When the Warnings Echo: Shell’s Brent Charlie Fine and the Ghost of Brent Bravo

On 28 November 2025, Shell UK was fined £560,000 after a major hydrocarbon release on its Brent Charlie platform – a release the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) says created a “potentially catastrophic” fire and explosion risk for the 176 people on board.

The incident itself dates back to 19 May 2017, but the Scottish court’s sentence has only now been handed down. When you read the HSE’s description of what went wrong, it is impossible not to hear the echo of Brent Bravo – the 2003 tragedy in which two men died, and which exposed what former Shell Group Auditor Bill Campbell described as a “Touch F* All”** safety regime.

Shell would like to present Brent Charlie as an isolated case. The record says otherwise.

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The 2017 Brent Charlie incident – “potentially catastrophic”

 

According to the HSE’s official press release and Scottish media reports, the facts are stark:

• On 19 May 2017, the Return Oil Line (ROL) pipework inside Concrete Leg Column 4 on Brent Charlie failed.

• The line had been installed as a temporary carbon steel spool and was supposed to be removed in 2010. Instead, it was left in place for seven years, during which time it corroded internally.

• When it finally failed, it caused the largest uncontrolled hydrocarbon release reported to HSE on the UK Continental Shelf in 2017:

  • about 200kg of gas, and

  • about 1,550kg of crude oil, more than 1.7 tonnes of hydrocarbons in total.

   

• The escaping hydrocarbons formed a “potentially catastrophic explosive and flammable mixture” inside the leg.

• Ventilation extract and supply fans – safety-critical equipment designed to prevent or mitigate gas build-up – were themselves not properly maintained and “did not function properly”.

• In the words of HSE offshore inspector Dozie Azubike:

  “It is simply fortunate that no one was in the leg at the time, or they could have been asphyxiated from the hydrocarbon-rich atmosphere, quite apart from any fire and explosion risk.”

 

Shell UK Ltd pleaded guilty to two charges under the Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response) Regulations 1995 (PFEER). Aberdeen Sheriff Ian Duguid remarked that Shell “ought to have recognised that the temporary carbon steel spool was not suitable for such a line and should have been replaced.” After mitigation, the court imposed a £560,000 fine.

Shell’s statement, as reported, followed the familiar script:

• Emphasise its “focus on safety and care for our people”,

• Note that emergency procedures worked and nobody was hurt,

• Downplay the ignition risk as “extremely low”,

• And assure everyone that “this cannot happen again”.

 

We’ve heard variations on that theme before.

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Brent Bravo: deaths, corrosion and “Touch F*** All”

 

To understand why the Brent Charlie case matters, you have to go back to Brent Bravo.

In September 2003, two workers – Keith Moncrieff (45) and Sean McCue (22) – were killed in the utility leg of Brent Bravo after a gas leak from a corroded pipeline. A Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI) later concluded that the deaths were “preventable” and that there were “defects in the system of working” that contributed to the accident.

Key points from that era:

• In 1999, four years before the fatal accident, Shell appointed Bill Campbell as Group Auditor for Health, Safety and Environment to lead a safety audit on Brent Bravo.

• His audit found a platform culture that gave production priority over safety and operated under an informal “Touch F* All”** policy – meaning unsafe equipment and defects were left alone rather than fixed, and safety-critical records were routinely falsified.

• Campbell reported to senior management, including then EP director Malcolm Brinded, warning of falsified emergency shutdown valve (ESDV) tests and unsafe conditions on Bravo and other installations. Promises were made; the necessary changes were not delivered.

• In 2005, Shell was fined £900,000 at Stonehaven Sheriff Court after pleading guilty to health and safety breaches related to the 2003 deaths – at the time, a record fine for an offshore case.

 

Despite that, subsequent leaks, HSE notices and internal documents suggested that many of the underlying cultural and management failings – especially around corrosion, maintenance and integrity of “temporary” fixes – persisted for years.

It is against that background that the Brent Charlie case must be judged.

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Same field, same problems: corruption by corrosion

 

Brent Charlie is part of the same Brent field complex as Alpha, Bravo and Delta – once the jewel of the UK sector, now largely decommissioned.

The HSE’s own investigation into the 2017 release reads like a checklist of issues that have haunted Brent for decades:

• “Temporary” pipework left in place for years beyond its intended life – in this case, installed as short-term ROL spool, meant to be removed in 2010, still in service in 2017.

• Internal corrosion not properly monitored or managed.

• Safety-critical equipment – ventilation fans – inadequately maintained, so that when the moment came, they did not perform as required.

• A failure of management of change, where temporary modifications become permanent by neglect, without the necessary engineering analysis and integrity assurance.

 

HSE is explicit that this was not just a freak engineering failure:

“An HSE investigation found that deficiencies in Shell’s safety management system led to the release.”

That formula – systemic deficiency, corrosion, “temporary” bodges, safety-critical kit neglected – is painfully familiar from Brent Bravo.

The only real difference this time is luck: there was no-one in the leg when the gas and oil filled it, and nothing ignited.

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Are fines changing behaviour – or just the cost of doing business?

 

Set against Shell’s global profits, a £560,000 fine is loose change. It is less than the daily profit Shell can make in a strong commodity market, and dwarfed by the £900,000 fine imposed after the Bravo deaths two decades ago.

Over the years, the pattern in Shell’s North Sea safety record has been:

1. Warning – internal audits, whistleblower reports, safety notices.

2. Incident – sometimes near-misses, sometimes fatalities.

3. Investigation and fine – HSE or FAI finds systemic failings, corrosion, poor maintenance, or falsified tests.

4. Promises and PR – Shell speaks of “deeply ingrained” safety culture and lessons learned.

5. Repeat – new leaks, new enforcement notices, new fines.

 

The Brent Charlie judgment suggests that, even after Bravo, after Campbell’s evidence was taken up by a Parliamentary Select Committee, and after repeated public promises of reform, the same structural weaknesses were still present in 2017.

HSE inspector Dozie Azubike struck a careful balance in his public statement, praising the on-the-day emergency response while stressing the bigger point:

• The offshore industry has reduced the overall number of hydrocarbon releases, but there are still several each year which, if ignited, would have “potentially catastrophic consequences”.

• Duty-holders must strengthen inspection regimes for internal corrosion, manage temporary spools properly, and scrutinise the maintenance history of safety-critical equipment.

 

In plainer English: you cannot keep getting lucky.

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Why this matters now, even as Brent is decommissioned

 

Some might say that with the Brent platforms now removed and the field decommissioned, these incidents belong to history. That is a mistake.

There are at least three reasons the Brent Charlie fine still matters:

1. Ageing infrastructure elsewhere

   The North Sea now consists largely of aging assets being sweated for their last barrels. Problems with corrosion, temporary modifications and neglected safety-critical equipment are not unique to Brent. The HSE clearly intended this prosecution as a warning to the whole sector.

2. Corporate memory – and amnesia

   Shell has known, in exquisite detail, about its Brent safety problems since at least 1999, when Campbell’s audit reported the “Touch F*** All” regime, and certainly since the 2003 Bravo deaths and the 2005/06 fine. The fact that a very similar cocktail of failings surfaced on another Brent platform in 2017 raises obvious questions about how deep any cultural change really went.

3. Regulatory credibility

   For years, campaigners – including Campbell and this website – have alleged a too-cosy relationship between Shell and regulators in the handling of Brent Bravo, including failures to act on warnings and to inform workers.

   The Brent Charlie prosecution shows HSE can and will act, but it also throws into relief the long delay between the 2017 release and the 2025 sentence. That gap feeds the perception that consequences in this industry are slow, modest and largely absorbed as a cost of doing business.

 

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My conclusion

 

The new Brent Charlie fine is being reported as a “near miss”: a potentially catastrophic leak that, by good fortune and competent emergency response, did not kill anyone.

But seen in the light of Brent Bravo, the “Touch F* All”** safety culture, the 2003 deaths, the £900,000 fine, and years of leaked documents and parliamentary evidence, it looks less like an isolated failure and more like another data point in a long-running pattern.

The HSE has politely spelled out the lesson for the industry:

Temporary fixes must be removed on time. Corrosion must be taken seriously. Safety-critical equipment must be inspected, maintained and tested properly. And management systems that let these things slide are not fit for purpose.

In theory, Shell agrees. In practice, the record of Brent suggests that, for decades, production targets too often trumped safety warnings – until people died, and even after that.

This fine may close the book on Brent Charlie in legal terms. It does not close the book on Shell’s North Sea safety record. That story will continue to be written – in HSE databases, in courtrooms, and in the memories of the men and women who worked under regimes that were supposed to have changed, but too often did not.

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