W. Vincent, 'The History of Shell's United Kingdom Oil Refineries 1914-1959' (June 1959), 1.
- 32 Smith, 'Shell', 36; cf. SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 3 March 1915.
- 33 Henriques' claims in *Samuel*, 601-2, echoed by Yergin, *Prize* 175, that the factories produced 80 per cent is based on a misreading of Smith, 'Shell', who claims this percentage only for 1915, and gives the correct half share on 18-19. The Portishead plant was subsequently transferred to Rouen: GHS/2B/83. *St Helen's Court Bulletin*, 6 April 1918.
- 34 AN CAMT 132 AQ 195, board minutes Bataafsche, 11 March 1915; Bosboom, *Moelijke omstandigheden*, 138-40, echoed by De Leeuw, *Nederland*, 190-2; cf. the weak defence of Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 18; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Carbochemie', 336-7; SHA board minutes Bataafsche, 10 February 1916 for the contract with the Dutch Government.
- 35 Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 206-207. German steel supplied to shipyards came with similar restrictions, preventing the Group from having ships built in the Netherlands: Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1917, 25.
- 36 Gibb and Knowlton, *Resurgent Years*, 122-6.
- 37 SHA 3/83A, Pleyte to Loudon, 5 July 1915; Waley Cohen to Pleyte, 9 and 15 July 1915. The suggestion that this was the first step to a complete transfer of the research activities to the UK would appear to be too strong: cf. Homburg/Rip/Small, 'Chemici', 303-4; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Carbochemie', 337-48. SLA 119/3/3, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 26 March, 14 May 1919, for the £50,000 donation to set up a chemistry school at Cambridge in conjunction with Anglo-Persian, Burmah, and Mexican Eagle; cf. for that particular initiative Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 247-8. In 1915, Royal Dutch had considered giving 500,000 guilders (£40,000) as part of its silver jubilee celebrations to Delft for setting up a chemistry department, only to reject the idea since the board thought the Group's staff would not agree with it: SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 16 June 1915. In preparation for the dyestuff business, Anglo-Saxon started looking around for

- suitable factories in 1917: SHA 119/3/3, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 4 April 1917. Colijn was against rushing ahead, however, considering the capital requirements too big and the German competition too strong: SHA 5/335, Colijn to Deterding, 9 January 1917.
- 38 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 294; Reynolds, *Ricardo*, 106-8, 129, 142-3, 157, 159, 163, 168, 220. Ricardo was a direct descendant of the economist David Ricardo, and thus of distant Anglo-Dutch descent. Cf. SHA 119/11/17, Anglo-Saxon board memos, 15 November 1927 (£19,573 spent by the Ricardo High Speed Diesel project, request for another £18,000 granted); 119/11/23, Anglo-Saxon board memos, 18 December 1933, £86,685 spent since 1925, rising royalty earnings and successes with the introduction of new engines. According to Forbes, Waley Cohen had argued to employ Ricardo by tactlessly remarking that 'we suffered greatly in the past relying too much on our experts for suggesting ideas'. This opinion enraged De Kok, who had just moved from Amsterdam lab to manage the Technical Department in The Hague, and he made Waley Cohen retract his ill-considered statement. SHA 190C/34A, Forbes 'Benzine', 7. Forbes' reference to Asiatic commissioning Ricardo must be an uncharacteristic slip.
- 39 A description of the festivities in *The Times*, 22 November 1918, *The Petroleum Review*, 23 November 1918 pp. 329 ff, and Béranger, *La pétrole*, 170-5.
- 40 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 14; Sumida, 'Naval logistics', 465.
- 41 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 14.
- 42 Ibid., 39-41.
- 43 Ibid., 59; AN CAMT 132 AQ 161, correspondence 1914, Lane to Weill, 17 and 19 August 1914.
- 44 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 15.
- 45 Sumida, 'Naval Logistics', 479-80.
- 46 Van Creveld, *Supplying War*, 141, quoting Henniker, *Transportation*.
- 47 Singleton, 'Military Use', 194; SHA 119/3/2, Anglo-Saxon board minutes 4 February, 2 April, 16 December 1914.
- 48 DiNardo and Bay, 'Horse-drawn Transport', 130; Deterding knew this, cf. SHA 195/28, Deterding to Loudon, 23 November 1914. See also Schouteete, *Chevaux*.
- 49 Becker, *La première guerre mondiale*, 209.
- 50 Laux, 'Trucks', 68-9; see also Heuzé, *Camions*.
- 51 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 9.
- 52 Singleton, 'Military Use', 194, 195; Jones, 'British Government', 655.
- 53 Fenton, 'Ambulance drivers', 328-30; Singleton, 'Military Use', 194.
- 54 Morrow, *Great War*, 297.
- 55 Becker, *Première guerre mondiale*, 32-3.
- 56 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 15.
- 57 Béranger, *La pétrole*, 42, 77-80.
- 58 Singleton, 'Military Use', 182-3.
- 59 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 14, 61.
- 60 Ibid., 14, 51-2, 59-61.
- 61 Béranger, *La pétrole*, 22-3.
- 62 Jones, 'British Government', 655-7. The liquid fuel shortage was unnecessarily exacerbated by the tight viscosity specification of the Admiralty. Royal Navy ships did not have heating coils in the bunkers, unlike for instance those of the US Navy: Foley, 'Petroleum problems', 1829-30.
- 63 Béranger, *La pétrole*, 69-71.
- 64 Yergin, *Prize*, 176-7; a detailed discussion from the French perspective of the wrangles over transport in Clémentel, *La France*, 95-247.
- 65 Jones, 'British Government', 655-6, 665.
- 66 Jones, 'British Government', 659-61; *ibid.*, State 182-4.
- 67 Jones, *State*, 184-185; Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 228-9.
- 68 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1914, Lane to Weill, 3 September 1914; 132 AQ 163, correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, 28 April 1916; Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 239-41.
- 69 Smith, 'Shell', 36-8; Foley, 'Petroleum Problems', 1811 outlines the bulk gasoline delivery network in France.
- 70 Foley, 'Petroleum Problems', 1814-15, recognizing that in fact the tin system was more suited for war requirements.
- 71 Deterding received an honorary KBE and allowed himself to be addressed as Sir Henry Deterding, though, as a foreigner, he did not have the right to use the title in that way. Corley, *Burmah Oil*, I, 258, erroneously states that Deterding was naturalized, which the author later corrected in his entry on Deterding for the 2004 *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
- 72 NA CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915 for a list of shareholders in the holding company which held the Asiatic shares. Two Deutsch brothers owned 2,000 out of the 10,000 shares, Lane and Macandrew 268, two private investors 202, and the Rothschild bank and family the rest.
- 73 SHA 195/33-2, correspondence Deterding-Gulbenkian, 1916; *ibid.* 195/175, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 12 May 1918.
- 74 SHA 190B/138, Memoirs Späth, 4, quoting a range of uses for gasoline before finishing with the motor car. Späth, the director of a gasoline works in Southern Germany, set up the Rhenania for Royal Dutch and was the firm's first director. The number of cars in Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics* 668, 670; Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 93, also mentions 22,000 motorcycles.
- 75 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 13-14, and Table 15 on p. 70 showing no imports of liquid fuel at all in 1913. Cf. DeNovo, 'Petroleum', for the US Navy's similar conservative stance, more surprisingly given the country's share in world oil production.
- 76 AN CAMT 132 AQ 161, Lane to Weill, 30 March 1914; the agreement was the result of negotiations by Deterding and Teagle on behalf of the two companies.
- 77 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 67-8.
- 78 Ibid., 14.
- 79 Pearton, *Oil*, 93; quote from Friedensburg, *Erdöl* 126-7; *ibid.* 77 for the rationing measures.
- 80 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 70, 73.
- 81 Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 94; Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 473; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Carbochimie', 344-5.
- 82 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 71-2.
- 83 Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Carbochimie', 341.
- 84 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 71, 75-6.
- 85 Béranger, *La pétrole*, 95-136.
- 86 British experts, with the notable exception of Ricardo, considered benzol unacceptable as engine fuel due to its high specific gravity: Reynolds, *Ricardo*, 104-5.
- 87 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 72; Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 100.
- 88 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 9-10, 74-5.
- 89 Laux, 'Trucks', 68-9.
- 90 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 15, see however 74; Corum, *Luftwaffe* 37; Morrow, *German Air Power*, 101, 102, 119.
- 91 Morrow, *German Air Power*, 112, 124, 130, 133; Morrow, *Great War*, 300-1.
- 92 Jensen, 'Importance Energy', 540-2;

- Mitchell, *European historical statistics*, 383;  
Morrow, *German Air Power*, 75, 102.
- 93 Singleton, 'Military Use', 189.
- 94 SHA 195/28, Deterding to Loudon, 23 November 1914.
- 95 AN CAMT 132 AQ 161 and 162, accounts 1913 and 1914.
- 96 SHA 190A/146, Pleyte to Rudeloff, 23 February 1915, telling him to approach Jacobson for oil supplies. Astra sent its reports to the Group's bank in Berlin, Delbrück Schickler & Co., which passed them on to The Hague: SHA 8/2210, three files on Astra during the First World War.
- 97 Pearton, *Oil*, 70-6; Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 198-201.
- 98 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 70.
- 99 SHA 8/2138, profit and loss statements Astra. The sterling figures calculated at the official exchange rate of 44.25 lei to the pound in 1919 given in this file. Translated into guilders, Astra's 1913 profit would have been 3.6 million guilders in 1913, rising to 6.4 million in 1914 and 8.1 million in 1915.
- 100 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 203-5; Pearton, *Oil*, 78-9.
- 101 SLA 141/3/7, board minutes Shell Transport, 21 November 1916. On 4 December, Colijn sent Deterding Astra's latest inventory of stocks, so London would know what had been destroyed: *ibid.*, 19 December 1916.
- 102 Pearton, *Oil*, 82. In its usual style, the Royal Dutch Annual Reports emphasize the damage sustained and the outstanding claim for compensation, but omit to mention either the amount of the claim or its settlement.
- 103 SHA 8/2210-3, statement of damages 31 December 1918; see also 8/2173.
- 104 Royal Dutch Annual Report 1917, 17-8; Pearton, *Oil*, 83-4.
- 105 Pearton, *Oil*, 106-7.
- 106 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 124-31.
- 107 AN CAMT 132 AQ 161, correspondence 1914, Lane to Weill, 21 July 1914m
- 108 SHA monthly report Bataafsche, January 1918.
- 109 Royal Dutch Annual Report 1916, 16-8.
- 110 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 144.
- 111 SHA Country Volumes Russia, vol. 6, statement of Russian claims, 18 July 1922. Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 11, only gives Royal Dutch's investment and not those of the London companies as well. The £32 million figure did not include Bataafsche's investment of 20 million guilders (£1.6 million) in Benzonaft and Argoun during 1920, since it was thought that, coming as it had long after the establishment of the Soviet regime, the inclusion might harm the prospects of the larger claim: SHA 190A/200-2, Van Wijk to Price, 9 July 1930.
- 112 NA CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915, Lane to Weill, 18 November 1915.
- 113 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 149; this office became the Asiatic Petroleum Corporation in 1920.
- 114 Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 90, 96.
- 115 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, accounts 1915; SHA 195/51, reorganization Bataafsche, for the 1918 Asiatic sales data.
- 116 Gibb and Knowlton, *Resurgent Years*, 676-9, 681; Ferrier, *British Petroleum*, 271; Corley, *Burmah*, 320-1.
- 117 SHA 190B/138, memoirs Späth.
- 118 Cf. SHA 190B/137, urgent telegrams Rhenania to Colijn, 13 August 1914, to send more of this type of oil from Amsterdam or Rotterdam now that import duties had been suspended.
- 119 Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 100-1; Gibb and Knowlton, *Resurgent years*, 229-233.
- 120 SHA 8/1585, board minutes Bataafsche, 9 March, 13 July 1916; SHA Country Files Germany vol. 3, s.v. Shareholders, and Fusion. Fifteen million Reichsmarks would have been about 400,000 guilders or 35,000 pounds at 1917 exchange rates. The original capital of 840,000 RM was the equivalent of 14,000 guilders or 1,200 sterling at prewar exchange rates.
- 121 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 368-370; SHA 190C/251, Forbes 'Lube oil', 10 and SHA 190C/250, Forbes 'Extraction', 8 (viscosity improvement); Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 102; SHA 190B/138, memoirs Späth; after consultation with Deterding in London, Bataafsche instructed Astra to increase its lube oil production capacity: SHA 190D/637-1 Colijn to Pleyte, 23 March 1915.
- 122 SHA 190G/245, Annual Reports Rhenania Ossag, 1917-20.
- 123 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 266-388; AN CAMT 132 AQ 163, bundle correspondence 1918, Lane to Weill, 26 February 1918.
- 124 SHA 190C/250, Forbes 'Extraction', 4 (rise of kerosene output Balik Papan).
- 125 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 97; SHA 195/51, reorganization Bataafsche, for the 1918 Asiatic sales data; SHA 195/25, Deterding to Loudon, 23 November 1914, Deterding to Colijn, 15 February 1915, Colijn to Deterding, February 1915. Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 368-70; a similar installation in Romania had only taken eight months to build; SHA 195/100, report R. A. Wischin February 1913 on the importance of lube oil for Bataafsche; SHA 190D/637-1, Van Tienen to Colijn, 21 July 1915, cost-price calculations for lube oil; SHA 190D/767, Colijn to Agnew, 1 February 1916, appointing the liaison manager; SHA 8/1872, memo by Dubourq 16 March 1917 about the charts and his visit to London, plus Colijn to Dubourq, 18 June 1917; SHA 190C/251, Forbes 'Lube oil', 3-4; SLA GHS/3A/4 binder 2 memo no. 62, estimated profit and loss Asiatic 1919.
- 126 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 69-71.
- 127 *Ibid.*, 125, 130-139.
- 128 Gibb and Knowlton, *Resurgent Years*, 106-7, 666, giving sales figures only from 1919; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 782.
- 129 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, March 1916.
- 130 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, 14 February 1916.
- 131 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 88-93; Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 306-9; SLA 119/11/1-2, Board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo Pyzel, 19 February 1915, describing the original system.
- 132 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 309-10.
- 133 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 19 and 26 August, 9 and 23 September, 28 October 1914; SLA 119/11/1-2, board memos Anglo-Saxon, bundle 2, agreements 28 July and 22 October 1914 plus undated memo Kessler; SLA Sc46/1, Vincent, 'History of Shell Refineries UK', 3-4, erroneously dating the decision to build a Trumble on 22 July 1914, when the licence had not yet been taken; the Anglo-Saxon board specifically postponed a decision to September in order to obtain the guarantee; SHA 195/28, Loudon to Deterding, 16 November 1914, Deterding to Loudon, 23 November 1914. Trumbles would have been very useful as well in Russia, and it was considered to build one to treat the paraffinic Grozny crude, but the plans came to nothing owing to the war: SHA 190A/203-3, report technical development Russian companies, 11-3.
- 134 SHA 195/167, Pyzel to Deterding, 28 January 1914.
- 135 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 91-2.
- 136 Colijn considered Meischke Smith's arguments for buying the Trumble patents

- more important than Pyzel's report: SHA 5/335, Colijn to Deterding, 13 December 1916. The Trumble company was reorganized as a patent holding company and renamed Simplex Refining.
- 137 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 17 February, 24 March, 28 April, 26 May 1915; SLA 119/11/1-2, board memos Anglo-Saxon, bundle 2, Meischke-Smith to Deterding, 16 February, 15 June 1915, memo Pyzel 19 February 1915; SLA 141/11/9, Board memos Shell Transport, Meischke Smith to Deterding, 2 January 1915, Deterding to Meischke Smith, 6 February 1915; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 91.
- 138 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 309-10; SHA, board minutes Bataafsche, 14 March 1918.
- 139 Royal Dutch, Annual Report 1918, 28 (total capacity); Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 208-10 (75,000 tons in official use).
- 140 Bosboom, *Moeilijke omstandigheden*, 138-40.
- 141 Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 211-2, 214, 222-3; cf. Royal Dutch Annual Report 1917, 8-9.
- 142 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915, Lane to Weill, 18 November 1915, memo Weill November 1915.
- 143 SLA 119/11/5-6, board memos Anglo-Saxon, undated memo of the marine superintendent Zulver, probably July 1918.
- 144 Wouters, *Shell Tankers*, 47; SHA, minutes Royal Dutch, 17 December 1914 (changed shipping schedules); SLA 119/11/1-2, board memos Anglo-Saxon, bundle A-B, Memo 26 April 1916.
- 145 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon 28 April 1915; *ibid.* 119/3/3, 19 January, 5 April, 10 May, 5 July 1916; SLA 119/11/1-2, board memos Anglo-Saxon, bundle A+B, report Shell California, 25 January 1916; *ibid.* 119/11/3-4, bundle A-C, report Shell California 31 December 1916; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 97-9.
- 146 Foley, 'Petroleum Problems', 1821-22, 1824-5.
- 147 Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 207-11; Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 90, for British import data.
- 148 SHA 195/167, Pyzel to Deterding, 28 January 1914.
- 149 Foley, 'Petroleum Problems', 1804, 1819.
- 150 SHA 195/33/3, memorandum Zulver for the French Government, 30 October 1917, claiming the system had been used since the beginning of the war; SLA 119/3/3, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 5 December 1917; SHA monthly report Bataafsche 18 May 1918; *St Helen's Court Bulletin*, 14 December 1918; Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 214-7, quoting a January 1916 letter from Waley Cohen to the Admiralty that the Group had used it 'for years' in Dutch ships and giving a total of 761 ships converted; Howarth, *Century*, 106 and Smith, 'Shell', 28, give a total of 1,280 ships for the UK alone. Sir Marcus Samuel had already suggested using ballast tanks in his 1899 Society of Arts paper on liquid fuel: Henriques, *Samuel*, 606-7. SLA GHS3H/4, first folder, gives a synopsis of the correspondence between Anglo-Saxon and the Admiralty. At the Transport Department of the Admiralty, George Legh-Jones oversaw the implementation of the double bottom scheme. He then transferred to the British War Mission in the US, and joined Asiatic in 1919: *Petroleum Times*, 8 January 1938.
- 151 SLA 119/3/3, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 16 August 1916 (contract with the Admiralty for freighter conversions); 27 September 1916 (six bought, five under offer); 11 April 1917 (Admiralty buys ship to be managed by Anglo-Saxon) 11 July 1917 (19 freighters under construction placed under Anglo-Saxon's management); *ibid.* 24 May 1916, administration Dutch ships returned to The Hague.
- 152 The term 'Rothschild interests' is strictly speaking not correct. The Asiatic's 'C' shares were held by the Commercial and Mining Company. The Paris Rothschild bank owned just over half of that company's 10,000 shares, with family members possessing another 2,345 for a total of 7,363. Emile and Henry Deutsch each had 1,000 shares, Lane and Macandrew 268, and various other individuals owned the rest. A list in AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915; cf. SHA 8/1366, files Asiatic 'C' shares.
- 153 SLA 131/3/3, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 5 July 1916.
- 154 AN CAMT 132 AQ 161, correspondence 1914, Lane to Weill, 17 September, 5 October 1914.
- 155 *Ibid.*, Lane to Weill, 12 August 1915.
- 156 *Ibid.*, Lane to Weill, 19 July 1915 (extra funding estimated by Deterding at £800,000); *ibid.* correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, 15 January 1916 (£4.5 million).
- 157 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 14 April 1915; *ibid.* 120/3/1, minutes Asiatic 17 May 1915; AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915, Lane to Weill, 31 March, 8 April 1915.
- 158 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915, Lane to Weill, 15 October, 18 November, 2 and 9 December 1915.
- 159 SLA 119/3/3, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 10 November 1915; AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915, Lane to Weill, 18 November 1915.
- 160 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915, Weill to Lane, 24 November 1915; Lane to Weill, 9 December 1915.
- 161 AN CAMT 132 AQ 163, correspondence 1918, memorandum probably from Weill, 30 April 1918.
- 162 SLA 120/3/1, board minutes Asiatic, 19 August 1914, adopting the principle; SLA 119/3/3 board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 19 January 1916.
- 163 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915, Lane to Weill, 15 and two letters of 18 January, 16 February 1916.
- 164 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, 16 February, 8 April 1916.
- 165 *Ibid.*, Weill to Lane, 11 March 1916; *ibid.* 132 AQ 163, correspondence 1918, memorandum probably by Weill, 30 April 1918.
- 166 SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 28 April 1915 (decision to set up Shell Marketing), 119/3/3, board minutes Anglo-Saxon 2 February 1916 (Shell Marketing to start operating 1 November); 141/11/9, board memos Shell Transport (history BP); AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, 1 April 1916 (Deterding no longer wants BP). Ferrier, *BP*, 218.
- 167 SHA 8/1366, Deterding and Cohen Stuart to Loudon, 23 January 1918; SHA board minutes Bataafsche, 14 March 1918.
- 168 AN CAMT 132 AQ 163, correspondence 1918, Lane to Weill, 4 and 8 January, 16 April 1918. Anglo-Saxon chartered Dutch vessels at 35 shillings a ton, however: SLA 119/3/4, Board minutes Anglo-Saxon 15 January 1919.
- 169 AN CAMT 132 AQ 163, correspondence 1918, Lane to Weill, 16 April 1918. Anglo-Saxon and Asiatic only modified the freight rates clause of the 1908 contract from a fixed rate to actual cost at market rates in 1921, SLA 119/11/9, board memos Anglo-Saxon, draft letter to Asiatic agreed by the board on 8 December 1921, and calculation of freight rates to be charged in 1922, 2 March 1922. At the same time the rental conditions for Anglo-Saxon's

- installations was modified to take into account the substantial expansions to them: SLA 119/11/9, draft letter Anglo-Saxon to Asiatic, agreed by the board 8 December 1921.
- 170 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 16, 29 June 1915.
- 171 SHA 195/28, Deterding to Bataafsche, 4 August 1915, using US conditions to argue that staff in the Netherlands East Indies had nothing to complain of and should take to heart that they were no longer supplying the bulk of the Group's profits.
- 172 SLA 119/11/2, board memos Anglo-Saxon, Bundle A-B, Meischke-Smith to Deterding, 16 February 1915, with memorandum Pyzel 19 February 1915; SHA 195/28, Deterding to Pleyte, 11 November 1914, Loudon to Deterding, 16 November 1914; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 130, 158, 200, mentioning the training of an American geologist in The Hague after he had first worked in Venezuela, Pyzel's Yarhola casinghead gasoline plant, and Van der Gracht's introduction of core-drilling. On Van der Gracht see Van der Veen, *Van der Gracht*.
- 173 For the strains on Deterding, see RA Alkmaar De Lange papers (no inventory available at time of writing), diary Dolph Kessler, entry for 11 June 1913 commenting on stress wearing down Deterding's capacity for work.
- 174 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, accounts 1915; SHA 195/51, reorganization Bataafsche, for the 1918 Asiatic sales data.
- 175 SHA 195/28, Loudon to Deterding, 16 November 1914, complaining about his inability to follow developments in California; Deterding to Loudon, 23 November 1914. Colijn had aired the same complaint a few weeks earlier: SHA 5/335, Colijn to Deterding, 6 November 1914.
- 176 SHA 8/1863-1, undated manuscript memo Colijn and typescript memo 24 April 1917, laying down the tasks of the statistical department; 195/110, Colijn to De Jonge, 28 May 1920.
- 177 SHA, board minutes Royal Dutch, 17 December 1914.
- 178 Ibid.
- 179 Ibid.; SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon 30 December 1914, amounts to be transferred; the Bataafsche board had earlier opposed the transfer: AN CAMT 132 AQ 195, board minutes Bataafsche, 10 and 22 December 1914.
- 180 SHA 190C/266, a file with various staff statistics.
- 181 VU, Historisch Documentatiecentrum van het Nederlands Protestantisme (hereafter VU Colijn Papers) Colijn no. 352 book 1 with regular complaints to private correspondents about his having to interview applicants; SHA 8/1863-1, reorganization Bataafsche office, memo 7 April 1917.
- 182 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, V, 34-5; SHA 8/1863-1, reorganization Bataafsche, an organization chart dated 19 December 1916; NA The Hague 2.21.095, De Jonge papers No. 58, a memo written by Gerretson for De Jonge to prepare him for his directorship of Bataafsche and thus probably dating from the winter of 1921. For the reorganization of the information flows and record keeping at Bataafsche see the manuscript study by Vos, 'Archiefwezen'.
- 183 SHA 8/1863-1, reorganization Bataafsche, organization chart 1916 and undated memo Colijn about the AG department; SHA 8/1420, Asiatic, report on a visit to St Helen's Court, October 1915. The preparations for the reorganization clearly predated the move to the new head office, and did not follow it, as Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, V, 34-5 has it. Cf. Gabriëls, *Honderd jaar*, 71, for a description of the new building and its amenities.
- 184 The Bataafsche football club had been set up in September 1916; similar clubs for tennis, fencing, gymnastics (notably tug-of-war) and athletics soon followed. The fields were located more or less at the site of the present building C23. Cf. *Clubhuis Te Werve* 1922-1982, unnumbered pages; *Zestig jaar Te Werve*, unnumbered pages. Other operating companies soon followed suit and founded their own sports clubs, see for instance Pradier, *Shell France*, 24-5, for the development of the French sports club since 1924.
- 185 SHA 8/1863-1, organization Bataafsche, Colijn to Deterding, 3 November 1915.
- 186 RA Alkmaar De Lange papers (no inventory numbers at time of writing), memo Guépin, 8 April 1936.
- 187 SLA 119/11/2, board memos Anglo-Saxon, Russian department presenting a new style of report, August 1915; 141/11/9, board memos Shell Transport, a letter from the Russian Department, April 1915, with an improvised letterhead; cf. SLA 119/3/2, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 26 May 1915, sanctioning Godber to spend \$140,000 on four Trumble plants.
- 188 Godber had been appointed head of the American department in 1912, overseeing two clerks; see Rady, 'Godber', *British Dictionary of Business Biography*, and Barran, 'Godber', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online at [www.oxforddnb.com](http://www.oxforddnb.com).
- 189 SLA Sc46/1, Vincent, 'History of Shell Refineries UK', 3.
- 190 SHA 8/1420, Report on the organization of St Helen's Court, October 1915; SLA GHS/3A/4, binder 1, memorandum no. 53, floor area and staff of Asiatic; SLA 119/11/7, board memos Anglo-Saxon, undated memo Staff and floor area Anglo-Saxon, 1914 and 1920, April 1920; SLA 141/3/7, board minutes Shell Transport, 18 January 1916.
- 191 Annual contests between London and The Hague sports clubs appear to have started shortly after the war at Teddington; when in 1921 London beat The Hague in all competitions save the tug-of-war, Deterding resolved to let The Hague have facilities similar to the Lensbury Club, which became the Te Werve complex in Rijswijk. From 1923, The Hague team for these events included Group employees from Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and France. Cf. *Clubhuis Te Werve* 1922-1982, unnumbered pages; *Zestig jaar Te Werve*, unnumbered pages.
- 192 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, 18 January, 16 February 1916; ibid. 132 AQ 163, correspondence 1918, Lane to Weill, 26 February 1918.
- 193 SHA 195/28, Deterding to Loudon, 9 August 1915. One staff member, Van Rees, died when the ferry on which he travelled was sunk. SHA 8/1872, Dubourg to Bataafsche, 16 March 1917 (visit to Asiatic).
- 194 SHA 195/33-1, correspondence Gulbenkian to Deterding, 1915-1916. The general correspondence on the New York issue in SHA 8/1657.
- 195 SHA, board minutes Royal Dutch, 8 April 1916. Earlier, Stuart had written privately to Loudon about the matter: SHA 190D/637-2, Stuart to Loudon, 1 March 1916.
- 196 SHA, board minutes Royal Dutch, 4 December 1916. Agreement with Kuhn Loeb was reached in November, but the shares were to be handed over and paid in January 1917. Deterding's other objective for a New York issue, stabilizing the



- market in Royal Dutch shares by creating another market, was foiled by speculators arbitraging between New York and Amsterdam, leading to a large but unspecified number of the American certificates being exchanged for Royal Dutch shares: SHA 195/22-4, Deterding to Gordon Leith, 10 March 1934.
- 197 SHA 8/1657-1, Deterding to Loudon, 23 November 1916.
- 198 SHA, board minutes Royal Dutch, February 1916–January 1917.
- 199 Waley Cohen to Phillips, 27 December 1923, quoted in Jones, *State*, 223.
- 200 Ferrier, *British Petroleum*, 243; NA Kew ADM 18537/240, memorandum Board of Trade, 'The future control of oil supplies', 12 August 1916.
- 201 Ferrier, *British Petroleum*, 243-4; Corley, *Burmah Oil*, 244-7; SHA 190D/637-3, Deterding to Colijn, 4 January 1917, reporting discussions with Sir Marcus, Waley Cohen, and Stuart about the question of whether Asiatic could ever become a British Government controlled company, and dismissing the idea with some contempt.
- 202 SLA 141/3/7, board minutes Shell Transport, 15 January 1918; Jones, *State*, 201-2; Ferrier, *British Petroleum*, 250; NA Kew POWE 33/13 p39.
- 203 Ferrier, *British Petroleum*, 252-253; Jones, *State*, 201-3; the committee's report and proceedings in NA Kew POWE 33/13.
- 204 Cf. for the Mosul question Fitzgerald, 'France's Middle Eastern ambitions'.
- 205 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 4 February, 8 March 1919; Ferrier, *British Petroleum*, 197, 258-9; Jones, *State*, 212-4 links the episode also with the developments in Russia and Romania, where the Group needed British support to recover lost assets. However,
- Deterding's sudden switch of position and the continuing emphasis in the Royal Dutch board discussion suggests that access to oil concessions was uppermost; the Harcourt Committee even appears to have threatened to put a stop the Group's expansion in Egypt, cf. SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 8 March 1919.
- 206 Thus Deterding held on to a joint venture with Burmah in Trinidad, since selling would help Burmah's expansion: AN CAMT 132 AQ 163, bundle correspondence 1918, Lane to Weill, 26 February 1918.
- 207 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 8 March 1919.
- 208 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 4 February 1919; the Harcourt report states unequivocally that Harcourt and Deterding initialled a provisional agreement on 31 January, followed by an amended agreement which the committee approved on February 7: POWE 33/13, 13-4.
- 209 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162 correspondence 1915, Lane to Weill, 8 April 1915. Colijn became a Royal Dutch director in 1921.
- 210 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 4 February 1919; SHA 102, Loudon papers, memo Deterding explaining the agreement, 1 February 1919. The board's decision was immediately transmitted to London by diplomatic telegram from The Hague Chargé d'Affaires to the Foreign Office, a copy of which in SHA 102, Loudon papers, telegram 4 February 1919; quoted in Henriques, *Samuel*, 625.
- 211 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 8 and 11 March 1919; the conditions summarized in Henriques, *Samuel*, 626-7.
- 212 SLA 141/11/10, board memos Shell Transport 1917-20, list of the biggest shareholders, 27 July 1917. Cf. NA Kew POWE 33/13, report PIPCO, 4.
- 213 The text of the two agreements of January and February 1919 in NA Kew POWE 33/13; see also Kent, *Oil and Empire*, 178-82. The Anglo-French memorandum was confirmed at the 1920 San Remo Conference.
- 214 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 25 July 1919; SHA Country Files France, vol. 1, s.v. Régime National; Nouschi, *La France*, 25-6; Jones, *State*, 215-6; Kent, *Oil and Empire*, 155, erroneously puts the Société's foundation in 1924; Jones, *State*, 213, 216, gives the correct sequence. Interestingly, Béranger defended the agreement by pointing out that French investors owned almost 40 per cent of Royal Dutch's capital, so that the Group was almost as French as it was Dutch or British: Béranger, *Pétrole*, 290.
- 215 Jones, *State*, 215-6; cf. Friedensburg, *Erdöl*, 91, Mexico having been the second biggest supplier of oil to Britain during the war, after the US. SHA 102, Loudon papers has some correspondence about the further complications surfacing after the initial agreement.
- 216 AN CAMT 132 AQ 161, correspondence 1914, Lane to Weill, 4, 26 August 1914, 12 August 1915.
- 217 SHA 195/28, Colijn to Deterding, 13 November 1914.
- 218 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915, Lane to Weill, 6 January 1915.
- 219 SLA 141/11/9, board memos Shell Transport, Waley Cohen to Sir Marcus, 31 May 1916.
- 220 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, March 1916.
- 221 Calculated as 18,881,800 shares issued at par times 5.3 is 100,073,540 guilders plus 29,688,336 guilders ordinary dividends divided by 120,000,000 guilders of ordinary capital=108 per cent. AN CAMT 132 AQ 162 correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill, March 1916; SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 3, 16 and 28 March, 8 April, 2, 11, 17 May 1916. The Rothschilds held shares for a total of 10.1 million guilders, which entitled them to 3,373,700 guilders worth of bonus shares: AN CAMT 132 AQ 200, bundle 1918-19, Lane to Weill, 18 December 1918, plus copy of Rothschilds to Royal Dutch, undated; Lane to Royal Dutch, 4 February 1919.
- 222 Shell Transport had issued shares to shareholders at a discount in 1912 and 1913, but the 1917 issue had been at about market price: cf. *The Economist*, 1 July 1922, 7.
- 223 Cf. AN CAMT 132 AQ 198, bundle 1910, Deterding to Aron, 31 May 1910, explaining the Group's depreciation policy.
- 224 Waley Cohen had already pleaded for writing off the Russian investments in 1916 at the prevailing low exchange rates, which nobody would notice from the balance sheet: SLA 141/11/9, board memos Shell Transport, Waley Cohen to Sir Marcus, 31 May 1916. AN CAMT 132 AQ 200, bundle 1918-19, Lane to Weill, 7 November 1918 (Bataafsche writing off its Russian investments). The Royal Dutch Annual Report for 1918 still printed a concise balance sheet for Bataafsche showing a reservation of 60 million guilders (about 5 million pounds) for anticipated Russian losses, but the 1919 report no longer gave details on Bataafsche, so the rest was probably written off during that year.
- 225 Cf. a long report dated 15 October 1917 by G. S. Engle about costs of living of the London office staff in SLA 119/11/3-4, Board memos Anglo-Saxon.
- 226 Cf. e.g. Henriques, *Samuel*, 581-592.

- 1 Source: Annual Report Royal Dutch 1927 p. 13, quoted from 'South American Oil Reports', March 1928. We were able to check the crude production data of this table for Royal Dutch Shell, Jersey Standard and Anglo-Persian.
- 2 Sources Figure 4.1: See appendix.
- 3 Sources Figure 4.2: See appendix.
- 4 Sources Figure 4.3: See appendix.
- 5 SHA 102, Correspondence Loudon, memo 'Financieel voorstel van den heer Deterding aan Lord Cowdray'. Unfortunately the official conditions for buying these shares were not published; the current share price was 530 per cent, Deterding's proposal was to pay 550 per cent, but probably he paid up to 600 per cent or £6 per share. According to Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 317, the Group paid 98 shillings per share.
- 6 Howarth, *Century*, 120-1.
- 7 SHA 190C/386 gives estimates of market shares of the Group on for example Java between 1912 and 1929 which varied between 78.5 and 91.9 per cent.
- 8 Source: Annual reports Shell Transport, Royal Dutch, and Bataafsche.
- 9 Before the Harcourt Committee, for example, Deterding stated that 'he was chiefly concerned in avoidance of waste and was therefore anxious for co-operation (...) He favoured amalgamation because of the economies which would result both in production and distribution'. NA Kew CAB 27/180, meeting 30 March 1922.
- 10 CAMT, Archives Rothschild 132 AQ 166, memo 21 June 1927.
- 11 Gerretson, *History*, IV, 241: 'Deterding simply *had* to get to America'.
- 12 SHA 195/115, Deterding to Loudon, 18 February 1911.
- 13 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 504.
- 14 AN CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1916, Lane to Weill 19 April 1916.
- 15 See Van Veen, *Van Waterschoot van der Gracht*. After leaving the Group, he became the most prominent proponent of the theory of Continental Drift. Originally formulated by Alfred Wegener in 1915, this theory was further elaborated and given wider berth by Van Waterschoot van der Gracht during the 1920s and 1930s. The idea was then largely forgotten, however, until it was rediscovered in the 1960s.
- 16 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 159-66.
- 17 SHA 8/204-3, Deterding to Van der Gracht, 15 January 1919.
- 18 SHA 8/204-3, Deterding to Colijn, 16 January 1919.
- 19 SHA 8/204-3, Deterding to Van der Gracht, 15 January 1919.
- 20 SHA 8/307, memo 24 February 1919.
- 21 SHA 8/307; memo 5 March 1919.
- 22 SHA 8/204-3, Van der Gracht to Deterding, 25 December 1918.
- 23 SHA 8/204-3, memo 24 February 1919.
- 24 SHA 8/204-3, Van der Gracht to Erb, 9 August 1921.
- 25 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 172-90 gives all the details about this episode.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 206.
- 27 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 510-12.
- 28 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 197.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 299-300.
- 30 At one point it was suggested to let Marland become president of the new company: Beaton, *Enterprise* 215.
- 31 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 228.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 206.
- 33 SHA 8/204, Erb to Godber, 13 February 1922; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 219.
- 34 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 218-19.
- 35 SLA 119/3/5, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 26 January 1922.
- 36 SHA 195/22-1, memo Deterding, 24 December 1923.
- 37 SHA, board minutes Bataafsche, 10 January 1924.
- 38 SHA, board minutes Bataafsche, 10 January 1924; the following November, Philips resigned from the board of Bataafsche.
- 39 SLA 141/11/11, 22/1 Board memos Shell Transport, Deterding to Shell Transport, 19 November 1921; note that he interpreted these structural problems very much in personal terms: HE (and HE alone) 'had to fight for the interest of the parent companies' etc.
- 40 SHA, board minutes Bataafsche, 25 September 1925.
- 41 SHA, board minutes Bataafsche, 30 October 1925.
- 42 Beaton, *Enterprise* 360.
- 43 *Ibid.*, 315-6.
- 44 Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New Horizons*, 134.
- 45 SHA 8/790, Erb to Deterding 26 August 1925.
- 46 McBeth, *Gómez and the Oil Companies*, 38.
- 47 *Ibid.*, 37.
- 48 SHA 8/772, 8/774, Colon Development Company, correspondence related to the possible sale of CDC.
- 49 SLA 102/3/4, board minutes VOC, 14 November 1924.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 27 March 1925.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 17 September 1925.
- 52 McBeth, *Gómez and the Oil Companies*, 64; Van Soest, *Olie als water*, 234, mentions that in 1922 there were only six oil companies in Venezuela, all related to the Group; in 1926 there were 75.
- 53 Van Soest, *Olie als water*, 162-77, 233-42.
- 54 *Ibid.*
- 55 *Ibid.*, 240.
- 56 Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New*

- Horizons*, 134-7.
- 57 AN CAMT AQ 132 161, Copy of Agreement Turkish Petroleum Concessions.
- 58 The text of the two agreements of January and February 1919 in NA Kew POWE 33/13; the latter published in Kent, *Oil and Empire*, 178-82. There is also a copy of the memorandum in SHA Loudon Papers. See also Jones, *State*, 193.
- 59 SHA 102, Loudon Papers, memo Cohen Stuart 15 August 1919; in a related letter dated 24 August 1920, Cohen Stuart even argued that he felt 'more and more that our association with the Shell (...) does not seem to be a happy one. The whole world is getting more and more afraid of British Government influence in oil matters (...) I have, until of late, never been very much in favour of the idea which has sometimes been promoted by Sir Marcus Samuel, namely that the Shell Company should merge in the Royal Dutch in such a way that the existing Shell shareholders would receive a certain proportion of Royal Dutch shares in exchange for their Shell shares, after which the Shell company would be wound up. But I have gradually been led to think that this would not be a bad solution'.
- 60 SHA 102, Loudon Papers, J. B. Body to Deterding, 25 July 1919.
- 61 NA Kew CAB 27/180, interview with Walter Samuel, 5 April 1922.
- 62 Yergin, *Prize*, 199.
- 63 Jones, *State*, 220; Yergin, *Prize*, 194-5.
- 64 Jones, *State*, 237.
- 65 SLA RA 262/1, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 25 July 1924.
- 66 Ibid., 31 July 1924; he considered the working agreement 'wholly unacceptable' and 'disastrous as regards my interest'.
- 67 Gulbenkian confidentially told his solicitor that he 'was going to make great use in Court of the VOC agreements', meaning that he would also use his inside knowledge of the problems within the VOC between the majority shareholders and the minority to put pressure on the Group (see chapter 5 for details); SLA RA 262/1, Cochrane to Agnew, 13 September 1924; Cochrane added that 'it would be very difficult to face them in Court', meaning that the threat was quite credible.
- 68 Howarth, *Century*, 149.
- 69 As early as 1913, Erb warned about the risks of investing in Mexico because of the geological circumstances: Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 543-4.
- 70 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 321.
- 71 Brown, *Oil*, 241.
- 72 Van Vuurde, *Los Países Bajos*, 28-33; Brown, *Oil and Revolution*, 164.
- 73 The debate about the causes of the decline of the Mexican oil industry in Haber, Mauser and Razo, 'When the law does not matter.'
- 74 Pearton, *Oil*, 105, 110-1.
- 75 Ibid., 110.
- 76 Ibid., 129.
- 77 Gibb and Knowlton, *Resurgent Years*, 91-3, mentioning a sum of \$6 million spent between 1912 and 1918 for getting a production of 135 barrels a day.
- 78 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, V, 169-73.
- 79 SHA, 190C/76, Colijn to Idenburg.
- 80 SHA, 190A/120-1, Colijn to De Jonge, 1 March 1921.
- 81 SHA 141/11/11, containing the translated minutes of the Bataafsche board of 6 May 1920; Sir Marcus's remark was certainly an exaggeration but, as noted above, oil from the Dutch East Indies was indeed the main source of profits in these years.
- 82 AN CAMT 132 AQ 164 Lane to Weill, 26 January 1920.
- 83 Ibid., 15 June 1920.
- 84 Ibid., Lane to Weill 28 January 1921.
- 85 Ibid., Deterding to Baron Edmond de Rothschild, 2 September 1921.
- 86 Taselaar, *De Nederlandse koloniale lobby*, 226-7.
- 87 *Minjak*, 3, November 1921.
- 88 AN CAMT 132 AQ 164, Deterding to Baron Edmond de Rothschild, 16 September 1921: 'In strict confidence, I can tell you that I have been asked to meet Her Majesty the Queen on the 21th, and I may have the opportunity at this private interview to say a word in that regard'.
- 89 AN CAMT 132 AQ 164, Deterding to Lane, 5 October 1921.
- 90 SHA 195/176, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 30 August 1921 and Gulbenkian to Colijn, 21 September 1921.
- 91 SHA 195/168, Philips to De Graaff, 25 January 1922.
- 92 SHA 195/168, Philips to Deterding, 22 November 1922.
- 93 Source for yield of export taxes: [www.iisg.nl/indonesianeconomy/index.html](http://www.iisg.nl/indonesianeconomy/index.html) (database of reconstructed financial accounts of the Dutch East Indies); in 1922 the yield of the export tax increased to almost 12 million guilders.
- 94 SHA, 190A/120-1, undated and unsigned letter, probably from November 1921. Deterding was criticized by colleagues for his linking the export tax to the Jambi agreement; another undated document from the same files, probably written by Colijn, argued that at that stage it was impossible not to continue with the signing of the agreement with the government, because of the damage to the reputation of both the Group and the Minister of Colonial Affairs.
- 95 SHA, 190A/120-1, minutes meeting with De Graaff, 29 November 1921.
- 96 The story of Jambi has received a lot of attention in the Dutch colonial literature, most recently by De Graaff, *Kalm*, 453-493.
- 97 Wilkins, *History* II, 102.
- 98 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis* V, 231.
- 99 De Graaff, 'Kalm', 475, 477.
- 100 SHA 195/34.
- 101 SHA 195/25, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 22 September 1920; the connection with Wrangel was supposed to be secret, cf. SHA 195/34, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 2 October 1920, 'I regret that I mentioned the name of General Wrangel in connection with the 100,000,000 pouds transaction. I really gave you more information than I was authorized to give, for that part dealing with General Wrangel was given me under great secrecy'.
- 102 SHA Country volumes Russia, vol. 4, Gulbenkian to Philips 28 October 1920.
- 103 SHA Country volumes Russia, vol. 4, letters by Philips to Colijn and Gulbenkian, 2 November 1920.
- 104 SHA Country volumes Russia, vol. 4, BPM Board minutes 11 November 1920; see also Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 150-3.
- 105 The first letter, from Gerretson to Krassin, is from 20 October 1920, and refers to 'our recent conversation'; SHA Country volumes Russia, vol. 4, entitled Negotiations between Mr Krassin and Dr Gerretson.
- 106 SHA Country volumes Russia, vol. 4, Colijn to Sir Robert Horne, 22 December 1920; the text of the draft agreement between Krassin and Anglo-Persian, for which again Gulbenkian was the source of information, in SHA 195/32, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 20 December 1920.
- 107 SHA Country volumes Russia, vol. 4, the most detailed proposals, notably a memo 'Main conditions of Concessions for Exploiting oil fields in the R.S.F.S.R.' date

- from March 1921. During that month Krassin was also negotiating with Anglo-Persian and Jersey Standard about identical plans, see Gibb and Knowlton, *Resurgent Years*, 337.
- 108 Cited in Yergin, *Prize*, 238.
- 109 Yergin, *Prize*, 238; Gibb and Knowlton, *Resurgent Years*, 334.
- 110 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, IV, 159.
- 111 SLA 141/11/13, memo 8 June 1927; £27 million was a formidable amount, but only slightly more than 10 per cent of the total capitalized value of the Group in these years. In 1922, the figure was put at £33 million: SHA Country Volumes Russia, vol. 6, statement of Russian claims, 18 July 1922.
- 112 Gibb and Knowlton, *Resurgent Years*, 340.
- 113 SHA 195/39, N. Gulbenkian to Deterding, 27 March 1923.
- 114 SHA 195/39, Deterding to Gulbenkian, 21 March 1923; the volumes involved were 70,000 tons with an option on 200,000 tons; on 30 January 1923, Deterding wrote to Gulbenkian that he was not in favor of the boycott of Russian oil.
- 115 Gibb and Knowlton, *Resurgent Years*, 344.
- 116 *Ibid.*, 346-7 for these negotiations; they also mention his marriage.
- 117 AN CAMT 132 AQ 166, memorandum Weill 28 July 1927; already in 1925 Deterding had warned Cadman of Anglo-Persian not to buy Russian oil (SHA 195/39, Deterding to Cadman, 3 December 25).
- 118 AN CAMT 132 AQ 166, memorandum Weill 28 July 1927; according to Deterding they replied that Deterding had an agreement with the president of Socony, not with the Managing Director, and that the former did not have the power to bind the company ('n'avait pas qualité pour engager le Standard Oil de New-York').
- 119 AN CAMT 132 AQ 166, Weill to Baron Edmond, 19 May 1927; as usual, this scheme had been developed by Gulbenkian, *idem* memorandum Weill, 21 June 1927. The Rothschilds were concerned that a conflict between Poincaré and Deterding might harm their interests.
- 120 SLA, 119/11/72, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo Russian Department, 14 June 1932; it contributed to the publication of Anglo-Russian News by Dr. Edouard Luboff, who was 'a dangerous critic of their [= Soviet] regime'.
- 121 AN CAMT 132 AQ 166, Weill to Baron Edmond, 19 May 1927, 'Il estime que c'est pour lui une question de prestige de maintenir le point de vue qu'il a pris et qu'il ne peut pas accepter qu'on manque de parole à une Société de l'importance de la Royal Dutch'. Weill also mentions that his colleagues were surprised by the violent nature of his outbursts ('étonnés de la raideur de ses notes'); on 15 February 1926, Deterding wrote for example to Nobel: 'The Bolsheviks *must be defeated*, but the defeat will never come if everybody is frightened into buying Russian oil'.
- 122 Yergin, *Prize*, 243.
- 123 AN CAMT 132 AQ 166, memorandum Weill, 9 March 1928.
- 124 Bamberg, *History BP*, II, 107.
- 125 Howarth, *Century*, 164.
- 126 AN CAMT 132 AQ 166, memo Weill 15 July 1928.
- 127 SHA 195/30-2, Deterding to Agnew, 13 August 1928.
- 128 See also Bamberg, *History BP* II, 107-9, who claims that Fraser had prepared a first draft. In his regular conversation with M. Weill from Rothschilds, Deterding also claimed to have drafted the agreement: 'J'ai rédigé, d'accord avec eux, un projet de contrat de 8 à 9 pages qui fixe les bases d'une entente entre les gros producteurs'. To stress his predominant role, Deterding added that 'ces conversations ont duré 11 jours pendant lesquels M. Deterding aurait parlé 8 heures par jour'. AN CAMT 132 AQ 166, memo Weill 1 October 1928.
- 129 Bamberg, *History BP*, II, 110.
- 130 AN CAMT 132 AQ 166, memo Weill, 1 October 1928.
- 131 Yergin, *Prize*, 265.
- 132 SLA SC7/A22/22/1, letters concerning negotiations with Teagle and Mellon.
- 133 SHA 195/23, Deterding to Teagle, 17 May, 19 August 1932.
- 134 SLA 119/11/26, board memos Anglo-Saxon, 29 August and 16 November 1938; cf. Corley, *Burmah*, II, 56-7.
- 135 SLA SC7/92/1/1, Godber to Airey 23 August 1929, about the boycott of Spain 'because if by any chance and of course it is an exceedingly small chance the Monopoly eventually becomes successful (...) it will encourage other countries like France and Italy, who are all the time on the verge of creating monopolies, to do so'.
- 136 SLA 119/11/15, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 12 August 1926.
- 137 Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New Horizons*, 39-41, 51.
- 138 *Ibid.*, 52.
- 139 SLA 119/11/23, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 20 April 1933.
- 140 SLA 119/3/9, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 26 April 1933.
- 141 SLA 119/11/23, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 20 April 1933; 119/11/24, memo 10 July 1935.
- 142 Cf SLA GHC/COL/A1-A19, an extensive file on the Colombian operations.
- 143 SHA 15/133-1, statement of Group sales 1926; Van Wijk to Engle, 27 June 1927; Engle to Van Wijk, 4 July 1927. Bamberg, *History BP*, II, 120-2; the volume rose from 340,000 long tons in 1928 to just over 400,000 tons by the late 1930s, all from the Abadan refinery. Warwick BP Archive 109194. We are indebted to Jim Bamberg for this reference.

- 1 NA CAMT 132 AQ 159, Lane to Aron 21 September 1912. This solution created a new complication of its own, because some of the profits previously realized by Asiatic were now made by Bataafsche as formal owner of Dordtsche. Consequently a special compensation account had to be created to ensure that the third partner in Asiatic, the Rothschilds, received their due.
- 2 SHA, board minutes Royal Dutch, 30 September 1919.
- 3 SHA 195/175, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 17 November 1919.
- 4 SHA 8/1863-1, Colijn to Deterding, 3 November 1915.
- 5 NA CAMT 132 AQ 164, Lane to Weill, 26 January 1920.
- 6 The Rothschild archives contain a draft letter (NA CAMT 132 AQ 164) 'que suggéré mr Gulbenkian', dated 26 April 1921 containing his views; the crucial passage runs as follows: 'après tant d'années d'admirable et de si fructueux labeur consacrées par vous à ces entreprises auxquelles vous avez donné votre vie, il est indispensable, dans l'intérêt même de ceux que vous représentez, que vous vous ménagiez des périodes de détente et de repos: ceci est une nécessité absolue. Si vous ne le faisiez pas vous-même, nous serions les premiers à vous presser de le faire.' Lane and Gulbenkian must have been in contact about this, since they held almost identical views; the letter cited here suggests that they have tried to convince the Rothschilds to put pressure on Deterding.
- 7 In the event, Cohen Stuart died in March 1921 before he could take up the appointment.
- 8 SHA, board minutes Royal Dutch 10 February 1921; De Jonge, *Herinneringen*, 69-70.
- 9 SHA, 195/51, Philips to Capadose. In Dutch, Philips' complaints were 'gebrek aan goede organisatie der werkzaamheden, onvoldoende afbakening van ieders taak (...) vermindering van verantwoordelijkheidgevoel bij sommige leiders, usurpatie van macht en invloed bij sommige ambtenaren (...) Vaak wordt hetzelfde onderwerp door een bureau in Londen behandeld, waarvan ook iemand in den Haag overtuigd is dat hij het behoort te behandelen (...). De verwarde verdeling van terrein tusschen de verschillende boards (...) het ontbreken van een systematische en doeltreffende werkwijze in de alleroppperste leiding'. The complaint about 'the management in The Hague has also become rather autocratic' probably alludes to Colijn's rise to power within the BPM.
- 10 In 1908 Sir Marcus had even suggested to liquidate the two companies and 'form one Company to hold the entire business', NA CAMT 132 AQ 157, Lane to Aron 30 September 1908. However, the proposed compensation for the management was so generous they would receive '1 million sterling 5 per cent preference shares' that the plan was rejected as too expensive.
- 11 SHA 195/51, Capadose to Colijn 3 October 1921 ('commissarissen (...) waren het, meen ik, allen eens dat het critische gedeelte van Philips epistel voortreffelijk was').
- 12 SHA, 195/51, anonymous author to Capadose, 4 October 1921; Colijn, Deterding, and Philips are mentioned in the letter, so it was probably written by Loudon.
- 13 SHA, 195/51 notes in margin letter Philips to Capadose ('Hoofdzaak is dat den laatsten tijd geen personen maar departementen aansprakelijk worden gemaakt wat m.i. geheel fout is')
- 14 Ibidem, 'Kwaal van de Hollanders die te veel persoonlijk crediet willen in plaats van zich zelf weg te cijferen + de zaak alleen alle crediet te geven'.
- 15 SHA 195/176, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 6 January 1922; he added 'that perhaps you should not exaggerate and smash too hard in order to gain your ends'.
- 16 SHA 195/51, memo 6 September 1921.
- 17 Langeveld, *Colijn* I, 243.
- 18 SHA 195/168, Colijn to Deterding 30 March 1922: 'Steunend op wat men meende te zijn uw anti-Hollandsche gezindheid, voelde ik overal, natuurlijk beleefden en uiterst correcten, maar toch ook standvastigen tegendruk (...) Tegen de "stille kracht" om dat te beletten heb ik het feitelijk afgelegd'. Colijn's assessment of Deterding's attitude was shared by others. Sir Philip Lloyd Graeme, member of the Harcourt committee, said at a meeting of the committee in March 1922 that Deterding's 'sympathies were very pro-English (...) as long as he remained Managing Director it was probable that the British share in management would tend to grow', NA Kew CAB 27/180, meeting 10 March 1922.
- 19 See Klein, 'Colijn', 105. Deterding did reply to Colijn's letter, clearly showing his anti-Dutch sentiment in this period: SHA 195/168, Deterding to Colijn, 3 April 1922: 'als die exportrechten gehandhaafd blijven, het Hollandsch element geheel en al moet plaats maken voor het Britsche' 'Indien de tegenwoordige positie bestendigd wordt, zullen zeker nog wel Hollanders gebruikt kunnen worden, doch deze moeten dan beginnen met zich te verengelschen of als u wilt te ver-internationaliseren'.

- 20 De Jonge, *Herinneringen 70-1*. De Jonge became a Royal Dutch non-executive director in 1923 and a Bataafsche director on his return to the Netherlands in 1930. His frequent attendance at London board meetings belies his self-denigrating portrait of an ineffectual stranger in the oil business.
- 21 SHA 195/177, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 28 December 1922.
- 22 SHA 195/92, memo Deterding for Gerretson, 1932.
- 23 SHA 195/177, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 4 January 1923.
- 24 SLA SC7/A22/11, De Kok to Agnew, 6 July 1923.
- 25 SHA 195/177, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 17 July 1923.
- 26 SHA 195/177, A. Cull of Cull & Co. to Deterding, 18 December 1923. The letter's postscript reads: 'I have just heard from Mr. Gulbenkian that he has declined to arbitrate with you, but I hope you will persuade him to alter his mind.'
- 27 SHL 102/3/4, minutes VOC board, 25 April 1924.
- 28 SHL 102/3/4, minutes VOC board, 10 November 1924.
- 29 SHL 102/3/4 minutes VOC board, Meetings 21/12/1925 and 11/1/1926.
- 30 SHA 195/33/4, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 30 September 1925.
- 31 NA CAMT 132 AQ 164, Lane to Weill, 21 November 1921.
- 32 Health reasons may have contributed to Philips's decision. He suffered from recurrent depressions, which in 1918 had forced him to resign as Dutch envoy to Washington before he had even presented his credentials: obituary Philips in *Olie* 8 (1955) 66; NA The Hague 2.21.095 De Jonge papers No. 25, De Kok to De Jonge, 23 December 1931.
- 33 Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 296.
- 34 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, secret annex to the meeting of 9 October 1924, 'Indien in het college van Directeuren der Koninklijke de meerderheid een besluit zou willen nemen waartegen de heer Deterding bezwaar heeft, zal dit niet worden uitgevoerd, maar worden onderworpen aan het oordeel van de Raad van Commissarissen'. The first version of the proposal reads as follows: 'De heer Deterding wenscht dat indien' (Mr Deterding wishes that if the board of directors), which clearly indicates that Deterding was behind this proposal.
- 35 Colijn's profit share had been paid out of Deterding's share, to the amount of one half percent of the dividend of Royal Dutch; SHA 15/13, Philips to Deterding, 28 May 1923.
- 36 SHA 15/13, Philips to Deterding, 28 May 1923.
- 37 SHA Royal Dutch Board, 9 October 1924 and 12 February 1925.
- 38 SHA 15/13, Van Wijk to BPM, 1 July 1929; Deterding's income from the British companies was about 600,000 to 700,000 guilders.
- 39 SHA 102, Loudon papers, and 8/1648, contract of sale between Mrs. Kessler-De Lange, Deterding, Loudon, and Capadose, the last clause reading 'De ondergeteekenden ter andere nemen de zedelijke verplichting op zich, elk voor zich, tegenover de ondergeteekende ter eenre om, wanneer een of meer harer zonen mocht wenschen om als Directeur of Directeuren der K.N.P.M. op te treden en deze daartoe de noodige bekwaamheid mochten beschikken, hem of hen in de vervulling van dat verlangen met raad en daad bij te staan, echter alleen voor zoverre de vervulling van dien wensch door hen geacht wordt in het belang der K.N.P.M. en hare Aandeelhouders te zijn'.
- 40 There were four sons; the other two showed no inclination for joining the Group, one becoming a lawyer, the other an ophthalmologist.
- 41 SHA board minutes Royal Dutch, 27 September 1923; significantly it was added that Kessler's remuneration would not be subtracted from Deterding's. The first mission of the newly appointed Kessler was to discuss the preference shares with his mother: board minutes Royal Dutch 10 January 1923.
- 42 SHA, board minutes Royal Dutch 14 February 1924. Additionally, all owners of preference shares had signed a blank agreement to transfer their holding upon retirement, board minutes Royal Dutch, 19 September 1929.
- 43 SHA 15/134 (correspondence between Kessler and Waley Cohen about financial relations within the Group); SLA 119/3/6, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 2 December 1925 (Kessler to approve plans for Belgium garage and workshops), 22 September 1926 (oversees building tank installations Switzerland), 3 November 1926 (supervises purchase motor cars and lorries Germany), 119/3/7, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 4 July 1929 (must decide on Brussels office building), 2 October 1929 (idem Hamburg building); SHA 10/541-1, A. de Jongh to Rudeloff, 23 May 1930 (Kessler's instructions for a commercial audit in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland); CAMT Rothschild 132 AQ 168, notes from a conversation between Baron Edmond and Kessler, 19 December 1933 (French organization performs so much better since Kessler has taken over its management). SHA 190C/251, memo
- Forbes 'Smeeroliebedrijf', 7; 190C/34A, memo Forbes 'Benzine', 22-23; SHA 11/22-1, Kessler to Fenwick and others, 19 January 1939 (gasoline cost prices and selling policy).
- 44 *The Pipeline*, September 1922 announced Kessler's appointment to the board of Anglo-Saxon, so this was not 1923 or 1924, as stated in his obituaries and other texts.
- 45 SLA GHS/3E/1, group directors; NA The Hague 2.21.095 De Jonge papers No. 18, Deterding to De Jonge, 13 July 1932 and 2 January 1933, No. 25, De Kok to De Jonge, 16 March 1932, all three letters professing shock and grief over Debenham's sudden death.
- 46 SLA GHS/3E/1, group directors; ODNB, 'Agnew'.
- 47 ODNB 'Godber'; Rady, 'Godber'; one of Agnew's sons married one of Godber's daughters.
- 48 SHA Royal Dutch board minutes, 13 March 1930; Erb regretted having to give up his London directorships, since these had enabled him to keep abreast of the production in Iraq, Sarawak, Egypt, and Trinidad, figures which he would not otherwise receive. This underlines the continuing lack of integration at board level: SHA 195/172, Erb to Deterding, 5 March 1930.
- 49 Obituaries in *De Bron*, December 1940.
- 50 Lane's assessment of Deterding in 1913 in NA CAMT 132 AQ 199, Lane to Baron Edouard, 21 October 1913.
- 51 RA Alkmaar De Lange papers (no inventory numbers at time of writing), Deterding to Kessler 7 December 1930.
- 52 Interview with J. B. A. Kessler III, June 2004.
- 53 For a remarkable testimony of Deterding accepting this state of affairs, see SHA 195/22-6, Deterding to Kessler, 20 July

- 1932, emphasizing the need for co-operation and the joint responsibility of directors.
- 54 When Agnew wrote to De Kok in May 1930 asking his approval for a circular letter about Provident Fund contributions over 1929 to be sent out to representatives overseas, he stated that 'Godber will deal with America; Kessler with the various European countries; Debenham with the Asiatic representatives; whilst I will deal with Venezuela, Sarawak, and Egypt', so this division of tasks by area was not an established matter. Moreover, in June Engle wrote to Van Wijk asking him to write 'as usual' to the companies in Romania, Germany, the Netherlands, and others under control of Bataafsche, at which Van Wijk noted that this was supposed to have been done by Kessler, but that the companies were to be notified by Bataafsche anyway. Thus there was even no clear demarcation between London and The Hague. SHA 15/227, Agnew to De Kok, 19 May 1930. Deterding wrote separately to the chief executives in the States, informing them of their bonuses: SHA 195/22-4, Deterding to Airey, Daly, Van Eck, and Legh-Jones, 6 May 1930.
- 55 De Jonge, *Herinneringen*, 70.
- 56 SHA 190C/449, survey of the most important Group companies, listing Royal Dutch, Shell Transport, Anglo-Saxon and Bataafsche on p. 2, and Asiatic amongst the large body of operating companies on p. 8.
- 57 SHA 8/1869, organization patent department; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 351.
- 58 SLA 119/3/7, Anglo-Saxon board minutes, 12 May 1927, 2 May 1928; 141/3/9, Shell Transport board minutes, 12 May 1932, 11 May 1933, 17 May 1934, 15 May 1935.
- 59 Cf. SHA 15/2, De Kok writing to the Governor-General in 1935 on the announced gasoline excise increases; Taselaar, *Koloniale lobby*, 416-7.
- 60 SHA Royal Dutch board minutes, 28 March 1930 (undue haste with the bond issue). The same happened in 1939 (see Ch. 7).
- 61 The tone of the articles in which the leading Dutch financial magazine *De Kroniek van Sternheim* discussed the Annual Report of Royal Dutch became increasingly critical during the 1920s and 1930s, pointing to the deficiencies of its financial reporting and the repetitive nature of Deterding's complaints about the Soviet Union.
- 62 *Kroniek van Sternheim*, 1 April 1930, 308, 1 June 1931, 45-6, 1 July 1934, 60-1; *Naamlouze vennootschap*, 15 August 1939, 157; *De Maasbode*, 14 January 1939, criticizing the lack of information in the prospectus for Bataafsche's 100 million guilder bond loan.
- 63 SHA 15/112, correspondence with Bianchi. The auditor had asked for better data on the holding companies so as to be able to give an accurate picture of Royal Dutch's investment in them, but managers refused to give precise figures.
- 64 SLA 119/11/16, board memos Anglo-Saxon, January 1927; cf SHA 15/217, for a run of estimates 1932-8; SHA 15/133-2, Colquhoun to Van Wijk, 8 November 1933, for the compilation and use of the material.
- 65 SHA 15/133-1, Statement Group Sales 1926, dated 20 April 1927; Van Wijk to Engle, 29 June 1927, Engle to Van Wijk, 4 July 1927.
- 66 The existence of the Group Finance Committee can be deduced from SHA 15/131, Van Wijk to Engle 13 February 1931, about appointing Colquhoun to the committee as successor to Anglo-Saxon's company secretary Price. In 1930, Group production data were still not shared between the boards of Bataafsche and Anglo-Saxon: SHA 195/172, Erb to Deterding, 5 March 1930.
- 67 SHA 49/23-2, Godber to Van Wijk, 18 May 1937.
- 68 SHA 49/23-2, Van Eck to Van Wijk, 21 September 1937.
- 69 SHA 15/114, Van Leeuwen to BPM, 29 February 1940.
- 70 Deterding, *An International Oilman*, 15; according to Deterding the Pope answered: 'The material rewards from such a vast business don't impress me in the least (...) What impresses me is the intense happiness you must draw from the knowledge that your life-work provides the wherewithal for so many thousands of families'.
- 71 SHA 190A/116; the figure for 1929 shows a considerable increase from 1913, when Bataafsche employed 23,167 Asians and 825 Europeans.
- 72 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 352.
- 73 Royal Dutch Annual Report 1935.
- 74 SLA 119/3/2, Minutes Board Anglo-Saxon, 8 April 1914.
- 75 The variety of Engle's tasks explains his description as having 'no particular title in the company and no precise designated function' in Howarth, *Century*, 134-5.
- 76 For instance SLA 119/3/5, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 16 December 1922; 141/3/9, board minutes Shell Transport, 15 July 1930, 15 March 1932; the words 'at the board's discretion' were probably added for tax reasons, gratuities not counting as taxable income.
- 77 SLA 141/11/15, board memos Shell Transport, memo 12 December 1932.
- 78 SHA 15/238, De Booy to Kessler, 4 March 1937; SLA 141/3/9, board minutes Shell Transport, 1 February 1938; 119/3/10, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 19 January 1938.
- 79 SHA 1585, board minutes Bataafsche, 18 November 1919, proposal by Colijn of the new rules for staff salaries: 'a. Op 21-jarigen leeftijd behoort de ongetrouwde employé zelfstandig te kunnen leven, waarvoor een salaris van f. 1200 wordt noodig geacht. b. Op 25-jarigen leeftijd behoort het salaris tot F 2000 gestegen te zijn, opdat de employe in staat zij een gezin te vormen. c. Naast het vaste salaris wordt een gezinstoeslag toegekend, zijnde 10 per cent voor de echtgenoot en 2 per cent voor elk ten laste van de employé zijnd kind. d. de duurtetoeslag en extra-duurte toeslag, zooals tot heden genoten, vervallen'; Bataafsche accepted the new rules, but also advised to consult the London office in order to harmonize employment conditions. The London boards already operated a family and child allowance. See SLA 119/3/3, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo G. S. Engle 15 October 1917, for a detailed description of salaries and employees' budgets to argue for raising salaries across the board.
- 80 SLA 119/11/13-3 and 4, board memos Anglo-Saxon, report of the St. Helen's Housing Co. 1923; 119/11/24, board memos Anglo-Saxon, report for 1933.
- 81 SLA 119/11/22, board memos Anglo-Saxon, report St Helen's Court Stores for 1930.
- 82 See e.g. 'The De Kok challenge competition' in *The Pipeline*, 2 (1922), 170-7; 'Deterding challenge cup competition', *The Pipeline*, 5 (1925), 174-81. In 1922 membership of the different sports clubs was 4,000 in Britain and only 400 in the Netherlands.
- 83 SHA 190C/276-1, Wurfbain to Pladju, 17 July 1920, and a loose memo with notes

- about the early history of the association; *Minjak*, 1921, 2-8.
- 84 SHA 190C/276-1, Colijn to De Jonge, 7 August 1920. In earlier talks in Indonesia, managers had put a third condition, that a union would have to represent 75 per cent of the European employees.
- 85 Trade unions were in general not influential in the oil industry, perhaps because of relatively high earnings. Mexico was the exception, of course; unions played a large role there, see Brown, *Oil*, 307 ff.
- 86 Henriques, *Waley Cohen*, 166-8.
- 87 *Ibid.*, 166. The Group later developed a special procedure for recruiting relatives to prevent strings being pulled, see SHA 11/22-1, Godber to Engle, 6 July 1939.
- 88 Henssen, *Geschiedenis*, 81.
- 89 *Ibid.*
- 90 SHA 15/126, report four accountants on cost cuttings in the London office, 3 March 1931.
- 91 SHA 11/22, memo Gray, 13 February 1939, Gray to Legh-Jones, 22 February 1939.
- 92 SLA SC7/42/9/2-2, Godber to De Booy, 26 January 1937.
- 93 SHA 8/962, Kessler to Erb, 10 January 1927.
- 94 SHA 15/242, Kessler to De Kok, 27 September 1934.
- 95 SHA 15/223 memo Kessler to Deterding, 30 January 1935; on reception of a copy, De Kok replied next day that he entirely agreed with it; the B.I.M. was the marketing organization in the Netherlands.
- 96 SHA 8/1865 Bataafsche to Pladjoe, 15 October 1928.
- 97 G., 'Zijn wij 'werknemers'?' *Minjak*, 1921, 13-14. The identity of 'G.' is unknown. Gerretson always signed his memos as G., but it appears unlikely that a staff member of Bataafsche in The Hague would publish an article in the first issue of the staff magazine for the Netherlands East Indies. On the other hand, the views expressed in the article could well have been those of Gerretson.
- 98 G., 'Zijn wij 'werknemers'?' *Minjak*, 1921, 13-14, 'want ook de schijn van antagonisme zou den Asiaat tot gevaarlijke conclusies kunnen leiden'.
- 99 *Minjak*, February 1922, 161.
- 100 SHA, board minutes Bataafsche, 9 October 1924, which leave no room for doubt about the motivation of this decision: 'zulks met de bedoeling om, tezamen met andere belanghebbende ondernemers in Nederlandsch-Indie, tegenover de overwegend-LINKSCHE en weinig praktische opleiding der Oost-Indische ambtenaren te Leiden een tegenwicht te hebben'.
- 101 Henssen, *Gerretson*, 43-63.
- 102 Interview Deterding in 'De Mijlpaal', printed in *De Telegraaf*, 28 February 1929, 'Nederlands politiek in Indië funest' and 'dwaasheid te spreken van een Indonesisch volk'.
- 103 We thank Geoffrey Jones for pointing this out to us.
- ## Chapter 6
- 1 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 174-5; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 200.
- 2 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 95, 102-8.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 110-14, 118; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 200-2, 204-6.
- 4 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 120-5; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 202-5, 552; MS, 'Fifty Years, Shell Petroleum Corporation Geophysical Research Laboratory 1936-Shell Development Company Bellaire Research Center 1986', 6-7. Marland Oil probably adopted seismology at the instigation of its Vice-President E&P, Van der Gracht.
- 5 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 131-40.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 165-72.
- 7 *Ibid.*, *Technical Development*, 179-93; Beaton, *Enterprise* 103-4; SHA 49/180-1, Kessler to Guest, 30 September 1925 (McDuffie appointment, temporary sojourn in The Hague, and future assignments to other operating areas).
- 8 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 244.
- 9 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 332; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 240; SHA board minutes Bataafsche, 14 February 1918
- 10 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 244; the Dubbs was both more simple to build and maintain, and it gave a better yield of gasoline.
- 11 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 244-7; Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 335-42; SHA board minutes Bataafsche, 13 July 1922 (budget for cracking trials Balik Papan); 24 April 1925 (20 per cent gasoline from cracking in 1923); SLA SC46/1, Vincent, MS 'One hundred years of Shell refining 1891-1991', 3 (25 Dubbs units 1927).
- 12 SHA 190C/23A, paper Forbes,



- 'Asfaltbitumen', 8-9 (contacting foreign asphalt experts); Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 426-7 (Group representatives on international white oil committees).
- 13 Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 337-40.
- 14 SRTCA, Abbott Room, manuscript Duinmaijer and Groenveld about the history of the laboratory, budgets laboratory 1914-18. the 1918 budget was almost 100,000 guilders, just over £8,300, up from 30,000 guilders (£2,500) in 1914, a substantial increase even considering wartime inflation.
- 15 SRTCA, Abbott Room, manuscript Duinmaijer and Groenveld about the history of the laboratory; Schweppe, *Research aan het IJ*, 28-32.
- 16 SHA 49/737, memo Brocades Zaalberg 13 January 1934.
- 17 Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 344-53; SHA 190C/40, Bataafsche sold its share for 600,000 guilders, having invested a total of 3 million in the company, so the board clearly wanted to get rid of it.
- 18 Cf. SHA 190C/23A, paper Forbes, 'Asfaltbitumen'; 190C/34A, paper Forbes, 'Benzine'; 190C/466, paper Forbes 'Witte oliën'; 190C/251, paper Forbes 'Smeeroliebedrijf'.
- 19 SHA 190C/34A, Forbes, 'Benzine', 15, 16, 18, which gives more details than Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 394-6.
- 20 According to Deterding, Rolls Royces ran best on Shell No. 1 Spirit: SHA 49/317, Deterding to Colijn, 3 December 1917. Some straight-run gasoline had octane numbers as high as 75; Charles Lindbergh allegedly crossed the Atlantic on aviation fuel with octane number 73, MS, 'Shell Oil Company's Research and War Production 1943', 39.
- 21 SHA 190C/34A, Forbes, 'Benzine', 8-9.
- 22 Ibid., 8-10, 12; Reynolds, *Ricardo*, 143-6; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 549-50; Gabriëls, *Koninklijke Olie*, 94; Delft initially concentrated on drafting specifications for Diesel fuel.
- 23 From this point of departure, octane numbers developed into performance indicators, so there could be more than 100 octane gasoline, or 100 octane gasoline with only 45 per cent iso-octane. Cf. Beaton, *Enterprise*, 581.
- 24 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 369-70; SHA 190C/250, Forbes, 'Extractiemethoden' is more detailed than the text in the book, cf. for instance on the extracts 6-7, 14.
- 25 SHA 190C/34A, Forbes, 'Benzine', 11, 13, 16, 17.
- 26 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 342.
- 27 SHA 49/180-1, Kessler to De Kok, 25 August 1927.
- 28 SHA 190C/34A, Forbes, 'Benzine', 13, 14.
- 29 Larson/Knowlton/Popple, *New Horizons*, 161.
- 30 SHA 190C/34A, Forbes, 'Benzine', 13, 17; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 412-15.
- 31 SHA 190C/34A, Forbes, 'Benzine', 21-4; Schweppe, *Research aan het IJ*, 60.
- 32 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 412-15; SHA 10/234, Airey to Deterding, 21 November 1930 (gasoline without ethyl now uncompetitive); 49/74-2, memo Aviation Department, London 30 March 1933 (need to add lead to aircraft gasoline means building ethyl mixing plants at strategic points), Dooijewaard to Caland, 1 April 1933 (lead the only way to give the market what it wants).
- 33 Reynolds, *Ricardo*, 158-65; SLA 119/11/17 and 119/11/23, Anglo-Saxon board memos, 15 November 1927 and 18 December 1933; SHA 49/161 and 49/162, contracts with Ricardo concerning Diesel engines, 1927-1935; 49/164-169 and /174-175, negotiations and agreements with engine manufacturers in various countries. The importance of Ricardo's innovation becomes fully clear by the assertion that, in the 1980s, some 90 per cent of the world's diesel cars and commercial vehicles had Comet-derived combustion chambers: Reynolds, *Ricardo*, 164.
- 34 Ibid., *Ricardo*, 146-7.
- 35 SHA 190B/138, memoirs Späth, 13-4, 19; 8/1170, memo take-over Stern-Sonneborn 19 July 1924; Flieger, *Gelben Muschel*, 107-15; SHA 190C/250, memo Forbes, 'Extractiemethoden', 15-17; 190C/251, memo Forbes 'Smeeroliebedrijf', 6-12, 16-21; Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 408-20.
- 36 190C/251, memo Forbes 'Smeeroliebedrijf', 15, 26-7; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 409-11; SLA 119/11/24, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 17 May 1935 (extraction plants Shell Haven), 119/11/27, memo 19 April 1939 (building Stanlow).
- 37 Detailed discussion in SHA 190C/23A, paper Forbes, 'Asfaltbitumen' and 190C/466, paper Forbes 'Witte oliën'.
- 38 At least in gasoline manufacturing, it took some time before blending had become a faultless procedure: SHA 49/74-3, Asiatic Singapore to Bataafsche, 21 September 1935, 49/74-4, Bataafsche to Balik Papan, 14 October 1935, 49/74-5, BIM to the Amsterdam laboratory, 26 July 1937, the Amsterdam laboratory to BIM, 4 August 1937.
- 39 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 157-9.
- 40 SHA 49/180-1, memo extension research work Group, 5 April 1927; Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 456-74; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 502-7; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 344-53. In 1927, Pyzel estimated that the Group's US companies wasted the gas equivalent of 10,000 barrels of fuel daily: SHA 49/180-1, memo extension Group research, 5 April 1927.
- 41 Hayes, *Industry and Ideology*, 36-8; Knowlton/Larson/Popple, *New horizons*, 154-7.
- 42 Royal Dutch Annual Report 1926, 16-8; Spitz, *Petrochemicals*, 37.
- 43 De Vries, *Hoogovens*, 320-1; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 352; memoirs Kessler in *Olie*, June 1957. Teagle had travelled to London from the talks with Farben in Heidelberg on 9 August; the meeting took place on the 18th: Wall and Gibb, *Teagle*, 301.
- 44 Gibb and Knowlton, *Resurgent Years*, 537; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 513.
- 45 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 456; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 354.
- 46 Reader, *ICI*, II, 163-164.
- 47 Spitz, *Petrochemicals*, 33.
- 48 Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 348-9; Spitz, *Petrochemicals*, 35, 37.
- 49 SHA 49/180-2, Kessler to De Kok, 16 June 1930.
- 50 SHA 49/180, Kessler to De Kok, 25 August 1927. Quoted in Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 456-7.
- 51 Underlining his conviction that research and chemicals needed to be exempted from short-term considerations, Kessler wrote to De Kok in August 1930 emphasizing that the spending cuts then introduced by Bataafsche should not harm these functions unduly, whereupon

- De Kok assured him that he would keep this in mind: SHA 8/960, Kessler to De Kok, 21 August 1930; De Kok to Kessler, 23 August 1930.
- 52 Quoted in Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 458.
- 53 Ibid., 460, 464, 472; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 351-355; Schweppe, *Research aan het IJ*, 32-37. SHA 190Y/1038, brochure Intellectual Property Services 1917-97; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 507. In its first twenty years of existence, Shell Development spent only 1.4 per cent of its total expenses of \$64.6 million on acquiring patents: SHA 2/80, Highlights Shell Development Company, 1928-48. Kessler was keen to keep the Amsterdam laboratory a Bataafsche department, and not turn it into a separate company, fearing that this would become too isolated from business considerations: SHA 49/180-1, Kessler to S. A. Guest, 30 September 1925. Guest, employed by Astra, had advocated intensifying Group research efforts in three long letters to Kessler, emphasizing the need to have the research organization separate from the managerial and executive organization.
- 54 SHA 8/1869, organization patent department. By 1934 the department employed a staff of 26. See also 190Y/1038, brochure Intellectual Property Services 1917-97. On the initial considerations about patent management 49/178, general patent policy; it typically took two years before the overlaps with the patent activities of a London department were sorted out.
- 55 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 460, 464, 472; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 351-355; Schweppe, *Research aan het IJ*, 33-37. From 1928, research budgets were also scrutinized more closely by directors. In January 1928, neither De Kok nor Kessler knew exactly how much Bataafsche spent on the Amsterdam laboratory, but they soon made sure to know, and also how much the research had yielded in commercial benefits: SHA 49/180-2, Kessler to De Kok, 20 January 1928. SHA 190Y/1038, brochure Intellectual Property Services 1917-97; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 507. On pesticides SRTCA manuscript Duinmaijer and Groenveld chapter 1921-29, 3; SHA 49/79, Braybrook to the Amsterdam laboratory, 3 January 1940, 11/22, Asiatic to BIM, 18 April 1940 (Dutch version film on fruit protection). Shell sold insecticides in the US since the late 1920s: Beaton, *Enterprise*, 408.
- 56 SHA 49/180-1, Kessler to S. A. Guest, 30 September 1925.
- 57 SHA 49/151, 15/215 (Simplex and Research Agreements); 49/23-1, Van Eck to De Booy, 20 July 1938 for the gist of the agreement and the date of the first agreement. The agreement was signed in 1932 and deemed to have run from January 1st, 1929: Beaton, *Enterprise*, 547.
- 58 SHA 49/180-1, memo extension Group research work 5 April 1927, defining the separation of work between the US and Amsterdam as California to do the more technical research, and Amsterdam the semi-technical and scientific work. Shell Development was moulded on the examples of the Standard Oil Development Company, which Pyzel visited with the specific intention to get information about its organization. Pyzel probably also visited the General Motors research organization with the same intention. SHA Agenda's board BPM, 1939, separate table with research spending 1938 and budget 1939; Larson, Knowlton and Poppo, *New Horizons*, 174; SRTCA, manuscript Duinmaijer and Groenveld, 1929-40, 1 (staff in 1940); Beaton, *Enterprise*, 620 (staff Emeryville 1940); SHA 8/1869, patent department organization; SHA 49/180-1, correspondence on the siting and motives behind the setting up of Shell Development.
- 59 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 517-18, 531-3; Spitz, *Petrochemicals*, 85-6; SHA 2/80, Highlights Shell Development Company, 1928-48.
- 60 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 408.
- 61 SHA 15/152, De Kok to Kessler, 15 October 1931; 111/545, report February 1932; 111/655, report July 1932; board minutes BPM, memo 28 July 1954; Pradier, *Shell France*, 22-3, 90-8. Butagaz's signature blue bottle was later also successfully applied to Camping Gaz, a company selling canisters of gas and matching small stoves and lights to generations of Europeans holidaying in tents and caravans. URG had a 70 per cent stake in Camping Gaz.
- 62 The crucial importance of nitrogen fixation may be deduced from the recent estimate that almost half of the nitrogen atoms in the proteins of human bodies came at one time or another from an ammonia factory: *The Economist*, 24 December 2005, 27.
- 63 'I have joined the company to become a director, and that Guus would really have the same desire speaks for itself' ('Ik ben bij de Mij, om directeur te worden en dat Guus au fond hetzelfde verlangen zou koesteren spreekt vanzelf'), Dolph Kessler to Margot Kessler-De Lange, 30 January 1911, *Tussen moeder en zoon*, 219.
- 64 The Group did have a few other conspicuous cases in which members of the same family came to occupy prominent managerial positions, as with the Deterding brothers, the Engles in the London office and of course father and son Loudon. In order to avoid nepotism managers instituted a special vetting procedure for relatives of employees. In 1939 Godber issued a formal directive detailing this, but the ban on employing close relatives probably operated earlier than that. SHA 11/22, Memos Van Eck, folder no. 1, Godber to Engle and others, 6 July 1939.
- 65 De Vries, 'J. B. Kessler', 295.
- 66 SHA 190C/350, Survey of Group Russian interests by Kessler, 1916, p. 77; De Vries, 'J. B. Kessler', 296; reminiscences Kessler in *Olie*, June 1957, retirement in *Olie* July 1961, obituary in *De ingenieur* 84 (1972) A 1067. Dolph may have thought it better for his own career not to have his brother join the company, too: Dolph Kessler to Margot Kessler-De Lange, 15 January 1910, published in *Tussen moeder en zoon*, 175, also referring to Deterding's categorical statement that he did not want Guus in the company, repeated in a letter of 30 January 1911, *ibid.* 218.
- 67 Cf. R. A. Alkmaar, De Lange papers, no inventory numbers available at the time of writing, Dolph's diary entry for 12 December 1914. Guus Kessler had married Anna Françoise Stoop, daughter of Adriaan Stoop's eldest brother François, the senior partner in the family banking firm. SHA 5/335, Colijn to Deterding, 24 April 1915, about Kessler's intended position with the Residu Gas Maatschappij. Lane considered Dolph himself to blame for his failing to achieve his aims: NA CAMT 132 AQ 162, correspondence 1915, Lane to Weill,

- 8 April 1915.
- 68 SHA 190D/637/2, Deterding to Colijn, 10 February 1916 (employing Kessler if possible, 'if only out of respect to his father'); Colijn to Deterding, 16 February 1916.
- 69 SHA 190C/52, memo 21 September 1927, outlining the basic agreement between BPM and Hoogovens.
- 70 In 1932 BPM technical staff carefully considered switching to the Haber-Bosch process, only to reject it. Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 503-7.
- 71 De Vries, *Hoogovens*, 322-3. De Vries' reference to the Mekog proposal being discussed in the board of the Royal Dutch-Shell Group is erroneous, since of course no such organ existed. The proposal will have been discussed in the Bataafsche board, but the minutes for the later 1920s are missing, so we have not been able to ascertain why some board members opposed the proposals. However, even De Kok was initially sceptical about the venture: SHA 49/180, De Kok to Kessler, 24 August 1927. The Hoogovens board held out to get a higher profit share, which rendered their gas supply very profitable indeed. Mekog paid Hoogovens the market price at which the gas was sold to municipal gas companies, but used only 40 per cent of its calorific value. After extracting the hydrogen Mekog returned the gas to Hoogovens, which could then sell again the remaining 60 per cent calorific value still present. This proved to be so profitable that at one point managers wanted to expand the coking plant and iron foundry simply because the offgases yielded such good revenues. Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 504; Dankers and Verheul, *Hoogovens*, 48.
- 72 SHA 8/1682; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 352; De Vries, *Hoogovens*, 323-5.
- 73 Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 504-5; De Vries, *Hoogovens*, 323-5.
- 74 To his dismay, Pyzel did not become president of Shell Chemical, presumably because he was thought to lack the administrative qualities required: SHA 15/59, correspondence Pyzel; SHA 15/215, Godber to De Kok, 4 December 1930; SHA 49/180-2, memo discussions Kessler, Gallagher, and Pyzel about the nitrogen fixation plant, 2 November 1928; id. about the setting up of Shell Chemical, 13 November 1928.
- 75 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 522.
- 76 Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 352-3; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 522; Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 515-6. By 1934, the Pyzels' family affair had become irksome to Godber, who no longer wanted them to work together: SHA 15/236, Godber to De Kok, 11 May 1934.
- 77 Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New Horizons*, 156-7.
- 78 SHA 49/150, a comprehensive file on the hydrogenation negotiations; SHA 15/59, Deterding to De Kok, 19 October 1929 (IGF as wolf); Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 353.
- 79 SHA minutes BPM 2 May 1930, giving the outlines of the deal; on the negotiations and detailed cost calculations about the deal SHA 49/150; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 353. By 1931, ICI had spent about 1.25 million pounds, or 3.6 million dollars, on hydrogenation research, yet the Billingham plant was nowhere being finished: Reader, *ICI*, II, 175.
- 80 Bamberg, *BP*, II, 180; Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Van carbo- naar petrochemie', 353.
- 81 Cf. Hayes, *Industry and Ideology*, 38.
- 82 SHA 11/1904, memo BPM commercial patent policy, 14 February 1936.
- 83 SHA BPM minutes, 9 January, 29 August 1930 (first details of the UOP deal). The Group appears to have hesitated about the UOP deal in April 1930, thinking that Jersey had a better process which would make Dubbs obsolete, cf. SLA 119/3/7, minutes Anglo-Saxon, 16 April 1930. Beaton, *Enterprise*, 256-8, 570-3; Hengstebeck, *Petroleum processing*, 148-9. The weakness of patents was also demonstrated when the Soviet government approached UOP for a Dubbs licence, presumably during the 1920s. As a UOP shareholder, the Group opposed this as a matter of principle, so the Russians simply built and used Dubbs installations without paying royalties. The question resurfaced in 1937, when UOP negotiated with the Soviet government over a licence to an unspecified cracking process. By then the Group agreed that UOP might as well make some money since the Russians would use the process anyway. SHA 15/4, correspondence Godber; SHA 15/302 on the negotiations with Soviet Russia about taking part in IHP. For the competition between UOP and Kellogg, SHA 49/46. On the cat cracking pool SHA 11/21-2, Larson/Knowlton/Popple, *New Horizons*, 166-169, Bamberg, *BP* II, 194-195.
- 84 SHA 15/302, memo IHP, 10 August 1935; Country Volumes Italy, vol. 2, ANIC to IHP, 28 March 1936, memo on patent position IHP, 20 June 1936.
- 85 The most modern process for coal hydrogenation is claimed to be economically viable if crude prices are 25 dollars a barrel or more: 'Steenkoololie', *NRC-Handelsblad*, 11 September 2005. During most of the 1920s and 1930s, crude prices ranged between one and two dollars a barrel, with lows of 65 cents.
- 86 Reader, *ICI*, II, 170-181. The Group presented a memo to the British Government arguing against subsidizing coal hydrogenation on the grounds of exorbitant costs and subsequently refused to take a part in it: SHA 15/302, Corbett to De Kok, 5 December 1932, Van Eck to Wilkinson (New York), telegram 18 February 1937.
- 87 SHA 11/24, Van Embden to De Booy, 28 December 1939. Japan had probably acquired the Fischer-Tropsch patents in 1937: SHA 11/21, Department AGT/AMN to Van Eck, 9 June 1937.
- 88 Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 139, 152-3.
- 89 190C/251, memo Forbes 'Smeerolie-bedrijf', 23-5; Forbes and O'Beirne, *Technical Development*, 417.
- 90 SHA 190C/34A, Forbes, 'Benzine', 18, 20-2; SLA 119/11/26 board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 29 June 1938; SHA 49/861-13 (Ploesti); SHA 10/617, memo May 1938 on the services provided by the BPM. By 1945, Shell Oil had a reforming capacity of 9 million barrels a year on a total gasoline output of 51 million barrels: Annual Report 1945, 10.
- 91 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 534-5, 564-8. Bataafsche wrote to the London Aviation Department in August 1934 asking whether it would be a good idea to make a new aircraft fuel with it for demanding customers such as KLM, in which case Shell Chemical could increase its production of iso-octane: SHA 49/74-3, Bataafsche to London, 6 August 1934. SHA 49/69 (comprehensive file on polymerization). The Stanlow plant was

- partly built because the British Air Ministry did not want to be dependent on supplies from the Continent in case of war: SLA SC7/92/10/2 Vol. 2, Godber to De Kok, 4 January 1937, memo Hill to Godber, 31 December 1936. SHA 10/607, memo 10 July 1935 (proposal to set up the Pernis iso-octane plant), 11/24, memo CI department July 1939 (Pernis investment and profits). The original proposal had estimated the pay-back time at four years.
- 92 SHA 15/180, Brylinski to Kessler, 2 October 1936; 11/21-1, minutes meeting 17 March 1938; 11/21-2, Riedemann to Godber, 16 June 1938, Godber to Riedemann, 17 June 1938, Kessler to De Booy, 6 March 1939.
- 93 SHA 49/74, Aviation Department to Bataafsche, 12 May 1936.
- 94 Schweppe, *Research aan het IJ*, 65; Bamberg, *BP*, II, 204. Bataafsche's application was dated 16 July; Anglo-Iranian's 29 July.
- 95 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 592 (butadiene); SHA 49/24 (contract with IGF); 49/79 (complete file on ester salts and the negotiations with IGF); 10/617, memo May 1938 on the organization of The Hague central office (products to be made from slack wax); SLA 119/11/25, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 21 December 1937 on the building of the Stanlow Teepol plant; 119/11/26, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 3 August 1938 (Stanlow Teepol plant). On the development of Teepol: Van der Most et al., 'Synthetische producten', 367-86.
- 96 Gerretson, *Geschiedenis*, III, 253-4. In 1902, Shell used the Rising Sun brand for kerosene in Asia, except for Japan, where the company sold it under the Horse and Anchor brand: AN CAMT 132 AQ 154, Deterding to Bnito, 24 December 1902. These brands may, of course, have been used alongside others, such as the Fish brand current in Singapore in 1922: Moey, *Shell Endeavour*, 33.
- 97 SLA 120/35/5, minutes executive committee Asiatic, 5 April 1907, 'It was decided to ask the "Shell" Co. to register the "Shell" brand in all countries of Europe and the East, and to confer upon the Asiatic the right to use the same'.
- 98 SLA 120/35/5, minutes executive committee Asiatic, 20 February 1907, registration in France and in Italy; 29 July 1907 (Belgium); 30 January 1908 (UK); 15 September 1908 (Germany); 1 October 1908 (Hong Kong and East Africa); 15 November 1908 (Denmark); 12 January 1912 (Jamaica). The pecten was first registered in the United States in 1909 for gasoline and extended in 1914 to cover a range of oil products: Shell Oil Houston Documents Room, legal memorandum by James J. Mullen, 'Shell Oil Company/Scallop Corporation Trademark Matter: Use of the Pecten Symbol', 3 September 1980.
- 99 SLA 119/11/3, 4/5, 78/2, board memos Anglo Saxon, 14 September 1918.
- 100 AN CAMT 132 AQ 198 folder correspondence 1908, Marcus Samuel to Lane, 27 November 1908.
- 101 Henriques, *Samuel*, 479.
- 102 Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering*, 577.
- 103 Montgomery, *Down Many a Road* 18-19; the Irish branch of the General Petroleum Company for example published its first ads in the *Irish Motor Magazine* for April 1906.
- 104 Montgomery, *Down Many a Road*, 22.
- 105 Howarth, *Century* 83, 87; *Shell News*, May 1952, 9; Murray, *Go Well*, 33.
- 106 Howarth, *Century*, 103.
- 107 Montgomery, *Down Many a Road*, 26 mentions three gasoline grades and their prices in 1914: Shell, Shell II (slightly cheaper) and Crown (the cheapest); Gabriëls, *Koninklijke Olie*, endflaps, for advertising of candles, vaseline, and turpene.
- 108 However, as late as 1922 Asiatic in Singapore still sold kerosene under the Fish brand: Moey, *Shell Endeavour*, 33.
- 109 Cf. the plate in Gabriëls, *Koninklijke Olie* on the endflaps.
- 110 BIM also moved its head office from Rotterdam to The Hague, in the vicinity of the central office there. De Goey, 'Deterding', 71-73; SHA, *De Bron* 1931, 90, six years ago: 'den naam "Autoline" vervangen door "Shell" (...) 'In een mum van tijd was Shell erin', 'gele pompen', 'gele Shell reclame borden', 'Shell zag men overal'. Apparently the corporate style was then not yet a uniform template covering all aspects of the organization. When in 1926 Anglo-Saxon voted a budget to buy cars for the regional marketing inspectors in the Netherlands, the board decided that the cars 'should all be painted the same distinctive colour, preferably red, similar to the inspectors' cars of Shell-Mex Ltd', SLA 119/3/6, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 3 November 1926. The network overhaul and the introduction of the Shell brand in the Netherlands probably coincided with a similar operation in Germany, where until then Rhenania had sold gasoline under the Stellin brand: Flieger, *Gelben Muschel*, 98-9, 120-3.
- 111 See Chapter 1 for the efforts to mask Royal Dutch involvement with Rhenania. The Californian company was initially called American Gasoline Company and would have had a Shell name but for the fact that a Shell Petroleum Company already existed there, run by two Shell brothers: Beaton, *Enterprise*, 64-5. However, Deterding expressly wanted the Midwest operations not to have associations with the rest of the Group, giving Mark Abrahams free rein to choose a name: SHA 195/33-3, Gulbenkian to Deterding, 23 January 1917.
- 112 See the charts in Gerretson, *History*, III., facing 288, and IV, facing 174.
- 113 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 348.
- 114 SHA 8/204-2, Deterding to Kessler, 28 April 1925.
- 115 SHA 8/204-2, De Kok to Kessler, 6 August 1928.
- 116 The list of operating companies in Bank of England Archives G1/482. We have added Rhenania, omitted from the list as an enemy company, to the count. Cf. Howarth, *Century*, 248.
- 117 Gibb/Knowlton, *Resurgent years*, 494-5. At the time of writing Jersey Standard's successor company Exxon Mobil still did not have a single brand for gasoline, service stations in the US selling Exxon, whereas those in Europe continue to sell Esso.
- 118 SHA 49/74-2, Dooijewaard to Caland, 19 February 1932.
- 119 Beaton, *Enterprise* 77-8.
- 120 SHA 190C/370, Memo 'Information received from Mr. D. Pyzel about the Shell colours and trade mark' 12 November 1956. The Californian organization was also credited for developing the yellow Shell flag with a red pecten, probably first used on service stations in 1915.
- 121 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 792.
- 122 *Ibid.*, 273-4.
- 123 *Ibid.*, 275.
- 124 Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC), *Control of the Petroleum Industry by Major Oil Companies* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), 57

- 125 TNEC, *Control*, 50
- 126 Beaton, *Enterprise* 283.
- 127 SLA 119/11/17, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 20 March 1928. The same was true for Germany, where after the currency stabilization of November 1923 Jersey began expanding its service station network, followed by the Group: Flieger, *Gelben Muschel*, 98-9.
- 128 SLA 119/11/18, Anglo-Saxon board memos, memo 24 October 1928.
- 129 SLA 119/11/17, Anglo-Saxon board memos, memo 28 March 1928.
- 130 *De Bron* 1931, 90.
- 131 SHA 10/523-1, De Jongh to Rhenania-Ossag, 5 and 14 November 1932. Bataafsche managers in the Dutch East Indies received instructions to fly the Shell flag side by side with the Royal Dutch flag: Wouters, *Shell Tankers*, 85
- 132 See *Shell Magazine*, July 1934, 313-4, explaining the philosophy behind the posters in detail.
- 133 Montgomery, *Down many a road*, 224-8.
- 134 On marketing campaigns in Germany see Gries, 'Geistige Landnahme'.
- 135 In 1983 the Barbican Art gallery organized a retrospective featuring some of the best specimens, a tribute to both the company which commissioned the posters and the artists who designed them.
- 136 Beaton, *Enterprise*, opposite 305.
- 137 Hillier, *New Fame*, 66-73.
- 138 Gabriëls, *Koninklijke Olie*, 81 (first film commissioned 1924); *Olie* 1965 No. 6, 169-241 (documentary films); Howarth, *Century*, 168.
- 139 SHA 11/22-1, Darch to Van Eck (programme Film Unit).
- 140 Klemperer, *Zeugnis*, 25 April, p. 345; Klemperer refers as well to the maps and guide books which formed part of the same campaign. Cf. Gries, 'Geistige Landnahme' for a discussion of the campaign and the Shell marketing strategy in Germany. The German Aral company also used film to promote its gasoline; a few months earlier Klemperer had watched one of their films: *Zeugnis*, 24 November 1936, p. 321. As early as 1932, Asiatic contemplated making films on general themes to which local material would be added to increase their appeal in the countries where the films would be used: SHA 10/523-1, Asiatic to Rhenania-Ossag, 18 June 1932.
- 141 SHA 11/22-1, Godber to A. E. Moore, 29 December 1938.
- 142 SHA 11/22-1, Asiatic to BIM, 18 April 1940.
- 143 SLA 119/3/8, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 18 September 1929 (aviation departments in Japan, South Africa, and India, each with a light aircraft); Beaton, *Enterprise*, 404-5.
- 144 SHA board minutes Bataafsche, 15 September 1920, 9 February 1922; like Royal Dutch, the airline had also obtained the royal warrant from its inception, though this time without a court intrigue.
- 145 Dierikx, *Blauw*, 41-5; Dierikx, *Begrensde*, 80-100.
- 146 SLA SC7/92/10/2 Vol. 2, memo Aviation Department 18 February 1938.
- 147 SHA 49/74-1, Plesman to De Kok, 25 September 1928.
- 148 SHA 49/74-1, Hill to De Kok, 29 February and 3 May 1928, note Hill for Deterding, May 1929; 49/74-2, Hill to Bataafsche Surabaya, 3 April 1933, KLM to BIM, 19 October 1933, Gould to Godber, 6 June 1934.
- 149 SHA 49/74-1, Hill to De Kok, 2 and 10 April, 3 May 1928; Asiatic to KLM, 30 January 1929; 49/74-2, memo Hill for Deterding, May 1929; memo Delft for BPM, 19 and 21 October 1931; Bataafsche to Aviation Department, 20 March 1933; Dooijewaard to Caland, 1 April 1933; Hill to Bataafsche Surabaya, 3 April 1933; 49/74-3, Aviation Department to Caland, 8 March 1934; Bataafsche to laboratory Amsterdam, 13 April 1934; Delft to Bataafsche, 26 April 1935; 10/503-6 and -7, Sandkuyl to Bataafsche The Hague, 27 May and 7 August 1937 (discount of 25 per cent on KLM tickets).
- 150 London marketing was not entirely convinced of the need for publication, commenting in March 1928 that 'It is necessary for sales people to be able to exercise a certain amount of bluff and they can do so best if they have not too much exact information as to possible effects of ingredients in the asphalt', quoted in SHA 190C/23A, paper Forbes, 'Asfaltbitumen', 6, 8.
- 151 SHA 190C/23A, paper Forbes, 'Asfaltbitumen', 16-17; *Petroleum handbook*, 366; Flieger, *Gelben Muschel*, 133-4.
- 152 SHA 190C/23A, paper Forbes, 'Asfaltbitumen', 32-3; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 474-5.
- 153 We are indebted to Jan Verloop for spelling these maxims out for us.

- 1 Quoted in Royal Dutch Annual Report 1929, 8-10; the full text in *Special Annual Meeting Bulletin* of the API, a copy in SHA 195/2. The 1928 Annual Report had already rehearsed most of these themes. In 1932 Cadman, the CEO of Anglo-Persian, touched on them as well in his API address: Yergin, *Prize*, 266.
- 2 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 315-6; Yergin, *Prize*, 267.
- 3 SHA BPM minutes, 7 March 1930 (price cuts); file 8/960 folder 1, Jacobson to managers, 3 and 17 July 1929.
- 4 SLA GHC/USA/D9/1/1, Corbett (London) to Fraser, (St Louis), 4 May 1934.
- 5 Yergin, *Prize*, 244-7, 265.
- 6 Royal Dutch Annual Report 1929, 16-7, and an article signed by Deterding in the *Daily Telegraph* 15 December 1930, quoted in Wouters, *Shell Tankers*, 76.
- 7 SHA 15/132, Deterding to De Kok, 3 May 1932, plus other correspondence and press cuttings on the matter.
- 8 De Vries, *Hoogovens*, 328; Beaton, *Enterprise*, 524.
- 9 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 524-525; SHA 15/45, Godber to Kessler, 1 February 1933. By 1939, Shell Chemical still had only a modest turnover of \$4 million, \$2.3 million in fertilizers and \$1.6 million in solvents: Bundesarchiv Berlin, Reichswirtschaftsministerium (BB RWM) R87-5951, Anhang 3, page 27.
- 10 Royal Dutch Annual Report for 1931, giving the exchange rate at which the loss was calculated as 8.485 guilders to the pound, whereas before the par rate had been 12.09. The amount of 288 million guilders represented twenty per cent of the company's total assets ultimo 1930. To limit its loss, Bataafsche split its London assets of £24 million into a loan account of £14 million at the devalued exchange rate and a £10 million sterling loan to Anglo-Saxon, which was valued at 12 guilders to the pound on the spurious grounds that this money had been invested in fixed assets which supposedly retained their original value: SHA 15/112, auditors' report on Bataafsche for 1931; 15/133-1, Van Wijk to Deterding, 30 July 1930, 15/133-2, memo Sterling loans Anglo-Saxon 4 December 1935; 15/134, correspondence on inter-Group financial relations.
- 11 SHA 15/227, minutes Bataafsche 14 May 1930; Agnew to De Kok, 19 May 1930.
- 12 SHA 190C/266, staff numbers at The Hague central office.
- 13 SLA 119/11/23, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo redevelopment Great St Helen's, 14 January 1931.
- 14 Wouters, *Shell Tankers*, 77. The initiative came from London; Deterding informed De Kok only after having informed London managers of the directors' decision, SHA 15/239, Deterding to De Kok, 13 August 1931.
- 15 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 362-3.
- 16 SHA 15/220, travel reports Godber.
- 17 Annual Reports Shell Union, 1929-31.
- 18 SHA monthly reports, 1930-31; BPM Annual Reports, 1931-32; Royal Dutch Annual Reports, 1931-32. The practice of selling equipment and hiring it back can be deduced from SHA 190A/116-1, cost comparisons Indonesia. The item does not appear not in 1929, but it does in the figures for 1937. Expenses in Indonesia dropped from 94 million guilders in 1929 to 30 million in 1936: SHA 190A/116/1. Comparative costs 1911-35 in SHA 10/445.
- 19 SHA 8/960-2, correspondence on the reactions to the redundancies.
- 20 SHA minutes BPM 2 May 1930; file 8/960, BPM The Hague to general manager Batavia, telegram 6 September 1930.
- 21 Royal Dutch Annual Reports 1929-33.
- 22 SHA 10/36, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> reports on efficiency measures at Curaçao; 15/3, Van Wijk to Agnew and Zulver, 7 June 1932; minutes BPM, 10 April 1930; Van Soest, *Olie*, 315, 323; Wouters, *Shell Tankers*, 77.
- 23 Wouters, *Shell Tankers*, 77.
- 24 SHA 190Y/863, Vijftig jaar Shell op Curaçao, 15.
- 25 SHA 12/177, memo Public Relations and Group staff, summer 1944.
- 26 Royal Dutch Annual Reports, 1931-38.
- 27 SHA 190A/123, to calculate their respective shares, parties had agreed on a sliding scale. With dividends of 0-25 per cent, the colonial government would get 60 per cent, the Group 40. Between 25 and 35 per cent, the split was 65:35; for 35 and 45 per cent, a 70:30 split; 45-55 per cent, 75:25; 55 per cent and above, 80:20. From 1928 to 1934 dividends ranged between 2 and 6 per cent overall. For 1935, it was 15.6 per cent (for the government) to 9.9 (for the Group); 1936: 40.8 to 24.0; 1937: 130.7 to 50.3; 1938: 132.3 to 50.9; 1939: 103 to 39.8; 1940: 125.8 to 48.4.
- 28 Wouters, *Shell Tankers*, 74.
- 29 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 364-9, 784-5.
- 30 SLA GHC/USA/D9/1/1-4, correspondence 1933-34.
- 31 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 426-36.
- 32 An accountant inspecting Pladju in 1922 asked for cost price figures and received the answer that these were not compiled at all by the Indonesian administrations: SHA 8/999-12, report of a visit to Pladju 9-17 October 1922.
- 33 Shell Oil Houston, interview Spaght, 17.
- 34 By way of speaking, Shell Union managers would say that the company marketed in 50 per cent of the geographical area, but reached 90 per cent of the people: Shell Oil Houston, interview Spaght, 17.
- 35 Beaton, *Enterprise*, 426-36, and the

- number of retail outlets on 792. After an inspection trip in 1939, Van Eck still considered the Shell Union companies as underperforming, notably in marketing: SHA 15/219, notes Van Eck 21 July 1939, and memorandum 4 July 1939. However, gasoline prices in California were much higher, pushing up profits there: BB RWM R87-5951, Anhang 3, 18.
- 36 The data in SHA 190A/116-1. Only Romania failed to supply data to the required template, but Astra did send in regular refinery cost price reports (cf. SHA 49/795), which shows the extent to which the organization failed to use the available data.
- 37 BB RWM R87-5950, p. 19; R87-5951, Anhang 2, 10. Exploration drilling in Indonesia was already reaching 3,000-3,400 metres. By contrast, the wells in Egypt were at 800-900 metres and those in Iraq only 500 metres.
- 38 Cf. SHA 10/503, correspondence general manager-The Hague, 1936-38.
- 39 For all coordination efforts, there was still no regular exchange of research results between the main installations in Indonesia as late as 1935: SHA 49/16, BPM The Hague to research managers Indonesia and Singapore, 2 November 1935. Despite repeated efforts, complaints about a lack of research co-ordination continued to surface for another two years.
- 40 SHA 8/1868, organization geological services, 1928-33, memo 27 January 1930; 12/177, memo Public Relations and Group staff, summer 1944. The scheme set up just prior to the Japanese invasion envisaged a two-year course, the top students then going to the US for further university and practical training.
- 41 SHA 190A/116-1.
- 42 *Petroleum Times*, 10 October 1931, 475-8; 12 March 1932, 279-83.
- 43 Quoted in Yergin, *Prize*, 265.
- 44 SHA 15/4, Godber to Airey, 23 November 1931.
- 45 SHA 15/4, Godber to Van der Woude, 18 March 1932.
- 46 Jersey had planned to have its foreign markets to be entirely supplied from foreign production, and no longer from US exports, by 1935: SHA 49/119, Airey (New York) to Agnew, 17 October 1934.
- 47 SHA 15/133-1, Engle to Van Wijk, 4 July 1927, for the Group's pattern of purchases in 1926.
- 48 SHA 15/4, Godber to Van der Woude, 28 April 1932.
- 49 SLA SC7/A22/22, Airey to Agnew, 23 February 1929.
- 50 SLA SC7/A22/22, Airey to De Kok, 22 November 1929.
- 51 SLA SC7/A22/22, De Kok to Airey, 25 November 1929.
- 52 SHA 10/388, Agnew to De Kok, 14 October 1932.
- 53 A copy of the draft agreement in SHA Country Volumes Spain Volume 1, with letter Godber to De Kok, 1 May 1934, and also in Italy Vol. 2. Cf. Bamberg, *BP II*, 115. Following this general agreement, the three companies appointed a special travelling team of auditors to carry out periodical checks on delivery figures against the As-Is agreement covering the market concerned: SHA 10/549, De Jongh to Rhenania-Ossag, 24 August 1934.
- 54 SHA 10/42 (As-Is Curaçao), 10/639 (Netherlands), 15/212 (Argentina), Country Volume Spain, Godber to de Kok, 1 May 1934 (As-Is agreement Spain), 10/454-2 (Dutch East Indies). On the fuel oil bunker discussions Kessler to Wilkinson, 27 October 1933, in SHA 10/454-2. Discussions with Socony Vacuum on an As-Is agreement in SHA 10/454-3, Wilkinson to Godber, 11 October 1934. SHA 15/200, minutes two-party discussions 14 August 1935 (procedure differences and Central Committee), one such three-party conference, about Yugoslavia, included Socony Vacuum rather than Anglo-Iranian: SHA 10/584, three party conference 25 April 1938; Bamberg, *BP II*, 114-15; Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New horizons*, 310-11. A special As-Is department at St Helen's Court monitored these agreements but, as with other departments, no records survive. The instruction from London to keep As-Is details secret meant that at least one area manager in the Dutch East Indies did not put the agreement there into practice, since he was not allowed to brief his local managers as to the purpose and intention of the agreement. Consequently, competition there continued unabated until, urged by complaints from the Jersey representative, London revised its instructions: SHA 10/454-2, memo 28 December 1932.
- 55 SHA 15/109 (formation of SMBP); Bamberg, *BP II*, 119, 129-30.
- 56 SHA 190C/34A, memo Forbes, 'Benzine', 17; Forbes does not mention a specific date for this agreement, but the context indicates that it must have been around 1932.
- 57 SLA 119/11/24, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 27 March 1934.
- 58 SHA 15/202, two-and three-party discussions; specifically on refineries in consumption countries, SHA 49/664, Fenwick to Sluyterman van Loo, 13 July 1935 (joint resistance with AIOC to Italian Government's wish for a refinery); 15/181; 10/581, Kessler to New York, 1 May 1935 (joint action successful in thwarting refinery plans in Japan, Denmark and Ireland) and 49/23, Kessler to De Kok, 12 September 1938.; cf. Bamberg, *BP II*, 115.
- 59 SHA 49/19, a comprehensive file about product swaps with Jersey Standard and the NKPM; 49/119, a thin file about specific exchanges with Jersey; 15/110, a proposed collaboration between the refineries on Curaçao and Aruba.
- 60 SHA 10/523-1, Rudeloff to De Kok, 13 September 1932, commenting that the new cartel agreement might just give the participating companies some peace until outsiders would come in once again.
- 61 SHA 15/114, De Kok to Kessler, 1 December 1933, with annex estimating Asiatic returns for 1933 in comparison to 1932 for asphalt, kerosene and gasoline.
- 62 Retail prices from Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, Mededeeling No. 148, Prijzen, indexcijfers en wisselkoersen op Java 1913-37, Batavia 1938.
- 63 SHA 15/114, annex to De Kok to Kessler, 1 December 1933. In July 1931, the general manager in the Dutch East Indies Sandkuyl asked Bataafsche in The Hague for comparative data on the Group's gasoline prices across Asia, so he could defend himself against the accusations that prices in Indonesia were higher than elsewhere. After conferring with Agnew, De Kok replied that he could not give him these figures and did not see the point of making comparisons anyway, since pricing policy involved so many factors which outsiders would misinterpret that it would be counterproductive to do so: SHA 10/454-1, Sandkuyl to De Kok, 21 July 1931, De Kok to Sandkuyl, 24 August 1931. Clearly De Kok preferred to leave his general manager in the dark as well about the extent to which the Indonesian

- market was exploited.
- 64 SHA 49/19-1, memo TL Department, 16 December 1935.
- 65 BB RWM R87-5950, 44-5.
- 66 Cf. Bamberg, *BP II*, 116-17.
- 67 Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New Horizons*, 313-14; Yergin, *Prize*, 268.
- 68 SHA 49/19-1, memo Godber 1 December 1937.
- 69 SLA 119/3/9, board minutes Anglo-Saxon, 2 January 1933, 3 January 1934.
- 70 Middlemiss, *Tankers*, 44-7. The new ships offered considerable fuel savings; fuel consumption of the Group's fleet averaged 14.1 tons of fuel a day in 1933, down from 19.47 tons in 1928, underlining the effect of the economy drive during the crisis: SLA 119/11/24, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo fuel consumption fleet, 14 February 1934.
- 71 SLA 119/11/23, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 14 January 1931, redevelopment Great St Helen's (quote); 119/11/24, memo 8 May 1936 (resumption redevelopment).
- 72 SLA 119/11/26, memos 1 and 7 June, 21 July, 10 and 30 August, 15 September, 24 and 31 October 1938, with nice coloured plans indicating the Group's premises and the properties bought.
- 73 BB RWM R87-5951, Anhang 1, 3, 17, 29, Anhang 2, 30, 60.
- 74 BB RWM R87-5951, Anhang 2, 19-22 for a good overview of the Pernis installations at the end of the 1930s.
- 75 *Van Rotterdam Charlois naar Rotterdam Pernis*, 26-33; Bank of England Archives (BEA) G1/482, memo 28 December 1942, Annex C (refining capacity). At 1.5 million tons, Pernis equalled Group refining capacity in Romania.
- 76 Van Soest, *Olie*, 358-361; BB RWM R87-5950, 28-30, R87-5951, Anhang 4, 56-7, 60.
- 77 Source for Table 7.1: SHA 15/133-1.
- 78 BB RWM R87-5951, Anhang 2, 25.
- 79 BB RWM R87-5950, 38-9.
- 80 BEA G1/482, memo 3 December 1942 on the Group's overall position, Annex D. Having been drafted during the war, the document omitted to mention Group sales in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, but Italy did appear in it, since the operations there had been sequestered in July 1940. For unknown reasons, sales in the US do not appear either. We have added sales in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia for 1938 found in Ministry of Finance, The Hague (MFH) GS 86, code 1.822.145.3, Bataafsche to Ministry of Finance, June 1945, annex, and taken Shell Union's production and crude purchases in 1939 from Beaton, *Enterprise* 784-5, as a rough gauge for US product sales, which results in a probable understatement. The marketing data figured in the 1942-43 discussions Bearsted, Godber and Legh-Jones had with Bank of England officials about efforts to change the ownership balance in the Group to 50:50, about which see Volume 2, Chapter 1.
- 81 SHA 15/151, memo London Area Management F, 17 August 1937, with documentation. Average profits for Jupiter over 1926-36 were 3.75 per cent, those for Rhenania-Ossag 1.65 per cent, this latter figure depressed by exceptional depreciations during 1935 and 1936 totalling RM 19 million.
- 82 SHA 49/664, Fenwick to Sluyterman van Loo, 13 July 1935 (joint resistance with APOC to Italian Government's wish for a refinery); 15/181; 10/581, Kessler to New York, 1 May 1935 (joint action successful in thwarting refinery plans in Japan, Denmark and Ireland) and 49/23, Kessler to De Kok, 12 September 1938.
- 83 BEA G1/482, memo 28 December 1942, annexes C (refining capacity) and D (volume sales), using crude supplies to Germany as proxy for refining capacity there.
- 84 SHA 11/22, Godber to Van Eck, 11 October 1939.
- 85 A typical example of the scepticism towards the state companies was a remark on the newly established Italian oil company AGIP, stating that 'the A.G.I.P., everyone admits, cannot last possibly more than a year', SLA 119/11/15, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo Fenwick 29 September 1926.
- 86 SHA Country Volumes Spain, vol. 2, s.v. Monopoly.
- 87 Ibid., s.v. Monopoly, cable from H. E. Bedford (Jersey Standard), 30 August 1927.
- 88 Ibid., s.v. Monopoly.
- 89 Correljé and Holman, 'Spaanse oliemonopolie'.
- 90 SHA, Country Volumes Spain, vol. 2, s.v. Monopoly, memo 13 June 1931 mentions that the total sum paid for the expropriation of the oil companies, 4.2 million pounds, 'was sent out of the country. This heavy drain was undoubtedly responsible for the starting of the slump of the peseta'.
- 91 SLA SC7/92/9/4, memo Fenwick to Godber, 30 November 1936. The Group continued to watch the Spanish market closely in order to follow where imports came from: SHA 10/726. Jersey and the Group applied the same policy of supply refusal when Japan imposed an oil monopoly in its puppet state of Manchukuo on the Chinese mainland in 1934: SHA 15/2, Dutch Colonial ministry to De Kok, 29 May 1935, 10/454-3, correspondence about the embargo, NA Kew FO371/2775/F9027, memo F. E. W. Barnett 6 September 1941.
- 92 SLA SC7/92/9/4, memo Fenwick for Godber, 30 November 1936.
- 93 SHA 8/1585, board minutes Bataafsche, 12 December 1929; SLA Boxes HR, Blair report 1959, 12-3; thus technically El Aguila was not a British company as Yergin, *Prize*, 275 has it. La Corona remained in existence as a shipping company.
- 94 BB RWM R87/5951, Anhang 5, 25; SLA GHC/Mex/C1-2, London to Van Hasselt, 3 September 1937.
- 95 SLA GHC/Mex/B2-1, memo 27 June 1938 on Mexican Eagle's financial performance.
- 96 SLA GHC/Mex/D35-2, memo 9 October 1934 for a catalogue of the grievances.
- 97 Van Vuurde, *Países Bajos*, 92.
- 98 SLA GHC/Mex/D35-1, memo J. D. Bowles to Godber, 6 September 1934; GHC/Mex/D35-2, memo Davidson, 25 September 1935; GHC/Mex/D36, an unsigned memo from December 1935 judging a suspension of exports jointly with Jersey Standard inadvisable as likely to incite violence.
- 99 SLA Boxes HR, Blair report 1959, 5, 12-3, mentioning Astra Romana as another company, apart from the Western European marketing companies, in which most of the senior posts were held by locals. As may be seen, El Aguila did not find itself in a crossfire between local management and London as Yergin, *Prize*, 274, describes on the basis of diplomatic gossip. Cf. Van Vuurde, *Países Bajos*, 91-2.
- 100 Van Vuurde, *Países Bajos*, 92-3, quoting an amount of 14 million pesos or \$3.9 million.
- 101 Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New Horizons*, 128-31; Yergin, *Prize*, 274-5.
- 102 SLA GHC/Mex/B2-1, memo 27 June 1938 on Mexican Eagle's financial performance.
- 103 SLA SC7/92/9/2 vol. 2, memo Godber



- about a telephone conversation with Van Hasselt, 17 August 1937.
- 104 SLA GHC/Mex/C1-2, Davidson and Van Hasselt to Godber, 22 December 1937.
- 105 SLA GHC/Mex/C1-2, Godber to De Booy, 22 December 1937.
- 106 SLA SC7/92/9/4, Godber to Van Hasselt, 24 May 1937 (provisional agreement 1936), Van Vuurde, *Países Bajos*, 95 (agreement 1937).
- 107 Deterding's outburst against the El Aguila general manager quoted in Yergin, *Prize*, 274, is conspicuous for being an exception. Following the nationalization, the Cowdray Estate and the Group commissioned the English novelist Evelyn Waugh to make a trip to Mexico with the object of writing a travel book telling 'the story of Mexico, politically, economically and, particularly, from the oil point of view'. Waugh travelled via New York to be briefed at Asiatic Corporation, all in the deepest secrecy to guard his cover. In 1939, he published his account under the title *Robbery under Law, the Mexican Object Lesson*, retitled for the US market to the less inflammatory *Mexico: An Object Lesson*. SLA SC7/92/10/4-4, Godber to Wilkinson, 20 July 1938; Brennan, 'Greene, Waugh, Mexico'.
- 108 SHA 10/581, Asiatic Ltd., London, to Asiatic Corporation New York, 12 September 1934.
- 109 SHA 12/525, Dubbs royalties (capacity La Spezia 1929); 190C/386, Group processing capacity in Europe, 1938; 10/581, management Italy, memo for the Italian government, 29 October 1934 (doubling cracking capacity).
- 110 SHA 10/51, De Graan (Group general manager Italy) to Fenwick (London), 9 October 1934.
- 111 SHA Country Volumes Italy, vol. 2, s.v. Anglo-Persian Agreement; Bamberg, *BPII*, 115-6; Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New Horizons*, 335-6.
- 112 SHA 10/581, Asiatic Ltd. to Asiatic Corp. New York, 12 September 1934 (Japan), Asiatic Ltd. to Asiatic Corp., 15 September 1934 (Argentina), Asiatic Corp. to Asiatic Ltd., 19 March 1935 (Japan), Kessler to Asiatic Corp., 1 May 1935 (Denmark, Ireland, Japan).
- 113 SHA 10/581, Asiatic Corp. to Asiatic Ltd., 13 September 1934.
- 114 SHA 10/581, Asiatic Ltd. to Asiatic Corp., 15 September 1934. The Group was not always so principled itself, however. During the summer of 1933 the Rhenania-Ossag manager Kruspig and Kessler had talks with German officials about the government's plans for expanding the refinery capacity in that country, much to the indignation of Jersey and APOC, who considered this a breach of the agreement to act jointly in this and other matters in Germany. Kessler defended his action by saying that he considered building refineries a lesser evil compared to the building of new coal hydrogenation plants: Bamberg, *BPII*, 131-2, Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 165-7.
- 115 SHA Country Volumes Italy, Vol. 2, s.v. SIO and ULL., for the acquisition of Gulf's fuel oil and lube oil businesses, in addition to SHA 10/581.
- 116 SHA 10/581, Asiatic Ltd. to Asiatic Corp., 15 March 1935.
- 117 SHA 10/581, Kessler to Asiatic Corp., 1 May 1935, Asiatic Corp. to Asiatic Ltd., 20 May 1935.
- 118 SHA 49/664, Fenwick to Sluyterman van Loo, 13 July 1935.
- 119 SHA 10/581, Asiatic Ltd. to Asiatic Corp., 15 August 1935, Asiatic Corp. to Asiatic Ltd., 20 August 1935.
- 120 This decision was probably reached around the middle of October, when Agnew and Bearsted were in New York for talks with Jersey: SHA 10/581, Asiatic Ltd. to Nafta Italiana, 17 October 1935, Godber to Agnew, 19 October 1935, Asiatic Corp. to Asiatic Ltd., 9 November 1935, Airey to Godber, 15 October, and 18 November 1935, Asiatic Ltd. to Asiatic Corp., 22 and 27 November 1935. Cf. Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New Horizons*, 336.
- 121 BEA C1/482, memo 3 December 1942 on the Group's overall position, Annex D. Jersey's volume rose by 47% between 1927 and 1938: Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New Horizons*, 324.
- 122 SLA SC7/92/9/4, memo Fenwick to Godber, 30 November 1936.
- 123 SLA SC7/92/9/4, Godber to R.W. Sellers, 4 December 1936, Godber to Riedemann, 7 December 1936; SC7/92/9/3, Godber to H.B. Heath Eves (APOC), 16 December 1936. In August 1937, however, the companies refused to supply 50,000 tons of aviation gasoline for reasons unknown: SLA SC7/92/9/2, H. E. Bedford (Jersey Standard) to Godber, 19 August 1937, Godber to Bedford, 20 August 1937.
- 124 BEA, C1/482, memo 28 December 1942, Annex D.
- 125 Larson, Knowlton and Popple, *New Horizons*, 339-40.
- 126 Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 165-6, referring to a row in the summer of 1933 about talks between Kessler and Kruspig and government officials about plans to expand German refinery capacity, which Jersey and APOC took as going behind their backs.
- 127 Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 191. The gasoline market share was actually slightly higher, if one takes into account the 6.3% share of Deutsche Gasolin, in which the Group had a 25 per cent stake, DAPG (25%) and IG Farben (50%) holding the rest. This company sold IG Farben's synthetic product.
- 128 SHA 15/151, memo Asiatic 30 July 1934.
- 129 SHA 15/151, financial data Rhenania-Ossag 1926-36. RM 190,000 equalled 112,700 guilders or £9,300; RM 2.4 million about 1.4 million guilders or £115,600; RM 40 million 23.7 million guilders or £2 million. Flieger, *Gelben Muschel*, 147, 149 (head office Hamburg).
- 130 Karlsch/Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 148.
- 131 SHA 15/151, financial data Rhenania-Ossag 1926-36.
- 132 SHA 15/151, De Kok to Kessler, 7 September 1931 (Minister of Finance Colijn agrees to 60:40 clearing split), memos De Jongh, 29 August and 4 September 1934 (German imports 2/3<sup>rd</sup> via Dutch-German clearing and 1/3<sup>rd</sup> Romanian-German clearing), Knoops to De Jongh, 5 September 1934 (shifting exports to Germany from Bataafsche to Asiatic) De Kok to Colijn, 4 February 1935 (doors for exporting to Germany). The relative ease with which the Group surmounted the currency problems contrasted sharply with the difficulties encountered by Anglo-Persian and its German subsidiary Olex, see Forbes, *Doing Business*, 150-2, 154-5.
- 133 SHA 15/151, Van Eck to Kessler, 29 July 1937.
- 134 SHA 49/47, Bataafsche to Proefstation Delft, 12 April 1937; SLA 119/11/27, board memos Anglo-Saxon, memo 19 April 1939 (58,000 tons lube oil imported from Rhenania); Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 179 (tariff 1935).
- 135 SHA 10/540, board minutes Bataafsche, 29 January 1937 (RM 5 million for syntholube plant Harburg), 8 September 1938 (RM 27 million for expanding lube oil

- production Grasbrook, Reisholz, Harburg); SHA 10/549, memo 4 January 1939 (technical advice from Amsterdam laboratory results in 50 per cent higher production at the Freital Voltol lube oil factory).
- 136 Middlemiss, *Tankers*, 132-8; BB RWM R 3101-15235, Abteilung Handels- und Devisenfragen, file Rhenania-Ossag, Tankers.
- 137 SHA 11/20, Van Eck to Deterding, 29 July 1937, Van Eck to Kruspig, 20 October 1938.
- 138 Barkai, *Boycott*, 13-32.
- 139 SHA 190D/803, (Rudeloff?) to Kessler, 1 March 1933 (bomb in Königberg), Rudeloff to Reichskanzlei, 30 March 1933 (Westphalian service stations), Rudeloff to Kessler, 3 April 1933 (works council demands), Rudeloff to Kessler, 4 April 1933 (immediate leave Franken), Franken to Rudeloff, 5 April 1933 (emigration). Rhenania-Ossag's Hamburg works council had been recently elected, all nine members now being Nazis.
- 140 SHA 190D/803, (Rudeloff?) to Kessler, 1 March 1933 (denial violence), Rudeloff to De Kok and to Deterding, 30 March 1933 (denials in foreign press), De Kok to Rudeloff, 3 April 1933 (denial published in *De Telegraaf*), Rudeloff to Deterding, 3 April 1933 (grateful to government for disciplined boycott). Deterding was against publishing the denials in the Group's house magazines, because these were not intended to serve political ends: Rudeloff to De Kok, 6 April 1933.
- 141 SHA 190D/803, Rudeloff to Kessler, 4 April 1933.
- 142 Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 161. The transfers would appear to have concerned a limited number of Jewish employees, for following the Nuremberg Laws in 1935 the Rhenania-Ossag board appointed a commission to deal with 'special staff problems', presumably referring to a perceived need to dismiss or transfer other Jewish staff.
- 143 SHA 10/525, Rudeloff to Kessler, 30 June 1933 (overhaul necessary for the future, third member not immediately necessary), Rudeloff to Hogrewe, 30 June 1933 (resignations Stern, Sonneborn, Hogrewe, De Jongh, Knoops), Rudeloff to Knoops, 7 July 1933 (resignation); Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 161. In 1937, there appears to have been pressure on the Dutch employees at Rhenania-Ossag to leave, Kruspig assuring Van Eck that he would protect their interests: SHA 10/552, Van Eck to De Booy, 22 March 1937.
- 144 James, *Nazi Dictatorship*, 40-7; Wubs, *Unilever*, 51-3. Cf. Turner, *General Motors*, 16-7, for General Motors in 1934 reforming the supervisory board of Opel to minimize the apparent foreign influence. On general questions of big business in Nazi Germany, see Nicosia and Hener, *Business and History*, and Kobrak, *European Business*.
- 145 Such a fundamental matter would have been debated at the Bataafsche board, which concerned itself with the smallest details of Rhenania-Ossag's business, but the minutes for 1933 have not survived. SHA 10/525, Rudeloff to Kessler, 30 June 1933, suggests that Kessler demurred at the thoroughness of the overhaul, Rudeloff writing to him that this was necessary because of the expected *Gleichschaltung*, i.e. legislation barring Jews from holding directorships and imposing mandatory party members as directors on companies.
- 146 During the 1933 row about talks with German government over refinery capacity, a DAPG representative told his APOC counterpart that he considered the Group's position influenced by fanatical Nazis at Rhenania-Ossag: Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 166. Given the circumstances and the board changes then underway at Rhenania-Ossag, this uttering looks more like an angry outburst than a balanced assessment of the situation.
- 147 Cf. Overy, 'Transportation'.
- 148 SHA Country Files Germany vol. 3, s.v. shareholders.
- 149 SLA 119/11/24, board memos Anglo-Saxon, report Rhenania-Ossag sales January–October 1933.
- 150 Karlsch/Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 167-8, 180; SHA 15/151, memo Asiatic 30 July 1934, a copy of which also in NA Kew FO C5279. According to this memo the Group was initially in favour of this deal; we have been unable to ascertain why the other companies were against. See also Forbes, *Doing Business* 149-53; contrary to his suggestion, the demand for increased stocks came from the German government, and did not issue from a meeting between Deterding and a high official at the *Reichswirtschaftsamt*.
- 151 Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 168-9, 180-1.
- 152 SHA 10/541-2, Kessler to Van Wijk, 19, 23, and 25 September 1935, Van Wijk to Kessler, 21 and 24 September 1935.
- 153 SHA 15/302, memo Kruspig sent 29 October 1936. Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl* 193, describe the participation from the Group and Jersey Standard as motivated by a wish to find a suitable investment for surplus marks held by their German subsidiaries, but the wish to regain some control over the synthetic gasoline market would appear to have been a more powerful motive. Their suggestion that IG Farben dissimulated the true intent of the project by emphasizing that the plant would use residue and not coal is contradicted by Kruspig's memo, which mentions that it would use both.
- 154 SHA 15/302, memo Kruspig 29 October 1936. Van Eck's later protestations that the Group had only joined the project at the invitation of IG Farben and Jersey Standard would appear to be incorrect; Kruspig participated in the discussions almost from the start.
- 155 SHA 15/302, Kessler to De Kok, 2 November 1936.
- 156 SHA 11/21-1 and -2, memo 26 April 1937 (Italy), letter to Van Eck, 9 June 1937 (Japan), minutes meeting 17 March 1938, Riedemann to Godber, 16 and 20 June 1938, Godber to Riedemann, 17 June 1938, Van der Woude to London, 28 May 1938 (France), Homburg, Small and Vincken, 'Carbochemie', 354 (Netherlands). The latter ascribe the Group's reluctance to participate in hydrogenation plants to the disappointments with Bergius during the early 1920s, but the documents on such projects make it clear that the high cost was the prime motive.
- 157 SHA 15/302, Van Eck to Wilkinson, 18 February 1937, outlining the project. Throughout later negotiations Van Eck never missed an opportunity to emphasize that the Group had joined at the behest of others, which suggest that managers had finally agreed to it with the greatest reluctance; cf. correspondence in SHA 11/20.
- 158 SHA 15/151, Van Eck to Kessler, 29 July 1937, referring to the possibility that under the Four-Year Plan Rhenania-Ossag's sales would likely become restricted to lube oil and perhaps asphalt. BB RWM R87-5951, p. 41, R87-5953, Anhang 13 (gasoline sales Germany 1937-38).
- 159 SHA 15/302, Van Eck to Wilkinson, 18

- February 1937; Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 194. Delbrück Schickler & Co. represented the Group, Deutsche Länderbank AG Jersey Standard, and not the other way around, as Karlsch and Stokes write.
- 160 SHA 11/20, memo Van Eck, 2 February 1939 (precarious position), 13 February 1939 (true position); 11/21-2, Van Eck to Kruspig, 1 February 1939; BB RWM R3101-18238, memo 23 August 1938 (costs now estimated at RM 300 million); BB Deutsche Bank R 8119F-P170, P171, P 1759, copious documentation about the difficulties concerning the bonds.
- 161 SHA 11/20, Van Eck to De Kok, 18 April 1939, noting that since several months the credit of £330,000 was being paid back at a rate of £70,000 a month.
- 162 SHA 11/20, Van Eck to De Kok, 18 April 1939, 11/22, Van Eck to Godber, 9 December 1938; SLA GHC/Mex/B2-2, memo 3 November 1938. The Group and Jersey had earlier attempted, unsuccessfully, to prevent the imports from Mexico. DAPG was forced to process Mexican crude in the autumn of 1938.
- 163 BB RWM R 3101-18238, Von Heemskerck to Römer, 28 January 1939. Jersey Standard's manager Riedemann had warned Van Eck about the implications of the German joint-stock company law, but Van Eck had not wanted to believe him: *ibidem*, Riedemann to Van Eck, 25 January 1939, Van Eck to Riedemann, 27 January 1939. Officials had to use similar pressure on the majority of companies involved in the expansion of synthetic gasoline production: Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 199.
- 164 SHA 11/21-2, Van Eck to Von Heemskerck, 17 February 1939. In replying to Van Eck's capitulation, Von Heemskerck gave him a heavy hint that the Rhenania-Ossag board would have to be reinforced with German businessmen if the company were to avoid further trouble. Kruspig had meanwhile warned Van Eck that the Dutchmen working in senior management positions would have to be replaced by Germans as well for military reasons: SHA 10/525, Von Heemskerck to Van Eck, 21 March 1939, Van Eck to De Kok, 24 March 1939. The main target was probably I. J. F. Reydon, who as Rhenania-Ossag's technical manager must have been regarded by the Nazis as a security risk. Security reasons also seem to have led to a thorough reconsideration of the regular exchange of technical data, notably on lube oil: SHA 10/549, memo 12 December 1938. To avoid the need for consulting the Bataafsche board about the new commitments to Pölitz, Van Eck and De Booy contrived to have the money approved by the Anglo-Saxon board, as Group Treasurer, in the form of a loan by Rhenania-Ossag to Delbrück Schickler: SHA 11/21-2, De Booy to Van Eck, 21 October 1938, Van Eck to De Booy, 29 October 1938.
- 165 Karlsch and Stokes, *Faktor Öl*, 196; <http://www.police.pl/historiager.html> (forced labour camps).
- 166 Cf. for instance SHA 15/133, for Deterding's correspondence about Group finance dealings to counteract exchange rate fluctuations.
- 167 RA Alkmaar De Lange collection, Deterding to Kessler, 7 December 1930 (even setting the date of 1 July 1931 and prompting the Royal Dutch commissarissen to start preparations for his succession), Deterding to Kessler, 19 January 1933, Guépin to Kessler, 18 April 1935.
- 168 Yergin, *Prize*, 274 (outburst). Deterding's correspondence in SHA for the 1930s is nearly all of a private nature, i.e. concerning currency policy or general economic policy, and business letters from him on major issues are rare indeed.
- 169 SHA 195/101.
- 170 Griffiths, *Netherlands*, 35-6; Royal Dutch Annual Reports, 1932, 1933; Hendrix, *Deterding*, 262.
- 171 SHA 15/263, Deterding to Kessler, 26 December 1933; RA Alkmaar De Lange papers (no inventory numbers at time of writing), Deterding to Kessler, 27 June 1936; SHA 195/97-2, correspondence about currency matters during the summer of 1933; Langeveld, *Colijn*, II, 90, 111.
- 172 SHA 195/22-5, Deterding to Rudeloff, 23 April 1931; 195/22-6, *idem* 25 April 1932; 195/97-1, Deterding to Rudeloff, 14 March 1932.
- 173 The efforts of Hendrix in his Deterding biography to whitewash his evident sympathy for Nazism simply fail to convince. As a specimen of Deterding's convictions, see Naylor, *Oil man*, 114, where he confesses to a desire to shoot idlers on sight. Deterding used the term Fascist in a letter to W. M. Westerman, 10 April 1933, SHA 195/22-6. In 1942 an SS official in the Netherlands wrote a report on Deterding based on a conversation with W. Dijt, who had known Deterding well. According to the report, Deterding claimed to be a Fascist, but 'he never really succeeded in mastering the Nazi set of ideas and convictions (Gedankengut)', NIOD 77/801, letter to Rauter, 7 July 1942.
- 174 SHA 195/22-7, Deterding to Rudeloff, 4 February 1933, worth quoting for the remark '*Hitler & politics*. It looks as if after all the whole movement will do a lot of good, especially as it is directed against Communism'; *id.* 15 March 1933, with the radio lectures idea, commenting that these 'would certainly mean an enormous indirect support to Hitler's marvellous stand against Communism who is after all the first courageous public man to announce openly that he means to root out the Communists at any cost, being a menace to all civilisation as we understand it'. Rebuffed, Deterding then donated money to the Berlin Pergamon museum, to which he had made donations before: SHA 195/22-7, Deterding to Rudeloff, 27 March 1933. NIOD No. 207/FOSD 1584 382385/ 382457, also in BB Reichskanzlei R 43, No. II/1461, Reichskanzlei to Rudeloff, 23 March 1933, with memo 18 March 1933; Deterding to Craven, 15 November 1933, SHA 195/101-4 and quoted in Langeveld, *Colijn*, II, 126. In this letter, Deterding refers to Hitler and Mussolini as men who have 'done really a great deal to bring about the dawn of world understanding which I think has started today'. He does not refer to the visit in a letter to Craven dated 10 November, so the meeting presumably occurred between the 10th and the 15th.
- 175 SHA 195/97-2, Deterding to Leon, 2 May 1933, describing the meeting with Schacht at the German embassy in Paris; quoted in Hendrix, *Deterding*, 270.
- 176 Claims such as Wennekes, *Aartsvaders*, 366-7, that Deterding knew Rosenberg since 1921 and entertained him at his Norfolk home would appear to be untrue: cf SHA 195/97-5, Deterding to Rosenberg, 27 April 1934, referring to his gratitude in having just made Rosenberg's acquaintance. He did know Rosenberg's reputation, though; cf 195/97-1, Deterding to Rudeloff, 14 March 1932, commenting

- that 'the name Rosenberg is about the worst introduction for anything'.
- 177 NA Kew FO 371/18868, C6788. The London FO considered this man, Horst Obermüller, to be a 'well-known apologist of the Nazi regime and a promoter of Anglo-German friendship'.
- 178 Seraphim, *Tagebuch Rosenberg*, 38, 46, 139-40; Hendrix, *Deterding*, 282-3, 286.
- 179 Deterding to Groeninx, 14 July 1934, quoted in Langeveld, *Colijn* II, 126.
- 180 NIOD No. 207/FOSD 1584 382385/ 382457, also in BB Reichskanzlei R 43, No. II/1461, Reichskanzlei to Rudeloff, 23 March 1933, with memo 18 March 1933.
- 181 Hendrix, *Deterding* 282-3; NIOD, 77/801, letter to Rauter, 7 July 1942.
- 182 Quoted in Turner, *Big Business*, 271.
- 183 SHA 15/263, De Kok to Rothschilds, 4 and 14 September 1933; Rothschilds to De Kok, 11 September 1933; Deterding claimed that Gulbenkian, whom he accused of having led the bear raid on Royal Dutch two years before, was behind the loan proposal, SHA 195/97-3, Deterding to Serruys, 16 November 1933.
- 184 Cf. SHA 15/193, 190C/196.
- 185 SHA 15/263, Rothschilds to Deterding, 19 September 1933; Deterding to Rothschilds, 21 September 1933; to De Kok, Deterding contradicted his earlier letter, writing that at the time the Bnito had been a good deal for both parties: Deterding to De Kok, 21 September 1933.
- 186 SHA 15/263, Kessler to Robert de Rothschild, 24 October 1933; Robert de Rothschild to Kessler, 31 October 1933; Kessler to Deterding, 22 December 1933; Deterding to Kessler, 26 December 1933. By that time Deterding realized that he had better raise the matter at the Bataafsche board in January, of which no minutes survive. At the second interview, Baron Edmond had plainly told Kessler that he questioned Deterding's mental health; moreover, the Rothschilds could not condone his insults to France and his support for Hitler, however much they valued his achievements for the Group. CAMT Roubaix, 132 AQ 168, minutes meeting Edmond de Rothschild with Kessler, 19 December 1933.
- 187 Cf. RA Alkmaar, De Lange collection, Deterding to Kessler, 4 February 1925, 7 December 1930. The sharply anti-Semitic remarks attributed to Deterding in a Dutch Nazi periodical in November 1940 (quoted in De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, I, 394) appear to have been a fabrication: E. de Jong, 'Was Deterding antisemit?', in: *Haagse Post*, 7 March 1969. SHA 195/22-7, Deterding to Rudeloff, 27 March 1933, shows that Deterding did nurse a suspicion against Jews as being allegedly in such large numbers supporters of Communism. Deterding does not appear to have been interested in eugenics and racial theories. In December 1933, he turned down a request for support from a Dutch eugenics association: SHA 195/16.
- 188 SHA 195/22-7, Deterding to Rudeloff, 15 and 27 March 1933.
- 189 Cf. E. de Jong, 'Was Deterding antisemit?', in *Haagse Post*, 7 March 1969.
- 190 NIOD No. 207/FOSD 1584 382385/ 382457, also in BB Reichskanzlei R 43, No. II/1461, Reichskanzlei to Rudeloff, 23 March 1933, with memo 18 March 1933.
- 191 Earlier that year, De Kok had acted for Deterding in a similar way, sending cuttings from British newspapers downplaying the anti-Semitism in Hitler Germany to the editor of a Dutch right-wing newspaper with a view to getting them published: SHA 15/277, correspondence Deterding-De Kok, April-June 1933.
- 192 SHA 190B/21, Deterding to Kessler, 29 December 1938; SHA 15/132, Deterding to De Kok, 3 May 1932; Langeveld, *Colijn*, II, 176.
- 193 Langeveld, *Colijn*, II, 124-5.
- 194 However, Deterding did have a hand in the smear campaign against the naturalization of Mannheimer, and he probably also helped to engineer the intrigue to bring down Prime Minister Colijn, whose currency policy he hated, with allegations of an affair with a German woman: Hendrix, *Deterding*, 272-6; Langeveld, *Colijn*, II, 173, 181, 208.
- 195 Pool and Pool, *Who Financed Hitler?*, 322-3, for instance, give an uncritical survey of the rumours about loans, coming to the remarkable conclusion that 'With so many sources agreeing on the matter, there can be little doubt that Deterding financed Hitler. All that remains uncertain is the exact sum of money.' A similar line of reasoning in Wennekes, *Aartsvaders*, 366-7. Roberts, *Most Powerful Man* is a good compendium of Deterding rumours and stories. Richardi and Schumann, *Geheimakte*, 76, link Deterding more specifically to Röhm's SA. For a more judicious review of the evidence see Turner, *Big Business*, 270-1.
- 196 Cf. SHA 15/268, correspondence from 1931 explicitly rejecting the practical possibility of such a monopoly.
- 197 Deterding's rejection of them quoted in De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, I, 395; one donation of 1,000 guilders spotted as an exception by Langeveld, *Colijn*, II, 126.
- 198 De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, I, 273, 396-7, showing that De Kok also donated a small sum to the paper, but gave a far larger sum to a charity helping Protestant-Jewish refugees from Germany; SLA 119/11/23, memo Russian department 14 June 1932, about the support given to Dr. Edouard Luboff and his *Anglo-Russian News*. Deterding's sponsoring of the periodical *De Waag* may have been tied to his funding of a fledgling political movement in The Hague called the Rijksunie, Van der Boom, *The Hague*, 77-8. Deterding's annoyance with the Dutch press led him in 1935 to offer substantial financial support for setting up a new paper: E. de Jong, 'Was Deterding antisemit?', in *Haagse Post*, 7 March 1969.
- 199 NIOD No. 207/FOSD 1584 382385/ 382457, also in BB Reichskanzlei R 43, No. II/1461, Reichskanzlei to Rudeloff, 23 March 1933, with memo 18 March 1933.
- 200 Hirschfeld, *Herinneringen*, 92-5; a full discussion in Krips-Van der Laan, 'Plan Deterding'.
- 201 Turner, *Big Business*, 270-1.
- 202 Wennekes, *Aartsvaders*, 367, misquoting an entry in the Goebbels diaries and misdating this to 12 and 13 January 1936. The complete edition of the Goebbels diaries makes it patently clear that the entries are for 1937, not 1936, and deal with Deterding's swap with Dutch food generating RM 40 million for the Winterhilfswerk (written down by Goebbels as W.H.W., which Wennekes wrongly transcribes as Deterding's initials H.W.A.). Goebbels then mentions that RM 30 million of the RM 100 million total donated by the public to the Winterhilfswerk would be syphoned off for the Volkswagen factory: Fröhlich, *Tagebücher Goebbels*, 3/2: 325, 327. Thus technically some of Deterding's money went towards the factory, but as a result of misappropriation by the Nazi government, not because of Deterding's intention.
- 203 RA Alkmaar, De Lange collection, note

- Guépin 8 April 1936, quoting Deterding's optimism about Germany; SHA 10/541-2, Kessler to Van Wijk, 19 September 1935, Van Wijk to Kessler, 21 September 1935; SHA SHA 15/151, exports into Germany and France.
- 204 NA Kew FO 371/17769, C3591, Phipps to FO, 7 June 1934; C5177, minutes 31 July 1934.
- 205 The Romanian Chargé d'Affaires in London had enquired at the Foreign Office for confirmation of the story on 24 May: FO371/17769 C5177, minutes 17 July 1934. The French Embassy in Berlin had heard the story as well: FO371/17769 C4030, Phipps to Foreign Office, 20 June 1934. In both cases the quid pro quo was again rumoured to be a monopoly for the Group in Germany.
- 206 Seraphim, *Tagebuch Rosenberg*, 38, 46, 139-40.
- 207 SHA 15/151, exports into Germany and France.
- 208 There had been a discussion between Kessler and Deterding about limiting Rhenania's credit outstanding to £600,000 and, if necessary, to cut back supplies: RA Alkmaar De Lange collection, memo Guépin, 8 April 1936. Cf. SHA 190C/8, Rhenania-Ossag's outstanding debt to Asiatic of RM 1.6 million was expected to be cleared by September 1934, memo De Jongh discussions 29 August 1934. The limit was later lowered to £330,000 and in 1939 the Group had even decided to abolish the entire credit: SHA 11/20, Van Eck to De Kok, 18 April 1939.
- 209 NA Kew FO371/17769, C 5280, minute R. F. Wigram, 8 August 1934.
- 210 NA The Hague 2.21.095 De Jonge papers No. 25, De Kok to De Jonge, 23 December 1931.
- 211 NA Kew FO 371/18868, C6788, Faulkner to Vansittard, 30 September 1935.
- 212 RA Alkmaar, De Lange papers (no inventory numbers at the time of writing), Guépin to Kessler, Kessler to Agnew, Deterding, and Rudeloff, Deterding to Rudeloff, all 18 April 1935.
- 213 J. B. A. Kessler III, the son of J.B.A. Kessler Jr, to Stephen Howarth, 26 October 1998; RA Alkmaar De Lange papers (no inventory numbers at the time of writing), Guépin to Kessler and memo Guépin, 8 April 1936 (Rhenania correspondence).
- 214 RA Alkmaar, De Lange papers (no inventory numbers at the time of writing), Deterding to Kessler, 27 June 1936. Rumours that Deterding had intentions to settle in the Netherlands had excited one notary public sufficiently to enquire whether Deterding would not be interested in buying Soestdijk palace in Baarn, the late Queen Mother's residence which Queen Wilhelmina rarely used: SHA 195/16. The year before Deterding had bought his second Mecklenburg estate, Dobbin, from the Prince Consort's estate.
- 215 Sampson, *Seven Sisters*, 96, and Wennekes, *Aartsvaders*, 371-2, state that Deterding was forced to go, but they cite no evidence. Oral tradition from Loudon's son supports this: Dr. J. B. A. K. Kessler III to Stephen Howarth, 26 October 1998. However, Kessler puts the crucial meeting in September or October 1936, whereas Deterding had effectively withdrawn already in April.
- 216 SHA 195/2, Sandkuyl to Oppenheim, 27 October 1936; Adrian Corbett, a manager at the London office with a long career in the Group, was equally surprised: RA Alkmaar De Lange papers (no inventory numbers at the time of writing), Corbett to Kessler, 31 October 1936, a copy of which in SHA 190D/730.
- 217 NA The Hague 2.21.095, No. 55, De Jonge to Kessler, 9 January 1931, Kessler to De Jonge, 12 January 1931, De Jonge to Deterding, 14 February 1931, Loudon to De Jonge, 14 March 1931.
- 218 Corbett felt 'in his bones' that Deterding had played a trick: RA Alkmaar De Lange papers (no inventory numbers at the time of writing), Corbett to Kessler, 31 October 1936, a copy of which in SHA 190D/730.
- 219 In 1937, Godber and De Booy set up a scheme for a regular exchange between British trainees in The Hague and Dutch trainees in London with a view to having the latter then sent to the US, thus helping to break down this odd barrier: SLA SC7/92/9/2 Vol 2, 189/L, Godber to De Booy, 26 January 1937; SHA 49/23, Kessler to De Booy, 26 February 1937, Van Eck to De Booy, 26 February 1937. Schweppe, *Research aan het II*, 51.
- 220 RA Alkmaar De Lange collection, De Jonge, probably to Kessler, 9 January 1931; Kessler to De Jonge, 12 January 1931; De Jonge to Deterding, 14 February 1931.
- 221 SHA Royal Dutch board minutes, 8 October 1936.
- 222 For a rare exception see 119/3/9, minutes Anglo-Saxon 17 October 1934, spelling out a procedure for dealing with differences of opinion within the board.
- 223 SLA 119/3/7, Minutes Anglo-Saxon, 28 October 1936. The Bataafsche board already operated with proxies during the 1920s.
- 224 SHA 190B/21, Kessler to Collot d'Escury (NHM), 23 December 1938; Kessler to Deterding, 26 December 1938.
- 225 SHA 49/23, De Booy to Godber, 28 September 1938.
- 226 A full report in *De Bron*, 28 February 1939. The suggestion by Gilbert, *Churchill*, v, Companion Part 3, 1286, footnote 2, that Deterding committed suicide, is not supported by any evidence.
- 227 Wennekes, *Aartsvaders*, 372; De Jong, *Koninkrijk*, I, 273.
- 228 Hendrix, *Deterding*, 296 (newspaper article).
- 229 The bust in The Hague was apparently removed in 1945, and replaced by a plaque commemorating De Kok: information from Mr Pieter Folmer, and E. de Jong, 'Was Deterding antisemit?', in *Haagse Post*, 7 March 1969.
- 230 Deterding's death immediately sparked speculations about his estate and the possibility that Nazi Germany might get hold of his Royal Dutch shares and use them to take hold of the company. These rumours died down only when Colijn assured the British envoy in The Hague, Sir Neville Bland, about the preference shares construction which protected Royal Dutch against any takeover attempt: NA Kew FO371/23087. The Royal Dutch directors held these shares for the duration of their tenure, and consequently Deterding had lost his shares upon his resignation.