




“The Ogoni cause is like a pregnant tortoise who is yet to deliver. When the tortoise delivers there will be joy, happiness, dancing, singing - everyone will have clothes to wear.”

*52 year-old Ogoni man, Zaakpon, Babbe kingdom.*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I. UNPO Mission to investigate the situation of the Ogoni of Nigeria: Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
UNPO and its Objectives	5
Background to UNPO's Mission to Nigeria	5
Mandate and purpose of Mission	6
Itinerary	6
<b>II. Findings</b>	<b>7</b>
The Ogoni People - the background	7
Oil is Discovered in Ogoniland	8
Conditions Leading to the Birth of the Ogoni Movement	9
The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People	9
1. The Founding of MOSOP	9
2. MOSOP Leadership	11
3. Community Based Organizations	12
4. Conservative Ogoni Opposition	13
5. Vigilante Groups	15
6. Internationalization of The Ogoni Case	16
The Nigerian State and the Ogoni	17
1. The Nigerian Federal Government and The Ogoni	17
2. Federal Government Laws and Decrees Affecting the Ogoni	17
3. The Rivers State Government	18
4. The State's Use-of-force and Pressure Against the Ogoni	18
Shell and the Ogoni	20
Shell and Community Relations	21
<b>III. Key Events in The Ogoni Struggle</b>	<b>22</b>
April 1993 - Shell Builds a Pipeline	22
Conflicts with Ogoni Neighbors	24
1. Andoni/Ogoni	24
2. Okrika/Ogoni	26
3. Ndoki/Ogoni	27
The Murder of Four Ogoni Leaders	27
Murder of Ogoni Chiefs Leads to Military Crackdown	29
The Trial Against Ogoni Leaders	30
Current Situation in Ogoniland	31
<b>IV. Conclusions</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>V. Recommendations</b>	<b>35</b>



**I. UNPO MISSION TO INVESTIGATE  
THE SITUATION OF THE Ogoni OF NIGERIA  
INTRODUCTION**

**UNPO and its Objectives**

The Unrepresented Nations and People Organization (UNPO) is an organization of nations and peoples that are not adequately represented in international forums, such as the United Nations. Founded in 1991, its 48 Members represent over 100 million people.

One of the principal objectives of UNPO is the promotion of non-violent methods for the prevention or resolution of disputes involving nations and peoples.

UNPO's activities in this area includes sending missions, at the Member's request, to troubled areas. Other missions and visits are undertaken towards resolving already violent conflicts or to bring to light the facts concerning such conflicts. UNPO missions have included; those to monitor elections in Tatarstan (March 1992), Iraqi Kurdistan (May 1992), Kosova (May 1992), Chuvash (December 1993), and Taiwan (December 1994); fact-finding and diplomatic missions to Abkhazia and Georgia (June and November 1992 and December 1993), to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (January 1994) and to the Greek Minority in Albania (January and August 1994), the Batwa in Rwanda (October to December 1994) and Ingushetia and Chechenia (December 1994).

**Background to UNPO's Mission to Nigeria**

The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), representing the Ogoni people of Nigeria, was admitted as a UNPO Member in January 1993. Since then UNPO has served as a distribution point, to the international community, for information coming from Ogoniland. The offices in both The Hague, Washington and Geneva have organized programs for MOSOP representatives visiting Europe and the United States. They have also assisted Ogoni delegations to United Nations meetings and conferences in Vienna and Geneva. UNPO issued twenty three press releases, initiated a large number of press interviews and distributed information and updates on developments to governments, the United Nations, the UN Assistant Secretary General for Human Rights and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.. Numerous representations, by the UNPO General Secretary, have been made to the Nigerian government and Shell International to encourage talks between the parties. UNPO has also maintained an ongoing dialogue with Shell International.

MOSOP requested that UNPO send a mission to Ogoniland in May 1993. Around the same time Shell International's representatives suggested UNPO should visit Ogoniland to gain a better understanding of the situation. A firm invitation from Shell International and Shell Nigeria was provided at a meeting with UNPO in November 1993. With invitations from MOSOP and Shell to undertake a fact-finding mission, UNPO hoped it would also provide an opportunity for preliminary talks between the parties, towards reducing tensions.

In March 1994 Shell<sup>1</sup> changed its position and withdrew its invitation. By the planned date of departure, March 8, the Nigerian government had not granted visas to the UNPO Mission members.

In late 1994, with still no response from the Nigerian government, UNPO's General Secretary decided to send a representative, Mr. Richard Boele, on an unofficial mission in February 1995. This decision was taken reluctantly and UNPO remains open for an official mission to visit the area, with the assistance of the Nigerian government, so the organization can better understand the Nigerian government and Shell's views.

## **Mandate and Purpose of Mission**

UNPO's second General Assembly adopted on August 6, 1991 the resolution entitled, "Prevention of the Use of Force by States Against People Under their Rule". This resolution reaffirmed the UNPO Covenant's condemnation of the unprovoked use of all forms of violence by States against nations and peoples. The resolution authorizes the UNPO Secretariat to intervene, at the Member's request, in situations where the Member feels threatened by the use of force or other forms of violence. As the dispatching of missions is one of the UNPO's primary methods of intervention, a mission was organized to investigate the situation of the Ogoni people of Nigeria.

The purpose of the UNPO Mission was as follows:

1. To obtain first hand information on the situation in Ogoniland
2. To prepare a report for distribution to governments, international organizations, NGOS, the press, Shell and other relevant parties in an effort to provide a more accurate picture of the situation and the aspirations of the Ogoni people.
3. To make recommendations to all concerned parties and to the international community with respect to the situation in Ogoniland.

## **Itinerary**

The Mission visited Lagos and Port Harcourt, Rivers State.

In Lagos the UNPO representative met with representatives of the Ogoni community including the Ogoni Welfare Association, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the National Council for Ogoni Youth (NYCOP). The UNPO representative also met with Nigerian human rights organizations such as the Constitutional Rights Project and the Civil Liberties Organization as well as lawyers defending detained Ogoni leaders. Private discussions with diplomats and international organizations, such as the International Red Cross, were also held.

In Port Harcourt the UNPO representative met with Ogoni people from all walks of life, Ogoni refugees, Ogoni chiefs, representatives of the Federation of Ogoni Women Associations (FOWA), MOSOP, NYCOP, the Daughters of Charity (Catholic nuns with a mission in Ogoniland), Ikwerre representatives (Ogoni neighbours) and Professor Claude Ake, a respected Nigerian social scientist. With the Ogoni people who came to Port Harcourt, the UNPO representative conducted both private interviews and small meetings of up to 20 people. Those interviewed represented a cross-section of Ogoni society - from all six kingdoms, young and old, men and women.

In an effort to broaden the mission's scope, contact was established with Ogoni representatives other than MOSOP, resulting in extensive telephone interviews with representatives in Port Harcourt and London. The Nigerian government and Shell International were invited to respond to the Interim Mission Statement with the assurance that their responses would be acknowledged in this report.

The mission coincided with the trial of Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP President, and Ledum Mitee, MOSOP Vice president and Dr. Barinem Kiobel, MOSOP supporter, who have all been accused, along with some 30 other MOSOP members, of murdering four Ogoni community leaders. A special military tribunal is hearing the case in Port Harcourt. Mr. Saro-Wiwa was elected Vice-chairperson of the UNPO General Assembly in 1993.

Upon the UNPO representative's return to The Hague an Interim Mission Statement was released to MOSOP, governments, NGOs, Shell and the media on March 3, 1995.

## II. FINDINGS

### **The Ogoni People - the Background**

The Ogoni are a distinct ethnic group numbering around 500,000 who live in an area of about 100,000 square kilometers (404 acres), east of present-day Port Harcourt. Archaeological and linguistic evidence suggest the Ogoni have inhabited this region of the Niger delta for up to 500 years. The Ogoni are an agricultural and fishing society, living in close-knit rural communities in what is one of the most densely populated areas of Africa.

They farm mostly yams and cassava, the staple food of southern Nigeria. The Ogoni speak proudly of the time before the 1960s when they say their soil was rich and the area was known as the “breadbasket” of the region. They say the roads were busy with traders coming from Port Harcourt to purchase Ogoni-grown food.

Because of their agricultural economy and an ever increasing population, most of the rainforest that once covered the area has been altered or removed for farming. Over the years larger Ogoni villages have grown together to form towns, some as large as 10,000 people.

There are six kingdoms in Ogoniland: Babbe, Eleme, Gokana, Ken-Khana, Nyo-Khana and Tai; the town of Bori is considered the capital of Ogoniland. Within Ogoniland there are four main languages and many more dialects. The four languages, although related, are mutually unintelligible.

The Ogoni have their own distinct culture, in which land was traditionally seen as a god and worshipped as such. Despite Christianization, many aspects of their indigenous culture and religion are still evident.

Festival time with its colorful masks reveals the strength of Ogoni performance and decorative arts and when Ogoni fall ill, many still turn to shamans for cures.

After the Berlin Treaty of 1885, in which the colonial powers distributed much of Africa amongst themselves, many peoples in the region of present-day Nigeria signed treaties with the British. The Ogoni refused. British colonial records make a number of references to the Ogoni’s fierce resistance to colonization but the struggle finally collapsed in the early 1900s.

The British saw Nigeria in terms of the three major peoples - the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the West and the Igbo in the East. More than 250 smaller peoples were largely ignored. This was especially clear in the British preparations for de-colonization. When Nigeria was divided into a federation of three regions, each dominated by one of the major groups. This laid the foundations for minority marginalization in Nigeria.

The Igbos held the positions of power and influence in the Eastern region’s political and economic life. Minority demands were acknowledged when the British established the Sir Henry Willink Commission of Inquiry in the late 1950s but it did little in offering real solutions. Their fears unaddressed, the Delta minorities agitated for their own Rivers State.

Many Ogoni still speak today of discrimination suffered at the hands of the Igbo. A 36 year-old Ogoni man from Bori remembered:

“...growing up in a cement house, they were rare then - the early 60s - all our neighbours were Igbo - the language of the streets were Igbo... if you spoke Igbo you get things cheaper, even from Ogoni traders, the reason was if you asked a price too high they just reported you for overcharging and took it. That was the discrimination at that time, it was total, police, courts, everywhere they were domineering.”

It was not only Igbo who discriminated against the Ogoni. There was a general contempt for Ogoni people in the Delta region - the Ogoni were at the bottom of the social ladder. They did the menial jobs, becoming

servants, cleaners and manual laborers. The cat-call “pio pio” (loosely translated it means, “idiot, idiot”), is still well known in Port Harcourt. Non-Ogoni used it to refer to specifically to Ogoni.

### **Oil is Discovered in Ogoniland**

The Shell Oil Company discovery of oil under Ogoniland at Kegbara Dere in 1958 began a process that dramatically affected not just Ogoni society, but Nigeria as a whole. Oil, and most importantly its revenue, quickly took over the Nigerian economy. Today, oil accounts for over 90% of Nigeria’s export earnings and some 80% of government revenue, distorting Nigeria’s economic and political life into a grab for petrodollars.

For the Ogoni there was the environmental and social costs of oil exploitation. The agricultural and fishing communities experienced oil spills for the first time. Community response to the problems was slow - few had any education let alone any knowledge of oil.

Stories are still told of the times when elderly Ogoni used bottles to scoop oil from spills. The oil was saved for times of sickness when it was rubbed on the skin as a magic cure. More sinister stories related their fear of Shell operatives - women and children were warned to steer clear of Shell roads and installations as the workers and contractors had a reputation for raping and beating.

Large flares burnt gas from the oil extraction process, illuminating the sky and polluting the air. Most of the flares burnt at ground level and some flares were built close to populated areas such as that at K-Dere. Land availability was already a problem in the densely populated Ogoniland. Tensions increased as oil companies moved in, also needing land. Land grew even scarcer as the Ogoni population continued to grow. Illiterate landowners often missed government and oil company notifications of land acquisitions printed in Port Harcourt newspapers. Many Ogoni claim if compensation was offered, it was either inadequate, accepted under duress or simply not paid.

Oil was one of the main reasons for the Biafran civil war in the 1960s. The Ogoni found themselves in the middle of the war. A number of Ogoni leaders even held prominent positions in the Biafran government. As Federal troops pushed back the Biafran soldiers, Ogoniland became a battlefield. Thousands of Ogoni refugees fled advancing Federal troops and walked for days to Igbol and refugee camps. There are reports that the Ogoni were discriminated against in the camps on the basis of being Ogoni.

### **Conditions Leading to the Birth of the Ogoni Movement**

One of the first Ogoni community-based organizations established this century was the Central Ogoni Union (COU). In the 1940s it campaigned for better conditions under the British, including a separate Ogoni administrative division. Success came for the COU when such a Division was created in 1946. It was administered by the Ogoni Native Authority but was short-lived. In 1957 it was divided into three local government authorities.

Mr. Paul Birabi, one of the few educated Ogoni at the time, appears to have played a crucial role in the creation of an Ogoni national identity. He was instrumental in setting up the COU which provided scholarships and raised funds for building schools. In 1950, Mr. Birabi inaugurated the Ogoni State Representative Assembly which provided a political platform for Ogoni representation in Nigerian national politics. Mr. Birabi sat in the Lagos House of Representatives, however Ogoni representation ended in 1953 with Mr. Birabi’s death.

Later attempts at gaining Ogoni representation and influence in Nigeria’s political system largely failed. Mr. Birabi’s son, Dr Paul Birabi, became a minority leader in the Senate, yet could do little to improve the general situation of the Ogoni.

The oil companies also failed to improve life for the Ogoni. A major blow-out at K-Dere in 1970 spewed oil for weeks, devastating a large part of one of Ogoniland’s most densely populated areas. The 1970s brought increasing activity from the oil companies, a deteriorating environment and decreasing crop yields

and fish catches. These factors all contributed to increasing tensions between the Ogoni and the oil companies.

Industrial development also came to Ogoniland. Eleme is probably the most industrialized area of the country as a government erected sign, vandalized with paint, states on entering Ogoniland, "Welcome to Eleme the heart of the Nigerian Economy". There are two refineries, one petro-chemical plant and a fertilizer plant, while Ogoniland also has a power plant on its northern border. Few Ogoni found employment in these projects. Instead they only increased the pressure on land and the environment. Despite this level of industrial development Ogoni villagers received no pipe-borne water, no electricity and little infrastructure.

The Ogoni remained marginalized in all aspects of Nigerian society. As Myra Lawrence, an American posted to Port Harcourt in the 1970s observed:

"...the Ogoni were treated like America's 'niggers', in Port Harcourt, let alone permitted in the schools. When David (her husband) arrived in Bori Hospital 40 miles south-east of Port Harcourt, he found by the medical records that almost everyone operated on had been Ibo (Igbo), that only in extreme circumstances would an Ogoni be treated and then he would be charged outrageous prices." <sup>2</sup>

## **The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People**

### **1. The Founding of MOSOP**

The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) began with the launching of the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) in October, 1990. All the Ogoni leaders came together and signed a document that outlined their demands for environmental, social and economic justice. For the first time the Ogoni people had a document that articulated their feelings and desires. In twenty points the document outlined the history and problems of the Ogoni people. As a solution it called for "political autonomy" within the Nigerian federation. (For text of OBR see Appendix 1)

To achieve the goals set out in the OBR the leaders who signed the document established MOSOP. After years of neglect, marginalization and discrimination from the government, the oil companies and society in general, the Ogoni found a voice. They had an organization that was theirs, that would fight for their rights. For the ordinary farming or fishing Ogoni, this was a revolution.

MOSOP presented the Ogoni Bill of Rights to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, General Babangida and members of the Armed Forces Ruling Council in October 1990. MOSOP received no reply.

Ogoni leaders met again on August 26, 1991 and added a section to the Ogoni Bill of Rights authorizing MOSOP to internationalize the campaign. The addendum also affirmed MOSOP's methods and commitment to non-violence:

"...the Ogoni people abjure violence in their just struggle for their rights within the Federal Republic of Nigeria." <sup>3</sup>

The demands were first taken to the international community in July 1992 when the Ogoni case was presented to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations.

On December 3, 1992, MOSOP presented its demands to those oil companies operating in Ogoniland, including Shell, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and Chevron. They had to pay back-royalties and compensation within 30 days or quit Ogoniland.

The Ogoni Day March of January 4, 1993, celebrating the start of the United Nations Year of Indigenous People, was a milestone in the Ogoni movement. Its impact on the whole struggle cannot be underestimated. Marches of 300,000 people are rare in the world and even rarer when they take place without one single incident of violence. The March put the Ogoni issue onto Nigeria's public agenda and established the non-violent nature of the struggle.

International attention consolidated MOSOP's support in Ogoniland. MOSOP, representing the Ogoni people, was accepted into UNPO at its 3rd General Assembly in The Hague, in January 1993. It was there that the Ogoni case received its first major international exposure through coverage by CNN, Time magazine and other international media.

In Ogoniland, two more successful mobilizations occurred in February and March. The One Naira Ogoni Survival Fund invited every Ogoni woman, man and child to of that year commit to the struggle. The response was spontaneous and enormous. In March a National Ogoni Vigil was held and thousands of Ogoni came out at night to protest under candlelight.

With the mass mobilization of Ogoni people MOSOP needed a structure to accommodate a broadened base. This was done through organizing different sections of the community: the women, the students, the teachers and so on. Grassroots organizations were formed such as National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP) and the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations (FOWA).

Each of these community-based Ogoni organizations is represented in MOSOP's highest decision making organ - the Steering Committee. This Steering Committee decides on policy and activities, using a majority vote of the Committee's members. Before May 1994, the Steering Committee met once a week. Today, because many key MOSOP figures are imprisoned and the security situation is tense, the Committee is unable to meet.

A Western diplomat, based in Lagos, saw the Ogoni movement as an example to others: "MOSOP is genuinely grassroots. It cuts across elite lines, it's extremely effective. It is a fundamental threat to the way politics is done in Nigeria."

## **2. MOSOP Leadership**

The first MOSOP President was Dr. G. B. Leton. Dr. Leton is recognized in the Ogoni community as a scientist and leading-figure and represents the more conservative, traditional leaders of the community. During the civil war he worked in a scientific unit, developing weapons for the Biafran government: He later held positions in the Federal Nigerian government, including a tenure on the Board of Directors of NAFCON, Nigeria's fertilizer company. As recently as January 24 Dr Leton was listed as a trustee of the newly registered Association of Solid Minerals Produces and Marketers. <sup>4</sup>

Chief E. N. Kobani was the first vice-president of MOSOP and also a conservative leader. He was leading traditional chief in Gokana Kingdom and had served in a number of important posts in government and private enterprise.

Ken Saro-Wiwa is the current President of MOSOP and popular leader of the Ogoni people. He was born in Bori in 1941 and attended Ibadan University. In his 20s he held a number of Commissioner positions in the Rivers State government. In the 1970s he went into business but left in 1984 and became a writer, publisher and television producer. Ken Saro-Wiwa began as MOSOP's spokesperson and was elected president, by the MOSOP Steering Committee, after Dr Leton and Chief Kobani resigned their positions in June 1993.

The UNPO Mission noted how ordinary Ogoni speak of Ken Saro-Wiwa in almost mythical terms. There is a very high-level of respect, with most Ogoni referring to him as "one who can be trusted". It appears to be Mr. Saro-Wiwa's actions that have earned him the respect. The mission heard from several sources of how Mr. Saro-Wiwa addresses Ogoni people in their local language. That he made the effort to learn to

speak the various Ogoni languages, an apparently unusual characteristic for Ogoniland leaders, has impressed many people. A whole generation of today's Ogoni activists, those in their 30s, owe their education to Ken Saro-Wiwa's tenure as Education Commissioner of Rivers State in the 1970s. All the Ogoni who applied for scholarships received them.

Ken Saro-Wiwa's international recognition is also a source of pride for ordinary Ogoni people. Each international award, either for his writing or environmental work, is a point of pride for most Ogoni. Ledum Mitee, a successful Port Harcourt lawyer, is the current MOSOP deputy-president. Dr Ben Naanen, a visiting scholar at Port Harcourt University is MOSOP's secretary general.

A Lagos-based representative of the Civil Liberties Organization, one of Nigeria's most active human rights groups, commented on MOSOP's leadership:

“Perhaps more than any other movement Ken has mobilized people, not on an issue of class, not on superiority, not for personal political ambition but through their own self-consciousness. No other person in Nigeria can get 100,000 people on the streets ... that's why they (the government) are now scared of Ken.”

### **3. Community Based Organizations**

MOSOP, and particularly Ken Saro-Wiwa, encouraged the establishment of strong community-based organizations. By May, 1994 new organizations were formed. Today, MOSOP's member organizations are, the youth organization, NYCOP, the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations (FOWA), the Ogoni Teachers Union, the National Union of Ogoni Students (NUOS), the Conference of Ogoni Traditional Rulers (COTRA), Council of Ogoni Churches (COC), Ogoni Students Union (for young students), Ogoni Central Union (OCU), the Council for Ogoni Rights (COR) and Council of Ogoni Professionals (COP). NYCOP is the strongest of these organizations and is a highly organized, disciplined and sophisticated grassroots-organization. (See Appendix 7 for example of NYCOP operations) Its history and spectacular growth illustrates MOSOP's success.

NYCOP started as the Committee for Ogoni Autonomy (COA) at the end of 1991 but it was not until late 1992 that it began meeting regularly. COA organized the logistics for Ogoni Day, January 1993. In February 1993, COA changed its name to NYCOP and began a rapid process of democratization and expansion.

A new three-tiered structure was established. At the summit was a National Executive Council comprising the office holders and vice-presidents representing the six Ogoni kingdoms. Under the Executive were the kingdom co-ordinators, who had their own executives. They, in-turn, supervised the lowest level, the chapter or village co-ordinators and their groups. NYCOP is a democratic organization holding its first elections in February 1993.

Besides providing logistical support for most of MOSOP's activities NYCOP's main achievement was in education. NYCOP brought the MOSOP message to probably every village in Ogoniland. By 1994, the weekly NYCOP meetings in Port Harcourt, attracted up to 3000 Ogoni. The organization was a phenomenal success in grassroots mobilization with some 5,000 members at the national level and an estimated 40,000 throughout Ogoniland.

This success must be partly due to the age and experience of NYCOP's leaders - as most were far from young. Goodluck Diigbo, the NYCOP president, is a 38-year old journalist with a university education while most of the Executive's 25-odd members are well over 30. Most of those holding major NYCOP posts have university degrees.

Another highly successful MOSOP member organization is the Ogoni women's FOWA. A 34 year-old woman from Yehge described to the UNPO Mission what FOWA meant for her:

“FOWA joined us as one - made us to be independent, to work with our hands. FOWA taught us to sew, to earn little money, so we never have to rely on the government cooking kara (beans). We sell what we make in market. There is now cooking, sewing and love. I can use cassava in different ways now and do something to live. Since FOWA formed the women are very happy.”

The average Ogoni, for the first time, felt a sense of pride in belonging to a movement to which he or she directly contributed. It was this active sense of belonging that the community organizations were so instrumental in delivering. The creation of community, through self-sustaining organizations, was key in ensuring the growth of the Ogoni movement. As the most popular Ogoni song begins:

“Be proud, be proud Ogoni people, be proud. We shall no longer allow the world to cheat us.”

#### **4. Conservative Ogoni Opposition**

There are some conservative Ogoni leaders who have split from MOSOP. Dr Leton is recognized as their leader, while the group included people such as Chief E.N. Kobani; Chief S. Orage, a former commissioner; Mr. A. Badey also a former commissioner and highly placed public servant; and Chief I. Kogbara, a former politician and business person. There are a number of factors that could together, or separately explain the split: MOSOP's methods, personalities and money. The reason for different factors is because the opposition is split within itself. Mr. Lah Loolo was a member of the conservative group but left when they tried to implicate Ken Saro-Wiwa in the murder of the four conservative Ogoni chiefs: “When they went to the press conference and announced that it was Saro-Wiwa that did the killing, I felt so bad. I may disagree with Saro-Wiwa, but I cannot imagine myself sitting somewhere and allow people to crucify him for what he knew nothing about.”<sup>5</sup>

MOSOP's methods and structure have been debated even before Ogoni Day January 1993. The more conservative Ogoni leaders, such as Dr Leton and Chief Kobani, attacked the concept of MOSOP as an umbrella for community-based organizations:

“...most elders of MOSOP felt that such a structure would spell the demise of MOSOP as they would have no control of its components, not to mention the unintentional exclusion from membership (of MOSOP) of many Ogonis who might not fit into any of the independent organizations.”<sup>6</sup>

Far from spelling the demise of MOSOP, Ogoni people turned to the community-based organizations in their thousands. As Chief Kogbara, another conservative leader, stated:

“Most who belong to MOSOP belong to it innocently. The problem of MOSOP is a problem of leadership - when I saw the extent of the organization I was surprised. It was too organized - you don't give them very high expectations, you don't organize these grassroots people and promise them all these things.”

From the point-of-view of the traditional leaders, their concerns were understandable, as their power was threatened. The people of Ogoni discovered an alternative, one in which they could democratically participate.

What must have been insulting to the traditional power structures in Ogoniland was the creation of Council of Ogoni Traditional Rulers (COTRA). This brought together those traditional leaders, who clearly supported MOSOP and Ken Saro-Wiwa's leadership.

As these tensions came to a head, the idea to boycott the June 1993 Nigerian Presidential elections was floated. Key Ogoni leaders, across both Ogoni factions, held positions in the two Nigerian parties fielding presidential candidates. There was, however, a vigorous campaign from those conservative leaders to participate in the elections. The conservatives felt the Ogoni movement had to work within Nigeria's political structure.

A crucial MOSOP Steering Committee meeting was held on June 2, in Dr. Leton's house, to decide whether the Ogoni people would boycott. After strong arguments for and against a boycott, a vote was cast. Eleven voted for and seven against a boycott. Those leading the campaign against a boycott, such as Dr Leton and Chief Kobani, later resigned their MOSOP offices but not their MOSOP membership. The conservative leaders maintain that the voting was rigged as the 11 votes were largely youths and not members of the Steering Committee. Yet leader of the conservatives, Dr Leton, was MOSOP president and chairperson of the meeting when the vote took place.

The split was now public and appeared to center on MOSOP's methods.

Personality may have played a role in the leadership split. Animosity between Ken Saro-Wiwa and the conservative leaders goes back to university days. At Ibadan University Mr. Saro-Wiwa challenged older Ogoni students in elections for the student union. This should be understood in the context of the Ogoni's strict social order of respect, where challenging elders is frowned upon.

During the Biafran war some traditional Ogoni leaders saw Ken Saro-Wiwa as a traitor because he went to work for the Federal government. He was against the war, and felt the Ogoni would suffer more under Igbo domination in a separate Biafra. Most of the today's conservative Ogoni leaders worked with the Biafran government. Dr. Leton developed weapons in the Biafran Scientific Unit; Chief Kobani worked in the Propaganda Unit while Chief Kogbara became the unofficial Biafran High Commissioner in London. In 1977, Ken Saro-Wiwa contested an election for the constituent assembly against Chief Kobani. Chief Kobani was disqualified but with the support of other conservative Ogoni leaders fielded another candidate who defeated Mr. Saro-Wiwa.

Personality disagreements seemed to be resolved with the first MOSOP leadership but in early 1993 surfaced again. Dr Leton states Mr. Saro-Wiwa was trying to "...mastermind a situation of complete control of Ogoni affairs, *to the exclusion of his political seniors and superiors...* Ken Saro-Wiwa was prepared to go to any extent, even at expense of loss of lives so as to realize his ultimate goal, which is the singular control of Ogoni human and material resources." (emphasis added) <sup>7</sup>

Money is another possible factor for the split. In Nigeria, there is a clear patronage system that usually runs along family, tribal or friendship lines. Large sums of money are simply given through the granting of government or company contracts for road building, electrification, and so on. Money changes hands but the commissioned work is rarely finished and in some cases not even begun. This 'system' is also used by the oil companies to buy the cooperation of influential or powerful leaders in a community to arrange access for operations.

Many of the Ogoni leaders in KAGOTE (KAGOTE was an elitist club, established before MOSOP and included all successful, educated and traditional Ogoni figures) benefited from this patronage system - securing either government or oil company contracts. A number of the conservative leaders, such as Chief Orage and Mr. Badey, benefited from this system. Ken Saro-Wiwa also benefited from his connections in government and in the 70s and 80s accepted government contracts.

As the Ogoni movement grew and challenged the government in the 1990s Ken Saro-Wiwa refused to accept any more government contracts, as he was concerned they would have been used to compromise him. It is possible the more conservative Ogoni leaders found their government contracts increasingly threatened as MOSOP openly challenged the government. The split can then be seen as an attempt to moderate MOSOP's activities to protect the economic interest of the few.

## **5. Vigilante Groups**

As the Ogoni movement grew in 1993, bands of young men calling themselves vigilante groups began operating. Reports suggest they set-up roadblocks, extorted money, conducted hearings and executions and various other unlawful and criminal activities in the name of MOSOP and NYCOR There are conflicting reports as to who established the vigilante. The government and conservative Ogoni leaders say it is Ken

Saro-Wiwa's militant wing, made up of NYCOP members. MOSOP claims politicians set them up, to further their political goals, in the lead up to the elections on June 12, 1993.

What is clear is that both MOSOP and NYCOP took strong public and private steps against vigilante activity.

MOSOP issued a number of public notices in November 1993, warning the community that vigilantes were using MOSOP's name. (See Appendix 2) Ken Saro-Wiwa even wrote to the military authorities in January 1994 calling on them to arrest Nwinka Asiga, Ike Ekpere and Nathan Neebani, three youths who were identified by MOSOP as running vigilante groups. Two were finally arrested in April 1994. (See Appendix 2)

NYCOP, as the youth organization, was especially sensitive to the operation of vigilante groups. In Gokana, the NYCOP Executive targeted its own Kingdom coordinator, Celestine Meabe, for allegedly running a vigilante group. He was ordered to disband the group.

Nevertheless, vigilante activities continued in Gokana. In the first week of April the National Executive dissolved the Gokana Kingdom Executive Council, so dismissing Celestine Meabe as Coordinator, and held new elections. The former Coordinator protested the action but lost a vote of no confidence from his own Gokana Kingdom Executive. In the new elections he failed to gain even a nomination for a NYCOP position.

Security and the integrity of members became a serious concern for NYCOP's leaders as the membership ballooned through 1993. In response they introduced a number of new security measures, which included the introduction of a photo ID card, the completion of a national register of members and the establishment of a "screening committee".

## **6. Internationalization of The Ogoni Case**

MOSOP has achieved tremendous success in making the Ogoni case an international issue. It began with Ken Saro-Wiwa's 1992 address to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, after which European-based NGOs, including Greenpeace, visited Ogoniland.

MOSOP, representing the Ogoni people, joined UNPO in late January 1993, giving the Ogoni better access to the international community. Ken Saro-Wiwa traveled to The Hague for UNPO's 3rd General Assembly at the time. Through this, the Ogoni case received international media coverage, including CNN and *Time* magazine.

UNPO has also served as the main channel of information on the Ogoni issue, for governments, international organizations and NGOs.

Since January 1993, most major international environmental and human rights organizations have reacted to Ogoni and UNPO appeals for help. They have addressed the Ogoni issue through their publications, demonstrations, letter-writing campaigns or other actions.

Greenpeace issued a 30-page report in July 1994 on Shell's role in the Ogoni situation. Greenpeace has also organized protests in Europe and the US. <sup>8</sup>

Amnesty International released a number of Urgent Actions through 1993 and 1994 culminating in the release of a Nigeria report highlighting the Ogoni case in November 1994. This was followed by a high-level mission to Nigeria in December 1994. The Amnesty report concluded, "In Ogoniland the government's suppression of its critics has led to some of the most serious human rights violations." <sup>9</sup>

Human Rights Watch/Africa also sent a mission to Ogoniland in February 1995. They condemned the Nigerian government for systematic human rights abuses in Ogoniland.

Writers' organizations, such as PEN International have also been active in letter writing and demonstrating in support of Ken Saro-Wiwa and broadening the international reach of the Ogoni campaign. The international campaign has been most successful in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, both homes to Shell. Indeed it has been another multinational, the Body Shop, that has been a main force in the Ogoni campaign. International support will only increase as a growing number of environmental, human rights, indigenous, church organizations and other NGOs join the Ogoni campaign.

A major factor in the Ogoni's success in garnering NGO support is the attention the international press has given the issue. In 1993 Ogoni stories appeared in most major media outlets including, CNN, BBC, Reuters, *Newsweek*, *New York Times* and *Le Monde*. Channel Four, an independent British broadcaster, produced two documentaries (a third is about to be released) on the Ogoni issue. They have been sold around the world.

At the United Nations the issue has been raised in Geneva at the various human rights bodies, including the Human Rights Commission, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Working Group on Indigenous Populations. The UN Special Rapporteur on Extra judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions is currently investigating allegations of human rights violations against the Nigerian military government. A growing number of awards have been given to Ken Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP for their nonviolent campaign. The most prestigious was the "alternative Nobel peace prize", the Swedish Right Livelihood Award while the most recent was the Californian Goldman Environmental Award.

## **The Nigerian State and the Ogoni**

### **1. The Nigerian Federal Government and The Ogoni**

Military dictatorship has been the rule rather than the exception since Nigeria gained independence in 1960. Successive military governments have largely failed to address the social, economic and political problems of Nigeria.

Both the Federal and State governments have neglected communities living in oil-bearing areas. The federal government, since the 1970s, consistently cut-down the amount of oil revenue going back to the oil-bearing regions. A low point was reached in 1984 when only 1.5% of revenue was allocated to the region of derivation.

General Babangida's Federal government increased this to 3% in 1992 and established the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) to manage the fund. However apart from the question of whether 3% is adequate, little of the money earmarked for OMPADEC has come from the Federal government and even less has actually made it to the intended communities. Corruption skims nearly all of it well before it "trickles down" to the communities.

Successive military regimes have committed to clamping down on corruption and returning the country to democracy. The results have been discouraging, especially as corruption has become a way-of-life in Nigeria. Put simply there are huge oil revenues that those in power struggle to control - breaking laws or creating new ones to do so.

A number of talks have taken place between MOSOP and the Federal government. After the Ogoni Day March in January 1993, MOSOP leaders met with the Inspector-General of Police in Lagos on January 9, 1993 and presented their demands.

There were four core demands: political - the creation of an Ogoni state with 13 Local Government Authorities; environmental - a range of improvements to the oil industry's operation, including a special

compensation fund; economic - affirmative action for Ogoni in development; and greater involvement through employment in the oil industry. (For full text see Appendix 3)

The Inspector-General failed to respond. However, the MOSOP leaders were called to a meeting on May 13, in Abuja. There the MOSOP delegation met with military officers, representing General Babangida's government. Again the Ogoni presented their demands. Again there was no response.

General Babangida annulled the presidential elections in June 1993 and appointed an interim government, lead by Chief Earnest Shonekan. MOSOP held discussions with Chief Shonekan's government but any progress was dashed when General Abacha seized power in late 1993.

Despite MOSOP's repeated written requests to General Abacha's government for discussions on the Ogoni issue there have been none.

In January 1994 General Abacha sent a three minister fact-finding mission to investigate the grievances of the oil communities. More than a year later, the Commission's report and recommendations are yet to be released, while the three ministers were sacked in February 1995.

## **2. Federal Government Laws and Decrees Affecting the Ogoni**

The British colonial administration vested the ownership of all minerals in the Crown, a policy that was maintained by the post-colonial Nigerian government through a petroleum decree. Successive Nigerian governments recognized the importance of controlling oil resources. In 1977, a land-use decree further broadened the State's control giving itself the power to seize any land needed for oil exploitation without paying compensation to land owners.

In May 1993 the Federal government issued the Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree (1993). Under this decree advocating minority rights could be interpreted as a treasonable act punishable by death. The decree was met by widespread criticism, with many commentators interpreting it as a move clearly directed against the Ogoni movement and specifically against Ken Saro-Wiwa.

In September 1994 the Special Edict was promulgated under the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree 1987 (1987 No.2). The edict was entitled Instrument Constituting the Tribunal for the Trial of Offences under the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree 1987. Under the edict special courts can hand-down the death penalty for causing or involvement in ethnic clashes. As it came so soon after so many "ethnic" clashes between Ogoni and their neighbors, this decree was also seen by observers as a political move to neutralize vocal Ogoni leaders.

## **3. The Rivers State Government**

Living under a Rivers State government has not brought the Ogoni any measure of autonomy. Chief Rufus Ada-George, himself from the Okrika minority group and former Shell employee, was the first Rivers State governor to be faced by MOSOP. In an interview with a Nigerian paper, from the Rivers State capital Port Harcourt, he gave his views on the Ogoni movement:

"We did not see anything particularly wrong with the approach Ken Saro-Wiwa was using initially... We have always believed that it should not be violently done (but) the degree of mobilization tended to give credence to the fact that the method was probably to attract some form of violence."<sup>10</sup>

Relations between MOSOP and the Governor Ada-George were poor. They deteriorated rapidly when conflict broke out between the Andoni and the Ogoni in 1993 (see page 24 for more). The Ogoni saw the Governor as encouraging the conflict and choosing sides. Requests from MOSOP for the State government to send troops to stop the conflict were ignored. It was only a direct MOSOP appeal to the Federal government in Abuja that resulted in "peacekeeping" troops being deployed two months after the conflict began.

When General Abacha took power in Abuja, Lt. Colonel Komo in Port Harcourt replaced Governor Ada-George. Since his taking power the Internal Security Task Force, under Major Okuntimo, has been established and given a free hand in Ogoniland. The result has been a brutal military occupation.

#### **4. The State's Use-of-force and Pressure Against the Ogoni**

The Nigerian security services first interrogated MOSOP activists in December 1992. Since 1993 they have maintained surveillance and systematic harassment of Ogoni, especially targeting MOSOP activists. They have been followed, detained, interrogated, tortured, denied access to lawyers, doctors and family. The Mission spoke with a number of Ogoni, who played no active role in MOSOP, yet had been arrested, tortured and then ransomed back to their families. Before being released they had been forced to sign declarations denouncing MOSOP and Ken Saro-Wiwa. This pattern of intimidation increased in May 1994 when hundreds of Ogoni men were detained.

Apart from the intimidation of individuals there is also evidence that the authorities deliberately planned a military solution to the Ogoni situation. In April 1994, an internal memo, Operation Order No. 4/94 - Restoration of Law and Order in Ogoni Land, detailed plans for the extensive mobilization of the police and special units from all the armed forces to occupy Ogoniland -a move which was certain to increase tensions in an area already teeming with Federal "peace-keeping" troops.

The memo established what was to be known as the Internal Security Task Force. Before it was deployed, its commander, Major Paul Okuntimo, wrote his own memo to the Rivers State military administrator on May 12, 1994 laying out plans for a brutal military solution to the Ogoni problem. (For full text of memo see Appendix 4) One section of the memo reads:

"Shell operations still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence..." (The memo goes on to recommend) "...wasting operations coupled with psychological tactics of displacement/wasting as noted above."

Major (recently promoted to Lt. Col.) Paul Okuntimo has boasted to the press about "sanitizing Ogoni". *Newswatch*, a Nigerian national magazine, quoted Okuntimo in September 1994 as saying:

"...The solution to the Ogoni crisis requires more of a psychological approach since the people are pursuing a goal that they will get 400 million dollars from the federal government as royalty. You require a psychological approach to rewind them out of that mobilization."<sup>11</sup>

From May 1994, Major Okuntimo's Task Force systematically raided the majority of Ogoniland's 126 villages. The soldiers killed, burned, looted and raped. Many Ogoni, especially young men, were taken into custody, tortured and ransomed.

MOSOP has continued to appeal to the authorities to investigate cases of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution, detention or torture. The government appears unwilling to do so.

Instead of addressing the issues MOSOP has raised the Nigerian government has attacked the MOSOP leader Ken Saro-Wiwa especially outside Nigeria. The Nigerian High Commission in London has taken the lead:

"Saro-Wiwa has personal motives other than the protection of the Ogoni environment in his campaign of violence and calumny. It is only Saro-Wiwa's friends like the Body Shop International PLC based in the UK and some nuns who get distracted from their religious calling while in Nigeria, who could be gullible to MOSOP's antics of purported grand plan by the Nigerian Army to exterminate the Ogoni people..."<sup>12</sup>

The Government is currently trying Ken Saro-Wiwa and some thirty other MOSOP leaders and supporters for alleged murder. (see page ... for a full description of the incident and arrests) The government may hope to solve the Ogoni problem by convicting Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other MOSOP leaders but considering the continuing support amongst the people it is likely to fail. By handing out a stiff jail penalty, in a clearly political trial, the Government is more likely to create an Ogoni "Nelson Mandela" than restore normality to Ogoniland.

### **Shell and The Ogoni 13**

Shell has been active in Nigeria since colonial times and was the first company to discover oil in the Nigerian delta in the 1950s. As the longest operating and most active oil company in Nigeria it holds a prominent position in the country's oil industry. When much of the oil industry was nationalized in 1977, the Nigerian government's Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) became the major shareholder in the oil-industry's joint ventures. This put Shell Nigeria in direct partnership with the government in its oil activities.

Today, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) operates in Ogoniland with its joint venture partners NNPC, Elf and Agip. In Ogoniland the joint venture has five major oil fields - Bomu, Korokoro, Yorla, Bodo West and Ebubu - with 96 wells hooked up to five flow stations. According to SPDC the fields date from the 1960s and 1970s and today have a production potential of 28,000 barrels a day. By SPDC's reckoning 624 million barrels have been extracted from the Ogoni fields.

Shell International Petroleum Company (SIPC), based in London, has had to respond to the increasing international attention given to the Ogoni case. <sup>14</sup>

According to leaked internal Shell documents, SPDC and SIPC staff met in February 1993 in The Hague and London to discuss the internationalization of the Ogoni issue. (For full memo text see Appendix 5) The meeting came after the Ogoni Day March and the media attention surrounding Ken Saro-Wiwa's visit to the UNPO General Assembly in January 1993. The meetings concluded that operations in the oil-bearing communities in Nigeria and specifically in Ogoniland were a potential public relations problem for the company:

"The problem is not restricted to Nigeria: it has been thrust into UK sitting rooms through the TV program 'The Heat of the Moment' and the information has spread, most recently in the Netherlands and Australia. International networking, most prominently so far involving the Ogoni tribe and Ken Saro-Wiwa, is at work and gives rise to the possibility that internationally organized protest could develop... Ken Saro-Wiwa/UNPO will be using every opportunity made available by 1993 being the UN's declared Year for Indigenous Peoples (sic)."

The memo goes on to analyze the causes of the potential public relations problem:

"No matter what Shell does in the way of endeavoring to improve public relations, SPDC will be under pressure until the communities feel that their case is being heard and that real benefits start to flow from the 3% committee. Meanwhile HSE (Health Safety and Environment) aspects of SPDC's operational activities will require particular attention."

The memo then lists areas that Shell's performance on issues like oil spills, gas flaring, land use and local employment needs to be improved. The memo does not recommend engaging MOSOP or its leaders, instead it recommends that:

"SPDC and SIPC PA (Public Affairs) departments keep each other more closely informed to ensure that movement of key players, what they say and to whom are more effectively monitored to avoid unpleasant surprises and adversely affect the reputation of the group as a whole."

Since 1993 Shell has published three one-page Shell Briefing Notes on the Ogoni issue and an extensive nine-page booklet entitled *Nigeria Brief. The Ogoni Issue*. Hundreds of letters have left Shell Public Affairs departments in a number of countries in response to letters from those concerned about its operations in Ogoniland. Shell public affairs representatives have responded to the Ogoni issue on major international media outlets, such as CNN, the BBC as well as major national press in a growing number of countries. From national parliaments to the United Nations the company's operations in Ogoniland have been questioned leading to the company visiting foreign ministries.

Shell has had to respond to a number of Ogoni campaigns undertaken by environmental NGOs, human rights organizations and indigenous organizations.

If Shell's response to the Ogoni case is any indication, the Ogoni are a major concern for the company.

### **Shell and Community Relations**

What Shell has and has not done for the Ogoni, in terms of community assistance, is in dispute. According to Shell:

“Although community development is a government responsibility, SPDC has been running formal community assistance programs for more than 25 years. These are carried out in consultation with the communities. They include building roads, providing water and health facilities, assisting with agricultural development and offering education scholarships.”<sup>15</sup>

The Ogoni response is cynicism. As one 34-year old Ogoni man from Bianu, Nyo-Khana Kingdom put it: “...we would be better off today if Shell had never come and take one drop of oil”.

Despite the good intentions described in Shell's public relations material, little of their community assistance work has benefited the communities.

The discrepancy between what Shell (in London and Lagos) says and the reality in Ogoniland is understandable within the context of operating in Nigeria. Business is impossible to conduct in Nigeria without participating in corruption. Those responsible for awarding and executing the community assistance projects in Ogoniland, particularly if they are not Ogoni, could have channeled the money elsewhere.

Leaving community assistance work aside, the company's ability to communicate with the Ogoni community is very poor. Since 1990 this failure stems from the company's unwillingness to acknowledge the significance of the MOSOP, which now represents the bulk of the Ogoni community.

Shell's reluctance to recognize this fundamental change in Ogoni society is also reflected in the company's consistent questioning of MOSOP's representative nature. Shell Nigeria has chosen to promote the existence of conservative Ogoni leaders, some of whom have benefited greatly from the company's operations, instead of actively engaging MOSOP.

Despite Shell Nigeria's reluctance to deal with MOSOP seriously, Ken Saro-Wiwa met with Shell Nigeria management on at least two occasions in 1993. At one of these meetings, in Port Harcourt, Ken Saro-Wiwa was asked to present a “shopping list” to Shell. (For a later, revised version of this list see Appendix 6) To date Shell Nigeria has not formally responded.

Shell Nigeria maintains that it is open for discussions with MOSOP and Ken Saro-Wiwa. Yet the present MOSOP leadership has a deep-seated distrust of Shell Nigeria, distrust held even more strongly by the larger Ogoni community.

During informal discussions held with Shell International in 1993, UNPO stressed the need for Shell International to talk directly with MOSOP so they could better understand the problems between Shell Nigeria and MOSOP. UNPO also believed Shell International could have played a role in reducing tensions between the Ogoni and Shell Nigeria.

At the time of publication there have still been no known discussions between Shell International and MOSOP.

### III. KEY EVENTS IN THE Ogoni STRUGGLE

Since January 1993 there have been a number of key events in the Ogoni struggle. Some of these events have already been touched on in the previous section of the report but here they are dealt with in more detail.

#### **Shell Builds a Pipeline - April 1993**

Willbros, an American company contracted by Shell, began bulldozing Ogoni crops near Biara on Wednesday April 28, 1993 under the protection of Nigerian soldiers. On Thursday, April 29, when Ms. Kogbara protested the destruction of her crops she was beaten by the soldiers. She returned to her village to report what happened. The next morning, thousands of Ogoni protestors blocked the path of the bulldozers. Confronted by only palm and branch waving protestors, but frustrated at being unable to continue, the soldiers opened fire. A number of protestors were wounded, including Ms. Kogbara, who later had her arm amputated because of her wounds. By May 3, the soldiers shot and killed Mr. Agbarator Otu and left well over 20 wounded.

On this occasion, Shell personnel and Willbros entered Ogoniland fully aware of hostility towards the pipeline construction; indeed they had been forced to withdraw, from the same area in December the previous year. At that time Mr. J.K. Tillery, Divisional Manager of Willbros wrote:

“After the commencement of the Clear/Grade Crews in December 1992 at Bomu (refers to Bomu oilfield where the April shooting later took place), SPDC instructed WWAI (Willbros) to withdraw from the area due to the increasing threat of hostilities directed towards SPDC by the villagers. SPDC believed that the ever increasing tension in the area would result in an inevitable confrontation with the possibility of individuals suffering personal and physical injury.”<sup>16</sup>

Shell officially withdrew all their staff from Ogoniland in January 1993, after a worker had allegedly been beaten. Yet Shell and Willbros returned in April 1993 unsure that the community was satisfied with the “correct land acquisition procedures” and the community relations efforts. They chose to deliberately confront the community to see how the Ogoni would react:

“...a reduced work-force would be introduced (into the Bomu area) to enable the parties to *gauge the reaction of the local communities...*” (emphasis added)<sup>17</sup>

The company maintains it consulted with the “community leaders”. Whoever the leaders were they clearly did not represent MOSOP who actively organized the peaceful protest against the pipeline building. Shell also maintains that “the Army was drawn into a confrontation by the hostile villagers.” There is yet to be any evidence presented that soldiers, the Shell representative or Willbros personnel were injured during the demonstrations. However, it does appear that the contractor’s construction equipment was damaged.

#### **Conflicts with Ogoni Neighbors**

In 1993 and early 1994, over 30 Ogoni communities were attacked resulting in a heavy loss of life and property. The causes of these conflicts are unclear but they were described by the government and the media as ethnic clashes.

### **1. Andoni/Ogoni**

In late July 1993, between 60 and 100 Ogoni, returning by boat from business in Cameroon, were stopped on the Andoni River and massacred by men with automatic weapons. The murderers left two Ogoni women alive, who were told "...go and tell your people that it is Andoni's that killed your men." The Ogoni community protested the murders and called on the government to investigate. The authorities neither investigated the massacre nor arrested and charged anyone.

On August 5, 1993 the southern Ogoni town of Kaa was attacked by Andoni. Survivors described the use of automatic weapons, grenades, mortars and dynamite that left at least 124 people dead (according to a detailed MOSOP list of those killed). Hundreds lost their houses as the small town was systematically destroyed leaving even the main market and schools in ruins.

Nigerian and international human rights organizations including the Civil Liberties Organization and Amnesty International documented the attack. A Lagos-based military attaché of a Western diplomatic mission, who visited Kaa after the attack, confirmed that mortars were used.

What is unusual about the attack is that the Andoni, a much smaller people than the Ogoni, destroyed the very market they depended upon for selling their fish. The sophisticated weapons used in the attack were clearly beyond the means of a fishing community, pointing to some sort of military involvement in the attack.

Following the Kaa incident many Ogoni villages were attacked resulting in over 1000 Ogonis killed and more than 20,000 displaced persons (according to MOSOP estimates).

Suspiciously, most Ogoni police were drafted out of Ogoniland just weeks before the attacks began. Nigerian troops stationed in Bori, just 15 km from Kaa, failed to react to the situation. MOSOP appeals to the Governor Ada-George were ignored and it took a direct appeal to Abuja and two more months before Federal troops were finally deployed and the attacks abated.

During August 1993, Ogonis reportedly attacked Andoni villages, such as the village of Obiama, leaving a number of people dead and more than 80 houses destroyed.

Representatives from both communities denied there was any basis to the dispute. To date there has been no inquiry, in any form, into the causes of the Andoni/Ogoni clashes despite numerous calls from representatives of both communities for a judicial enquiry. No one has ever been charged in connection with the attacks.

The State government initiated a peace process to bring the Ogonis and Andonis together. Ogoni and Andoni delegations met in early October 1993 under the auspices of the Rivers State Peace Conference Committee and the National Council on Inter-governmental Relations. When the peace resolution was ready to be signed on October 6, Ken Saro-Wiwa, one of the two Ogoni leaders expected to sign, refused. Professor Claude Ake, a National Merit Award winner and government appointed mediator in the conflict, was also absent from the signing ceremony. (For full text of peace resolution see appendix 8)

Ken Saro-Wiwa explained his refusal to sign:

"Firstly, I was not properly seized of the document... Secondly, the team did not have a mandate from the Ogoni people and the document would have to be referred back to the people for ratification." 18

Ken Saro-Wiwa's refusal to sign was sharply criticized by the other Ogoni leaders in the peace delegation such as Mr. Badey the Ogoni representative who did sign the agreement. They argued that Mr. Saro-Wiwa did follow the proceedings; the delegation did have a mandate and asked why he did not raise his objections during the negotiations.

Professor Claude Ake, after the accord had been signed, expressed his concerns:

“Reports on the conflict have noted the scale and systematic nature of the destruction as well as the sophistication of the operations. These features raise questions about whether the conflict is merely communal and also the possibility that the two communities might have been victims of some other forces exploiting a local situation.”<sup>19</sup>

Professor Ake also wrote of his concerns about the circumstances of the signing of the Andoni/Ogoni peace conference:

“The resolution was made with unseemly haste, ad hoc, over a day and a half, as far as I can determine... I am amazed that the Peace Agreement was signed without prior consultation with the communities and ratification by them... I find it difficult to escape the conclusion that this manner of proceeding does not accord respect to the communities or show enough sensitivity to their suffering or serve the cause of peace.”<sup>20</sup>

On October 17, Ken Saro-Wiwa took the agreement back to a MOSOP Leadership Forum. The meeting decided to accept the Andoni/Ogoni Peace Agreement with two reservations; “...paragraphs four and six of the peace accord are unacceptable to the Ogonis because they are inimical to the interests of the people...”<sup>21</sup>

Besides these two paragraphs, the MOSOP Leadership Forum was concerned that the causes of the conflict were not even investigated, let alone resolved, making the peace agreement premature.

Two paragraphs were of particular concern. Paragraph four called for the “safe passage for all persons on all roads and water ways” while paragraph six called for the “immediate resumption of all full economic and social activities within Ogoni and Andoni areas”. The rejected paragraphs were interpreted as justifying Shell's resumption of operations in Ogoniland. A fear that was well founded as an internal Shell memo dated November 5, 1993 initialed GMB reveals:

“Following the peace agreement signed by representatives of the Andonis and Ogonis... it was... agreed that a few SPDC staff, accompanied by security personnel provided by the government, would visit the closed-in fields and inspect the facilities with a view to resuming operations at the earliest feasible time. The inspection team visited Ebubu and Korokoro on 20/10/93, Yorla on 21/10/93 and Bomu on 22/10/93 all without any incident though under much strain due to the hostilities from the communities.”<sup>22</sup>

For the second time in 1993, Shell went back into Ogoniland without consultation with MOSOP or its leaders.

On the October 25, 1993, army soldiers protecting Shell employees, reportedly retrieving two stolen fire-trucks, opened fire on villagers at Korokoro. They killed one Ogoni man and seriously injured two others. Shell's internal memo claims they acted in self-defense, yet it occurred within the context of the company attempting to restart operations in Ogoniland without consulting MOSOP.

## 2. Okrika/Ogoni

More attacks on Ogoni communities came in early December, 1993; this time it was between Ogoni and Okrika communities living on the Port Harcourt waterfronts. Witnesses interviewed by the UNPO Mission described a similar pattern of destruction to that of the Andoni/Ogoni attacks. Sophisticated weapons were

used to systematically destroy Ogoni areas of the waterfront. Again, the response of the authorities was slow.

As early as August 1993, MOSOP was concerned at rumors that other neighboring peoples were about to attack. MOSOP wrote to Okrika leaders asking them to, “resist every attempt by people to drag the Ogonis and the Okrikas into conflict in Okrika settlements.” Despite these attempts at preventing violence on December 12, 1993 Okrikas attacked Ogoni settlements.

A 34 year old Ogoni man living in one settlement, described his experience; “My father (was) killed in the waterfront. Ndoki waterside. Creek Road. I was there, sleeping with my family, somebody shouted ‘the Ogoni people should run’, I heard machine gun. We run, they throw something round, like a stone - many explosions.”

The attacks continued over the following days, when they stopped five Ogoni settlements were destroyed, 95 people were dead, scores more wounded and hundreds homeless. (according to MOSOP figures) The waterfront areas were less than a kilometer from Borikiri Naval Base and within two kilometers of Borikiri police station. One Ogoni witness ran to the Borikiri police station for help but was sent away, even though the sound of explosions, coming from the waterfront, could be heard while he was in the station.

This time the government did establish a commission of enquiry into the causes of the waterfront clashes. The seven-member commission was headed by a serving military officer, Major Paul Taiwo. In the commission’s final report it noted:

“... destruction of houses was really selective... only the houses in the Ogoni section were destroyed... the evidence... suggests a situation in which one well-prepared party caught the other unsuspecting party sleeping in a series of attacks coordinated with military expertise and precision.”<sup>23</sup>

The Commission also commended MOSOP’s role in assisting the refugees and helping to restore calm.

### **3. Ndoki/Ogoni**

In April, 1994 conflict flared again; this time with the Ogoni’s northern neighbors, the Ndoki in the Oyigbo area. The problems began as a small dispute over landownership between Ndoki and Ogoni villagers. Both communities reported destruction of their properties and injuries in the relatively small clash. What followed was a military operation, supposedly to restore order, against the Ogoni communities in the area.

On Easter Sunday, April 3, 1994 seven Ogoni villages were raided by Nigerian soldiers. Dr E.O. Gwezia, a government appointed official, in a report to the Military Administrator, Lt Colonel Komo criticised the authorities for not allowing an already established, local investigation into the troubles to continue. Instead the military attacked: “...what followed was the destruction of lives and property of Ogoni people in the Tai villages like Oloko I and II, Boobe, Gbaken, Nwemkova, and other villages by soldiers of the Nigerian Army.”<sup>24</sup>

Lt Colonel Komo was quoted in the *National Concord* newspaper on Wednesday April 13, 1994, in relation to the Ndoki/Ogoni clashes as saying, “Soldiers have been directed to deal ruthlessly with any aggressive community and if possible shoot trouble makers.”

MOSOP protested to the Military Administrator Lt Col. Komo that “... your Excellency sent in soldiers presumably to maintain peace in the area... the said soldiers have consistently carried out the actual destruction and burning of Ogoni Villages in the area... on Friday 16/4/94 these soldiers sacked and burnt down Ledor Village rendering its over 5,000 inhabitants homeless. Monday 18th April 1994 was the turn of the Tumbee Community whose natives are now refugees.”<sup>25</sup>

A nun from the Daughters of Charity (Catholic nuns with a mission in Ogoniland) arrived quickly in the area to provide relief for the refugees. She wrote a note to her headquarters describing the scene she found: "The military are busy flattening anything left standing on the 9th in the six villages and are taking up residence there to eat the goats and crops."<sup>26</sup>

The "ethnic conflicts" occurred between July 1993 and April 1994 with the Andoni, Okrika and the Ndoki peoples in a pattern that suggested they were more than simple communal clashes.

## **The Murder of Four Ogoni Leaders**

Four conservative Ogoni leaders were murdered May 21, at Giokoo, Gokana Kingdom, reportedly by angry youths. Those killed were Chief E.N. Kobani, Chief S.N. Orage, his brother Chief T.P. Orage and Mr A. Badey. They were hacked to death while holding a meeting. Reports vary as to exactly what happened and who was responsible for the murders. The families of those murdered hold Ken Saro-Wiwa responsible for ordering NYCOP youths to commit the murders. Ken Saro-Wiwa denies any involvement and both he and MOSOP have called for an independent, international judicial investigation. There were two main developments that clearly increased tensions in the Ogoni community leading up to the Giokoo events.

The first was the Federal government's elections for the Constitutional Conference; which would bring elected representatives from all over Nigeria to Abuja to offer solutions towards Nigeria's political problems. The second was the climaxing of the conservative Ogoni opposition's struggle with Ken Saro-Wiwa's leadership of MOSOR.

In early May 1994, conservative Gokana chiefs and a number of other Gokana people signed the Giokoo Accord. The accord, published on Saturday May 14, 1994 in the *Weekend Sunray*, was effectively calling for the Gokana people to pull out of MOSOP and stated that:

"the age-old culture of the people of respect to elders, and understanding of the youths be restored.. (and) that the chiefs and traditional rulers of Gokana continue to exercise their traditional authority unhindered."

The response to the accord was as spontaneous as it was powerful. On Thursday May 19, 1994 thousands of Gokana people demonstrated against the Accord. MOSOP denies any involvement in organizing the demonstration. Eyewitnesses report demonstrations in many of the villages of Gokana which included dancing and street theatre ridiculing Gokana's paramount ruler, HRH J.P. Bagia. There was also a large march from Kibani to Bodo. According to Gokana villagers interviewed by the UNPO Mission, the Giokoo Accord was not popular, instead it created a sense of betrayal and anger with the majority of Gokana people.

Days before the murders, Ken Saro-Wiwa began campaigning for election as an Ogoni representative to the Constitutional Conference. On Saturday May 21, he planned to travel further afield in Ogoni, explaining why MOSOP had boycotted the Presidential elections but was now participating in the Conference. According to MOSOP, the military administrator was informed of Ken Saro-Wiwa's schedule well before the tour began on the Friday.

On the Saturday Mr Saro-Wiwa had four rallies planned. According to Gookluck Diigbo, the NYCOP President who accompanied the MOSOP leader in his car that day, the Mobile Police prevented Ken from attending the first rally. But he received permission, from their commanding officer Steve Hasan, to attend a seminar in Bori for candidates and officials for the conference elections. Hasan and a truckload of troops followed Ken Saro-Wiwa to Bori but once there a crowd began to gather so the Ogoni leader was sent away. He then made his way to K-Dere under military escort.

The escort suddenly stopped his car in the middle of the busy Kibangha markets in Gokana. Ken Saro-Wiwa's car was encircled by armed soldiers while Navy Lt. PC. Nwatu informed Mr. Saro-Wiwa he could not continue and would have to return to Port Harcourt. A large crowd quickly gathered, possibly attracted by the obvious security presence. They had been stopped within sight of Giokoo village, where the conservative chiefs were meeting. According to Ken Saro-Wiwa and Goodluck Diigbo, they had no knowledge the meeting was even taking place.

Within minutes Ken Saro-Wiwa's car was being driven away under armed escort. Reports vary, but it appears the crowd misunderstood the actions of the security forces and believed that Ken Saro-Wiwa had been arrested. There was certainly an atmosphere of anger in the crowd. The now angry crowd surged towards the Giokoo meeting hall. Various witnesses the UNPO Mission spoke to reported Ogoni youths standing guard outside the Giokoo meeting.

These youths were seen fighting with the crowd. They also reported attempts to calm the crowd by a number of individuals. What followed is disputed. The government and families of those killed claim NYCOP youths stormed the meeting and targeted only those Chiefs branded by Ken Saro-Wiwa as "vultures". NYCOP representatives deny any responsibility for the attack.

There are even more questions raised by other circumstances around the murders. 'There were rumors that the conservative Ogoni leaders, or "vultures" were to be murdered. Chief Kobani, one of those targeted by the rumors, believed them serious enough to alert the State's Military Administrator. On the day of Chief Kobani's murder he was reported being seen in the company of security personnel. In fact, the whole of Gokana Kingdom experienced a stronger than usual security presence that day. The rumors of murder plans were also taken seriously enough by a number of other conservative leaders to refuse invitations to attend the Giokoo meeting.

Yet another factor is the leaked government memo from Major Okuntimo, the commander of the Internal Security Task Force, written only nine days before the Giokoo murders. In the memo Major Okuntimo outlines a strategy that involves killing Ogoni leaders to justify a military presence:

"Divisions between the elitist Ogoni leadership exists... Recommendations/Strategies: intra-communal/kingdom formulae alternative as discussed to apply. Wasting operations during MOSOP and other gatherings making constant military presence justifiable. Wasting targets occurring across communities and leadership cadres especially vocal individuals of various groups." (For full text of memo see Appendix 4)

For some observers the timing of the murders was suspicious. According to Professor Ake the murders happened just as Ken Saro-Wiwa was engaging the government and pointed to Ken Saro-Wiwa's welcoming of the ministerial commission on problems in oil-bearing communities in January 1994 as proof. Ken was even pushing for Ogoni participation in the Constitutional Conference. Professor Ake acknowledged the problems Ken faced:

"The Ogoni people boycotted the June election and were urging to boycott confab (the constitutional conference) but Ken decided it is better to dialogue so he went back and reversed himself - the people asked why, as all the progressive people were boycotting, but Ken went for peaceful engagement - the Commissioner of Justice was briefed and very much encouraged by it."

## **Murder of Ogoni Chiefs Leads to Military Crackdown**

The day after the murders, the Internal Security Task Force went into operation to arrest murder suspects. They arrested hundreds of young Ogoni men by raiding villages and establishing numerous roadblocks. But the operation was not a police operation - it was a punitive attack on the Ogoni community. In only the first six days of the operation 18 villages were raided by shooting soldiers. They left scores of dead, many

wounded and then looted and burned. The UNPO Mission collected more than 10 eyewitness accounts of Ogoni killed, wounded and raped in these raids.

As a result of these raids many Ogoni people left their villages to take refuge in the bush. Once empty the villages were easily looted and burned. With the 1994 rainy season under way, and no access to proper food or clean water, many of the young and elderly people died from exposure. A 45 year-old Ogoni woman from Pue, Ken Khana, described her experience:

“They came shooting, there was running, I hurt my foot. Army people said to those running, ‘where are your UN people, your international people to fight for your rights?’ We went to bush. I lost my boy, five and girl, three. All I have now (just my clothes) was given to me.”

Human Rights Watch/Africa recorded testimonies from soldiers taking part in the operation who were told they were being sent to repel an incursion by troops of neighboring Cameroon into a disputed border region. One Nigerian soldier described his involvement:

“When we arrived, they told us to shoot everyone who crossed our path. I followed my orders until I realized that the approaching civilians were Nigerians.”

Villages were held to ransom by the security forces, yet after paying the villages were raided anyway. Hundreds of Ogoni youths were taken to Kpor and detained, tortured and those who were not considered politically significant were forced to pay for their release. A 24-year-old from Korokoro-tai, Tai Kingdom, described being forced to sign an undertaking, in the presence of the conservative Chief G.N.K. Gininwa and Major Okuntimo, not to support MOSOP, NYCOP or Ken Saro-Wiwa.

With the taking of hostages and demands for money, many families lost any capital they may have had, while others mortgaged their land and future crops to buy family members out of detention. Since the May 1994 operations, many Ogoni have fallen in economic hardship, compounded by the loss of their houses and possessions.

From August 1994 onwards, villagers slowly began returning to their homes to rebuild their lives. However the UNPO Mission heard of large numbers of displaced persons unable to do so through lack of resources (to rebuild their dwellings) and fear. Amongst the displaced persons in Port Harcourt there were clear signs of underfeeding and some cases of malnutrition.

## **The Trial Against Ogoni Leaders**

Ken Saro-Wiwa was arrested, allegedly for murder, in the early hours of May 22, 1994. Ledum Mitee, the MOSOP Deputy President and a number of other MOSOP supporters were arrested soon after. At present there are more than 30 MOSOP supporters standing trial for the murder of the four Ogoni leaders. Lt. Colonel Komo, the Rivers State military administrator, preempted any judicial findings by announcing to the press, on May 23, 1994 (two days after the murders) that MOSOP leaders, including Ken Saro-Wiwa, were guilty of murdering the four Ogoni leaders, in collaboration with NYCOR. Despite a public verdict from Lt. Col. Komo, the Ogoni leaders were held for eight months before being charged. During the detention the accused Ogoni were beaten, tortured and were denied access to family, lawyers and medical attention.

In November a three-member special tribunal was inaugurated by the Federal government’s Chief Justice to try the detained Ogoni. It was established under a September 1994 edict, entitled Instrument Constituting the Tribunal for the Trial of Offences under the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree 1987. The appointment of the tribunal confirmed observers’ fears that the accused Ogoni would not appear before the civil courts but before a government controlled “special tribunal”. Special tribunals established by the military government in the past, have been condemned by international observers and criticized by

Amnesty International as “grossly unfair”. The composition of the tribunal only confirmed these suspicions as military officer was appointed as one of the three judges.

With growing national and international indignation at their treatment, Ken Saro-Wiwa and Ledum Mitee experienced slightly better conditions. On January 1, 1995 Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other more prominent MOSOP detainees were moved into a new cell block which included improvements such as a small window and a bed. Although there are still detained within a military camp.

While the accused were detained for eight months, without charge, reports surfaced of the government attempts to engineer “star” witnesses who would give testimony that would convict the accused. The UNPO representative met with one of these prosecution witness, Charles Danwi, who described, in detail, the government’s offer of money, a steady income and a house in return for a testimony against the defendants. A second ex-witness, Naayone Nkpah, has since confessed to accepting government bribes for his testimony against the defendants.

On January 28, 1995, Mr Ken Saro-Wiwa, Mr Ledum Mitee, Dr Barinem Nubari Kiobel, Mr John Kpuinien and Mr Baribor Bera were charged on four counts of murder, under item 13, Schedule I, Civil Disturbance (Special Tribunal) Act, Cap. 53, 1990. The charge stated:

“... the 1st, 2nd, 3rd accused persons, counseled and procured the 4th and 5th accused persons and other persons who are at present at large to inflict grievous harm on the participants of the Council of Chiefs meeting at Giokoo...”

The accused, who pleaded not guilty, came before the special Tribunal on February 6, 1995. The proceedings have progressed very slowly with the prosecution only calling its first witness in the beginning of March. The trial is expected to continue for some months. If the trials of other political figures in Nigeria are an indication, this tribunal may never return a verdict.

International observers from foreign embassies and some human rights organizations are attending the Tribunal. However, there is a danger that, as the Tribunal runs into weeks and months, their presence will wane.

On the second day of sitting, Tuesday, February 21, the security forces arrested over 100 people protesting against the Tribunal and took them to Task Force operational-headquarters in Kpor, Ogoniland. There they were divided into Ogoni and non-Ogoni. The Ogoni were asked to pay 10,000 naira while the others were freed unconditionally.

Extra roadblocks before and during Tribunal days are put in place preventing many Ogoni from traveling to Port Harcourt. The level of violence at these roadblocks also increases on hearing days.

## **Current Situation in Ogoniland**

A strong military presence remains in Ogoniland. Roadblocks, maintained by mobile police and soldiers armed with automatic weapons and batons harass those traveling along roads in Ogoniland. The main source of hardship is these roadblocks. Security personnel at the roadblocks extort money and goods from the passing Ogoni, and randomly beat and arrest people. The UNPO Mission recorded a number of incidents of beatings. A 40-year-old man from Bodo, Gokhana Kingdom described one beating:

“At Bere, Kibangha checkpoint, a young boy didn’t hear the soldiers say stop and they pull him from bike and asked why he rode past. He had to carry bicycle above his head as he run up and down, they flogged him. When he tired, bike fall, they flogged him. He collapsed, complaining of chest pains.”

Meanwhile roving security patrols continue to visit villages at night, looting and taking hostages. The hostages are routinely taken to Kpor, the headquarters of the Internal Security Task Force, where they are tortured to encourage their families to find the money to buy their freedom. Various methods of torture were recorded by the UNPO Mission, including beatings, being forced to eat sand and mock executions. Ordinary Ogonis refer to Kpor as “the concentration camp”.

Demonstrations or any sign of support for MOSOP are met with the same military brutality that Ogonis experienced in 1994. A 45 year-old Ogoni woman from Pue, Ken-Khana Kingdom, described her experience of Ogoni Day celebration on January 4, 1995:

“There was 5000 of us (women) singing - army asked, leave the road, we singing with bibles in the hand, they used tear gas, we were running, started whipping us, we ran into the churches, they ran after us.”

A man in his 40s from Yehge village in Gokana told of his sister-in-law who was taking part in the same Ogoni Day celebrations. She was run down by a security vehicle. When his brother went to recover the body at the Military Hospital in Port Harcourt he was asked to pay for it. The brother returned the next day with money he needed to buy her body.

Women are especially affected by the security situation. A number of them reported to the UNPO Mission going to market, being stopped at checkpoints and being forced to pay bribes, equal to what they would earn in a day selling their goods. The women also expressed fear of being raped and said they go farming in groups as a precaution.

The security situation has also limited the operation of MOSOP. Some of the member organizations are not operating because of fear or because the members are in detention. There were a number of reports of paid Ogoni informants who report any support for MOSOP to the authorities. Despite the restrictions the UNPO Mission met with active members of MOSOP, NYCOP and FOWA. There were reports of the security forces actively hunting members of MOSOP and NYCOP using “wanted lists” and offering rewards of up to 600,000 naira. Consequently the organizations are operating underground but with surprising effectiveness.

Some of the Ogoni interviewed also complained of increasing discrimination at work with at least three losing their jobs (in Port Harcourt and Lagos) because of being identified by their employers as MOSOP activists.

Despite the targeting of MOSOP activists and the continuing oppression in Ogoniland the level of support for MOSOP and Ken Saro-Wiwa’s leadership is strong. Every Ogoni the UNPO representative met was asked what the level of support was for MOSOP in their village. Without hesitation, nearly all the interviewees responded with figures between 90% and 99%.

#### **IV. CONCLUSIONS**

The situation in Ogoniland today is a tragic one. The military authorities have imposed a brutal military “occupation”. Daily, the Ogoni’s fundamental human rights are violated, as the security forces in Ogoniland have a free hand to detain, torture, rape, kill, loot and extort. For the ordinary Ogoni person, daily life is dominated by fear.

The psychological, physical and economic cost of this military operation is threatening the long-term viability of the community. The current circumstances are that more devastating for the Ogoni as they are already a people with a history of neglect, marginalization and underdevelopment.

The Ogoni people organized and peacefully protested to improve their situation. Through MOSOP they dramatically transformed the traditional structures of Ogoni society into democratic, participatory organizations that were capable of mass mobilization. Both the Nigerian government and the oil companies, such as Shell, failed to recognize these changes. Or perhaps, it is because they did, and saw the Ogoni example as a threat that such force and violence have been used against them.

## **1. The Federal and State Governments**

The Nigerian Federal and State governments have responded to the Ogoni's non-violent movement with oppressive measures that include the use of brute and excessive force. They have been and continue to be responsible for gross human rights violations in Ogoniland. The military authorities deliberately planned, according to their own documents, campaigns of terror to break the Ogoni movement.

What followed the May 1994 murders of the four Ogoni chiefs in Giokoo was not a police operation to arrest suspects, but a brutal military campaign against the larger Ogoni community. UNPO believes these raids were designed to intimidate the Ogoni people and to crush their support for the Ogoni movement. In late 1993, the Ogoni were attacked, reportedly by neighboring groups. While there is no direct evidence to prove the government was involved, both the sophistication of the attacks and the authorities' unwillingness to intervene leaves little doubt that some form of government sponsorship was involved in the violence. Again, UNPO believes this violence was designed to intimidate the Ogoni people and break their support for MOSOP.

Despite the military oppression most Ogoni people still support and identify with MOSOP and its President, Ken Saro-Wiwa. The recent suffering has only hardened their conviction that Ken Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP will save them.

The current trial of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other Ogoni supporters, should be condemned as a political trial; designed to silence the Ogoni movement. The available evidence suggests that the charges have been trumped-up and the circumstances surrounding the Tribunal reveal a complete lack of fairness and due process. The trial's political nature also denies justice to the families of the murdered leaders.

If the current trial of the Ogoni leaders results in death sentences or other severe sentences for Ken Saro-Wiwa and the others, mass protests will follow. Considering the government's current commitment to the use of force, a massacre of Ogoni people is not unlikely in that event.

## **2. The Oil Companies**

In 1993 Shell Nigeria entered Ogoniland on at least two occasions under military escort, as a result of which Ogoni people were killed and wounded in a number of incidents. On both of these occasions talking with the community would have been a way for Shell to "gauge the reaction of the local communities" and prevented the bloodshed that followed.

While there were no similar incidents in 1994, UNPO remains concerned that Shell Nigeria and Shell International have yet to engage MOSOP in constructive talks.

By refusing to recognize MOSOP and the changing political structures in Ogoniland and to engage MOSOP in 1993 and even in 1994, the company missed an opportunity to contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Ogoni situation.

UNPO is particularly concerned at the link between the abortive Andoni/Ogoni peace accord in October 1993, and Shell's moves, within weeks of the signing, to restart operations at the "earliest feasible time". A

move that was made without consulting MOSOP The Andoni/Ogoni accord did not address the dispute between the Ogoni and Shell Nigeria, yet the company felt there was a connection which justified re-entering Ogoniland under armed escort.

This is just one incident in a sequence of events, references in Shell documents and internal government memos that suggest a link between Shell Nigeria's activities and the cycle of violence that the Ogoni have experienced. While Shell denies any involvement in the violence, it operates in Nigeria's pervasive climate of corruption. Indications are that the company was in close communication with the military authorities at important times in the sequence of events affecting the Ogoni.

While UNPO has no way of confirming the information, UNPO is also concerned at allegations that Shell Nigeria supplied communications equipment, in the form of walkie-talkies, radios and mobile phones, to Major Okuntimo's Internal Security Task Force during the operations in May 1994.

### **3. Conservative Opposition**

There is an internal opposition in the Ogoni movement but its support does not seem to be as widespread as those campaigning against MOSOP suggest. The "splitting" of the Ogoni community seems to affect only the Ogoni elite, with no evidence that kingdoms or villages are pitted against each other.

### **4. The International Community**

UNPO is pleased with the many demarches undertaken by European governments; the E.U. and the U.S. government to the Nigerian government concerning the human rights situation in Ogoniland and concerning the arrest and detention of Ogoni leaders. Nevertheless, UNPO regrets that these international reactions came too late to encourage a peaceful resolution of the situation. The international community did not provide sufficient support for MOSOP at a time it was needed and failed to recognize the importance and impact of a movement for social change that employs non-violence.

### **5. The Future**

If the grievances of the Ogoni people are not addressed by the government and the oil companies, such as Shell, the situation will worsen, not only in Ogoniland but generally in the oil producing regions of Nigeria.

Improvement in the situation for the Ogoni people is unlikely while the military dictatorship of General Abacha remains. He has shown no willingness to use peaceful means towards resolving any of the Ogoni's legitimate demands. This inflexibility coupled with the use of military oppression is increasing tensions in an already unstable region of the country.

There is strong evidence to suggest neighboring peoples, facing similar problems and harboring the same grievances as the Ogoni, will follow their example.

## **V. RECOMMENDATIONS**

To prevent any more bloodshed and suffering, and to begin a process towards resolving the problems in Ogoniland, UNPO recommends that:

The Nigerian government and the Rivers State government:

- withdraw the Internal Security Task Force from Ogoniland and reinstall a civil authority and Ogoni police;
- release all Ogoni not charged with offences and ensure fair trials, in civil courts, for those charged;
- begin independent investigations into human rights abuses perpetrated by members of the Nigerian military and security forces;
- provide emergency shelter and aid to Ogoni refugees and homeless;
- open a dialogue with Mr Ken Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP leaders in an effort to restore peace and stability in Ogoniland.

Shell and other oil companies:

- open talks with MOSOP and its elected representatives towards creating an atmosphere of trust;
- use whatever influence the companies have to persuade the Nigerian government to withdraw soldiers from Ogoniland, release all Ogoni prisoners;
- not to conduct any operations in Ogoniland that could provoke further conflict or increase tensions with the communities;
- ensure the Niger Delta environmental survey, announced in February 1995, is as objective as possible and that it allows MOSOP to participate.

MOSOP and the Ogoni community:

- maintain the commitment to the use of non-violence;
- continue to keep the international community and other relevant parties informed of violations of human rights in Ogoniland;
- maintain the functioning of MOSOP and member organizations while recognizing the difficulties of the circumstances.

International community:

- call for the release of Ken Saro-Wiwa and all Ogoni prisoners;
- pressure the Nigerian government to withdraw all military forces from Ogoniland, respect human rights, and open dialogue with MOSOP and its leaders;
- provide relief and assistance so displaced Ogoni may return and reconstruct their villages.
- governments should inform themselves better of the real situation in Ogoniland through their embassies in Lagos.

## **Appendices**

**Appendix 1: Extract from the Ogoni Bill of Rights, October 1990**

**Appendix 2: MOSOP Action Against Vigilante Groups**

**Appendix 3: Ogoni Demands to the Federal Government of Nigeria**

**Appendix 4: Major Okuntimo's Secret Memo**

**Appendix 5: Shell's Internal Memo, February 1993**

**Appendix 6: Extract of MOSOP Document Outlining Ogoni Demands, September 1993**

**Appendix 7: NYCOP Memo**

**Appendix 8: Developments in Ogoniland, Nigeria**

## OGONI BILL OF RIGHTS

### PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF NIGERIA

We, the people of Ogoni (Babbe, Gokana, Ken Khana, Nyo Khana and Tai) numbering about 500,000 being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within the Federal Republic of Nigeria, wish to draw the attention of the Governments and people of Nigeria to the undermentioned facts:

1. That the Ogoni people, before the advent of British colonialism, were not conquered or colonized by any other ethnic group in present-day Nigeria.
2. That British colonization forced us into the administrative division of Opobo from 1908 to 1947.
3. That we protested against this forced union until the Ogoni Native Authority was created in 1947 and placed under the then Rivers Province.
4. That in 1951 we were forcibly included in the Eastern Region of Nigeria where we suffered utter neglect.
5. That we protested against this neglect by voting against the party in power in the Region in 1957, and against the forced union by testimony before the Willink Commission of Inquiry into Minority Fears in 1958.
6. That this protest led to the inclusion of our nationality in Rivers State in 1967, which State consists of several ethnic nationalities with differing cultures, languages and aspirations.
7. That oil was struck and produced in commercial quantities on our land in 1958 at K. Dere (Bomu oilfield).
8. That oil has been mined on our land since 1958 to this day from the following oilfields: (i) Bomu (ii) Bodo West (iii) Tai (iv) Korokoro (v) Yorla (vi) Lubara Creek and (vii) Afam by Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nigeria) Limited.
9. That in over 30 years of oil mining, the Ogoni nationality have provided the Nigerian nation with a total revenue estimated at over 40 billion Naira (N40 billion) or 30 billion dollars.
10. That in return for the above contribution, the Ogoni people have received NOTHING.
11. That today, the Ogoni people have:
  - (i) No representation whatsoever in ALL institutions of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
  - (ii) No pipe-borne water.
  - (iii) No electricity.
  - (iv) No job opportunities for the citizens in Federal, State, public sector or private sector companies.
  - (v) No social or economic project of the Federal Government.
12. That the Ogoni languages of Gokana and Khana are undeveloped and are about to disappear, whereas other Nigerian languages are being forced on us.
13. That the ethnic policies of successive Federal and State Governments are gradually pushing the Ogoni people to slavery and possible extinction.
14. That the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited does not employ Ogoni people at a meaningful or any level at all, in defiance of the Federal government's regulations.
15. That the search for oil has caused severe land and food shortages in Ogoni one of the most densely populated areas of Africa (average: 1,500 per square mile; national average: 300 per square mile).

16. That neglectful environmental pollution laws and sub-standard inspection techniques of the Federal authorities have led to the complete degradation of the Ogoni environment, turning our homeland into an ecological disaster.
17. That the Ogoni people lack education, health and other social facilities.
18. That it is intolerable that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow in abject poverty and destitution.
19. That successive Federal administrations have trampled on every minority right enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution to the detriment of the Ogoni and have by administrative structuring and other noxious acts transferred Ogoni wealth exclusively to other parts of the Republic.
20. That the Ogoni people wish to manage their own affairs.

Now, therefore, while reaffirming our wish to remain a part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, we make demand upon the Republic as follows:

That the Ogoni people be granted POLITICAL AUTONOMY to participate in the affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit by whatever name called, provided that this Autonomy guarantees the following:

- (a) Political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people.
- (b) The right to the control and use of a fair proportion of OGONI economic resources for Ogoni development.
- (c) Adequate and direct representation as of right in all Nigerian national institutions.
- (d) The use and development of Ogoni languages in Ogoni territory.
- (e) The full development of Ogoni culture.
- (f) The right to religious freedom.
- (g) The right to protect the OGONI environment and ecology from further degradation.

We make the above demand in the knowledge that it does not deny any other ethnic group in the Nigerian Federation of their rights and that it can only conduce to peace, justice and fairplay and hence stability and progress in the Nigerian nation.

We make the above demand in the belief that, as Obafemi Awolowo has written: *In a true Federation, each ethnic group no matter how small, is entitled to the same treatment as any other ethnic group, no matter how large.*

We demand these rights as equal members of the Nigerian Federation who contribute and have contributed to the growth of the Federation and have a right to expect full returns from that Federation.

Adopted by general acclaim of the Ogoni people on the 26th day of August, 1990 at Bori, Rivers State and signed by: (see under).

## ADDENDUM TO THE OGONI BILL OF RIGHTS

We, the people of Ogoni, being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within the Federal Republic of Nigeria, hereby state as follows:

- A. That on October 2, 1990 we addressed an "Ogoni Bill of Rights" to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida and members of the Armed Forces Ruling Council;
- B. That after a one-year wait, the President has been unable to grant us the audience which we sought to have with him in order to discuss the legitimate demands contained in the Ogoni Bill of Rights;
- C. That our demands as outlined in the Ogoni Bill of Rights are legitimate, just and our inalienable right and in accord with civilized values worldwide;
- D. That the Government of the Federal Republic has continued, since October 2, 1990, to decree measures and implement policies which further marginalize the Ogoni people, denying us political

autonomy, our rights to our resources, to the development of our languages and culture, to adequate representation as of right in all Nigerian national institutions and to the protection of our environment and ecology from further degradation;

- E. That we cannot sit idly by while we are, as a people, dehumanized and slowly exterminated and driven to extinction even as our rich resources are siphoned off to the exclusive comfort and improvement of other Nigerian communities, and the shareholders of multinational oil companies.

Now, therefore, while re-affirming our wish to remain a part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, we hereby authorize the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) to make representation, for as long as these injustices continue, to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the European Community and all international bodies which have a role to play in the preservation of our nationality, as follows:

1. That the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has, in utter disregard and contempt for human rights, since independence in 1960 till date, denied us our political rights to self-determination, economic rights to our resources, cultural rights to the development of our languages and culture, and social rights to education, health and adequate housing and to representation as of right in national institutions;
2. That, in particular, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has refused to pay us oil royalties and mining rents amounting to an estimated 20 billion US dollars for petroleum mined from our soil for over thirty-three years;
3. That the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria does not protect any of our rights whatsoever as an ethnic minority of 500,000 in a nation of about 100 million people and that the voting power and military might of the majority ethnic groups have been used remorselessly against us at every point in time;

4. That multi-national oil companies, namely Shell (Dutch/British) and Chevron (American) have severally and jointly devastated our environment and ecology, having flared gas in our villages for 33 years and caused oil spillages, blow-outs etc., and have dehumanized our people, denying them employment and those benefits which industrial organizations in Europe and America routinely contribute to their areas of operation;
5. That the Nigerian elite (bureaucratic, military, industrial and academic) have turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to these acts of dehumanization by the ethnic majority and have colluded with all the agents of destruction aimed at us;
6. That we cannot seek restitution in the courts of law in Nigeria as the act of expropriation of our rights and resources has been institutionalized in the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which Constitutions were acts of a Constituent Assembly imposed by a military regime and do not, in any way, protect minority rights or bear resemblance to the tacit agreement made at Nigerian independence;
7. That the Ogoni people abjure violence in their just struggle for their rights within the Federal Republic of Nigeria but will, through every lawful means, and for as long as is necessary, fight for social justice and equity for themselves and their progeny, and in particular demand political autonomy as a distinct and separate unit within the Nigerian nation with full right to (i) control Ogoni political affairs, (ii) use at least fifty per cent of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development; (iii) protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation; (iv) ensure the full restitution of the harm done to the health of our people by the flaring of gas, oil spillages, oil blow-outs, etc. by the following oil companies: Shell, Chevron and their Nigerian accomplices.
8. That without the intervention of the international community, the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the ethnic majority will continue these noxious policies until the Ogoni people are obliterated from the face of the earth.

Adopted by general acclaim of the Ogoni people on the 26th day of August 1991 at Bori, Rivers State of Nigeria.

Signed on behalf of the Ogoni people by:

**BABBE:** HRH Mark Tsaro-Igbara, Gbenemene Babbe; HRH F.M.K. Noryau, Menebua, Ka-Babbe; Chief M.A.M. Tornwe III, JP; Prince J.S. Sangha; Dr. Israel-Kue; Chief A.M.N. Gua.

**GOKANA:** HRH James P. Bagla, Gberesako XI, Gberemene Gokana; Chief E.N. Kobani, JP Tonsimene Gokana; Dr B.N. Birabi; Chief Kemte Giadom, JP; Chief S.N. Orage.

**KEN-KHANA:** HRH M. H. S. Eguru, Gbenemene Ken-Khana; HRH C.B.S. Nwikina, Emah III, Menebua Bom; Mr M.C. Daanwii; Chief T.N. Nwike; Mr Ken Saro-Wiwa; Mr Simeon Idemyor.

**NYO-KHANA:** HRH W.Z.P. Nzidee, Genemene Baa I of Nyo-Khana; Dr G.B. Leton, OON, JP; Mr Lekue Lah-Loolo; Mr L.E. Mwara; Chief E.A. Apenu; Pastor M.P. Maeba.

**TAI:** HRH B.A. Mballey, Gbenemene Tai; HRH G.N. Gininwa, Menebua Tua Tua; Chief J.S. Agbara; Chief D.J.K. Kumbe; Chief Fred Gwezia; HRH A. Demor-Kanni, Menebua Nonwa.

#### **THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD:**

1. Prevail on the American Government to stop buying Nigerian oil. It is stolen property.
2. Prevail on Shell and Chevron to stop flaring gas in Ogoni.
3. Prevail on the Federal Government of Nigeria to honour the rights of the Ogoni people to self-determination and AUTONOMY.
4. Prevail on the Federal Government of Nigeria to pay all royalties and mining rents collected on oil mined from Ogoni since 1958.
5. Prevail on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to stop giving loans to the Federal Government of Nigeria; all loans which

depend for their repayment on the exploitation of Ogoni oil resources.

6. Send urgent medical and other aid to the Ogoni people.
7. Prevail on the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth of Nations to either get the Federal Government of Nigeria to obey the rules and mores of these organizations, face sanctions or be expelled from them.
8. Prevail on European and American Governments to stop giving aid and credit to the Federal Government of Nigeria as aid and credit only go to encourage the further dehumanization of the Ogoni people.
9. Prevail on European and American Governments to grant political refugee status to all Ogoni people seeking protection from the political persecution and genocide at the hands of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
10. Prevail on Shell and Chevron to pay compensation to the Ogoni people for ruining the Ogoni environment and the health of Ogoni men, women and children.

MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF OGONI PEOPLE  
(M O S O P)

24 Aggrey Road,  
P. O. Box 193,  
Port Harcourt,  
NIGERIA.

10th November, 1993.

TO:

ALL TRADITIONAL RULERS -  
VILLAGE HEADS  
CDC CHAIRMEN  
ALL OGONI PEOPLE

PUBLIC NOTICE

The attention of MOSOP has been drawn to reports of activities of certain persons who are said to be engaging in several acts of lawlessness and wanton destruction of lives and property in Ogoni villages.

Available reports indicate that these people claiming to be acting on behalf or with the support of MOSOP or NYCOP have been arrogating to themselves powers of intervention in disputes of all kinds.

MOSOP condemns in unmistakable terms the activities of such persons who are believed to be sponsored by enemies of Ogoni people for the sole purpose of discrediting MOSOP. For the avoidance of doubt MOSOP disassociates itself and all its component organs from the activities.

Ogoni people are hereby warned against bringing any disputes before this group but to always report cases requiring MOSOP attention to the Conference of Traditional Rulers (COTRA) and/or to MOSOP offices which have now been opened in all Kingdoms. Traditional Rulers and all Ogonis are hereby advised that on no account should any person be harmed, molested or his property destroyed on a witchcraft allegation or for other reasons.

SEE MOSOP PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 5, 1993.

MOSOP stands for truth and justice and does not support any acts of lawlessness in any shape or form.

NB All village Heads (Members of COTRA) should ensure that their towncriers announce this in all villages and towns in Ogoni, WITHOUT delay.

  
G. A. NIFE, Esq  
DEPUTY PRESIDENT, MOSOP  
FOR: MOSOP PRESIDENT & O  
SPOKESMAN OF THE OGONI PEOPLE.

MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF OGONI PEOPLE  
(MOSOP)

24 Aggrey Road, P. O. Box 193, Port Harcourt, Nigeria  
Tel: 084-331763/335658 Fax: 234-84-331763

20th January, 1994.

The Commander,  
Peace Keeping Force,  
Bori.


PEACE AND SECURITY IN OGONI

We have reports that the following are at the head of a group of hoodlums threatening security of life and property in Ogoni :

1. Nwinka Asiga (alias Kuti) of Hogho
2. De Ekpere of Luubara.
3. Nathan Neebani of Beeri.
2. We will be grateful if you will have them arrested and put away for a time to give us opportunity to, if the rest of the groups they head behave properly henceforth.
3. We shall, after studying the situation, identify other hoodlums when necessary and pass their names to you for appropriate action.
4. We will cooperate with you fully henceforth to ensure security in Ogoni.

Thanks,

Yours faithfully,

  
KEN SARO - WIWA.

CC:

The Camp Commandant  
Bori Camp P. H.

President: Ken Saro-Wiwa. Secretary: Dr B.B.B. Nnamo

THE OGONI CASE

A. POLITICAL PROBLEM

As a distinct and culturally unique entity, it has remained manifest over the entire period of our national independence that the Ogoni require a measure of control of their own destiny. This fact manifests now as it did before our national independence in 1960. The issue at stake is a matter of dangerous marginalisation. There is need to reverse this situation if the Ogonis are to survive in the Nigerian nation. These are the reasons for holding that the granting of a state will be the answer. Such a State is to be made up of thirteen (13) LGAs.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION:

Arising from 35 years of oil exploration and exploitation land has not only been seriously polluted but extensively diminished in an area of the highest population density in Africa. The same degree of pollution has taken place with regard to water and air with dangerous consequences on farming, fishing and the health of the people. In sum, oil exploration and exploitation have become a disaster for the Ogonis. Since these activities must continue in the interest of the nation, it is necessary:

- i) that steps be taken to ensure that oil exploitation is done in a manner to safeguard our environment;
- ii) that all pipes be buried down to a reasonable and safe depth;
- iii) that gas flaring should be stopped; and
- iv) that a special fund controlled by the Ogoni people be created for the remedy of the damage enumerated above.

...../2.

It is emphasized that the proposals in 'B' can be achieved if 'A' above is granted.


C. ECONOMIC DEPRESSION:

The combination of A and B above has led to severe economic depression of Ogoniland and its people. To reverse this situation, definitive action will need to be taken in the areas of:


- i) Employment;
- ii) Education;
- iii) Appointments and representation in national bodies;
- iv) Social development in roads, electricity and water, health and housing.

D. INVOLVEMENT IN THE OIL INDUSTRY

Since oil industry has dislocated the traditional economy of the Ogoni people, they will need to be specially involved in all facets of the industry - employment, appointments, marketing and downstream industries. Because of our near total exclusion from other areas of the economy, special arrangements will need to be made to put this in place.

  
Dr. G. B. LETON

  
Chief E. N. KOBANI

  
Mr. K. B. SARO-WIWA

  
Mr. A. T. BADEY.



RESTRICTED      RESTRICTED      RESTRICTED  
RIVERS STATE INTERNAL SECURITY TASK FORCE, GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PH.

M E M O

TO:      HIS EXCELLENCY THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR RIVERS STATE  
FROM:    THE CHAIRMAN RIVERS STATE INTERNAL SECURITY (RSIS)  
SUBJECT: RSIS OPERATIONS: LAW AND ORDER IN OGOINI, ETC

OBSERVATIONS:

- POLICE IN OGOINI REMAIN INEFFECTIVE SINCE 1993.
- SHELL OPERATIONS STILL IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS RUTHLESS MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE UNDERTAKEN FOR SMOOTH ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES TO COMMENCE.
- SARA IBO AND OPOBO BORDERS INADVISABLE BECAUSE OF INACCESSIBILITY. ADDED TO DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN OPOBO/ANDONI MAKING COOPERATION BY THE FORMER UNREALISABLE.
- DIVISION BETWEEN THE ELITIST OGOINI LEADERSHIP EXISTS.
- EITHER BLOC LEADERSHIP LACKS ADEQUATE INFLUENCE TO DEFY NYCOP DECISIVE RESISTANCE TO OIL PRODUCTION UNLESS REPARATION OF 400 MILLION DOLLARS PAID WITH ARREARS OF INTEREST TO MOSOP AND KEN SARO-WIWA.

RECOMMENDATIONS/STRATEGIES:

- INTRA-COMMUNAL/KINGDOM FORMULAE ALTERNATIVE AS DISCUSSED TO APPLY.
- WASTING OPERATIONS DURING MOSOP AND OTHER GATHERINGS MAKING CONSTANT MILITARY PRESENCE JUSTIFIABLE.
- WASTING TARGETS CUTTING ACROSS COMMUNITIES AND LEADERSHIP CADRES ESPECIALLY VOCAL INDIVIDUALS IN VARIOUS GROUPS.
- DEPLOYMENT OF 400 MILITARY PERSONNEL (OFFICERS AND MEN).
- NEW CHECKPOINTS SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT FROM OPERATION ORDER NO. 4/94 DATED 21/4/94 BY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE RIVERS STATE COMMAND.
- DIRECT DAILY REPORT TO MILAD.

RESTRICTED      RESTRICTED      RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED      RESTRICTED      RESTRICTED

- WASTING OPERATIONS COUPLED WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL TACTICS OF DISPLACEMENT/WASTING AS NOTED ABOVE.
- PRESS MONITOR AND LOBBY.
- RESTRICTION OF UNAUTHORISED VISITORS ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM EUROPE TO THE OGOINI.
- MONTHLY PRESS BRIEFING BY CHAIRMAN, RIVERS STATE INTERNAL SECURITY (RSIS).

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS (ESTIMATES/FUNDING):

- INITIAL DISBURSEMENT OF 50 MILLION NAIRA AS ADVANCED ALLOWANCES TO OFFICERS AND MEN AND FOR LOGISTICS TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT AS AGREED.
- ECOMOG ALLOWANCE RATES APPLICABLE AS EARLIER DISCUSSED.
- PRESSURE ON OIL COMPANIES FOR PROMPT REGULAR INPUTS AS DISCUSSED.
- OMPADEC STANDS BY AS ARRANGED.

REMARKS:

- THE IKWERRE-IJAW-AHOUDA (OGAGI) AGENDA FOR SKELETAL OPERATIONS UNTIL FULL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES COMMENCE IN OGOINI.
- SURVEILLANCE ON OGOINI LEADERS CONSIDERED AS SECURITY RISKS/MOSOP PROPELLERS.
- PRESENT SSG OBVIOUSLY SENSITIVE (OGBAKOR/IKWERRE CONNECTION).
- MOSIEND AND MORETO IN IJAWS TERRITORY AS TARGETS FOR CLAMP DOWN.
- MODIFICATIONS OF PROGRAMME CONTINUOUSLY.
- RUTHLESS OPERATIONS AND HIGH LEVEL AUTHORITY FOR THE TASK FORCE EFFECTIVENESS.
- DIRECT SUPERVISION BY MILAD TO AVOID UNRULY INTERFERENCE BY OTHER SUPERIOR OFFICERS.
- RSIS INDEPENDENCE NECESSARY DESPITE SOME MOSOP INPUTS.

NOTE

This secret govt. memo, obtained two days ago, forms the basis of the present military operation in Ogoni. It vindicates MOSOP's position that the Ogoni crisis is contrived by the govt. and Shell to provide an opportunity for the military crackdown to enable Shell resume operation in Ogoni as well as act as a deterrent to other oil-producing communities.

12/05/94

RSIS/MILAD/L00/94004

RESTRICTED      RESTRICTED      RESTRICTED

FROM: GMB

TO: MD, DMD, GMC, GMH, GME, GMW

Meeting at Central Offices on Community Relations and Environment  
(15/16th February in London, 18th February in The Hague)

Attached are draft minutes of the meetings held with advisers last week in SIPC and SIPM on Community Relations and Environment. They should provide background for discussions on the same subjects at the SPDC Strategy Review on 26/2/93.

  
N.A. ACHEBE

22nd February, 1993

cc: HSEL, HSEE, HSEW  
PAGL, PAGE, PAGW.

File note

(following meetings on 15/16 February with Achebe, Oduku and Okonkwo)

The overriding PA issue facing Shell in Nigeria comes under the overall umbrella of community relations. In reality it is, in fact, a clustering of important issues, both for SPDC and the Group. It is commonly felt that other parts of the nation are benefiting from oil more than those who live in the oil-producing states, and this manifests itself in community attacks on installations, disrupting operations.

The problem is not restricted to Nigeria; it has been thrust into UK sitting rooms through the TV programme "The Heat of the Moment" and the information has spread, most recently in the Netherlands and Australia. International networking, most prominently so far involving the Ogoni tribe and Ken Saro-Wiwa, is at work and gives rise to the possibility that internationally organised protest could develop.

Ken Saro-Wiwa is using his influence at a number of meetings, last year in Geneva at the UN Commission on Human Rights and, most recently, one organised in the Netherlands by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (despite its acronym, UNPO, is not a UN offshoot). However, WIP (the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples), based in Amsterdam, is also involved and networks with organisations such as Amnesty International and Survival International (these organisations have in the past corresponded with Shell on matters relating to our involvement in countries with oppressive regimes and undermining the lot of indigenous peoples). Ken Saro-Wiwa/UNPO will be using every opportunity made available by 1993 being the UN's declared Year for Indigenous Peoples.

The attack is focused on Shell as it is perceived to be rich and powerful; it also alleges collusion with the government in the repression of local indigenous peoples, using the Uouchem massacre as an example. And standards of health, safety and treatment of the environment have been brought to question, particularly relating to oil spills (the majority of incidents arise from operational failures, but the greatest volume is due to sabotage) and flaring. With both there are perceived health risks and a waste of national resources. There is an inference of double standards, that standards in Nigeria are way behind those in places elsewhere, particularly in OECD countries. Yet it is stated that something will be done in the EP booklet "A Matter of Commitment". For instance, it says: "Great efforts are being made to reduce flaring and venting....the main drive is to find markets for the gas."

Exacerbating these problems are encroachment by communities onto company lands (resulting from the high rate of population growth and shortage of land in oil-producing areas), the country's general economic decline, the challenge to traditional leaders by educated,

unemployed youth and the perception that community projects undertaken so far have had little real impact are little more than tokenism

The main thrust of the activists now seems to be directed at achieving recognition of the problems of oil-producing areas by using the media and pressure groups. By concentrating accusations against Shell, especially internationally, they feel that the publicity generated will have greater impact.

Herein lies risk for Shell. Urgent attention, therefore, is being directed to the issue. The problems of the communities in the oil-producing areas are recognised. In the absence of real government action to ensure that the 1.5% (now 3%) fund has provided any significant benefits for these communities, SPDC has given some help, concentrating on agriculture, education and health care.

No matter what Shell does in the way of endeavouring to improve public relations, SPDC will be under pressure until the communities feel that their case is being heard and that real benefits start to flow from the 3% committee. Meanwhile HSE aspects of SPDC's operational activities will require particular attention. Priority will have to be paid to:

- \* spills - reducing the incidence from operations - this will involve improving staff motivation and training
- \* reduce flaring - a high priority
- \* gas gathering - having been one of the promulgators of the associated gas framework agreement, SPDC is losing ground as competitors propose practical schemes
- \* air and water quality - a need to work with consultants and the government (FEPA) to monitor standards and improve understanding, so a sense of realism can be given to growing accusations
- \* encroachment - reassess present methods of negotiation and levels of payment for land required by SPDC, also reassess the real needs for land in terms of technological advances and especially in more populated areas - there is also a need to assess what can be done where encroachment already represents a high level of risk
- \* PA staff - ensure that the quality and levels of staff are of a professional standard suitable to undertake these sensitive activities - training will be required, workshops are already planned for 1993 in conjunction with Group PA (PAR)
- \* consultants like IITA will need to be involved to monitor the performance of existing agricultural projects
- \* youth programmes - renewed urgency should be given to reviewing possibilities for introducing employment programmes
- \* indigenes - SPDC and SIPC PA departments to keep each other more closely informed to ensure that movements of key players, what they say and to whom is more effectively monitored to avoid unpleasant surprises and adversely affect the reputation of the Group as a whole

- \* media relations - need quality improvement to respond to questioning from international press on matters that may have an impact on the Group's reputation
- \* employee communications - need to be more effective in demonstrating to staff work already undertaken by SPDC to help communities and HSE efforts already under way in vital parts of the business, together with their need to be vigilant, especially in safety and environmental matters, thus mobilising their support

**Appendix 6: Extract of MOSOP Document Outlining Ogoni Demands,  
September 1993**

**MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF OGONI PEOPLE  
(MOSOP)**

24 Aggrey Road, P. O. Box 193, Port Harcourt, Nigeria  
Tel: 084-331763/335658 Fax: 234-84-331763

SHELL'S RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE OGONI PEOPLE.

1. Environmental Impact Assessment Study of Shell's activity in Ogoniland over the last 35 years.
2. Social Impact Assessment Study of Shell's activity in Ogoni land since 1958.
3. Compensation for the dislocation of Ogoni economic life 1958-1993.
4. Restoration of the destroyed environment: bury all pipes, stop gas flaring, restore mangrove forests, rejuvenate destroyed land.
5. Assessment of the health of the Ogoni people, particularly of all those who have lived in close proximity to gas flares for 35 years. Provision of general hospitals and specialist hospitals in Ogoniland.
6. Immediate supply of pipe-borne water and electricity to all of Ogoniland.
7. Payment of compensation for Bomu Oil blow-out, Ebubu oil blow-out, Afam oil blowout; spillages in Biara and Botem.
8. Adequate compensation for victims of Biara shooting and the death of Agbarator Otu of Nonwa.
9. Compliance with motion passed by the Rivers State House of Assembly and the Demand Notice of MOSOP dated 3rd December, 1992.
10. Provision of alternative employment within Shell organization for all those displaced by Shell's activities.
11. Land Use Study of Ogoniland to determine how much land must be reserved for agricultural, residential, recreational and industrial purposes in order to preserve Ogoniland as a viable community with sustainable development. Determine how much land Ogoni can spare for the activities of Shell and the cost of such land.
12. Payment of tenement rate for Shell installations on Ogoniland since 1958.
13. Review and payment of land rent for all land seized by Shell from Ogoni landlords from 1958 till date.
14. Provision of adequate housing for all those affected by Shell's activities in Ogoniland.
15. Payment of rents and royalties for oil and gas mined in Ogoniland.
16. Establishment of model farms, nature park and fish farms.
17. Resettlement of displaced villagers in modern towns.



Ken Saro-Wiwa  
President and Spokesman of the Ogoni People

NATIONAL YOUTH COUNCIL OF OGONI PEOPLE  
(NYCOP)  
Office of the National President

24 Aggrey Road, P. O. Box 193, Port Harcourt. Tel: 084-33565858, Fax: 234-84-331763

January 13, 1994

To: NYCOP Vice Presidents  
NYCOP Co-ordinators/Secretaries  
NYCOP Chapter Chairmen/Secretaries

From: National Headquarters  
NYCOP  
24 Aggrey Road, PH

MEMO

As part of measures to re-organise NYCOP, the National Executive Council (NEC) met on Monday 10th January, 1994 and resolved as follows:

- (a) That city/village chapters, National Territory Bori, Ben Ogoi Special Unit and the six kingdoms as well as the National Secretariat, should up-date the register of members and forward same to the National Headquarters. The National Vice Presidents/Co-ordinators are directed to set up a five (5) man committee in their area of jurisdiction to co-ordinate the assignment within two weeks. Expenses on transportation should reach the National Headquarters with the completed assignment latest 24th January, 1994.
- (b) Financial records should be updated and submitted. (Registration list) Deadline 24/01/94.
- (c) Nominees for Representative Assembly which will be followed by the General Assembly. Deadline for submission - 14th February, 1994.
- (d) On I. D. Cards, National Vice Presidents/Co-ordinator should endorse the Membership Lists for the issuance of I. D. Cards to members at the city/village/kingdom levels. Deadline for submission 31st January, 1994.
- (e) All members at the National level should endeavour to obtain their I. D. Cards before the end of January, 1994. Those who failed, will have to wait until all the city/village chapters kingdoms have been issued.
- (f) City/village/kingdom reports covering 1993 should reach the National Secretariat by the second week of February, 1994. The reports must be typed and will be included in a Nycop publication.
- (g) Elections should be conducted by city/village/kingdoms/units where there are vacancies or where new chapters were recently set up. Officers which are not effective should also be replaced with immediate effect. All the elections must be observed by at least one representative of the NEC. Deadline for submission of lists of old and newly elected officers is 31st January, 1994.
- (h) The Nycop Constitution should guide all concerned in the implementation of the above directives. Members are directed to attend all meetings with their copies of the constitution for effective guidance.

Appendix 7: NYCOP Memo

- (1) Co-ordinators are further directed to establish Nycop chapters in communities which have not done so and Nycop members must ensure that they join other affiliates of Mosop to form Mosop committees in their cities/villages without delay.

Please note that delay in implementing any of the above directives will be to the disadvantage of those concerned as every programme will go ahead as planned.

Nycop plans to produce a comprehensive National Register soon.

Remain active in our struggle for survival.

*Goodluck Diigbo*  
Goodluck Diigbo  
National President, NYCOP.

## Appendix 8: Developments in Ogoniland, Nigeria

August 1990 - March 1995

August 26, 1990: Ogoni leaders sign the Ogoni Bill of Rights, describing Ogoni demands. It is later presented to the Nigerian Federal government.

August 26, 1991: Ogoni leaders meet again. After no response from the government, the Ogoni Bill of Rights is amended to authorize the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People to take the Ogoni case to the international community.

July, 1992: Ken Saro-Wiwa, Ogoni spokesperson, addresses the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva.

January 4, 1993: 300,000 Ogoni peacefully protest against Shell Oil activities and the environmental destruction of Ogoniland. It is the Ogoni's first mass demonstration.

January 26: MOSOP, representing the Ogoni people, becomes a member of UNPO. Ken Saro-Wiwa is elected Vice-chairperson.

February 15-16: Shell International advisors meet with Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) in London (later in The Hague, February 18) to consider strategies for countering the "possibility that internationally organized protest could develop" over Shell's activities in Ogoni.

February 26: The One Naira Ogoni Survival Fund is launched, inviting every Ogoni woman, man and child to commit to the struggle.

March 13: National Ogoni Vigil is held. Thousands of Ogoni came out at night to hold a candlelight vigil.

April 18: Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP spokesperson, held by the state security service at Port Harcourt International Airport for 16 hours without charges, released, but arrested again 5 days later.

April 29: NYCOP organizes peaceful demonstration in **Port** Harcourt at the continued arrest and harassment of Ogoni leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa.

April 30: Construction work on Shell's Rumuekpe-Bomu Pipeline destroys freshly planted Ogoni farmland sparking what begins as a peaceful demonstration of approximately 10,000 Ogoni. Soldiers from the Second Amphibious Brigade then open fire on demonstrators, wounding at least 10 and leaving Mrs. Karalolo Korgbara, mother of five in critical condition.

May 1: Mass demonstrations along Bori Road against the pipeline construction continue. Shell withdraws the American workers, supplied by Willbros. Equipment is removed from Bomu oilfield area the next day.

May 2: The Federal government issues the Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree, making the call for minority autonomy treasonable.

May 3: Mr. Agbarator Otu dies after being shot in the back by Nigerian military soldiers while protesting work on the pipeline at Nonwa.

May 7: Ogoni leaders meet with the Federal government

May 16: Mr. Saro-Wiwa has his passport seized while trying to leave for London.

May 24: Mr. Saro-Wiwa begins a European tour and succeeds in drawing attention to the struggle of the Ogoni people.

Jun 2: MOSOP Steering Committee meeting votes 11 to 7 to boycott Presidential elections. Dr. Leton, MOSOP president and Chief Kobani, MOSOP deputy president, resign

June 12: Nigerian presidential elections are boycotted by the Ogoni  
A ruptured pipeline begins to spray oil in Bunu Tai, Ogoniland. 40 days later, oil still flows from the pipe.  
Mr. Saro-Wiwa is prevented from traveling to the UN conference in Vienna by Nigerian security service, his passport seized.

June 21: Mr. Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP officials including Mr. G.B. Dube, Mr. Kaban Nwree and Ms. Victoria Deeyor are arrested. Ogoni take to the streets of Port Harcourt to demand their release.

June 22: Ogoni people march in Bori, in protest against MOSOP arrests. In reaction, Second Amphibious Brigade soldiers are moved from Port Harcourt and stationed in Bon.  
Indiscriminate beatings and arrests of Ogoni people by "heavy armed and unfriendly Nigerian soldiers and police" (MOSOP release June 24) are frequent.

July 6: MOSOP Steering Committee elects Ken Saro-Wiwa as new president in absentia and Ledum Mitee as deputy president.

July 9: Over 100 Ogoni people massacred by men claiming to be Andoni while returning from Cameroon by boat. This 'incident' marks the beginning of Ogoni-Andoni violence

Mid July: Mr Saro-Wiwa is moved to a hospital and later released on bail, but the charges still stand.

July 20: Most Ogoni police officers are transferred out of Ogoniland.

August 5: Kaa is the first village attacked in the Andoni-Ogoni conflict, resulting in over 100 deaths and 8,000 refugees. Over the coming months, similar incidents occur in over 20 other villages creating an enormous refugee problem. MOSOP accuses Shell of being behind the Andoni-Ogoni violence.

August 31: MOSOP leaders summoned to Abuja for meeting with Interim Government, installed by president Babangida after the annulment of the election results.

Early September: Mr. Saro-Wiwa, Senator Birabi and representatives of Rivers State Security Council visit the destroyed village Kaa and urge Governor Ada George to take measures to curb the Andoni-Ogoni violence. Meetings are arranged between Andoni and Ogoni leaders and government representatives. This leads to the creation of a Peace Committee, headed by Prof. Claude Ake.

September 15: General Abacha promises Mr. Saro-Wiwa that federal troops will be sent to Ogoni land to help curb the Andoni-Ogoni violence.

September 25: MOSOP begins its first leadership course to train leaders in the various MOSOP member organizations.

September 30: Ogoni Relief and Rehabilitation Fund (ORAREF) is launched.

October 6: Peace Agreement signed concerning the Ogoni-AndorLi troubles, but without the signature of Mr. Saro-Wiwa.

October 17: Oil spill at Korokoro oil fields in Ogoni, operated by Shell. Mr. Bantonle Kpormon (30) shot dead at a checkpoint in Bori by a federal soldier who has been sent to ensure peace at Ogoni-Andoni border. Bori however is not at the border.

MOSOP Leadership Forum accepts the Peace Agreement but for two paragraphs, and calls for a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to be installed by the federal government.

October 19: Prof. Ake, mediator of the Peace Conference, sends a letter to Governor Ada George, stating that he does not agree with the Peace Agreement. According to him, it was drafted in haste and without proper consultation of the communities involved.

October 20: Shell inspection team enters Ogoniland with armed escort to assess facilities “with a view to resuming operations at the earliest feasible time”.

October 23: Two fire trucks from SPDC are allegedly seized at Korokoro by inhabitants of Korokoro.

October 25: Three Ogoni men shot at Korokoro oil fields by soldiers of the 2nd Amphibious Brigade accompanying Shell workers who went back to retrieve the fire trucks. Uebari Nna (18) dies, Pal Sunday (14) and Mboo Ndiike (70) are wounded.

November 17: The interim government resigns. General Sam Abacha becomes the new Nigerian leader.

December 13: Governor Ada George is replaced by a Military Administrator, Lt Col Dauda Komo.

Violent clashes as Okrika attack Ogoni settlements at waterfronts, Port Harcourt Over 90 people reported dead, many more wounded.

December 28: MOSOP leaders Dr Owens Wiwa and Mr. Ledum Mitee, lawyer. are arrested and detained without being charged. The Ogoni Assembly is dispersed by Nigerian soldiers. Lt. Col Komo states the Ogoni Week was aborted because MOSOP didn't apply for a permit as is expected of any community, to hold such activity”.

January 2: Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa is placed under house arrest.

January 4: Dr Owen Wiwa and Mr. Ledum Mitee are released, Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa's house arrest is lifted.

January 11: Seven-member Commission of Inquiry installed by River State government to investigate Ogoni-Okirika clashes, starts public sittings in Port Harcourt.

January 20: A three-member ministerial team starts a two- day tour of Rivers State to investigate the hostilities between communities there, as part of general inquiry of community clashes. The government is especially worried about troubles in oil producing areas.

January 21: 500 million dollar contract signed in Port Harcourt between Shell Nigeria and ABB Global Engineering of UK, allowing the latter to collect gas from 10 flow stations in Rivers State.

January 24: The three major oil companies in Port Harcourt estimate to have lost over 200 million dollars during 1993, due to “unfavorable conditions in their areas of operation”, and call for urgent measures to combat the situation.

April 3: There is a dispute between Ndoki and Ogoni villagers. This leads to the intervention of the Nigerian military. About 20 people are reported to have been killed by military raids on Ogoni villages.

April 6: Fifteen Ogoni people are arrested without being charged, among them Dr Owens Wiwa and Mr. Noble Obani-Nwibari.

April 16: Two Ogoni villages, Ledor Village and Tumbee community, are sacked and burnt down by Nigerian army troops.

April 21: The Rivers State Commissioner of Police develops an operation order for the restoration of law and order in Ogoniland. The memo details plans for the extensive military mobilization of the police and armed forces and occupation of Ogoniland (memo no\_ 4/94).

May 11: A major oil spill at Zaakpon, near Bori (operated by Shell)

May 12: Major Okuntimo, the commander of the soon to be deployed Internal Security Task Force, sends a secret memo to the Rivers State military administrator outlining plans to murder Ogoni leaders to justify military occupation of Ogoniland.

May 14: Conservative Ogoni leaders in Gokana publish the Giokoo Accord effectively calling on Gokana people to leave MOSOP.

May 19: Thousands of Gokana people protest against those Ogoni leaders who signed the Giokoo Accord.

May 20: Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa, spokesman of the Ogoni people, campaigns to explain MOSOP's decision to take part in the Constitutional Conference.

May 21 Four Ogoni leaders are killed in Gokana, one of the villages where rallies were going to be held: Albert T.Badey, Edward Kobani, Samuel Orage and Theophilus Orage

May 22: Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa, Mr. Ledum Mitee, Dr. Barinem Kiobel and several other people are arrested in connection with the murder of four Ogoni leaders, without being formally charged

From May 22: The Internal Security Task Force begins a systematic operation throughout Ogoniland. As the soldiers raid villages, Ogoni are killed, wounded, raped and see their village; looted and burned. The soldiers arrest hundreds of Ogoni. Thousands flee their villages. The operation kills over 1.000 Ogoni people while many more die of exposure and disease while hiding in the bush.

May 23: MOSOP and its youth wing, the National Youth Council of Ogoni People, are accused by Lt. Col. Komo of being responsible for the Giokoo murders.

June 13: Since the murder of the four Ogoni leaders, Ogoni land is placed entirely under army and police siege. A special Internal Security Unit is set up by Lt Col Komo, the military administrator of Rivers State.

June 20-27: UNPO initiated the “World Ogoni Week”, in which a number of international human rights and environmental organizations highlight the deteriorating situation of the Ogoni people.

June 26: Four people, including a British national and the Legal Secretary of the Nigerian Civil Liberties Organization, visit Bori Military Camp in order to meet with Mr Ledum Mitee in prison. Major Okuntimo violently objects to their presence in Ogoniland and has the four men arrested, tortured and submitted to interrogation. They are released after four days.

June: A court hearing is scheduled at the High Court in Port Harcourt to hear the cases of Mr Ken Saro-Wiwa and Mr. Ledum Mitee. The hearing does not take place as the defendants are prevented from attending the trial. Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa is brought to Port Harcourt from Afam where he is being detained. In Port Harcourt, Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa is taken to the State Intelligence and Investigation Bureau for a three day interrogation session.

July 1: Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa is returned to a secret detention place in Afam, just outside Port Harcourt.

July 4: Nigeria’s main oil workers’ union stages a massive strike to force the government to free Mr. Abiola and other political leaders.

July 11: A second court hearing is scheduled at the High Court in Port Harcourt to hear the cases of Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa and Mr. Ledum Mitee. Again the defendants are prevented from attending the hearing.

July 12: Thousands of people working in the oil industry join the stake

Jul 18: For the third time a court hearing is scheduled to hear the cases of Mr Ken Saro-Wi,,va and Mr. Ledum Mitee.

October-December: Oil spill devastates large area of swamp near Kwana and Buan

November: The three-judge panel to try Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other Ogoni is announced. It included one military officer.

January 4, 1995: Thousands of Ogoni celebrate Ogoni Day with church services, dancing, singing and prayer. Security forces respond with tear-gas and baton charges. A number of Ogoni are killed, many more wounded and mass arrests take place.

January 28: More than eight months after being arrested, Ken Saro-Wiwa and four other detained Ogoni are finally charged with the murder of four Ogoni leaders in Giokoo on May 21. 1994.


Februarv: Trial begins with international observers present. Hundreds are beaten and arrested around the trial sitting. Ken Saro-Wiwa’s elderly mother is amongst those beaten by security forces outside the Tribunal building.

Sources: Various, including MOSOP letters and press releases, Shell documents and various press articles. Please note, some of the dates are approximate only.

Unrepresented Nations and Peoples (UNPO), The Hague. April 1995.

## Notes

- 1 The term "Shell" is used where no distinction is necessary between the position of Shell Nigeria and Shell International. UNPO's contact usually been with Shell International's Public Affairs unit which is based in London.
- 2 Myra and Harold Lawrence in *Elisabeth*, USA 1976.
- 3 Ogoni Bill of Rights, Saros International Publishers, Port Harcourt, June 1992.
- 4 *The Broom* January 24-30, 1995.
- 5 *Newswatch*, September 26, 1994, pg. 26.
- 6 MOSOP - the Subversion of a People's Hope Memorandum signed by Dr. G. B. Leton and Chief E. N. Kobani, no date.
- 7 Extract from the official summary of statement made by Dr. G.B. Leton to Port Harcourt S.I.I.B.
- 8 *Shell Shocked: The environmental and social costs of living with Shell in Nigeria* Written by Andrew Rowell and edited by Andrea Goodall, Greenpeace International, Amsterdam, July 1994.
- 9 *Nigeria: Military government clampdown on opposition*, Amnesty International, London, November 11, 1994, pg. 5.
- 10 *Sunday Times*, October 17, 1993, pg. 9.
- 11 *Newswatch*, Sept 26, 1994, pg. 23.
- 12 *Nigeria Newsletter*, Nigerian High Commission, London, January 1995.
- 13 It is beyond the scope of this report to examine the accusations of environmental destruction leveled against Shell.
- 14 For a more complete report of Shell and the Ogoni issue refer to the Greenpeace Report, *Shell Shocked*.
- 15 Shell Briefing Note: Tensions in Nigeria, SIPC, London, 1993
- 16 Letter to Mr. J.R. Udofia, GM East Division, SPDC from J.K. Tillery, Divisional Manager, WWAI dated May 3, 1993.
- 17 *ibid*.
- 18 Letter to Mr. Albert Badey from Ken Saro-Wiwa, October 7, 1993.
- 19 Letter to Chief Rufus Ada George, Executive Govenor of Rivers State, October 19, 1993.
- 20 *ibid*.
- 21 Communique issued at the end of the Assembly of Ogoni Chiefs and People under the Auspices of MOSOP, held at Bori on Sunday, October 17, 1993.
- 22 The full text of this memo is available on request.
- 23 Taiwo Commission of Inquiry Report as quoted by MOSOP Briefing Note, April 1995.
- 24 Report to Military Administrator, from-Dr E.O. Gwezia, Chairman, Caretaker Committee, Tai/Eleme Local Government Council, May 8, 1994.refuges.
- 25 Letter to The Military Administrator of Rivers State from Ledum A. Mitee, Deputy President, MOSOP, dated April 22, 1994.
- 26 Handwritten note released by Sister M. M. McCarron, May 20, 1994.



Source: MITEE RESEARCH FOUNDATION © 1995