A History of Royal Dutch Shell

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 7 OCTOBER 2026

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 7 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-080

The Sakhalin Papers LXX: The Third Train — Shell Pushes to Expand the Project It No Longer Controlled

Seven years after Shell surrendered control of Sakhalin II to Gazprom, it was pressing its new majority partner to make the project larger. In September 2013 Shell warned that delay could squander favourable Asian LNG prices. The difficulty was not the existing plant: Sakhalin II was already producing above its original design capacity. The problem was finding enough additional gas. Shell pointed toward Gazprom’s neighbouring Sakhalin III resources. In December, Peter Voser and incoming chief executive Ben van Beurden agreed with Gazprom to advance engineering work. On 23 February 2014, van Beurden and Alexey Miller signed the roadmap in Sochi. Shell no longer controlled Sakhalin II. But it plainly still regarded the project as something worth expanding.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-080; Collection: The Sakhalin Papers; Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2014; Gazprom corporate records dated 23 October and 23 December 2013 and 23 February 2014; Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, 30 September 2013; Later corroborating record: Gazprom’s subsequent account of the proposed third train and its intended Sakhalin III feed gas; Evidence standard: preparation of FEED documentation is distinguished throughout from a final investment decision or authorisation to construct the third train. No court or arbitral ruling identified for this instalment adjudicated the commercial merits of the expansion proposal. read more

^*This website and sisters royaldutchshellgroup.com, shellnazihistory.com, royaldutchshell.website, johndonovan.website, shellnews.net, and shellwikipedia.com, are owned by John Donovan - more information here. There is also a Wikipedia segment, the Shell DPA Files, "Shell and the Spies", the Shell Leaks files, as well as books written and published by John Donovan - Kindle eBooks. Timeline of the Donovan Shell Feud. Toxic History of Royal Dutch Shell Group. Shell and the Donovans: The Full Media Record — 550+ Articles, 110 Books, 40 Years. ^*All created and supported by internet wizz, Nick Gill.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 4 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 4th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 4 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-077

The Sakhalin Papers LXVII: From Protocol Toward a Joint Venture — Shell and Gazprom Neft Plan Expansion Across Western Siberia and Beyond

Seven months after Shell and Gazprom signed their “Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation”, Shell chief executive Peter Voser and Gazprom Neft chief Alexander Dyukov signed basic terms for something more concrete: a possible new joint venture covering Western Siberia, other Russian regions and even “third countries”. The distinction matters. No new venture was actually created by the June 2011 document. Shell and Gazprom Neft agreed to study one. By September Alexey Miller and Voser were still discussing how it might be established. But the direction was unmistakable. Four years after Shell lost control of Sakhalin II, the company was attempting to turn its relationship with Gazprom into a platform for expansion far beyond Sakhalin.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-077
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2011; US Securities and Exchange Commission filing record; Gazprom corporate records concerning the 2010 Strategic Global Cooperation Protocol and the June 2011 Gazprom Neft–Shell agreement
Contemporaneous reporting: Gazprom Neft press-service material; Dow Jones; Russian business press; contemporaneous Donovan archive
Judicial context: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The June 2011 agreement is described according to what it actually did: it established basic terms for examining the creation of a joint venture. It is not represented as proof that the contemplated venture had already been incorporated or that every proposed project proceeded. Corporate statements about technology, international assets and future cooperation are attributed to the companies making them. Commentary concerning strategic motives is identified as commentary. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 3 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 3rd, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 3 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-076

The Sakhalin Papers LXVI: “Strategic Global Cooperation” — Four Years After the Kremlin Crisis, Shell Signs a Worldwide Pact with Gazprom

On 30 November 2010, Royal Dutch Shell chief executive Peter Voser and Gazprom chairman Alexey Miller signed a “Protocol on Strategic Global Cooperation”. The language was striking. Shell and Gazprom would examine exploration and production opportunities in western Siberia and the Russian Far East, downstream cooperation in Russia and Europe, and even Gazprom participation in Shell projects outside Russia. Shell described the relationship as a “strong partnership”. This was less than four years after Gazprom had taken control of Sakhalin II during one of the most contentious episodes in Shell’s modern history. The protocol did not erase what had happened at Sakhalin. It showed what Shell decided to do afterwards.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-076
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Form 6-K filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, December 2010; Royal Dutch Shell fourth-quarter and full-year 2010 results; Royal Dutch Shell plc Form 6-K of December 2006
Contemporaneous reporting: The Guardian; Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal reporting preserved in the Donovan archive; Bloomberg
Judicial context: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The 2010 protocol, its stated scope and the parties’ public statements are treated as established corporate facts. Contemporary descriptions of the 2006 Sakhalin ownership transfer as forced or Kremlin-driven remain attributed descriptions. No court identified here found that Shell entered the 2010 agreement because of coercion, a secret bargain or an earlier promise of access to Russian resources. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 2 OCTOBER 2026

Oct 2nd, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 2 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-075

The Sakhalin Papers LXV: The “New Heartland” — Why Shell Deepened Its Gazprom Partnership After Losing Control

In December 2006 Shell agreed to surrender control of Sakhalin II. By April 2007 Gazprom owned 50 per cent plus one share. Yet within two years Shell was not retreating from Russia. It was signing twenty-year gas agreements with Gazprom, discussing Sakhalin III, exploring Yamal LNG opportunities and establishing a working group to pursue additional Sakhalin resources. Shell’s 2009 Annual Report went further still: Russia had become a new corporate “heartland.” The documents establish the expansion of the relationship. They do not contain a single internal memorandum explaining why Shell chose that course. But Shell’s public statements, Gazprom’s records and the commercial structure make the strategic calculation unusually visible.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-075
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2009; Shell SEC filings; Gazprom corporate releases of 8 April and 18 September 2009
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, Bloomberg, Dow Jones/Wall Street Journal, UPI, AFP and The Times
Judicial context: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The agreements, meetings, ownership interests and Shell’s description of Russia as a new “heartland” are treated as established documentary facts. Contemporary descriptions of Shell having been forced or pressured to surrender control remain attributed to journalists and other observers. No public court judgment identified here determined that Gazprom’s acquisition resulted from an unlawful bargain. Explanations of Shell’s strategic motives are commentary unless explicitly attributed to Shell. read more

OPL 245 Twist: Italy’s Supreme Court Says Shell-Eni Prosecutors Did Not Breach Their Legal Duties

Oct 2nd, 2026

by John Donovan.

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The extraordinary legal afterlife of the Shell-Eni OPL 245 affair has produced another important development.

The detailed judgment behind the acquittal of former Milan prosecutors Fabio De Pasquale and Sergio Spadaro has now been published—and it overturns the proposition that their handling of potentially favourable material in the Shell-Eni Nigeria prosecution amounted to a criminal refusal to perform their duties.

The extraordinary legal afterlife of the Shell-Eni OPL 245 affair has produced another important development.

Italy’s Court of Cassation has published the reasoning behind its decision to clear former Milan prosecutors Fabio De Pasquale and Sergio Spadaro, who had themselves been convicted after the collapse of the enormous corruption prosecution involving Shell, Eni and Nigeria’s controversial OPL 245 offshore oil licence. read more

Marketing Week Magazine Shell/Donovan Archive Articles

Sep 30th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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1995

Irate Don hits Shell investors

By Marketing Week 27 Jan 1995 Shell UK dealers and institutional shareholders have received letters from sales promotion company Don Marketing accusing Shell of a cover-up involving a “flawed” promotion.

Don and Shell are involved in a long-running legal dispute, due to come to court in February. Don has issued three high court writs and county court proceedings against Shell, alleging the wrongful use of retail promotions developed by Don Marketing. Shell has settled one of the three writs out of court.

Now Don has formed the Shell Corporate Conscience Pressure Group, put ads in the petrol trade press rallying support from others who have had dealings with the firm and written to institutional investors. Those who have received a letter include the pension fund manager of The Equitable Life Assurance Society, a heavy investor in Shell. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 25 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 25th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 25 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-068

The Sakhalin Papers LVIII: The Audit After the Spill — What Shell’s Lenders Were Being Told About Sakhalin II

In December 2005, an independent lenders’ audit of Sakhalin II Phase I entered the documentary record. A later German parliamentary motion, citing the report by name, said that two-thirds of 90 matters examined produced negative results concerning compliance with environmental standards. A separate submission by WWF, Friends of the Earth and The Corner House said the same audit criticised management of oil-spill response equipment and found that materials used after the Cristoforo Colombo accident had not been replaced. The audit itself has not been located in the publicly accessible sources reviewed for this file. Those descriptions must therefore remain attributed. But Shell’s own 2005 Sustainability Report independently acknowledges another serious compliance problem: contractors had not always followed the agreed safeguards for environmentally sensitive river crossings, forcing Sakhalin Energy to halt its winter work programme, retrain contractors and tighten monitoring.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-068
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal audit cited in the record: 2005 Lenders Tier III HSE Audit for Phase One, RSK ENSR, December 2005
Authenticated corporate source: The Shell Sustainability Report 2005
Lender records: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Phase I project record and 2005 Annual Report
Contemporaneous reporting: The Observer, June 2005; Financial Times, December 2005
Parliamentary records: German Bundestag Drucksache 16/1668; UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee evidence
Judicial record: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The underlying RSK ENSR audit has not been located in the publicly available record examined here. Statements about its findings are therefore attributed to the organisations and parliamentarians who cited it. Shell and lender statements are identified as such. No court ruled on the findings of the December 2005 audit. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 24 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 24th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 24 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-067

The Sakhalin Papers LVII: The Spill Before the Whale Fight — Cristoforo Colombo, Kholmsk and Shell’s Emergency System Put to a Real-World Test

On 8 September 2004, Typhoon Songda drove the dredger Cristoforo Colombo aground only metres from the shore at Kholmsk. The vessel was working within the Sakhalin II construction chain. Fuel tanks ruptured, oil reached the sea and shoreline, Russian prosecutors opened a criminal investigation, and environmental organisations demanded that Shell halt marine work. Sakhalin Energy insisted that the vessel was neither owned nor directly contracted by the company and that its emergency organisation responded rapidly. A later company presentation provides something unusually valuable: an hour-by-hour response chronology. It also revises the amount of oil said to have escaped dramatically downward from the roughly 190–200 tonnes reported at the time to a final company estimate of 28 tonnes.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-067
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Sakhalin Energy 2004 Annual Review; Sakhalin Energy presentation, Cristoforo Colombo Incident — 8th September 2004
Contemporaneous reporting: Energy Intelligence, Kommersant and contemporary Russian reporting
Legal record: Sakhalin environmental prosecutor’s criminal investigation under Article 252(2) of the Russian Criminal Code; subsequent civil claim against European Dredging Company
Related archive evidence: Rick Steiner’s 1999 Sakhalin oil-spill recommendations and the 2004–2005 environmental controversy
Evidence standard: Initial spill-volume estimates are distinguished from Sakhalin Energy’s later estimate. Statements by environmental organisations are attributed to them. Company response claims are tested where possible against Sakhalin Energy’s own detailed incident chronology. read more

MSQ Launches ‘Project Extreme Gloss’ After Winning Shell PR Account

Sep 21st, 2026

by John Donovan.

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=&0=&

Agency’s newly created “Cosmic Eraser & Vibe Realignment” department promises to reframe a century of corporate blunders into modern lifestyle aesthetics. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 18th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-061

The Sakhalin Papers LI: The Billion-Rouble Exit Price — Novatek, Gazprom and the US$1 Billion Shell Still Could Not Simply Collect

In April 2023, the Russian government put a precise price on the 27.5% Sakhalin II interest Shell had declined to take in the replacement Russian operator: 94.8 billion roubles. Novatek was approved as purchaser. Shell’s response was immediate — no money had been received and its legal rights remained intact. Eleven months later, Moscow cancelled the Novatek arrangement and substituted a Gazprom-owned company at exactly the same price. The stake changed hands. The cash did not simply pass to Shell. By 2024, the 94 billion-rouble pot had become entangled with restricted-account rules and a much larger Russian claim against Shell. The corporate exit announced in February 2022 had become a battle over who was entitled to the exit proceeds.

1. A price finally appeared

The previous instalment followed Shell out of the operating Sakhalin II project.

By April 2023, Moscow had reached the next stage.

Russian Government Order No. 890-r, dated 11 April 2023, approved the sale of the unclaimed 27.49999998621683%interest in the new Sakhalin Energy LLC for:

94.8 billion roubles

and designated Novatek Moscow Region LLC as purchaser. Interfax reported that the order had been published through Russia’s official legal-information system. (Interfax)

At the exchange rate quoted in contemporaneous Reuters reporting, that amounted to approximately US$1.16 billion. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com) read more

Shell Spying, Corporate Intelligence and Security: Documentary Chronology

Sep 14th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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Shell Spying, Corporate Intelligence and Security: Documentary Chronology

Four of the most important emails.

1. 24 June 1998 — Richard Wiseman admits the Shell connection to Christopher Phillips.
This moves the story beyond pure allegation.
Read the document

2. 9 July 1998 — Wiseman: “The activities of Mr Phillips have, of course, been admitted.”
A particularly clear contemporaneous formulation. (johndonovan.website)
Read the document

3. 21 March 2007 — Shell’s global monitoring email.
The strongest evidence that Shell later monitored global internal email and website traffic in an effort to identify sources communicating with Donovan. (shellnews.net)
Read the Shell internal email read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 13th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-056

The Sakhalin Papers XLVI: One in Five Bore the Scars — When Fishing Nets Became the Next Major Threat

The western gray whales feeding off Sakhalin were recovering. Their IUCN status would soon improve. But another danger was becoming impossible to ignore. In 2013, Sakhalin Energy personnel photographed mothers and calves within 100 metres of newly deployed salmon nets near Piltun Lagoon. By 2018, peer-reviewed research found evidence of fishing-gear injury on 28 of 150 photographed whales — 18.7 per cent. The same research classified coastal salmon set nets near Piltun as presenting a “very high” entanglement risk. The documentary record also contains an important complication: this was not an impact caused by Shell’s oil and gas operations. Sakhalin Energy helped identify and report the threat.

1. The recovery did not remove the danger

The previous instalment ended with an apparently contradictory picture.

The whales feeding off north-eastern Sakhalin were increasing in number. By 2018 the IUCN would move the western subpopulation from Critically Endangered to Endangered.

Yet recovery did not mean security.

A small population recovering from historical commercial whaling remained vulnerable to relatively few avoidable deaths — particularly deaths of reproductive females and calves.

And one of the next dangers to emerge was not an oil platform, seismic airgun or tanker. read more

Shell Nigeria Case Takes a Dramatic Turn: High Court Allows Allegations of Misleading Evidence to Be Tried

Sep 11th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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A long-running English legal battle over oil pollution in Nigeria has entered a potentially explosive new phase.

On 10 September 2026, the High Court handed down judgment in Alame & Ors v Shell Plc & Anor [2026] EWHC 2332 (KB). Mrs Justice Lambert ruled that allegations that Shell and its former Nigerian subsidiary knowingly relied on false or misleading factual assertions during earlier jurisdiction proceedings should be dealt with as part of the litigation now moving towards trial. (Hassan Kohen Law) read more

Books About Shell

Sep 9th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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Books About Shell: An Expanded Bibliography

Introduction

Royal Dutch Shell, now Shell plc, has generated an unusually large body of literature stretching from official corporate histories and executive memoirs to academic studies, environmental investigations, human-rights accounts and books written by people directly involved in disputes with the company.

The bibliography below includes:

histories commissioned or published by Shell;
independent corporate histories;
biographies of important Shell figures;
books about particular Shell businesses and projects;
books concerning Nigeria, Ogoni and Ken Saro-Wiwa;
books about Brent Spar and Corrib;
studies of Shell’s celebrated scenario-planning system;
broader histories of the international oil industry in which Shell is a significant subject;
and Amazon Kindle books by John Donovan concerning his long-running relationship with Shell.

The descriptions below are original summaries rather than reproductions of publishers’ copyrighted descriptions.

Early Royal Dutch and Shell Histories

1934

An International Oil Man

Author: Sir Henri Deterding, as told to Stanley Naylor
Format: Print read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 8 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 8th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 8 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-051

The Sakhalin Papers XLI: “Just in Time” — Shareholders Back a PA-C Concept, but the Project Remains Marginal

By May 2013 the proposed South Piltun platform had crossed another corporate threshold. Sakhalin Energy’s shareholders had endorsed a “just-in-time” development concept, linking construction of PA-C to declining production elsewhere in Sakhalin II. But endorsement was not sanction. There was still no final investment decision. The proposed 2014 appraisal well had been abandoned. Company studies described South Piltun as a “marginal opportunity.” And while PA-C waited for its commercial moment, preparations began for another large 3-D/4-D seismic campaign across the Western Gray Whale feeding environment.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-051
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal primary record: Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel, Report of the Thirteenth Meeting, Tokyo, 15–17 May 2013
Supporting scientific record: WGWAP Noise Task Force reports, May and October 2013
Authenticated Shell records: Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2013; Royal Dutch Shell plc Sustainability Report 2013
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, 30 September 2013; Gazprom corporate announcement, 23 December 2013
Court record: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), used for historical financing and environmental context
Evidence standard: Shareholder endorsement of a development concept is distinguished from a final investment decision. Sakhalin Energy’s description of South Piltun as marginal is reported as the company’s own commercial assessment. The proposed third LNG train discussed later in 2013 is distinguished from PA-C: the two were related to expansion of the same integrated project but were not the same investment decision. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 5 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 5th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 5 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-048

The Sakhalin Papers XXXVIII: The Third Platform — PA-C Arrives Before the Scientists Have Finished Assessing the Last Expansion

In December 2010, the independent scientists advising Sakhalin Energy expected the industrial pressure around the Western Gray Whale feeding grounds finally to ease. PA-B construction was over. The controversial Astokh seismic survey was complete. Instead, Sakhalin Energy disclosed plans for another major development: South Piltun and a possible third offshore platform, PA-C. The company said no final investment decision had been taken. WGWAP nevertheless issued an unusually explicit recommendation: construction should not begin until the effects of earlier noise disturbance were better understood and appropriate mitigation was in place.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-048
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal scientific records: Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel, Reports of the Ninth Meeting, December 2010, and Tenth Meeting, May 2011
Authenticated Shell record: Royal Dutch Shell plc Sustainability Report 2010
Contemporaneous reporting: IUCN, 7 January 2011; Reuters, 18 January 2011; WWF/IFAW contemporary material
Court record: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin), used solely for the earlier Sakhalin II environmental and public-finance context
Evidence standard: The proposed PA-C platform was at a planning stage. No final investment decision had been taken at the period examined here. WGWAP was an independent scientific advisory panel, not a Russian licensing authority or court. NGO objections are identified as advocacy positions. Statements attributed to Sakhalin Energy are distinguished from WGWAP findings and later commentary. read more

30 November 2023: Posted by John Donovan

The content below is sourced from current verifiable customer reviews of Shell Energy published on Trustpilot.
Extremely slow broadband for 10 months, not fixed. I have had slow broadband well below the guaranteed speed for 10 months and Shell Energy have not been able to fix it. They have tried sending about 4 or 5 engineers but have not fixed the problem. Gurps, who I have been dealing with most recently, has been friendly and polite, alth… Read more

Extremely Slow Shell Broadband

A History of Royal Dutch Shell

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 7 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-080

The Sakhalin Papers LXX: The Third Train — Shell Pushes to Expand the Project It No Longer Controlled

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 4 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-077

The Sakhalin Papers LXVII: From Protocol Toward a Joint Venture — Shell and Gazprom Neft Plan Expansion Across Western Siberia and Beyond

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 3 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-076

The Sakhalin Papers LXVI: “Strategic Global Cooperation” — Four Years After the Kremlin Crisis, Shell Signs a Worldwide Pact with Gazprom

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 2 OCTOBER 2026

SLF-2007-075

The Sakhalin Papers LXV: The “New Heartland” — Why Shell Deepened Its Gazprom Partnership After Losing Control

The extraordinary legal afterlife of the Shell-Eni OPL 245 affair has produced another important development.

1995

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 25 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-068

The Sakhalin Papers LVIII: The Audit After the Spill — What Shell’s Lenders Were Being Told About Sakhalin II

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 24 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-067

The Sakhalin Papers LVII: The Spill Before the Whale Fight — Cristoforo Colombo, Kholmsk and Shell’s Emergency System Put to a Real-World Test

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-061

The Sakhalin Papers LI: The Billion-Rouble Exit Price — Novatek, Gazprom and the US$1 Billion Shell Still Could Not Simply Collect

1. A price finally appeared

94.8 billion roubles

Shell Spying, Corporate Intelligence and Security: Documentary Chronology

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-056

The Sakhalin Papers XLVI: One in Five Bore the Scars — When Fishing Nets Became the Next Major Threat

1. The recovery did not remove the danger

Books About Shell: An Expanded Bibliography

Introduction

Early Royal Dutch and Shell Histories

1934

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 8 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-051

The Sakhalin Papers XLI: “Just in Time” — Shareholders Back a PA-C Concept, but the Project Remains Marginal

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 5 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-048

The Sakhalin Papers XXXVIII: The Third Platform — PA-C Arrives Before the Scientists Have Finished Assessing the Last Expansion

Sir Henri Deterding, resurrected!

JOE LYCETT DISCUSSES SHELL WITH JOHN DONOVAN

Meta

John Donovan’s ebooks

JOHN DONOVAN TV DOCUMENTARY INTERVIEW

SHELL EXECUTIVES AT THE CENTER OF A SCHEME TO STEAL $1.3 BILLION FROM NIGERIA’S PEOPLE

SHELL ADMITS DEALING WITH NIGERIAN MONEY LAUNDERER – BBC NEWS

SHELL, ENI AND NIGERIAN OFFICIALS IN OPL 245 CORRUPTION SCANDAL

INVESTIGATION OF OPL 245 NIGERIAN OIL CORRUPTION SCANDAL

DUTCH EARTHQUAKES CAUSED BY SHELL/EXXON

SHELL KILLS FOR OIL IN NIGERIA

SHELL LIED ABOUT CLEANING UP OIL IN NIGER DELTA

SHELL SPIES INFILTRATED NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT

LEGO DROPS SHELL OVER GREENPEACE OIL SPILL VIDEO

SHELL ARCTIC DRILLING ACCIDENTS

SHELL KNEW ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE DECADES AGO

ROYAL DUTCH SHELL FOUNDER SIR HENRI DETERDING, NAZI FINANCIER

JOHN DONOVAN PROMOTIONAL GAMES FOR SHELL AND OTHER CLIENTS

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30 November 2023: Posted by John Donovan

The content below is sourced from current verifiable customer reviews of Shell Energy published on Trustpilot.

The worst ever

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