Russia

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 22 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 22nd, 2026

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 22 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-065

The Sakhalin Papers LV: The Scientist Who Walked Away — Rick Steiner’s Warning to Shell, the PA-B Tow-Out and the ISRP Resignation

On 14 July 2005, Independent Scientific Review Panel member Rick Steiner sent an urgent appeal directly to Royal Dutch Shell chief executive Jeroen van der Veer. The massive PA-B platform base was due to be towed to Sakhalin the following day. Steiner asked Shell to postpone it. He listed unresolved questions involving underwater noise, ship collisions, oil-spill preparedness, independent monitoring and the platform’s proximity to the feeding grounds of one of the world’s most endangered whale populations. Shell responded the next day. The tow-out went ahead. Six weeks later, Steiner resigned from the continuing scientific process.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-065
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal scientific record: IUCN Independent Scientific Review Panel report, 2005
Authenticated corporate record: The Shell Sustainability Report 2005
Contemporaneous correspondence: Rick Steiner to Jeroen van der Veer, 14 July 2005; Ian Craig, Sakhalin Energy, to Steiner, 15 July 2005; Steiner resignation email, 29 August 2005
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters-era coverage collected in the archive; The Guardian/Observer, March–September 2005
Judicial context: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: Steiner’s scientific concerns and personal assessments are attributed to him. Sakhalin Energy’s responses are attributed to the company. ISRP conclusions are distinguished from Steiner’s individual position. Neither the panel nor Steiner possessed regulatory authority to stop Sakhalin II. read more

^*This website and sisters royaldutchshellgroup.com, shellnazihistory.com, royaldutchshell.website, johndonovan.website, shellnews.net, and shellwikipedia.com, are owned by John Donovan - more information here. There is also a Wikipedia segment, the Shell DPA Files, "Shell and the Spies", the Shell Leaks files, as well as books written and published by John Donovan - Kindle eBooks. Timeline of the Donovan Shell Feud. Toxic History of Royal Dutch Shell Group. Shell and the Donovans: The Full Media Record — 550+ Articles, 110 Books, 40 Years. ^*All created and supported by internet wizz, Nick Gill.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 21 SEPTEMBER 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 21 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-064

The Sakhalin Papers LIV: The Russian LNG Contract That Survived — Shell Announced Its Exit in 2022. Its 2025 Accounts Still List the Novatek Deal

In March 2022, Shell announced that it intended to withdraw from all Russian hydrocarbons, including LNG. Yet a long-term contract signed with Novatek in 2015 survived the withdrawal from Sakhalin, survived the disposal of Shell’s Russian retail business, and was still being reported by Shell in its 2025 Form 20-F, published in March 2026. Shell confirmed in 2023 that it was continuing to receive Yamal LNG cargoes under the agreement. The latest accounts confirm that the contract still exists — but do not establish whether Shell is still physically taking cargoes today. New European and British restrictions now place a significant regulatory deadline at the beginning of 2027.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-064
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: NOVATEK contract announcement, 4 June 2015; Shell Russia statements, February–March 2022; Shell Annual Reports 2022–2025; UK sanctions regulations and guidance; EU REPowerEU gas regulation
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, Interfax and Argus
Evidence standard: The existence of Shell’s long-term Novatek contract is established by Shell’s latest SEC filing. Continued physical receipt of Yamal LNG was confirmed by Shell in February 2023. No public evidence located for this instalment establishes that Shell continues taking individual Yamal cargoes in September 2026. Those are separate propositions and are treated separately below. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 20 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 20th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 20 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-063

The Sakhalin Papers LIII: The Missing LNG Cargoes — Shell’s Contract Was Supposed to Run Until 2028. Then It “Stood Terminated”

Shell entered the Sakhalin LNG business as both shareholder and buyer. Public agreements envisaged long-term deliveries through 2028. After Russia transferred Sakhalin II to a new domestic operator in 2022, Shell stopped receiving the cargoes. In February 2023 it said it was considering its legal options. Its subsequent annual report went further: Shell said the old Sakhalin Energy company had failed to perform, had thereby renounced the LNG purchase contract, and that the contract “stood terminated.” No public record located for this file establishes that Shell has since received compensation for the lost deliveries.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-063
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Shell Annual Report and Accounts 2022; Shell Form 20-F 2023; Shell Form 20-F 2025
Contemporaneous reporting: Interfax, Reuters, Energy Intelligence and S&P Global
Related legal record: Russian restructuring of Sakhalin II and the continuing Moscow proceedings examined in the previous instalment
Evidence standard: Shell’s characterisation of contractual renunciation is attributed to Shell. It is not presented as a judicial finding. No inference is made that the absence of a publicly identified damages award proves that no confidential arbitration, negotiation or settlement process ever existed. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 19 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 19th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 19 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-062

The Sakhalin Papers LII: The Type-C Account — How a 2022 Rouble-Payment Dispute Became a €1.5 Billion Claim Against Shell

Russia’s Prosecutor General is seeking approximately €1.5 billion from Shell Energy Europe over disputed 2022 gas payments — and wants approximately 94 billion roubles set aside for Shell’s Sakhalin compensation used against the claim. The two sums arise from different transactions. Moscow has joined them together in one closed-door lawsuit. Shell says liability remains uncertain. As of July 2026, the next reported hearing was not due until January 2027.

The previous instalment followed the 94.8 billion roubles attached to Shell’s former Sakhalin II interest.

The money did not simply reach Shell.

Instead, approximately 94 billion roubles became trapped inside Russia’s post-2022 financial machinery and subsequently appeared in a lawsuit concerning an entirely different commercial relationship:

pipeline gas supplied by Gazprom Export to Shell Energy Europe for Germany.

That distinction is essential.

The Russian claim now links:

Shell’s withdrawal from Sakhalin II; read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 18th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-061

The Sakhalin Papers LI: The Billion-Rouble Exit Price — Novatek, Gazprom and the US$1 Billion Shell Still Could Not Simply Collect

In April 2023, the Russian government put a precise price on the 27.5% Sakhalin II interest Shell had declined to take in the replacement Russian operator: 94.8 billion roubles. Novatek was approved as purchaser. Shell’s response was immediate — no money had been received and its legal rights remained intact. Eleven months later, Moscow cancelled the Novatek arrangement and substituted a Gazprom-owned company at exactly the same price. The stake changed hands. The cash did not simply pass to Shell. By 2024, the 94 billion-rouble pot had become entangled with restricted-account rules and a much larger Russian claim against Shell. The corporate exit announced in February 2022 had become a battle over who was entitled to the exit proceeds.

1. A price finally appeared

The previous instalment followed Shell out of the operating Sakhalin II project.

By April 2023, Moscow had reached the next stage.

Russian Government Order No. 890-r, dated 11 April 2023, approved the sale of the unclaimed 27.49999998621683%interest in the new Sakhalin Energy LLC for:

94.8 billion roubles

and designated Novatek Moscow Region LLC as purchaser. Interfax reported that the order had been published through Russia’s official legal-information system. (Interfax)

At the exchange rate quoted in contemporaneous Reuters reporting, that amounted to approximately US$1.16 billion. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com) read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 17 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 17th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 17 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-060

The Sakhalin Papers L: The Exit — Shell Walks Away, Moscow Rewrites the Ownership and Sakhalin II Enters a New Era

On 28 February 2022, Shell announced that it would leave Sakhalin II. Within weeks its directors had resigned from the venture and its managerial and technical personnel were being withdrawn. Then the legal structure itself changed. A Russian presidential decree transferred the project’s licences, rights and obligations from the Bermuda-incorporated Sakhalin Energy Investment Company into a newly created Russian company. Shell declined to join it. The Japanese shareholders stayed. More than four years later, Shell still records an interest in the old Bermuda company — and the financial and legal consequences of the exit remain the subject of litigation in Moscow.

1. Four days that changed Shell’s Russian strategy

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

Four days later, on 28 February, Shell plc announced that its Board intended to withdraw from its joint ventures with Gazprom and related Russian entities.

The announcement specifically included:

Shell’s 27.5% minus one share interest in Sakhalin II;

its 50% interest in Salym Petroleum Development;

the Gydan Energy venture;

and its involvement in Nord Stream 2.

Shell said the decision had been taken in response to the invasion and that it would work through the commercial and energy-supply consequences while complying with sanctions. (Shell) read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 16 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 16th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 16 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-059

The Sakhalin Papers XLIX: “Unfinished Business” — Seventeen Years, 639 Recommendations and the End of the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel

In November 2021, the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel met for the last time. Its seventeen-year experiment in independent scientific oversight had changed pipelines, seismic-survey procedures, vessel management and corporate environmental practice. An independent evaluation concluded that it had materially reduced risks to the whales. Yet when the Panel closed, essential questions about prey, data access, cumulative impacts and long-term monitoring remained unresolved. Then Russia invaded Ukraine. Shell and Exxon began withdrawing. The institutional structure that had held companies, scientists, lenders, regulators and NGOs around the same table abruptly entered a different world.

1. The final meeting

The Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel held its 22nd and final meeting at IUCN headquarters in Gland, Switzerland, in November 2021.

It was the end of an experiment begun in 2004, when an Independent Scientific Review Panel was convened to assess the potential effects of Sakhalin II Phase 2 on the gray whales feeding off north-eastern Sakhalin.

The later WGWAP arrangement was unusual.

Sakhalin Energy helped finance the process.

IUCN administered it.

Independent scientists produced the recommendations. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 15th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-058

The Sakhalin Papers XLVIII: “A Philosophical Difference” — When Regulatory Compliance Was Not Enough for the Scientists

In November 2020, Sakhalin Energy and its independent scientific advisers arrived at an unusually candid point of disagreement. The company could satisfy Russian regulatory requirements and still fail to satisfy the evidential standards expected by the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel. The meeting record captured the difference in a phrase rarely encountered in corporate environmental reporting: there would always be a “philosophical difference” between conservation scientists and an oil company.

1. A meeting held in exceptional circumstances

The 21st meeting of the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel — WGWAP — took place by videoconference from 17 to 19 November 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic.

By then the Panel had spent well over a decade advising Sakhalin Energy on the protection of the endangered gray whales feeding off north-eastern Sakhalin.

Shell’s own Sustainability Report 2020 described WGWAP as an independent scientific panel established by IUCN to help mitigate environmental impacts. Shell stated that the Panel continued to advise Sakhalin Energy, in which Shell then held a 27.5% interest, and that WGWAP was preparing its final conclusions for release in 2021. (Shell) read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 14 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 14th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 14 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-057

The Sakhalin Papers XLVII: The Feeding Ground Was Losing Its Food — WGWAP’s 2019 Benthos Alarm

For fifteen years, oil companies operating off north-eastern Sakhalin financed a programme that measured the tiny bottom-dwelling animals on which gray whales depended. Then something changed. Amphipod biomass in the nearshore Piltun feeding ground began falling sharply in 2013 and reached the lowest level in the entire monitoring series in 2016. That same year, the industry-sponsored benthic programme ended. Three years later, the independent Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel issued an unusually stark public warning: the whales’ traditional nearshore feeding ground might be losing the capacity to support them.

1. The problem was beneath the whales

Much of the Sakhalin controversy had been visible above or within the water column.

Platforms.

Pipelines.

Ships.

Dredging.

Seismic airguns.

Fishing nets.

But the next warning came from the seabed.

Gray whales are benthic feeders. Off Sakhalin, they descend to the seafloor and consume large quantities of small invertebrates living in or immediately above the sediment.

In the shallow nearshore feeding area around Piltun Lagoon, one of the principal prey species was the amphipod Monoporeia affinis. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 13th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-056

The Sakhalin Papers XLVI: One in Five Bore the Scars — When Fishing Nets Became the Next Major Threat

The western gray whales feeding off Sakhalin were recovering. Their IUCN status would soon improve. But another danger was becoming impossible to ignore. In 2013, Sakhalin Energy personnel photographed mothers and calves within 100 metres of newly deployed salmon nets near Piltun Lagoon. By 2018, peer-reviewed research found evidence of fishing-gear injury on 28 of 150 photographed whales — 18.7 per cent. The same research classified coastal salmon set nets near Piltun as presenting a “very high” entanglement risk. The documentary record also contains an important complication: this was not an impact caused by Shell’s oil and gas operations. Sakhalin Energy helped identify and report the threat.

1. The recovery did not remove the danger

The previous instalment ended with an apparently contradictory picture.

The whales feeding off north-eastern Sakhalin were increasing in number. By 2018 the IUCN would move the western subpopulation from Critically Endangered to Endangered.

Yet recovery did not mean security.

A small population recovering from historical commercial whaling remained vulnerable to relatively few avoidable deaths — particularly deaths of reproductive females and calves.

And one of the next dangers to emerge was not an oil platform, seismic airgun or tanker. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 12 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 12th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 12 SEPTEMBER 2026

Archive reference: SLF-2007-055

The Sakhalin Papers XLV: From Critically Endangered to Endangered — What the Whale Recovery Did, and Did Not, Prove

By 2016, Shell could point to a genuinely encouraging development off Sakhalin: the western gray whales feeding near its giant oil and gas project were increasing in number. Shell’s own Sustainability Report recorded an estimated rise from 115 animals in 2004 to 174 in 2015. Independent conservation organisations reported the same trend. Two years later, the IUCN changed the western gray whale’s status from Critically Endangered to Endangered.

That was real progress. But the documentary record does not establish that Shell caused the recovery, that industrial disturbance had ceased to matter, or that the whales were safe. In fact, the independent scientific record becomes more complicated precisely at the point where the headline numbers begin to look most reassuring. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 11 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 11th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 11 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-054

The Sakhalin Papers XLIV: The Whales Moved — What the 2015 Data Eventually Revealed

The airguns stopped in 2015. The scientific argument did not. Seven years later, a series of peer-reviewed studies finally put numbers on what happened to western gray whales during the unprecedented seismic season off Sakhalin. The results resist both convenient extremes. The whales did respond: their local density fell as accumulated seismic and vessel noise increased, and individual animals changed movement and breathing behaviour. The researchers concluded explicitly that mitigation had not eliminated short-term behavioural responses. Yet models examining reproduction predicted little or no effect from the 2015 disturbance scenario, 14 calves were identified the following year, and the wider population continued its long-term recovery. The evidence therefore supports neither “no impact” nor “population damage proved.” It supports something scientifically more difficult: measurable disturbance, mitigation that reduced but did not eliminate response, and unresolved population-level consequences.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-054
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal scientific records: Glenn Gailey et al., Gray whale density during seismic surveys near their Sakhalin feeding ground; Glenn Gailey et al., Western gray whale behavioral response to seismic surveys during their foraging season, Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 2022
Supporting scientific record: Lisa Schwarz et al., Gray whale habitat use and reproductive success during seismic surveys near their feeding grounds, 2022; Lisanne Aerts et al., Seismic surveys near gray whale feeding areas off Sakhalin Island, Russia: assessing impact and mitigation effectiveness, 2022
Contemporaneous scientific record: Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel Statement of Concern, 8 May 2015
Authenticated Shell record: Royal Dutch Shell plc Sustainability Report 2015
Subsequent conservation record: IUCN, 3 September 2016 and 24 April 2019
Court record: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), used solely for the earlier Sakhalin II environmental and public-finance context
Evidence standard: Statistical association is distinguished from proof of injury or population-level causation. Observed behaviour is distinguished from modelled demographic consequences. Population recovery is not treated as proof that industrial disturbance was harmless. Industry financial and logistical support for parts of the research programme is disclosed rather than ignored. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 10 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 10th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 10 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-053

The Sakhalin Papers XLIII: Twenty-One Days of Airguns — What Actually Happened During the 2015 Piltun-Astokh Survey

The argument over whether the 2015 seismic programme should take place ended when Exxon completed its Odoptu survey on 7 July. The following day Sakhalin Energy began firing. Twenty-one days later its Piltun-Astokh programme was complete. The company acquired all 36 planned lines, recorded more than 80,000 shot points and shut the source down five times for marine mammals. But almost half of the environmentally sensitive A-lines were acquired at night, acoustic equipment failed, the full complement of real-time monitoring buoys was not available, and much of the crucial pre-survey behavioural-monitoring period was consumed by training and troubleshooting. WGWAP ultimately concluded that the mitigation component had been implemented satisfactorily. It did not say the monitoring programme was flawless — or that the whales were unaffected.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-053
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal primary record: Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel, Report of the Sixteenth Meeting, Moscow, 22–24 November 2015
Supporting primary records: Sakhalin Energy 2015 Monitoring and Mitigation Plan; company after-action material reviewed by WGWAP; IUCN Independent Observer report; WGWAP Noise Task Force material
Authenticated Shell record: Royal Dutch Shell plc Sustainability Report 2015
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, 23 July 2015; contemporary May 2015 reporting of the WGWAP seismic controversy
Court record: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), used solely for the earlier Sakhalin II environmental and public-finance context
Evidence standard: Sakhalin Energy’s operational assessments are identified as company positions. WGWAP conclusions are identified as independent scientific findings or recommendations. Operational compliance is not treated as proof of absence of biological effect. Later peer-reviewed analyses are distinguished from what was known immediately after the 2015 survey. read more

Books About Shell

Sep 9th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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Books About Shell: An Expanded Bibliography

Introduction

Royal Dutch Shell, now Shell plc, has generated an unusually large body of literature stretching from official corporate histories and executive memoirs to academic studies, environmental investigations, human-rights accounts and books written by people directly involved in disputes with the company.

The bibliography below includes:

histories commissioned or published by Shell;
independent corporate histories;
biographies of important Shell figures;
books about particular Shell businesses and projects;
books concerning Nigeria, Ogoni and Ken Saro-Wiwa;
books about Brent Spar and Corrib;
studies of Shell’s celebrated scenario-planning system;
broader histories of the international oil industry in which Shell is a significant subject;
and Amazon Kindle books by John Donovan concerning his long-running relationship with Shell.

The descriptions below are original summaries rather than reproductions of publishers’ copyrighted descriptions.

Early Royal Dutch and Shell Histories

1934

An International Oil Man

Author: Sir Henri Deterding, as told to Stanley Naylor
Format: Print read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 9 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 9th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 9 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-052

The Sakhalin Papers XLII: The Airguns Return — How One 4-D Survey Became a Cumulative-Acoustic Crisis

Sakhalin Energy began planning its next Piltun-Astokh 4-D seismic survey as a reservoir-management exercise. By May 2015, the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel was confronting something much larger. Exxon Neftegas and Rosneft also intended major seismic programmes. The independent scientists warned that almost the entire nearshore feeding and nursery habitat could be exposed to industrial noise, questioned whether all the surveys should proceed in the same season, and ultimately issued a formal Statement of Concern. Sakhalin Energy did not accept postponement — but neither did it simply ignore the Panel. The documentary record shows negotiation, redesign, reduced source strength, coordination between companies, and a fundamental disagreement over how much cumulative disturbance was acceptable.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-052
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal primary records: Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel, Report of the Fifteenth Meeting, 8–9 December 2014; WGWAP Statement of Concern, 8 May 2015
Supporting technical records: WGWAP Noise Task Force reports, 2013–2015; Sakhalin Energy response to WGWAP Statement, 23 May 2015
Authenticated Shell record: Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2014
Contemporaneous public record: IUCN, Keeping whales safe in sound, 20 January 2014; Sakhalin Energy public response, May 2015
Court record: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), used solely for the earlier Sakhalin II environmental and public-finance context
Evidence standard: WGWAP recommendations are identified as independent scientific advice, not regulatory orders. Sakhalin Energy’s technical and commercial explanations are identified as company positions. Exxon Neftegas and Rosneft were separate operators; nothing in the records examined establishes that Shell controlled their seismic programmes. Later scientific findings are distinguished from what was known before the 2015 surveys began. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 8 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 8th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 8 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-051

The Sakhalin Papers XLI: “Just in Time” — Shareholders Back a PA-C Concept, but the Project Remains Marginal

By May 2013 the proposed South Piltun platform had crossed another corporate threshold. Sakhalin Energy’s shareholders had endorsed a “just-in-time” development concept, linking construction of PA-C to declining production elsewhere in Sakhalin II. But endorsement was not sanction. There was still no final investment decision. The proposed 2014 appraisal well had been abandoned. Company studies described South Piltun as a “marginal opportunity.” And while PA-C waited for its commercial moment, preparations began for another large 3-D/4-D seismic campaign across the Western Gray Whale feeding environment.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-051
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal primary record: Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel, Report of the Thirteenth Meeting, Tokyo, 15–17 May 2013
Supporting scientific record: WGWAP Noise Task Force reports, May and October 2013
Authenticated Shell records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2013; Royal Dutch Shell plc Sustainability Report 2013
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, 30 September 2013; Gazprom corporate announcement, 23 December 2013
Court record: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), used for historical financing and environmental context
Evidence standard: Shareholder endorsement of a development concept is distinguished from a final investment decision. Sakhalin Energy’s description of South Piltun as marginal is reported as the company’s own commercial assessment. The proposed third LNG train discussed later in 2013 is distinguished from PA-C: the two were related to expansion of the same integrated project but were not the same investment decision. read more

30 November 2023: Posted by John Donovan

The content below is sourced from current verifiable customer reviews of Shell Energy published on Trustpilot.
Extremely slow broadband for 10 months, not fixed. I have had slow broadband well below the guaranteed speed for 10 months and Shell Energy have not been able to fix it. They have tried sending about 4 or 5 engineers but have not fixed the problem. Gurps, who I have been dealing with most recently, has been friendly and polite, alth… Read more

Extremely Slow Shell Broadband

Russia

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 22 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-065

The Sakhalin Papers LV: The Scientist Who Walked Away — Rick Steiner’s Warning to Shell, the PA-B Tow-Out and the ISRP Resignation

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 21 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-064

The Sakhalin Papers LIV: The Russian LNG Contract That Survived — Shell Announced Its Exit in 2022. Its 2025 Accounts Still List the Novatek Deal

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 20 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-063

The Sakhalin Papers LIII: The Missing LNG Cargoes — Shell’s Contract Was Supposed to Run Until 2028. Then It “Stood Terminated”

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 19 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-062

The Sakhalin Papers LII: The Type-C Account — How a 2022 Rouble-Payment Dispute Became a €1.5 Billion Claim Against Shell

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-061

The Sakhalin Papers LI: The Billion-Rouble Exit Price — Novatek, Gazprom and the US$1 Billion Shell Still Could Not Simply Collect

1. A price finally appeared

94.8 billion roubles

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 17 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-060

The Sakhalin Papers L: The Exit — Shell Walks Away, Moscow Rewrites the Ownership and Sakhalin II Enters a New Era

1. Four days that changed Shell’s Russian strategy

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 16 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-059

The Sakhalin Papers XLIX: “Unfinished Business” — Seventeen Years, 639 Recommendations and the End of the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel

1. The final meeting

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-058

The Sakhalin Papers XLVIII: “A Philosophical Difference” — When Regulatory Compliance Was Not Enough for the Scientists

1. A meeting held in exceptional circumstances

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 14 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-057

The Sakhalin Papers XLVII: The Feeding Ground Was Losing Its Food — WGWAP’s 2019 Benthos Alarm

1. The problem was beneath the whales

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-056

The Sakhalin Papers XLVI: One in Five Bore the Scars — When Fishing Nets Became the Next Major Threat

1. The recovery did not remove the danger

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 12 SEPTEMBER 2026

The Sakhalin Papers XLV: From Critically Endangered to Endangered — What the Whale Recovery Did, and Did Not, Prove

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 11 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-054

The Sakhalin Papers XLIV: The Whales Moved — What the 2015 Data Eventually Revealed

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 10 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-053

The Sakhalin Papers XLIII: Twenty-One Days of Airguns — What Actually Happened During the 2015 Piltun-Astokh Survey

Books About Shell: An Expanded Bibliography

Introduction

Early Royal Dutch and Shell Histories

1934

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 9 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-052

The Sakhalin Papers XLII: The Airguns Return — How One 4-D Survey Became a Cumulative-Acoustic Crisis

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 8 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-051

The Sakhalin Papers XLI: “Just in Time” — Shareholders Back a PA-C Concept, but the Project Remains Marginal

Sir Henri Deterding, resurrected!

JOE LYCETT DISCUSSES SHELL WITH JOHN DONOVAN

Meta

John Donovan’s ebooks

JOHN DONOVAN TV DOCUMENTARY INTERVIEW

SHELL EXECUTIVES AT THE CENTER OF A SCHEME TO STEAL $1.3 BILLION FROM NIGERIA’S PEOPLE

SHELL ADMITS DEALING WITH NIGERIAN MONEY LAUNDERER – BBC NEWS

SHELL, ENI AND NIGERIAN OFFICIALS IN OPL 245 CORRUPTION SCANDAL

INVESTIGATION OF OPL 245 NIGERIAN OIL CORRUPTION SCANDAL

DUTCH EARTHQUAKES CAUSED BY SHELL/EXXON

SHELL KILLS FOR OIL IN NIGERIA

SHELL LIED ABOUT CLEANING UP OIL IN NIGER DELTA

SHELL SPIES INFILTRATED NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT

LEGO DROPS SHELL OVER GREENPEACE OIL SPILL VIDEO

SHELL ARCTIC DRILLING ACCIDENTS

SHELL KNEW ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE DECADES AGO

ROYAL DUTCH SHELL FOUNDER SIR HENRI DETERDING, NAZI FINANCIER

JOHN DONOVAN PROMOTIONAL GAMES FOR SHELL AND OTHER CLIENTS

Archives

SHELL OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT OF THIS WEBSITE

Critic’s corner

The worst ever

30 November 2023: Posted by John Donovan

The content below is sourced from current verifiable customer reviews of Shell Energy published on Trustpilot.