Agency’s newly created “Cosmic Eraser & Vibe Realignment” department promises to reframe a century of corporate blunders into modern lifestyle aesthetics.
Nigeria
MSQ Launches ‘Project Extreme Gloss’ After Winning Shell PR Account
MSQ Takes the Shell Account: A Job Description That Should Have Come With Hazard Pay
The following is understood to be an internal document circulated to new starters on MSQ’s Shell business. We cannot verify its authenticity, but we also cannot stop laughing.
In a move surprising absolutely no one who has watched the energy giant cycle through PR partners the way other companies cycle through printer ink, Shell has confirmed — or at least not denied loudly enough — that MSQ is now steering the wheel of its global reputation management. It is, by any honest measure, one of the more ambitious contracts in modern advertising history, roughly equivalent to being hired to do the PR for a house fire while the fire department is still deciding whether to show up.
From 106 Known Spills to an Entire Polluted Region: Shell Faces a Much Broader Nigeria Trial in 2027
High Court ruling allows Bille community to argue that Shell is responsible for all relevant oil pollution in the region — including pollution that cannot be traced to one of 106 individually identified spills
A major new dimension has emerged in the long-running litigation over Shell-related oil pollution in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.
On 10 September 2026, Mrs Justice Lambert handed down judgment in Alame & Ors v Shell Plc & Anor [2026] EWHC 2332 (KB).
Much attention has understandably focused on another part of the ruling: allegations that Shell witnesses knowingly relied upon false or misleading factual assertions during the company’s earlier jurisdiction challenge are now to be dealt with as the litigation moves towards trial.
Shell Nigeria Case Takes a Dramatic Turn: High Court Allows Allegations of Misleading Evidence to Be Tried
A long-running English legal battle over oil pollution in Nigeria has entered a potentially explosive new phase.
On 10 September 2026, the High Court handed down judgment in Alame & Ors v Shell Plc & Anor [2026] EWHC 2332 (KB). Mrs Justice Lambert ruled that allegations that Shell and its former Nigerian subsidiary knowingly relied on false or misleading factual assertions during earlier jurisdiction proceedings should be dealt with as part of the litigation now moving towards trial. (Hassan Kohen Law)
Shell’s 2025 Sustainability Report: More Value, Less Emissions — and Plenty More Oil and Gas

Shell has produced hundreds of pages explaining its progress towards a lower-carbon future. Unfortunately for the corporate narrative, it has also included the numbers.
By John Donovan
Shell’s latest Annual Report and Accounts 2025, published in 2026 and incorporating extensive sustainability reporting, is an impressive document.
It is large. It is glossy. It is meticulously footnoted. It contains photographs of industrious-looking people in hard hats. And throughout its pages we encounter the familiar Shell formulation:
“More value with less emissions.”
There is just one small difficulty.
When you get past the photographs, aspirations, transition vocabulary, cautionary notes, definitions, methodologies, adjusted measures and corporate prose, Shell has supplied enough hard data to show what sort of company it actually intends to be.
Books About Shell

Books About Shell: An Expanded Bibliography
Introduction
Royal Dutch Shell, now Shell plc, has generated an unusually large body of literature stretching from official corporate histories and executive memoirs to academic studies, environmental investigations, human-rights accounts and books written by people directly involved in disputes with the company.
The bibliography below includes:
- histories commissioned or published by Shell;
- independent corporate histories;
- biographies of important Shell figures;
- books about particular Shell businesses and projects;
- books concerning Nigeria, Ogoni and Ken Saro-Wiwa;
- books about Brent Spar and Corrib;
- studies of Shell’s celebrated scenario-planning system;
- broader histories of the international oil industry in which Shell is a significant subject;
- and Amazon Kindle books by John Donovan concerning his long-running relationship with Shell.
The descriptions below are original summaries rather than reproductions of publishers’ copyrighted descriptions.
Early Royal Dutch and Shell Histories
1934
An International Oil Man
Author: Sir Henri Deterding, as told to Stanley Naylor
Format: Print
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: SERIES COMPLETE
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: SERIES COMPLETE
The Public HEDA Record Has Now Been Exhausted Without Repeating the Evidence
After checking the HEDA Resource Centre archive again against the full Nigeria: Lifting the Lid report and against the instalments already published in this series, I do not think there is another substantial documentary story that can responsibly be presented as new.
That is an editorial conclusion, not a shortage of material.
The material is extensive. But virtually every substantive evidential strand identified by the report has now been examined separately.
The report itself provides a useful audit trail. Its principal investigative chapters cover Shell’s exemptions from global standards; continued operation of tampered pipelines; the balance between production and environmental risk; deficient pipeline maintenance; leak detection; security failures; spill-cause assessments; the undecommissioned “basket” pipeline; treatment of internal safety objections and audits; breaches of company rules; suspected staff and contractor involvement in crude theft; divestment and decommissioning costs; concerns about the companies acquiring the business; and the extent of parent-company involvement in SPDC. (Amnesty International)
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 2 SEPTEMBER 2026
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 2 SEPTEMBER 2026
Shell Operated It. Nigeria’s State Oil Company Held 55%: The Forgotten Public-Sector Stake in the Niger Delta Disaster
The HEDA documents expose troubling decisions inside Shell and its former Nigerian subsidiary. But there is another institutional fact that should not disappear from the record: the pipelines, wells and facilities at the centre of the controversy belonged to an unincorporated joint venture in which Nigeria’s state oil company held a 55% interest. SPDC held 30% and operated the venture. For decades, therefore, the Nigerian state was simultaneously the majority economic participant in the enterprise and the sovereign responsible for regulating it and protecting its citizens. That does not diminish Shell’s accountability. It substantially widens the accountability question.
Much of The Shell Nigeria Files has necessarily concentrated on Shell.
The documents published by HEDA Resource Centre are Shell records. They contain Shell emails, Shell audits, Shell technical assessments, Shell management discussions and decisions taken within or concerning the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria.
HEDA says the released material includes confidential audits and exchanges between senior executives and argues that it substantiates longstanding complaints about the condition and management of infrastructure operated by SPDC. Those assertions remain disputed by Shell and several matters will be tested at the Bille factual trial expected in 2027. (HEDA Resource Centre)
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 1 SEPTEMBER 2026
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 1 SEPTEMBER 2026
Not a Leak: The 27 Shell Nigeria Documents Came Through Court Disclosure — and They Are Only a “Small Fraction” of the Record
The internal emails, audits and presentations now reshaping the public history of Shell’s Niger Delta operations were not anonymously leaked onto the internet. According to the July 2026 Nigeria: Lifting the Lid report, Shell disclosed relevant material to lawyers for the Bille community in the English litigation; 27 redacted documents subsequently entered the public domain after NGOs sought their publication on public-interest grounds. The same report makes an easily overlooked point: those 27 documents represent only a “small fraction” of the material disclosed to the claimants.
After weeks examining individual Shell Nigeria documents, there is a danger of overlooking perhaps the most important fact about the archive itself.
The public does not have the whole archive.
HEDA Resource Centre currently provides 27 Shell documents bearing litigation-style identifiers such as MPR-10 HB 1248-1262, MPR-10 HB 805-827, MPR-10 HB 800-804, MPR-10 HB 750-767, MPR-10 HB 856-891 and MPR-10 HB 900-911. Many are redacted. HEDA describes them as internal documents disclosed in UK proceedings against Shell, including senior-executive emails and confidential audits, and says campaigning organisations applied for their publication on public-interest grounds. (HEDA Resource Centre)
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 31 AUGUST 2026
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 31 AUGUST 2026
Shell Says the Criminals Did It. The High Court Says That Is Not the End of the Legal Question.
Shell says organised theft, sabotage and illegal refining caused the vast majority of Niger Delta pollution at issue in the Bille and Ogale litigation. That may ultimately be proved for many spills. But a 2025 High Court ruling on Nigerian law established something critically important: for a pipeline claim under section 11(5)(b) of Nigeria’s Oil Pipelines Act, third-party interference is not, by itself, a defence if relevant neglect by the licence-holder is proved. The newly disclosed Shell documents now have to be read against that legal framework.
For years, one word has dominated Shell’s explanation of oil pollution in the Niger Delta:
Sabotage.
Shell’s present litigation page says large-scale oil theft, sabotage and illegal refining by organised criminal gangs caused the vast majority of the pollution relevant to the Bille and Ogale proceedings. It says neither Shell nor Renaissance Africa Energy Company, formerly the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, should be liable for criminal acts committed by third parties. Shell says its former subsidiary invested in surveillance, pipeline monitoring, repairs, shut-ins and spill response and worked with Nigerian authorities as the criminality intensified. (Shell)
johndonovan.website: A Text-Only Archive for Search Engines, AI Research and the Donovan/Shell Historical Record
For archival, research and search purposes, I have transferred the textual content of JohnDonovan.website to this dedicated page on RoyalDutchShellPlc.com. The material is presented without the original images and other visual elements, creating a text-focused version that should be easier for conventional search engines, AI-powered research systems and other indexing tools to crawl, process, index and cross-reference with the extensive Donovan/Shell archive already published on this website.
The purpose is preservation and accessibility. JohnDonovan.website contains a substantial amount of historical information about my dealings with Shell, Don Marketing, the litigation between the Donovans and Shell, subsequent campaigning and publishing activities, and the origins and development of the various Shell-related websites. Bringing the text into RoyalDutchShellPlc.com places that material alongside the much larger documentary archive to which it relates.
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 30 AUGUST 2026
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 30 AUGUST 2026
Shell’s $10.9 Billion Nigeria Estimate vs Its Public Accounts: What Were Shareholders Told?
An internal report sent to Shell’s CEO in early 2014 reportedly put the cost of retiring SPDC’s existing asset base at $10.9 billion. Weeks later, Royal Dutch Shell approved its 2013 Annual Report and Form 20-F. The public accounts disclosed billions in global decommissioning provisions and a strategic review of Nigerian assets — but did not separately identify the $10.9 billion Nigeria estimate. That does not establish an accounting failure. It does create a legitimate disclosure question.
The 17 August instalment of The Shell Nigeria Files examined a particular issue: whether Shell’s programme of divestment risked transferring massive decommissioning and pollution problems along with the assets. This article addresses a different question.
What did Shell’s shareholders know, from Shell’s formal financial reporting, about the scale of the Nigerian retirement problem senior management was confronting internally? (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)
That question matters because Nigeria: Lifting the Lid, published on 29 July 2026 by Amnesty International, HEDA Resource Centre and partner organisations, says an internal report sent to Shell’s then CEO in 2014 estimated that decommissioning all existing SPDC assets could take decades and cost $10.9 billion, apparently excluding the separate cost of cleaning historic pollution. (Amnesty International)
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 29 AUGUST 2026
The next materially distinct angle is internal compliance culture inside SPDC. Earlier instalments quoted the 2012 remark in passing, but none has examined it as the central documentary issue. The contrast is unusually sharp: in 2012 Shell publicly said its Business Principles were the foundation of how it worked and reported disciplinary action for Code violations worldwide; yet a Shell headquarters manager visiting Nigeria reportedly told colleagues that SPDC was afflicted by “collusion, nepotism and corruption” and that the Code of Conduct was “completely ignored.” (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 28 AUGUST 2026
The next materially distinct documentary angle is the formal exception from Shell’s own group safety-control requirements. The 24 August instalment mentioned this only in passing and expressly identified it as a separate documentary story; it has not yet received a dedicated article. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 28 AUGUST 2026
Shell’s “Restricted” Safety Exception: Tampered Nigeria Pipelines Were Allowed to Keep Operating Outside a Group HSSE Requirement
A 2009 Shell engineering rule was rewritten specifically for SPDC. Then a 2012 internal application sought an exception from a group safety requirement after acknowledging that pipelines with numerous illegal connections called for “immediate corrective action or shutting in of the line.” The reason included the “considerable system downtime” needed to remove them. According to the newly published record, Shell executives approved the exception in 2013 and later extended it through 2016.
Some of the most consequential documents in a corporate archive do not look dramatic.
They are forms.
Procedures.
Technical standards.
Applications for exceptions.
One of the most important records in the newly disclosed Shell Nigeria files appears to be exactly that kind of document.
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 27 AUGUST 2026
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 27 AUGUST 2026
Shell’s 250-Barrel Threshold: Project Madrid Asked Whether Its Nigeria Shutdown Standard Was “Defensible Vs Global Benchmarks”
Buried in Shell’s 2013 Project Madrid papers is a remarkably specific figure. According to the newly published documentary record, “significant leaks” warranting pipeline shutdown were defined as more than 250 barrels over a month. The same internal presentation then asked whether that position was “defensible Vs global benchmarks.” That question came from inside Shell.
Sometimes one number changes the complexion of an entire document.
In the Shell Nigeria papers, that number is 250 barrels.
The figure appears in the Project Madrid Steering Group Update of 18 March 2013, now publicly catalogued by HEDA Resource Centre as Document 23 — MPR-10 HB 856-891_Redacted_260421_133829. HEDA says the disclosed cache contains internal emails and confidential audits cited in the Bille and Ogale litigation and released after campaigning groups sought publication on public-interest grounds. (HEDA Resource Centre)
THE SHELL NIGERIA FILES: 26 AUGUST 2026
The next materially distinct angle is Shell’s communications strategy itself. Previous instalments have examined what the documents say about pipelines, integrity, security, spill attribution, parent-company control and continued production. This one examines what the released material says Shell planned to tell governments, journalists and the wider public while those operational arguments were unfolding. A search of the published series found no previous instalment devoted to this issue. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com)


























