In summary, and there was evidence in 1999 to support this to a degree, Finlayson (right) saw himself as a victim of a brutal regime run out of Seafield House where the TFA mode was born and his MD Malcolm Brinded who was frantically doing everything in his power to suppress all this because he was seen by the Audit to be the principal architect of the demise in standards throughout the oilfield.  Finlayson in my book was weak, and ineffective, promoted in my opinion into a position he wasn’t competent or willing to handle.

EMAIL SENT 21 OCT 2013 TO A THIRD PARTY BY BILL CAMPBELL, RETIRED HSE GROUP AUDITOR, SHELL INTERNATIONAL

Subject: Chris Finlayson

My dealings with Chris were a long time ago during an Audit in 1999.  This Audit uncovered remarkably bad behaviour in the then Shell Expro organisation stemming from the business drivers and messages coming from the top of the organisation.  I spent some hours in the presence of Aberdeen auditors trying to get Finlayson to retract his statements made to journalists and the BBC North reporter Colin Wight that the Touch F All concerns raised by workforce representatives were unwarranted whilst in fact the situation was worse, much worse than anyone outside the organisation could have envisaged.  Last December on his appointment as the BG Chief the Independent newspaper (Mark Leftly) run a article on Finlayson titled if I can remember BG Chief breached safety rules when he was at Shell.  Subsequently I wrote a couple of articles putting the meat on the bones of this which John Donovan published.  BG given the right to reply made no comment and to date have not requested the evidence to support although this was offered to them.
 
In summary, and there was evidence in 1999 to support this to a degree, Finlayson saw himself as a victim of a brutal regime run out of Seafield House where the TFA mode was born and his MD Malcolm Brinded who was frantically doing everything in his power to suppress all this because he was seen by the Audit to be the principal architect of the demise in standards throughout the oilfield.  Finlayson in my book was weak, and ineffective, promoted in my opinion into a position he wasn’t competent or willing to handle.
 
Finlayson however was the accountable person as Oil Director that position in the installation Safety Cases having prime responsibility for the health and safety of some 3000 staff offshore (taking into account both shifts so in terms of the potential loss of life this figure has to be taken for quantitative assessment of risk).  After the MD brought the Audit to a premature halt Brent Bravo in particular continued to operate at intolerable risk levels.  The Audit actions reluctantly accepted by Finlayson but not implemented leading inevitably to the deaths in 2003.
 
All that I can say in summary is that in allowing Brent Bravo in particular to continue in operation Finlayson demonstrated a callous disregard for his duty of care for the health and safety of employees, direct and indirect, offshore.
 
Shell appears to accept this given that raised no objections to the articles published recently to commemorate the deaths, the evidence supporting these articles can be provide to you if you think this would be helpful to your cause.
 
I wish you luck and if I can help with any specific questions you may have please feel free to ask.
 
Regards
 
Bill read more