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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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3	ESSO EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION NIGERIA LIMITED, et al.,
5	Plaintiffs, New York, N.Y.
6	v. 14 Civ. 8445(WHP)
7	NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
8	Defendant.
9	x
10	February 17, 2017
11	10:45 a.m.
12	Before:
13	HON. WILLIAM H. PAULEY III,
14	District Judge
15	
16	APPEARANCES
17	(via telephone)
18	
19	FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER US LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs
20	BY: DAVID Y. LIVSHIZ ELLIOT FRIEDMAN
21	SHANNON M. LEITNER
22	CHAFFETZ LINDSEY LLP
23	Attorneys for Defendant BY: CECILIA FROELICH MOSS
24	ANDREAS A. FRISCHKNECHT JOSHUA D. ANDERS
25	

(In the robing room) 1 THE COURT: Good morning. This is District Judge 2 3 Pauley. You are on a speakerphone in my robing room and a court reporter is present, recording what's being said. 4 5 Would counsel for petitioner give his appearance. 6 MR. LIVSHIZ: Good morning, your Honor. David 7 Livshiz, from Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer U.S. LLP, for petitioners. With me are my colleagues Elliot Friedman and 8 9 Shannon Leitner. 10 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Livshiz. MR. LIVSHIZ: Good morning, your Honor. 11 12 THE COURT: Would counsel for the respondent give her 13 appearance. MS. MOSS: Good morning, your Honor. This is Cecilia 14 15 Moss, from Chaffetz Lindsey, for NNPC, and with me are my colleagues Andreas Frischknecht and J.D. Anders. 16 17 THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Moss. 18 I have received the parties' letters concerning the 19 discovery dispute, including one that came over the transom 20 very late last night. 21 Would one of you bring me up to speed as to whether 22 any agreements have been reached by the parties with respect to the issues presented in these letters? 23 24 MR. LIVSHIZ: Good morning, your Honor. David Livshiz

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for the petitioners.

No. Since our last letter last night, no agreements have been reached. We continue to be at an impasse in these three categories of documents.

THE COURT: Let me hear briefly first from you, Mr. Livshiz, with respect to the U.S.-based bank account documents.

MR. LIVSHIZ: Sure, your Honor.

Just it's been a while since we have been before you, so if I could take just a minute to set the table.

Petitioners have a relationship with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, which I will refer to as "NNPC." A dispute arose and was subject to arbitration, and an arbitral tribunal rendered a judgment in roughly the amount of 1.8 billion. Today that amount, with interest, your Honor, is about 2.5 billion. That judgment has been subject to litigation in Nigeria but, meanwhile, petitioners have brought this action here to confirm the arbitral award.

In 2015, when NNPC first appeared, it indicated its desire to make a dismissal motion, including on the basis of jurisdiction, and your Honor ordered jurisdictional discovery and set a briefing schedule.

Petitioners alleged four bases of jurisdiction, one of which, that the FSIA provides personal jurisdiction, is a purely legal matter, which your Honor will decide later on.

Of the remaining three, two concern the bank accounts

at issue, specifically, that Nigeria, NNPC, rather, has minimal contacts with the forum, including through its purposeful and intentional use of bank accounts, and that your Honor has *in* rem jurisdiction over the accounts at issue.

Specifically, your Honor, we are looking for five categories of information in connection with any account that NNPC either uses in the United States or in which it has an interest and, specifically, that information is:

The identification of accounts;

Account opening documents;

Information demonstrating which entity controls the account;

Information demonstrating who is the beneficial owner of the account; and

Any agreements concerning the account between NNPC and the Central Bank of Nigeria. And the reason for that particular request, your Honor, is, as we understand it, under Nigerian law, NNPC is only permitted to hold accounts outside of Nigeria if they are held by the Central Bank on behalf of NNPC.

And, finally, essentially bank account statements that would allow us to identify fund flows in and out of the account. We see this as a relatively narrow category of documents that should be easily identifiable and producible by NNPC and which is relevant to the petitioners' jurisdictional

theory.

As the Court of Appeals, New York Court of Appeals held in *Licci*, if there is intentional, purposeful direction of funds to a bank account, that can provide a basis for minimum contact. Here — and this is Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6 to the letter that we filed on February 10, your Honor — NNPC directs, when it sells its oil, including the oil that petitioners allege that NNPC improperly listed from the Erha oil field and which resulted in this dispute, those funds are directed to an account in the United States and we, accordingly, would like information concerning those accounts.

And, in addition, your Honor --

THE COURT: If I could interrupt for a moment,

Mr. Livshiz, though, as I understand it, NNPC claims that it

has provided information about these accounts in its

interrogatory responses; and, if that is true, what more does

Esso seek here?

MR. LIVSHIZ: Your Honor, so yesterday, for the first time, NNPC provided some information about a few accounts that petitioners have specifically identified. That information is not sufficient in the following way:

First of all, it is does not identify all of the accounts that NNPC potentially uses, including in connection with the Erha oil field.

Second of all, it does not identify the funds in the

account, which is relevant to your Honor's exercise of in remjurisdiction.

Third of all, the interrogatory responses, which were marked confidential, so we could not append them to our letter last night, assert essentially that NNPC has no interest in the account. But we are certainly entitled -- we would certainly like to test that.

In the Solgas Energy case, which also concerned

Nigerian documents and which we cited in our letter last night,
there was a similar situation where the government of Nigeria
asserted that it did not have control over the account, and the
court ordered production of documents, such as account control
and deposit control documents, that would provide that
information. None of that was included in the interrogatory
responses we received yesterday, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear briefly from NNPC on this issue relating to the U.S. bank accounts, and then we will turn to the Pricewaterhouse documents and the alter ego documents.

MS. MOSS: Thank you, your Honor.

I think, in response to what Mr. Mr. Livshiz said, I should just make a couple of points with respect to the overall dispute.

As your Honor may recall, the underlying arbitration was a dispute between Nigerian parties regarding a contract

that was subject to Nigerian law and related to the lifting of oil off of Nigerian water. The arbitration award has now been set aside, both by the Federal High Court of Nigeria and the Nigerian appellate court on the basis that the dispute was, at its essence, a tax dispute and not a contract dispute, and there is no question that the courts in Nigerian have the right to control tax disputes relating to Nigerian taxes and Nigerian law.

Our position with respect to the bank accounts, as your Honor pointed out, we have provided initial interrogatory responses, we have provided a declaration in support of our motion to dismiss, and we have provided supplemental interrogatory responses which outline what, if any, connection NNPC has with these bank accounts. Today is the first time, on this call, that I have heard petitioners ask for any specific categories of information relating to bank accounts. Instead, previously, we have heard requests for all documents relating to all bank accounts in the United States, which is clearly an improper request, particularly even under the cases that

With respect to the *Solgas* case, the *Solgas* case was a post-confirmation case, where the award had been confirmed. Here we have an award that's been set aside and *in rem* jurisdiction can't be based -- *in rem* jurisdiction, under *Shaffer v. Heitner*, that's the only way you get *in rem*

jurisdiction under that case is if a case court of competent jurisdiction has issued an award. Here, the courts of competent jurisdiction have set aside the award. So there is no basis for in rem jurisdiction and under the CME Media Enterprises case, which I think both parties cited in their letters, it is clear that in rem jurisdiction cannot be based on speculation about the possible existence of property.

What petitioners are seeking here is a fishing expedition into any possible connection with any possible bank accounts. It's far too broad a request, and there is no basis for that request at all.

And, importantly, with the verified interrogatory responses that NNPC provided yesterday, and NNPC has confirmed, that its sole authority with respect to the CBN bank account is to issue instructions to the Central Bank of Nigeria, to transfer from those accounts to accounts owned by or for the benefit of the government of the federation, the Nigerian government. NNPC has no authority whatsoever under Nigerian law to instruct the CBN to transfer funds from those accounts to any account in which NNPC has any legal ownership or property interest or to any other account that's not owned by or for the benefit of the government. So there —

THE COURT: But --

MS. MOSS: Go ahead. Sorry.

THE COURT: Here the discovery that's underway is

really narrowly focused to the issue of determining whether
jurisdiction is proper here in this court. I am having
difficulty, given the very purpose of this focused discovery,
which is jurisdictional, I am having difficulty understanding

NNPC's resistance to simply producing that account

6 information.

MS. MOSS: Well, your Honor, with respect to the question of jurisdiction, there is no argument in favor of general jurisdiction and there is no argument, in our opinion, in favor of specific jurisdiction. There is no connection between the underlying cause of action and the bank account. The cases that petitioners cite, there was a specific connection between the bank that were subject to discovery and the cause of action, because the cause of action in those cases arose out of the holdings or transfers in the bank account. Here, there is simply no connection to those bank accounts and there is no award, so there is no basis for in rem jurisdiction.

So I think that petitioners, in their second request for documents, ask about ten specific bank account -- 11, I'm corrected, 11 specific bank account numbers. We have explained, as I just explained to you, the relationship with two of those bank account numbers; and, with the other nine, NNPC has confirmed that it has no information, it has no connection and no information about those bank accounts in its

files.

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THE COURT: I guess here is where maybe you are losing me or I am not understanding:

Why are you making jurisdictional arguments when we are in a process at the moment that's designed to discover whether jurisdiction is proper? Shouldn't the argument you are making come after Esso has received the discovery that it believes it needs to weigh in on this issue?

MS. MOSS: Our position is they haven't made a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction here, and therefore we shouldn't have to provide more than we have already agreed to provide willingly and voluntarily.

THE COURT: All right. Let me --

MS. MOSS: And, quite frankly, I'm sorry, your Honor, if I might finish my sentence?

THE COURT: Yeah, I thought you had.

MS. MOSS: Yeah, I'm sorry.

I also wanted to add that, until today, as I said before, the requests were overly broad. The process of trying to search for every possible bank account number seemed unruly and unwieldy.

We have now heard something lightly more limited, and I wasn't able to jot it all down, but our concern was the extreme overbreadth of the request that we were trying to respond to.

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THE COURT: Right. I am thinking, listening to the two of you, that a further meet-and-confer on that issue might bear fruit.

I have another question, though, for you. When was the arbitral award vacated in Nigeria?

MS. MOSS: The award was vacated by the lower court prior to petitioners filing their petitioner here in the Southern District, and the appellate court affirmed the set-aside -- I am being handed -- the appellate court affirmed the set-aside decision of the monetary award on May 8, 2012. Is that right?

MR. LIVSHIZ: Your Honor, if I may just interject?

MS. MOSS: I think it's July -- so July 22, 2016, the

Court of Appeals affirmed the High Court set-aside decision

with respect to the monetary award.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Go ahead, Mr. Livshiz.

MR. LIVSHIZ: Your Honor, thank you.

If I may just interject, initially the Nigerian courts had set aside the award in May 2012; however, the Court of Appeals' judgment, which was rendered on July 22, 2016, reinstated the award's contractual findings, including that the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to determine whether NNPC breached its contractual obligation. It did uphold the lower court's decision that the tribunal should not have awarded

damages. But the award has partially been reinstated, your Honor. It is not a set-aside award as it has been characterized today.

MS. MOSS: I think I was clear, every time I referenced it, that the monetary -- the Court of Appeals affirmed the set-aside of the monetary award, and my understanding is that petitioners seek to enforce the monetary award here in the United States, which has been set aside, and that set-aside has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

THE COURT: Let me turn for a moment to the Pricewaterhouse documents.

Very briefly, Mr. Livshiz, I think understand your argument, but just very briefly state your position.

MR. LIVSHIZ: Absolutely. Thank you, your Honor.

The PWC audit was performed at the request of the government of Nigeria concerning NNPC -- concerning a number of issues, including NNPC's transfers of funds into the United States and the use of, among other things, U.S. bank accounts in the marketing of oil, including in the international markets.

This information is relevant to a number of petitioners' jurisdictional theories, including its contacts with the United States and also including the *in rem* jurisdiction. And, your Honor, the PWC report, which is

Exhibit 6, identifies, for example, on page 36, that NNPC provided PWC with documents sufficient to demonstrate transfers in and out of certain U.S. bank accounts. We think that that information is, again, narrowly tailored, and it should be easy to reproduce to petitioners here; and it is certainly relevant to our jurisdictional theories, and it is certainly proportional, given that it is a discrete set of information.

THE COURT: Ms. Moss, what do you mean when you say or write that the PWC audit documents cannot be recreated?

MS. MOSS: What I think I said is that we have not yet been able to determine whether there exists a set of documents that were provided to NNPC that were retained as a discrete set. We continue to investigate and try to figure out who at NNPC may have been responsible for providing some of those documents.

If you look at the last couple of pages of the PWC report, it indicate that is PWC received documents -- reviewed documents from a variety of different sources, some of which were not NNPC; and, so, whether NNPC has those documents is not clear to us, and we don't know -- it's not as if it was a litigation, where they Bates stamped documents and put together a production, as we in the United States might be familiar with.

We are trying to, you know, on the issue of whether --

petitioner has alleged there would be no burden because, of course, all of these documents were produced once before and could easily be produced again. We are investigating on the burden issue, whether that is the case, but our position is that, again, these documents are — this request is overbroad, and there is no connection between the cause of action and any documents related to potential bank accounts. But as I said, we continue to investigate what documents were actually provided by NNPC to PWC and where those documents are.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LIVSHIZ: Your Honor, may I respond briefly?

THE COURT: Very briefly, Mr. Livshiz.

MR. LIVSHIZ: Thank you, your Honor.

Just to specifically focus the request, we are not asking for documents produced to PWC by entities other than NNPC. We are asking for documents that NNPC produced, and that is the set of documents.

As for the fact that the documents — that this was not a litigation, respectfully, your Honor, this was an audit performed at the behest of the Nigerian government, and presumably NNPC took it as seriously as it would take a litigation.

THE COURT: All right. Let's turn to the third issue, the alter ego documents.

Briefly, Mr. Livshiz, do you want to be heard?

MR. LIVSHIZ: Yes, your Honor.

Very briefly, the allegation in the petition is that NNPC is the alter ego of Nigeria, and that is based on a number of things, including that the government of Nigeria dominates NNPC's discretion in the sense that it is effectively an alter ego. And one way in which that showing can be made, as demonstrated in the McKesson case, to the extent that NNPC is implementing a policy of the government, that would be sufficient to establish the control required to satisfy the test.

We are looking for documents, including -- we have shown in Exhibit 12, your Honor, that the very conduct that resulted in the arbitration was ordered by the President of Nigeria, and we are looking for documents to continue developing that theme.

NNPC's arguments to the contrary is based purely on the Banco National case in the Second Circuit, your Honor.

That case sets a standard, and it is essentially that we would need to show that the government controls NNPC. It is does not consider what would satisfy that standard. The D.C. Circuit did that in the McKesson case, which applies the same standard, just had a different way of establishing it, your Honor. And the documents that we seek would be essentially correspondence between NNPC and its various — the Nigerian government, including its Department of Petroleum Resources, concerning the

conduct -- the listing misconduct and the conduct in this litigation and arbitration, your Honor, where the various agencies of Nigeria have been acting as one at the direction of the Nigerian government.

THE COURT: Ms. Moss.

MS. MOSS: Thank you, your Honor.

With respect to the request for alter ego documents, first of all, the requests are far too broad. They have asked, not only for documents relating to NNPC's purported relationship with the government of Nigeria, but also all documents relating to its relationship with the Central Bank of Nigeria, FITR, which is the Federal Inland Tax Revenue, as well as another, so those are all three coequal instrumentalities of NNPC. They are not the Nigerian government.

But the bottom line is the facts alleged in the second amended petition, even if taken as true, do not establish a prima facie case for alter ego. The only one that might have was their allegation that the Nigerian government has some control over contracts with which NNPC entered into below a certain threshold. But their allegation is incorrect with respect to the threshold, and NNPC has the internal authority to enter into a host of day-to-day transactions in amounts up to \$20 million without the intervention of the Nigerian government.

The standard in the Second Circuit with respect alter

ego is whether the government exercises day—to—day control over the instrumentality. There are no allegations that suggest day—to—day control over the instrumentality, and their document requests are not at all tailored to solicit information with respect to day—to—day control. The alter ego allegation is an exceptional circumstance and would only establish that it would deprive NNPC of its due process rights. They just have not established a prima facie case of alter ego, and they have not narrowly tailored their request to get anywhere close to the Second Circuit standard of day—to—day control.

MR. LIVSHIZ: Your Honor, if I may respond very briefly?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. LIVSHIZ: As your Honor indicated when we were discussing bank accounts, the question at this point is not whether we will be able to establish jurisdiction but, in the standard in the Southern District, whether we have made a sufficient start. That's the *International Diamonds* case, 2016 WL 1717217. And we submit that our allegations do that, particularly in light of the exhibit that we have put in with our letter.

As to the standard in the Second Circuit in the Banco National case, the Second Circuit was not asked to opine, and did not opine, on whether jurisdiction would be -- on whether alter ego relationship would be found where the agency of a

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government was induced to implement a governmental policy. 1 finally, your Honor, it is a little bit of a cart before the 2 3 horse. How can we possibly show day-to-day control without getting the discovery that we are seeking? 4 5

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. LIVSHIZ: Discovery would establish that.

THE COURT: Look, in view of the discussion that we have had on these three issues, do the parties believe that another meet-and-confer might lead to narrowing the scope of the requests in resolving any of these three issues?

MS. MOSS: Your Honor --

MR. LIVSHIZ: Your Honor --

MS. MOSS: Go ahead.

MR. LIVSHIZ: Go ahead, Ms. Moss.

MS. MOSS: I was going to say that if petitioners were going to narrow their requests, we would certainly consider narrowed requests.

MR. LIVSHIZ: Your Honor, from petitioner's perspective we are certainly happy to meet and confer, but that presumes that NNPC is willing to budge off its flat no position that it has adopted until now. Otherwise the concern is -otherwise our concern is that, frankly, the bank account information we seek is already very narrow, and the time is running and we would like to keep the process moving.

That said, if NNPC is committed to considering moving

off the position of no without any other considerations, we would be happy to meet and confer.

THE COURT: Why don't you, in the next week or so, meet and confer and see, by the end of next week, whether you can resolve any of these issues.

My second question to both of you is whether, in view of your letters and the discussion that we have just had, either of you believe that further briefing or submissions are necessary on these issues?

Mr. Livshiz?

MR. LIVSHIZ: Your Honor, we are certainly happy to brief that issue further, but I think the position in our letters establishes it.

THE COURT: Ms. Moss?

MS. MOSS: Well, it is their motion, and so I think it is hard to respond to anything more than what they have said so far; and we think that if they narrow their requests, it would lead to some fruitful conversations and hopefully a resolution.

THE COURT: All I was asking is whether or not the parties want to submit further briefing. I am taking from the colloquy that the answer is largely no.

Why don't you see if you can meet and confer, as I have said, within the next week; and then, if you can and you have succeeded and there is still some issue that remains to be

resolved, why don't you send me a letter, a short letter, as to what that issue is by March 1, and then I will take this dispute and resolve it based upon what I have before me.

And, in that regard, I am going to direct the parties to make arrangements to obtain a copy of this transcript from the court reporter so that it can be docketed in the case.

Is there anything further at this time?

MR. LIVSHIZ: No, your Honor. Thank you.

Just one second. No, your Honor, nothing at the moment. No. Thank you very much.

We would like to say that, depending on how the meet-and-confer process goes, we would request the right to, in our March 1 letter, request additional briefing if that becomes necessary.

THE COURT: That's fine. That's fine. Anything further, Ms. Moss?

MS. MOSS: One thing that we wanted to mention, your Honor, is that the third-party subpoenas that petitioners have served on ten banks here in New York contain the same broad request for all documents relating to both NNPC and the other instrumentalities, and we find those requests to those banks to be overbroad on the same basis that we discussed today.

To the extent that we can reach an agreement on narrowing the document requests to NNPC, I would hope we could also reach an agreement with petitioners that they would narrow

their subpoenas. But we may, if petitioners are unwilling to do that, we may need to seek your assistance in quashing the subpoenas or at least narrowing their scope. THE COURT: I appreciate the heads up on that. Let's wait to see what develops. All right? MS. MOSS: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: I am going to live in hope that you reach an agreement in the next week. All right? Otherwise I will --MS. MOSS: Thank you, your Honor. MR. LIVSHIZ: Thank you. THE COURT: Otherwise I will decide the issue, because that's what judges do. All right? Thank you. COUNSEL: Thank you, your Honor.