The project is currently 10 years behind schedule, projected costs have risen from $800 million to $2.5billion, Statoil has had to sell off its retail outlets in Ireland because of the damage to its reputation and internationally the reputation of Statoil has suffered due to its partnership in the Corrib field.

CORRIB GAS PROJECT

The award winning documentary film about the controversial Corrib Gas pipeline – ‘The Pipe’ – will have its Norwegian premiere this Monday in Oslo at the Cinemateket presented by the Neptune Network:
http://www.neptunenetwork.org/.

Attendees will include people from industry, politics, media and academia, who will participate in a post screening discussion with director of the film Risteard Ó Domhnaill and County Mayo fisherman Patrick O’Donnell

(see photo right, courtesy of John Monaghan).

http://www.neptunenetwork.org/profiles/blogs/cinemateket-statoils-overgrep-mot-irsk-befolkning-vises-frem-i-pr

http://www.facebook.com/pages/The-Pipe-The-Film/270493470810

Staoil has a 36,5 per cent interest in the Corrib gas field north-west of Ireland. The Corrib field development is operated by Shell and has been marred by controversy since 5 local landowners were jailed in 2005 for 94 days for opposing the laying of an onshore high pressure raw gas pipeline through their land to the proposed refinery 9km inland.

The project is currently 10 years behind schedule, projected costs have risen from $800 million to $2.5billion, Statoil has had to sell off its retail outlets in Ireland because of the damage to its reputation and internationally the reputation of Statoil has suffered due to its partnership in the Corrib field.

http://www.statoil.com/en/About/Worldwide/Ireland/Pages/default.aspx

The Pipe – Synopsis

In a remote corner of the West of Ireland sits Broadhaven Bay. It is the perfect picture postcard, where the high cliffs of Erris Head and the Stags of Broadhaven stand sentry at the mouth of the bay against the mighty Atlantic, as if protecting the delicate golden sands of Glengad beach and the tiny village of Rossport, which nestles behind the dunes. However, this peaceful tranquility belies the turmoil that lies beneath, and the unique nature of the coastline which has sustained generations of farmers and fishermen, has also delivered to Shell and Statoil the perfect landfall for the Corrib Gas Pipeline.

In the most dramatic clash of cultures in modern Ireland, the rights of farmers over their fields, and of fishermen to their fishing grounds, has come in direct conflict with one of the worlds most powerful oil companies. When the citizens look to their state to protect their rights, they find that the state has put Shell and Statoil’s right to lay a pipeline over their own.

The Pipe is a story of a community tragically divided, and how they deal with a pipe that could bring economic prosperity or destruction of a way of life shared for generations.

press images:

www.thepipethefilm.com/press/
username: press
Password:  pipe1

Trailer and links:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yMSLuxuf_iE

www.cbc.ca/video/#/News/Featured_Videos/ID=1590885523

www.thepipethefilm.com

www.facebook.com/pages/The-Pipe-The-Film

www.thepipethefilm.com/main-sect/review-in-variety-magazine/

Articles and links supplied by a former employee of Shell Oil USA.

ARTICLES

The Arctic and Shell

What happens if Statoil is involved in major Arctic Ocean blowout?

Statoil, Shell and the Arctic Ocean

LINKS

Shell Chukchi Sea Application 2010 Application for Incidental Harassment Authorization for the Non-Lethal Taking of Whales and Seals in Conjunction with Planned 2010 Exploration Drilling Program Chukchi Sea, Alaska: April 2010

(IF SHELL WISHES TO EXPLAIN HOW YOU “TAKE” A WILD MULTI -TON WHALE IN A “NONE LETHAL” FASHION, WE WILL HAPPILY PUBLISH THAT INFORMATION HERE – I HAVE CHECKED THE 50 PAGES IN THIS SHELL DOCUMENT AND CANNOT FIND AN EXPLANATION?)

I have lifted some text from the NOAA EIS that relates to the bureaucratic definitions of ‘take’ and ‘harassment’. As can be seen, they are not benign definitions. These folks talk about ‘temporary loss’ of hearing. How did they determine this with cetaceans (whales)? Do these people know what they are talking about?

NMFS Statutory and Regulatory Mandates

Under the MMPA, the taking of marine mammals without a permit or exemption from NMFS is prohibited.

“Take” under the MMPA means:

“to harass, hunt, capture, kill or collect, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, kill or collect.”

Except with respect to certain activities not relevant here, the MMPA defines “harassment” as:

“…any act of pursuit, torment, or annoyance which (a) has the potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild [Level A harassment]; or (b) has the potential to disturb a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild by causing disruption of behavioral patterns, including, but not limited to, migration, breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering but which does not have the potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild [Level B harassment].”

To date, NMFS’ policy has been to use the 180-decibel (dB) root-mean-squared (rms) received level for cetaceans and 190-dB rms received level for pinnipeds to indicate where temporary threshold shift (TTS, or temporary loss of portion of hearing sensitivity) of these animals from acoustic exposure begins. Since TTS does not result in a permanent loss of hearing sensitivity, and the animal is expected to fully recover from TTS after a certain period of time (see review in Southall et al., 2007), NMFS views TTS as Level B harassment. In addition, NMFS uses the 160-dB rms isopleth for cetaceans and 170-dB rms for pinnipeds to indicate where Level B behavioral harassment begins for acoustic sources, including impulse sounds, such as those used for seismic surveys. In order to obtain an exemption from the MMPA’s prohibition on taking marine mammals, a citizen of the United States who engages in a specified activity (other than commercial fishing) within a specified geographic region must obtain an incidental take
authorization (ITA) under section 101(a)(5)(A) or (D) of the MMPA. An ITA shall be granted if NMFS finds that the taking of small numbers of marine mammals of a species or stock by such citizen will have a negligible impact on the affected species or stock(s) and will not have an unmitigable adverse impact on the availability of the species or stock(s) for subsistence uses. NMFS shall also prescribe, where applicable the
permissible methods of taking and other means of affecting the least practicable impact on the species or stock and its habitat (i.e., mitigation, monitoring and reporting of such takings). ITAs may be issued as either (1) regulations and associated Letters of Authorization (LOAs) where there is a potential for serious injury or mortality; or (2) IHAs, when there is no potential for serious injury or mortality or where any such potential can be negated through required mitigation measures.

As part of the MMPA authorization process, applicants are required to provide detailed mitigation plans that outline what efforts will be taken to reduce negative impacts to marine mammals, and their availability for subsistence use, to the lowest level practicable. In addition, IHA authorizations require that operators conduct monitoring, which should be designed to result in an increased knowledge of the species and an
understanding of the level and type of takings that result from the authorized activities. Under the MMPA, NMFS further requires that monitoring be designed to provide information and data verifying (or disputing) that the taking of marine mammals are, in fact, negligible and there are no unmitigable adverse impacts on the availability of marine mammals for subsistence uses.

In making a determination of no unmitigable adverse impacts to subsistence uses of marine mammals, NMFS and MMS consider whether a Plan of Cooperation (POC) is negotiated between the affected Alaskan Native communities and the applicants………

Statoil rewrites the rulebook: Sept 2007

Statoil wants to drill off Greenland: 25 November, 2009

Forum magazine – Statoil’s clean sweep on safety

Another article on Statoil. Maybe the WWF would be interested in this and perhaps lobby for the imposition of Norwegian safety standards in the Arctic offshore! They have the ear of the White House, so why not raise the issue?

Norwegian oil company increases Alaska holdings in Chukchi Sea: 2010

Why Norway’s offshore drilling is safer: 3 May 2010

This recent Guardian article on oil rig safety issues also mentions Statoil: BP threatened with legal case over safety of all its oil rigs

Norway’s offshore oil drilling safety record: 4 May 2010

For Big Oil, the N-word is “nationalize”: 27 May 2010

The real driving force in the Norwegian oil industry for safety, the environment, etc. is the Petroleum Safety Authority. I have included a link to their web site. They have their regulations on-line. PETROLEUM SAFETY AUTHORITY NORWAY

I have attached a link to an article in off-shore technology about BP’s proposed development of the Liberty Field in Alaska. It is interesting because of the use of extreme extended reach drilling technology. The cost of building a gravel island directly above the field was prohibitive. BP didn’t even consider some sort of man-made platform.

BP slows down plans for Liberty oil field: 6 July 2010

Six lessons from the BP oil spill: 10 July 2010

Alaska Gov: Judge Clears Shell’s Offshore Seismic Oil Testing: 6 August 2010

Still on hold: Statoil’s Chukchi seismic in doubt after injunction: 8 August 2010

BP America, BPXA may be fined $500m for repeated violations: 1 April 2009

Poisoning the Well: Jan 1997

Frontier Discoverer (The Frontier Discoverer was originally built as a log carrier and was converted in 1975 to a Sonat Offshore Drilling Discoverer Class turret moored drillship.)

The Biggest Oil Spills in History
Arctic Melting and Oil: Countries Stake Claims as World Faces Environmental Disaster
Chukchi Cap
Recent blowout is one of only 18 in Alaska: 18 December 2008
Arctic Governments And Industry Still Unprepared For Oil Spills 20 Years After Exxon Valdez: 19 March 2009
Arctic Oil: A Boon For Nest Predators: 9 September 2009
Low Concentrations of Oxygen and Nutrients Slowing Biodegradation of Exxon Valdez Oil: 18 January 2010
Arctic Voyage Illuminating Ocean Optics 26 July 2010
Alaska’s Arctic Seas: Court Ruling Halts Offshore Lease Sale 27 July 2010
U.S.-Canadian mission set to map Arctic seafloor: 1 August 2010
Chukchi Sea Planning Area: Draft Environmental Impact Statement by Minerals Management Service Volume 1 (pending)
Chukchi Sea Planning Area: Draft Environmental Impact Statement by Minerals Management Service Volume 2
Undiscovered oil resources in the Federal portion of the 1002 Area of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: an economic update: 2005-1217 Open-File Report 2005
ALASKA FEDERAL OFFSHORE: Descriptions of Geologic Plays 1995 U.S. Minerals Management Service
Last hope in the last frontier: offshore development key in Alaska.: March, 2007
Digital terrain mapping of the underside of sea ice from a small AUV: 2008

More information which might be of interest to the WWF. This data set consists of upward looking sonar draft data collected by submarines in the Arctic Ocean. It includes data from both U.S. Navy and Royal Navy submarines: Submarine Upward Looking Sonar Ice Draft Profile Data and Statistics

Update 14 August 2010

I have attached a link about the development of riser-less drilling technology. It is about 15 years old, but its use is growing rapidly. With reference to the Statoil article, Statoil has used it on 19 projects, NOT for 19 years, and it probably is not a required method of drilling in Norwegian waters, although I don’t know that for certain. If it isn’t now it probably will be in the near future. The environmental benefits are simply to great not to make it a required drilling technology.

Riserless drilling project develops critical new technology

There are some links in this article that I found amusing, but typical for the ‘oil patch’.

When I first went to work for Shell in the early 1980′s there was a popular bumper sticker in Texas that most people in the rest of the US didn’t quite understand and often found somewhat offensive. It went something like :

‘Please don’t tell my Mother that I work in the Oil Patch, she thinks I still play piano in a New Orleans ‘cat’ (whore) house.’

It always makes me laugh. But it tells you how oil field workers and the industry are often regarded by the rest of American society. The oil industry is not highly regarded. It is generally viewed as being a ‘rape, ruin and run’ industry. Like logging and coal mining. And justifiably so (e.g., Nigeria). BP’s bungling and callous disregard for operational safety hasn’t helped improve the image of the oil industry any.

Attached is a corporate news release from Statoil about them being the first to use riser-less drilling technology in the Gulf of Mexico that they have been using in the North Sea for almost 20 years. The article speaks for itself.

Environmentally friendly drilling solutions in the US

The method is clearly a cost effective drilling technology, and far more ‘environmentally friendly’. I presume the use of this technology is mandatory in the North Sea and Arctic waters of offshore Norway. And I am sure Norske Shell is well acquinted with the technology.

One wonders why the US Dept. of the Interior and MMS and Shell Oil USA, et al, are 20 years behind the Norwegians.

Someone should take a long hard look at the proposed drilling prognoses for the Statoil and Shell exploraton wells in next year’s proposed Chukchi Sea drilling program to see how each operator intends to drill their exploration wells. Any bets that Statoil’s plans are far less polluting that Shell’s.

The WWF might be interested in this. The drilling prognoses should be part of the environmental impact statement filed by each operator.

See the attached link and article. When you read the article you will note that reference is made to ‘ice scouring studies’. These are related to seabed scour by dragging sea ice (the pressure ridge issue I mentioned previously), and are obvious follow up studies to those done in the 1980′s, and perhaps later. The water depths in the locations Shell wants to drill are on the order of 30m – 50m.

Again, the WWF should be interested in these studies. They should determine whether production is, in theory, ‘possible’. These studies should also cover a multi-year period in order to obtain an idea of the variability in ice pack characteristics

Duo get greenlight for Chukchi surveys: 9 August 2010

Attached is a link to DOI’s list of EIS’s for Alaska. You might want to post this link in one of those articles. There are a host of them.

http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/EIS_EA.htm

Alaska Petroleum Reserve lease sale disappoints: 11 August 2010

From a former Shell employee…

This follows up on my article… What happens if Statoil is involved in major Arctic Ocean blowout?

I am absolutely certain that senior level Statoil management is fully aware of the potential ‘political consequences’ if any of their exploration or production operations in US Arctic waters were to suffer from a major ‘environmental incident’. The BP fiasco has sensitized the entire industry to that issue. I am also certain that the Norwegian government is likewise aware of the potential consequences.

(I am also certain that the Dept. of Interior and MMS are in over their little heads and clueless about how to deal with such a situation.)

So, it it my guess that discussions between Norwegian governmental representatives and Statoil representatives about Statoil operational policies in US waters have already taken place. And it is my guess the decision has already been made at Statoil to follow the far more rigid ‘Norwegian standards’ for operational and environmental safety when operating in US waters. This decision is not only a ‘good’ business decision, but politically wise as well. Statoil clearly cannot afford to be involved in any sort of ‘incident’ of note.

By following such a policy Statoil will actually set the industry ‘standard’ for operational safety in US Arctic waters. Given that this is most probably the case, it seems reasonable to me that this ‘Norwegian standard’ should become the ‘de facto’ norm for operating in US Arctic waters (why not in all US waters?).

If Statoil cannot afford to be involved in an ‘Arctic incident’ for obvious economic and political reasons, then it seems to me the same holds true for Shell USA (Royal Dutch Shell). Not after BP’s fiasco in the Gulf of Mexico.

(Any bets on whether BP will be allowed to drill in the US far offshore Arctic in our lifetimes? After their bungling in the Gulf of Mexico they are going to have a hard enough time getting permits to drill and develop the Liberty field in the near offshore.)

Of course, Shell USA will not operate to those same ‘Norwegian safety standards’ as Statoil will because they have no requirement to do so. Those standards are more rigid than US standards and more expensive to follow. And besides Shell USA is (was) a US oil company. Right? But expense is clearly not the issue here. If Statoil can afford to operate this way why can’t Shell USA (Royal Dutch Shell)? What is the issue here? Can someone at Shell or the Dept. of the Interior explain this to me? My poor feeble mind just doesn’t get it.

Shell’ Arctic Drill Ship

Noble Drilling has apparently acquired Frontier Drilling for about the price as Shell paid for their Chukchi leases. The acquisition was apparently effective at the end of June. Frontier (now Noble) and Shell are joint venture partners in the construction of two new drill ships specifically designed to operate in Arctic waters, and both are under contract to Shell for at least five years. These ships are the Bully I and Bully II, and both are supposedly state of the art ships. The Bully I is supposed to go into service this year followed by Bully II next year. Maybe Shell can think about using one of these modern rigs to drill their Chukchi Arctic exploration wells now that they have a years delay in the program. Frontier also owns the refurbished Japanese log carrier they were going to use to drill those wells. Just a thought.

Comment by former Shell employee on the article: Shell, Statoil to Conduct Seismic Studies in Chukchi Sea

It is my understanding that Statoil, which just received permission from a Federal court to proceed with seismic exploration studies in the Chukchi Sea, was at one time wholly owned by the Norwegian government. Today it is a privatized company but the Norwegian government still holds a majority of the stock in the company. It is my understanding as well that Statoil is the last of the three Norwegian oil/gas production companies established by Norwegian government policy in the early 1970′s to develop their oil and gas resources in their sector of the North Sea. As such it is the ‘flagship’ oil company of Norway and responsible for the development of Norwegian oil and gas resources, which are quite substantial.

My question is this: If Statoil were to be involved in a major blowout incident in the Arctic that was beyond the capacity of the company to deal with financially, is the Norwegian government, the majority shareholder, on the hook for the balance of any cleanup costs? I bet nobody has an answer for that question.

Shell is a completely independent company. Statoil is not. It seems to me that if Statoil is ever involved in a major incident, like BP’s or some of Shell’s past incidents, there is the possibility of a serious diplomatic ‘dustup’ over cleanup costs and the manner in which the company deals with the situation.

And how would the Norwegian government deal with a situation where an incident and the subsequent financial burden of cleanup threatened the long term financial stability of that country’s ‘flagship’ oil company?

It seems to me the US government is sailing into uncharted diplomatic waters when it allows state-controlled oil companies to explore and produce in US territorial waters. There are issues here that need to be resolved. It is also readily apparent that the Dept. of the Interior and MMS are in over their heads on these matters. Perhaps it is time to seek some competent and professional assistance from the US State Dept.

I would presume however, that when it comes to operating in the cold, difficult environment of the Arctic it is Statoil that has far greater technical and managerial competence than Shell Oil USA, which has never operated a production project in the Arctic, and is mostly a Gulf of Mexico based company. In fact, it is a good bet Statoil’s competence exceeds that of BP and Exxon. So, perhaps Statoil is actually the preferred operating company in US Arctic waters. Shell, et al, could probably learn a thing or two from Statoil.

It also seems to me that the only oil companies that should be allowed to operate in Arctic regions are the ‘majors’, simply because only they have the financial where-with-all to deal with a major accident and its aftermath.

And it also seems that the oil industry should be required to establish an ‘incident/accident’ fund of several billion dollars, similar to that being contemplated in the Gulf of Mexico (to great public fanfare). All operators would contribute to this fund. This fund would insure that there would be readily available financial resources to react immediately to a major ‘Arctic environment incident’. The oil industry has never operated accident/incident free anywhere in the world, and they most certainly haven’t been able to do so in the Alaskan Arctic. There will be a major offshore incident if production is allowed in the Arctic. So, it seems that a ‘damage control’ plan should be established and funded prior to development, and prior to the ‘incident’. If these companies have billions to spend on leases they most certainly have the cash to contribute to the establishment of such a contingency fund.

RELATED ARTICLES

Statoil rewrites the rulebook: Sept 2007

Statoil wants to drill off Greenland: 25 November, 2009

forum magazine – Statoil’s clean sweep on safety

Another article on Statoil. Maybe the WWF would be interested in this and perhaps lobby for the imposition of Norwegian safety standards in the Arctic offshore! They have the ear of the White House, so why not raise the issue?

Why Norway’s offshore drilling is safer: 3 May 2010

This recent Guardian article on oil rig safety issues also mentions Statoil: BP threatened with legal case over safety of all its oil rigs

Norway’s offshore oil drilling safety record: 4 May 2010

For Big Oil, the N-word is “nationalize”: 27 May 2010

The real driving force in the Norwegian oil industry for safety, the environment, etc. is the Petroleum Safety Authority. I have included a link to their web site. They have their regulations on-line. PETROLEUM SAFETY AUTHORITY NORWAY

I have attached a link to an article in off-shore technology about BP’s proposed development of the Liberty Field in Alaska. It is interesting because of the use of extreme extended reach drilling technology. The cost of building a gravel island directly above the field was prohibitive. BP didn’t even consider some sort of man-made platform.

BP slows down plans for Liberty oil field: 6 July 2010

Six lessons from the BP oil spill: 10 July 2010

BP America, BPXA may be fined $500m for repeated violations: 1 April 2009

Poisoning the Well: Jan 1997

Frontier Discoverer (The Frontier Discoverer was originally built as a log carrier and was converted in 1975 to a Sonat Offshore Drilling Discoverer Class turret moored drillship.)

Last year, in a record lease sale, Royal Dutch Shell PLC paid $2.1 billion for exploration blocks in the Chukchi Sea, off the coast of Alaska.

The oil industry faces several years of turbulence that could trigger a new wave of consolidation, according to Helge Lund, chief executive of Norway’s national oil company StatoilHydro.

Norway’s giant Ormen Lange gas field is now producing gas from six wells, after three new wells were brought online earlier this month, a spokeswoman for operator Royal Dutch Shell PLC (RDSA.LN) said Friday.

During their address, Rossport Five’s Vincent McGrath and John Monaghan outlined the history of the Corrib project, its impact on the local community, environmental and human rights concerns, and positive ways forward for all stakeholders – ‘concentrating on community input and local consent’.