LNG

Nord Stream Returns to the Headlines: Washington and Moscow Explore a Revival, but Brussels Says No — Where Does That Leave Shell?

Oct 28th, 2026

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By John Donovan — 28 October 2026

An extraordinary new chapter has opened in the Nord Stream controversy. Reuters reports that senior American and Russian figures have discussed bringing a US investor into the Baltic gas pipeline system. But the European Commission has responded with an unmistakable reminder: the European Union is legislating Russian gas out of its energy market. For Shell shareholders, the renewed controversy raises another question. What, if anything, remains recoverable from the $1.126 billion loan that Shell wrote down in 2022? read more

^*This website and sisters royaldutchshellgroup.com, shellnazihistory.com, royaldutchshell.website, johndonovan.website, shellnews.net, and shellwikipedia.com, are owned by John Donovan - more information here. There is also a Wikipedia segment, the Shell DPA Files, "Shell and the Spies", the Shell Leaks files, the Independent Shell Archive, as well as books written and published by John Donovan - Kindle eBooks. Timeline of the Donovan Shell Feud. Toxic History of Royal Dutch Shell Group. Shell and the Donovans: The Full Media Record — 550+ Articles, 110 Books, 40 Years. ^*All conjured up by internet wizz, Nick Gill.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 28 OCTOBER 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 28 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-101

The Sakhalin Papers XCI: The Security Report Withdrawn — How Germany’s October 2021 Approval Became a February 2022 Reversal

In October 2021, Germany’s economy ministry concluded that certifying Nord Stream 2 would not endanger European gas supplies. Its 54-page assessment acknowledged Russian state control of Gazprom, previous supply interruptions and objections from Poland and Ukraine. Four months later, Germany withdrew the assessment. The original document, subsequently released to the public, reveals what officials believed about Russian gas dependence before the invasion of Ukraine — and why the distinction between commercial infrastructure and geopolitical risk became so consequential for Shell’s investment.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-101
Publication date: 28 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-100, The Sakhalin Papers XC, 27 October 2026

Principal sources: German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, Security-of-Supply Assessment dated 26 October 2021; the ministry’s announcement dated 22 February 2022; Bundesnetzagentur certification proceedings BK7-21-056; Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine correspondence dated December 2021; the German-American joint statement of 21 July 2021; Court of Justice of the European Union judgment C-848/19 P; Shell’s original 2017 financing announcement; Shell’s announcement dated 28 February 2022; and Shell’s financial statements filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 27 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 27th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 27 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-100

The Sakhalin Papers XC: Built but Not Approved — Germany’s November 2021 Decision and the Regulatory Battle Over Nord Stream 2

On 26 October 2021, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs concluded that certifying Nord Stream 2 would not endanger German or European gas supplies. Just three weeks later, Germany’s energy regulator suspended certification of the pipeline’s operator. The original government records reveal that these were not contradictory decisions: they concerned different legal requirements. Meanwhile, Polish and Ukrainian energy companies had been admitted to the proceedings, raising objections to Gazprom’s control of the project. The documentary trail shows how a completed pipeline, backed by almost €9.5 billion in planned investment, remained unable to begin commercial operations — and how Shell’s substantial financing ultimately became a $1.126 billion write-down.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-100
Publication date: 27 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-099, The Sakhalin Papers LXXXIX, 26 October 2026

Principal sources: German Federal Network Agency certification proceedings, Case BK7-21-056; German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs security-of-supply assessment dated 26 October 2021; original German regulatory announcement of 16 November 2021; Polish PGNiG and Ukrainian Naftogaz corporate statements; contemporaneous Reuters reporting; German Energy Industry Act; Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court proceedings; European General Court judgment of 27 November 2024; and Shell’s authenticated financial disclosures filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 25 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 25th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 25 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-098

The Sakhalin Papers LXXXVIII: The Thirty-Day Exit — Washington’s October 2020 Sanctions Ultimatum and the Companies Caught Between Two Legal Systems

On 20 October 2020, the United States gave companies supporting Nord Stream 2 a sharply defined choice: end certain activities within 30 days or face potential sanctions. The warning extended to businesses supplying equipment, facilities and services to the vessels needed to complete the Russian gas pipeline. An examination of the original Federal Register notice, Shell’s financial disclosures, German parliamentary records and contemporaneous reporting reveals how Washington used an expansive interpretation of existing legislation to intensify pressure on a project already facing serious regulatory and political difficulties.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-098
Publication date: 25 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-097, The Sakhalin Papers LXXXVII, 24 October 2026
Principal sources: US Department of State Public Notice 11236; Federal Register, 5 November 2020; Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019; German Bundestag parliamentary records; European External Action Service statements; Shell’s authenticated April 2017 financing announcement; Shell’s 2022 Annual Report filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission; contemporary S&P Global and Reuters reporting; and subsequent US government sanctions records. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 21 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 21st, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 21 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-094

The Sakhalin Papers LXXXIV: The Foreseeability Test — What Shell and Its Partners Knew Before the Nord Stream 2 Investment Was Written Off

Shell’s own records establish that its final Nord Stream 2 loan instalments were made in the second quarter of 2020. By then, European legislation had changed, the project was facing legal challenges, American sanctions had disrupted construction and Germany’s energy regulator was deciding whether the pipeline qualified for an exemption. A subsequent European court judgment raises an important question: how much of this risk was foreseeable?

Archive reference: SLF-2007-094
Publication date: 21 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-093, The Sakhalin Papers LXXXIII, 20 October 2026
Principal sources: Shell’s 24 April 2017 financing announcement; Shell’s published 2022 financial results; European Parliament proceedings; European Commission and Council records; the German Federal Network Agency’s May 2020 decision; the EU General Court’s November 2024 judgment; Allseas’ December 2019 statement; and contemporaneous Reuters reporting.
Evidence classification: Authenticated corporate disclosures, official legislative and regulatory records, judicial findings, contemporaneous journalism and separately identified editorial analysis. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 19 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 19th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 19 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-092

The Sakhalin Papers LXXXII: Gazprom’s Pipeline Takes Europe to Court — The Energy Charter Treaty, Secretive Arbitration and the Battle Over Billions

An investment dispute begun in 2019, a European court defeat, sanctions that interrupted the arbitration itself, and an extraordinary January 2026 order questioning the European Union’s explanations

Archive reference: SLF-2007-092
Publication date: 19 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: The Shell Leaks Files — 18 October 2026
Principal evidence: Shell’s authenticated 2017 financing announcement and 2022 financial disclosures; Permanent Court of Arbitration Case No. 2020-07; Procedural Orders Nos. 18 and 19; European Union legislation; General Court judgments; and official records of subsequent legal proceedings.
Evidence classification: Authenticated corporate records, legislation and judicial decisions; documented submissions by opposing parties; independent legal reporting; and separately identified editorial analysis. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 15th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-088

The Sakhalin Papers LXXVIII: Washington Enters the Pipeline War — US Sanctions, German Resistance and Shell’s Nord Stream 2 Exposure

Between April 2017 and February 2022, Royal Dutch Shell’s financial participation in Nord Stream 2 became entangled in an escalating confrontation between Washington, Berlin and Moscow. The United States threatened sanctions against companies supporting the Russian gas pipeline. Germany resisted what it regarded as extraterritorial interference in European energy policy. A major offshore contractor abandoned construction work, while the American government subsequently warned that even financing partners could face sanctions. The pipeline was eventually completed, but it never entered commercial service. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany halted its certification, Washington sanctioned the project company, and Shell announced its withdrawal. In May 2022, Shell recognised a $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan. Authenticated corporate announcements, American sanctions records, German government statements, European court proceedings and contemporaneous reporting reveal how a commercially ambitious energy project accumulated increasingly visible political and financial risks. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 13th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-086

The Sakhalin Papers LXXVI: Poland’s Red Light — How Shell’s Nord Stream 2 Shareholding Became a €950 Million Financing Commitment

In September 2015, Royal Dutch Shell signed an agreement intended to give it a 10 per cent shareholding in Nord Stream 2, the controversial pipeline designed to transport Russian natural gas directly to Germany. Eleven months later, Poland’s competition authority effectively derailed the proposed ownership arrangement. Shell and its partners withdrew their application. But the project survived. On 24 April 2017, Shell signed a different agreement, committing financing and guarantees worth up to €950 million while Gazprom retained sole ownership of the pipeline company. The authenticated corporate announcements, Polish regulatory records, contemporaneous Reuters reporting and subsequent court proceedings reveal how an apparent regulatory defeat became a fundamentally different commercial arrangement. read more

Big Oil on Trial: ExxonMobil Faces US Supreme Court Climate Showdown — With Shell Fighting Its Own Battle in the Netherlands

Oct 13th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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13 October 2026 | RoyalDutchShellPlc.com

Two of the world’s most consequential courts are considering questions that could reshape the legal responsibilities of the fossil fuel industry. In Washington, the US Supreme Court is examining whether communities can pursue climate-damage claims against ExxonMobil and Suncor under state law. In the Netherlands, Shell is defending itself before the Dutch Supreme Court against demands for enforceable greenhouse gas reductions. The proceedings are legally distinct, but they expose the same underlying conflict: how far can courts go in holding major energy companies responsible for their contribution to climate change? read more

Shell Calls Australia’s Gas Reservation Plan a ‘Sledgehammer’ — But Who Should Control the Nation’s Gas?

Oct 13th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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13 October 2026 | RoyalDutchShellPlc.com

Australia is one of the world’s largest exporters of liquefied natural gas. Yet its own industries and households face uncertainty over future gas supplies and prices. Now Shell Australia chair Cecile Wake has attacked the government’s proposed domestic gas reservation scheme, warning that excessive intervention could damage investment and create the very shortages it is intended to prevent. But an investigation published by ABC News only yesterday raises an awkward question: why should Shell, which has historically contributed gas to Australia’s domestic market, face potentially onerous obligations while a rival exporter accused of drawing gas out of that market could benefit from exemptions? read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 10 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 10th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 10 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-083

The Sakhalin Papers LXXIII: The Sanctions Paradox — Shell and Gazprom Plan More LNG While Shell Suspends Russian Shale Exploration

On 30 September 2014, just eighteen days after Washington introduced expanded restrictions on Russian energy technology, Ben van Beurden met Gazprom chairman Alexey Miller at Gazprom’s headquarters. The Russian company’s official announcement welcomed the prospect of increasing LNG production at Sakhalin II. But Shell’s subsequent filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission reveals a crucial distinction: during the same year, Western sanctions had already caused Shell to suspend separate Russian shale-exploration activities. The documentary record exposes how Shell attempted to preserve one major Russian investment while restrictions were bringing other parts of its Russian portfolio to a halt.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-083

Collection: The Sakhalin Papers

Principal authenticated records: Gazprom corporate announcement of 30 September 2014; Gazprom–Shell memorandum-roadmap of 23 February 2014; Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2014, filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on 12 March 2015; Gazprom corporate records concerning Sakhalin III.

Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, 30 September 2013; Argus Media, 1 October 2014; LNG Industry, 1 October 2014; Reuters and Interfax reporting on Shell’s Russian operations during September 2014. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 8 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 8th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 8 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-081

The Sakhalin Papers LXXI: Good Friday with Putin — Shell Seeks Kremlin Support as Crimea Sanctions Begin

On 18 April 2014, barely a month after Russia annexed Crimea, Royal Dutch Shell chief executive Ben van Beurden travelled to Vladimir Putin’s residence outside Moscow. Western governments had begun imposing sanctions. Diplomatic relations were deteriorating. Yet Shell’s new chief executive was seeking something very different from confrontation: Kremlin support for expanding Sakhalin II and strengthening Shell’s long-term position in Russia. The meeting was recorded in an official Russian presidential transcript, reported by Reuters and Dutch broadcasters, and subsequently explained by van Beurden himself. What makes the episode especially revealing is what happened shortly afterwards. On the same afternoon, Putin authorised the first shipment of Arctic oil from Gazprom’s Prirazlomnaya platform — the installation at the centre of the Arctic 30 controversy examined earlier in this series.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-081
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Russian Presidential Executive Office transcript, 18 April 2014; Gazprom corporate records, 23 February, 18 April and 23 May 2014; Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2014; US Treasury sanctions announcements, March and April 2014; United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262.
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, 18 April 2014; NOS, 18 April 2014; Bloomberg, 18 April 2014; AFP, 18–19 April 2014; Washington Post interview with Ben van Beurden, 10 September 2014.
Judicial context: European Court of Human Rights, Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), Grand Chamber judgment of 25 June 2024.
Evidence standard: The meeting, public statements, sanctions chronology and project-development discussions are supported by official records and contemporary reporting. Commentary concerning Shell’s political judgment is distinguished from established fact. No finding is made that Shell breached sanctions or participated in Russia’s actions against Ukraine. read more

SHELL LEAKS FILES: 6 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 6th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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SHELL LEAKS FILES: 6 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-079

The Sakhalin Papers LXIX: “A Good and Reliable Partner” — The Arctic 30 Put Shell’s Gazprom Alliance to the Test

On 18 September 2013 Greenpeace activists attempted to scale Gazprom’s Prirazlomnaya platform in the Pechora Sea. The following day Russian authorities boarded the Dutch-flagged Arctic Sunrise in Russia’s exclusive economic zone. Twenty-eight Greenpeace activists and two freelance journalists were eventually detained and prosecuted. Within weeks Greenpeace was demanding that Shell sever its Arctic cooperation with Gazprom. Shell refused to disown its Russian partner. A spokesman called Gazprom a “good and reliable partner” — while simultaneously stressing that Shell had no involvement in Prirazlomnaya and no joint Arctic operation with Gazprom then under way. The distinction was legally important. Reputationally, it was much harder to maintain.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-079
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc SEC filings concerning Sakhalin II and Shell’s 2013 Annual Report and Form 20-F; Gazprom corporate records concerning Russian Arctic cooperation and Prirazlomnoye
Contemporaneous reporting: ANP, NOS, The Washington Post, contemporary reporting preserved in the Donovan archive
Judicial and arbitral record: The Arctic Sunrise Case, ITLOS Case No. 22; Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia); later Bryan and Others v. Russia, European Court of Human Rights
Evidence standard: Shell’s commercial relationship with Gazprom, the Greenpeace protest, Russian boarding and detention of the Arctic Sunrise, international proceedings and the start of Prirazlomnoye production are treated according to corporate, governmental and judicial records. Greenpeace accusations against Shell are attributed to Greenpeace. Nothing identified here establishes that Shell ordered, requested or participated in the Russian security operation or prosecution. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 5 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 5th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 5 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-078

The Sakhalin Papers LXVIII: From Siberia to the Arctic — Shell Takes the Gazprom Partnership Into Russia’s New Frontier

Forty days after Shell announced that it would pause its Alaskan Arctic drilling programme following the troubled 2012 season, Royal Dutch Shell chairman Jorma Ollila sat in Amsterdam with Gazprom chief Alexey Miller and signed a memorandum for cooperation on Russia’s Arctic shelf. Vladimir Putin and Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte were present. A parallel Shell–Gazprom Neft agreement targeted liquids-rich shale in Western Siberia. Shell had not abandoned its Arctic strategy after the grounding of the Kulluk. It had begun pursuing another Arctic frontier — this time through the Russian state company that had taken control of Sakhalin II.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-078
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2013; Gazprom corporate chronology and April 2013 corporate record; US Department of the Interior assessment of Shell’s 2012 Arctic operations; National Transportation Safety Board investigation of the Kulluk grounding
Court record: Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2013)
Contemporaneous reporting: UPI; RIA Novosti reporting; Daily Telegraph reporting preserved in the Donovan archive
Evidence standard: The Alaska pause, Kulluk grounding, US government review, April 2013 Gazprom–Shell memorandum and parallel shale agreement are established documentary facts. The Russian agreement is treated as a framework for potential cooperation, not as evidence that specific Arctic fields were awarded to Shell or that production was authorised. The proximity in time between the Alaska setbacks and the Russian agreement is established; any proposition that the Russian Arctic was a direct replacement for Alaska remains commentary rather than documented Shell policy. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 4 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 4th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 4 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-077

The Sakhalin Papers LXVII: From Protocol Toward a Joint Venture — Shell and Gazprom Neft Plan Expansion Across Western Siberia and Beyond

Seven months after Shell and Gazprom signed their “Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation”, Shell chief executive Peter Voser and Gazprom Neft chief Alexander Dyukov signed basic terms for something more concrete: a possible new joint venture covering Western Siberia, other Russian regions and even “third countries”. The distinction matters. No new venture was actually created by the June 2011 document. Shell and Gazprom Neft agreed to study one. By September Alexey Miller and Voser were still discussing how it might be established. But the direction was unmistakable. Four years after Shell lost control of Sakhalin II, the company was attempting to turn its relationship with Gazprom into a platform for expansion far beyond Sakhalin.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-077
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2011; US Securities and Exchange Commission filing record; Gazprom corporate records concerning the 2010 Strategic Global Cooperation Protocol and the June 2011 Gazprom Neft–Shell agreement
Contemporaneous reporting: Gazprom Neft press-service material; Dow Jones; Russian business press; contemporaneous Donovan archive
Judicial context: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The June 2011 agreement is described according to what it actually did: it established basic terms for examining the creation of a joint venture. It is not represented as proof that the contemplated venture had already been incorporated or that every proposed project proceeded. Corporate statements about technology, international assets and future cooperation are attributed to the companies making them. Commentary concerning strategic motives is identified as commentary. read more

Shell Veteran Takes Helm at NAM as Groningen Era Gives Way to Decommissioning

Oct 1st, 2026

by John Donovan.

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Martijn Kleverlaan will become Managing Director of Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij on 1 November 2026, taking charge of a much smaller organisation shaped by the end of Groningen gas production, offshore divestments and an expanding decommissioning programme.

Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij, the long-standing Dutch oil and gas producer associated with Shell, is changing leadership at a particularly symbolic moment in its history.

Martijn Kleverlaan, 53, will take over as Managing Director of NAM on 1 November 2026, succeeding Martijn van Haaster, who is returning to Shell after three years in charge. NAM announced the appointment on 30 September, with offshore industry publication Ocean Energy Resources reporting it on 1 October. nam.nl read more

30 November 2023: Posted by John Donovan

The content below is sourced from current verifiable customer reviews of Shell Energy published on Trustpilot.
Extremely slow broadband for 10 months, not fixed. I have had slow broadband well below the guaranteed speed for 10 months and Shell Energy have not been able to fix it. They have tried sending about 4 or 5 engineers but have not fixed the problem. Gurps, who I have been dealing with most recently, has been friendly and polite, alth… Read more

Extremely Slow Shell Broadband

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 28 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-101

The Sakhalin Papers XCI: The Security Report Withdrawn — How Germany’s October 2021 Approval Became a February 2022 Reversal

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 27 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-100

The Sakhalin Papers XC: Built but Not Approved — Germany’s November 2021 Decision and the Regulatory Battle Over Nord Stream 2

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 25 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-098

The Sakhalin Papers LXXXVIII: The Thirty-Day Exit — Washington’s October 2020 Sanctions Ultimatum and the Companies Caught Between Two Legal Systems

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 21 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-094

The Sakhalin Papers LXXXIV: The Foreseeability Test — What Shell and Its Partners Knew Before the Nord Stream 2 Investment Was Written Off

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 19 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-092

The Sakhalin Papers LXXXII: Gazprom’s Pipeline Takes Europe to Court — The Energy Charter Treaty, Secretive Arbitration and the Battle Over Billions

An investment dispute begun in 2019, a European court defeat, sanctions that interrupted the arbitration itself, and an extraordinary January 2026 order questioning the European Union’s explanations

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-088

The Sakhalin Papers LXXVIII: Washington Enters the Pipeline War — US Sanctions, German Resistance and Shell’s Nord Stream 2 Exposure

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-086

The Sakhalin Papers LXXVI: Poland’s Red Light — How Shell’s Nord Stream 2 Shareholding Became a €950 Million Financing Commitment

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 10 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-083

The Sakhalin Papers LXXIII: The Sanctions Paradox — Shell and Gazprom Plan More LNG While Shell Suspends Russian Shale Exploration

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 8 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-081

The Sakhalin Papers LXXI: Good Friday with Putin — Shell Seeks Kremlin Support as Crimea Sanctions Begin

SHELL LEAKS FILES: 6 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-079

The Sakhalin Papers LXIX: “A Good and Reliable Partner” — The Arctic 30 Put Shell’s Gazprom Alliance to the Test

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 5 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-078

The Sakhalin Papers LXVIII: From Siberia to the Arctic — Shell Takes the Gazprom Partnership Into Russia’s New Frontier

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 4 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-077

The Sakhalin Papers LXVII: From Protocol Toward a Joint Venture — Shell and Gazprom Neft Plan Expansion Across Western Siberia and Beyond

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30 November 2023: Posted by John Donovan

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