Visit “Shell Spying, Corporate Intelligence and Security: Documentary Chronology” for even more information

ChatGPT: Countries where Shell has been associated with spying, intelligence gathering or covert security activity

A necessary distinction

Shell operates in a dangerous world. Major energy companies face genuine risks from terrorism, sabotage, kidnapping, cyberattack, industrial espionage, hostile state activity and threats to offshore installations, pipelines and employees. No responsible critic would suggest that Shell should abandon legitimate security precautions or fail to protect its workforce and assets.

The concern examined in this series is different. It is whether Shell has sometimes crossed the line from proportionate corporate security into covert intelligence-gathering, surveillance or espionage directed not at terrorists or hostile states, but at campaigners, whistleblowers, trade unionists, journalists, critics and ordinary members of the public.

That distinction matters. Employing experienced security professionals, including former intelligence officers, is not in itself evidence of wrongdoing. The serious questions arise when intelligence methods, private investigators, undercover operatives or former state-security personnel are allegedly used to monitor, manipulate, intimidate or gather information about people engaged in lawful activity.

The issue is therefore not whether Shell is entitled to protect itself. Plainly it is. The issue is whether, in some cases, a multinational oil company with immense financial and institutional power has gone too far—and whether individuals exercising lawful rights have been treated as security threats simply because they challenged Shell.

Evidence status: This is a living audit. New countries may be added, existing entries expanded, and where the evidence does not justify inclusion, countries may be downgraded or removed. The objective is accuracy, not exaggeration.

MAIN ARTICLE

The word “associated” covers very different evidential situations. Some cases involve acknowledged employment of intelligence contractors; others involve allegations by whistleblowers, activists, employees or litigants. Ordinary protective security should not automatically be described as espionage.

1. United Kingdom

This is the central hub of the most firmly documented Shell intelligence connections.

Shell and BP acknowledged employing Hakluyt & Company, a London corporate-intelligence firm founded by former MI6 officers. Reporting in The Sunday Times stated that Hakluyt used an undercover operative to obtain information about Greenpeace, the Body Shop and other campaigning organisations. Senior Shell figures also held positions in Hakluyt or its associated foundation.

The UK is also where:

• Shell’s Corporate Affairs Security apparatus operated.
• Christopher Phillips and other unnamed investigators allegedly investigated Alfred and John Donovan.
• Covert approaches, surveillance, undercover contact and intelligence gathering were alleged during litigation involving Don Marketing.
• Shell internal documents later disclosed extensive monitoring of John Donovan and his international contacts.
• Shell employed former intelligence personnel, including former MI6 officer John Copleston.

Evidential status: Strong documentary and published-media basis for the Hakluyt relationship; further Donovan-related activity is supported by Shell correspondence, disclosure material and witness accounts but remains disputed in important respects.

2. Germany

Hakluyt operative Manfred Schlickenrieder, a German investigator and filmmaker, reportedly infiltrated or monitored Greenpeace Germany and associated environmental networks. He presented himself as sympathetic to environmental causes while gathering information for Hakluyt’s oil-company clients, including Shell and BP.

His reported targets extended beyond Greenpeace to campaigners connected with:

• The execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Nine.
• Shell’s operations in Nigeria.
• The Brent Spar controversy.
• The Body Shop and ethical-business campaigns.

Evidential status: One of the best-known and most extensively reported Shell-associated undercover-intelligence episodes.

3. Nigeria

Shell’s Nigerian operations have repeatedly been linked to intelligence collection, informants, government-security relationships and monitoring of environmental and community opposition.

Relevant strands include:

• Hakluyt’s collection of information about Greenpeace and organisations campaigning over Ogoniland.
• Shell’s close interaction with Nigerian police, military and government officials.
• Detailed internal political and commercial intelligence concerning the OPL 245 oil-block negotiations.
• The employment of former MI6 officer John Copleston, who appears in leaked OPL 245 correspondence supplying intelligence about Dan Etete and proposed distributions of money.
• Allegations that informants and security networks supplied Shell with information about Ogoni and Niger Delta activists.

It is important to distinguish between Shell gathering commercial or political intelligence and the actions of Nigerian state forces. Nevertheless, the overlap among corporate security, government contacts, informants and coercive state power is a recurring feature of the Nigerian record.

Evidential status: Strong evidence of intensive political and commercial intelligence gathering; more serious claims concerning operational complicity with state security forces remain contested and have been litigated.

4. Ireland

At the Corrib gas project, Shell and its partners employed an extensive private-security operation during sustained community opposition.

The most prominent contractor was Integrated Risk Management Services, usually known as I-RMS. Its personnel monitored protest activity, filmed demonstrators and maintained security around Shell compounds and construction work. Controversy included reports that security personnel filmed local people, including children swimming near the Glengad compound.

Other allegations involved:

• Surveillance of Shell to Sea campaigners.
• Collection of information about protest organisers.
• Close coordination among Shell security, contractors and the Gardaí.
• Monitoring of local residents and journalists.
• Reports from OSSL personnel concerning security operations, alleged threats and sensitive dealings around the Corrib project.

Evidential status: The security and filming operations are documented. Broader allegations of covert surveillance, improper police coordination or intelligence operations require careful attribution and remain disputed.

5. Malaysia

Former Shell geologist and whistleblower Dr John Huong alleged that he was watched, followed, intimidated or subjected to surveillance during litigation involving eight Shell companies.

The activity was alleged to have occurred before resolution of:

• Shell’s defamation proceedings against him.
• Dr Huong’s wrongful-dismissal counterclaim.
• The eventual confidential settlement and nondisclosure agreement.

The available public record does not conclusively identify the investigators or establish that every suspicious incident was ordered by Shell.

Evidential status: Serious whistleblower allegations, but not as independently substantiated as the Hakluyt-Greenpeace operation.

6. Norway

At Shell’s Nyhamna gas-processing plant, employees and safety representatives described a culture involving monitoring, informants, intimidation and internal intelligence gathering.

Reported allegations included:

• Employees being watched or reported upon.
• Information being collected about safety representatives and internal critics.
• A workplace informant culture.
• Surveillance concerns surrounding union and safety activity.
• Internal efforts to isolate or discredit troublesome safety representatives.

Some of these issues were covered by Norwegian media, labour representatives and academic researchers. They overlap with conventional employee-relations investigations, so not every instance should be labelled espionage.

Evidential status: Substantial allegations and reporting concerning workplace surveillance and informant practices; less evidence of a conventional external spy operation.

7. South Africa

Shell has been connected with intelligence activity in South Africa through several overlapping strands:

• Intelligence reports concerning Greenpeace and environmental activists.
• State-security “spy cable” material containing assessments of campaigners opposing oil-company activities.
• Monitoring of protest strategy, travel and planned environmental actions.
• Historical relationships among multinational companies, private security networks and state intelligence structures.

Some reporting treats Shell as the beneficiary or subject of state-produced intelligence rather than proving that Shell commissioned the collection itself.

Evidential status: Evidence of Shell-related intelligence reporting and activist monitoring exists, but the precise commissioning chain is not always publicly established.

8. United States

Shell’s Houston-based corporate-security and business-integrity operations have been associated with investigations, employee monitoring, intelligence collection and internal disputes among security personnel.

Names appearing in the broader record include:

• Bruce Culpepper.
• Tom Purves.
• Donald G. Lane.
• James W. D. Hall.
• Crockett Oaks III.
• Michael Oliveri.
• Walied Shatter.

Additional allegations concern:

• Investigations of employees, contractors and internal whistleblowers.
• Contacts with US government personnel seeking information about Shell critics.
• Monitoring of John Donovan’s US media and government contacts.
• Internal conflict between Shell Corporate Security and the Business Integrity Department.
• Intelligence supplied through confidential ProtonMail correspondence describing a breakdown in relations among Shell security figures.

Evidential status: A mixture of litigation records, insider allegations and documented corporate-security functions. The individual claims require case-by-case verification.

9. Russia — particularly Sakhalin

Shell’s Sakhalin-2 project necessarily involved high-level political, governmental, commercial and security intelligence in a strategically sensitive environment.

Shell internal correspondence shows extensive monitoring of:

• Russian government intentions.
• Gazprom’s position.
• Regulatory and environmental pressure.
• Political threats to Shell’s controlling interest.
• Campaigning organisations and media activity.
• Individuals communicating with the Donovan archive.

There is clear evidence of sophisticated intelligence assessment, although less publicly established evidence of undercover infiltration comparable with the Hakluyt operation.

Evidential status: Strong evidence of strategic and political intelligence gathering; weaker evidence, from currently public material, of unlawful spying.

10. The Netherlands

As the former headquarters jurisdiction of Royal Dutch Shell, the Netherlands was part of Shell’s global corporate-security and intelligence architecture.

Relevant connections include:

• Group-level security and reputational monitoring.
• Oversight of international investigations.
• Monitoring of activists, critics, litigation and online publications.
• Engagement of former military, police or intelligence personnel.
• Shell’s historical relationships with British and Dutch governmental establishments.

Evidential status: Clear corporate-intelligence and security functions, but individual covert operations need to be identified rather than inferred solely from Shell’s former headquarters location.

11. Canada and the Arctic campaigning network

Greenpeace’s international campaign against Shell’s Arctic drilling generated extensive corporate monitoring, risk intelligence and security planning. Activities crossed national borders and involved campaigners in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and northern European states.

This included:

• Monitoring planned demonstrations.
• Maritime and installation-security intelligence.
• Tracking campaign messaging and activist deployments.
• Legal and reputational threat assessments.

Evidential status: Corporate monitoring is well established as a general practice; proof of clandestine infiltration specifically commissioned by Shell is less clear than in the 1990s Hakluyt case.

12. Australia?

Shell maintains substantial security, risk-management, regulatory-analysis and internal-investigation capabilities in Australia, particularly in connection with major offshore assets such as Prelude FLNG.

Publicly documented activities include:

• physical-security, emergency-response and operational-risk planning for Prelude and its offshore safety zone;
• continuing consultation with regulators, maritime users and other affected stakeholders;
• monitoring regulatory, political and industrial-relations developments affecting Shell’s operations;
• internal investigations by Shell’s Business Integrity Department, Human Resources and relevant operational functions;
• monitoring publicly reported union statements and social-media material during the prolonged Prelude industrial dispute.

During the 2022 Prelude dispute, Shell relied upon public statements by union officials and social-media posts in industrial-relations proceedings. This supports the conclusion that Shell monitored publicly available union activity connected with the dispute.

However, no reliable public evidence has yet been identified showing that Shell Australia conducted covert surveillance of activists or trade unionists, infiltrated campaign groups, intercepted private communications, or employed Hakluyt, Control Risks, Kroll, Pinkerton or former Australian intelligence officers for such purposes.

Australia should therefore be classified as a country where Shell has documented corporate-security, stakeholder-monitoring and investigative capabilities—but not, on the presently available evidence, as a proven location of Shell espionage or covert intelligence operations.

13. Italy — Equalize, OPL 245 and the Intelligence Nexus

Evidence Rating: HIGH

Italy has become one of the clearest examples of the overlap between Shell’s security, intelligence and legal defence activities. Two separate but interconnected strands place Italy firmly within this evidence audit: the long-running OPL 245 corruption proceedings in Milan and the subsequent Equalize corporate espionage investigation.

The OPL 245 intelligence operation

During the Milan prosecution over the $1.3 billion OPL 245 Nigerian oil deal, investigators obtained a vast cache of internal Shell documents and communications.

Among the most significant revelations was Shell’s acknowledged use of former MI6 officers Guy Colegate and John Copleston as business and investment advisers connected with the Nigerian venture. Their role went well beyond conventional commercial consultancy, involving intelligence gathering, political analysis and strategic assessments surrounding one of the world’s largest corporate corruption investigations.

The leaked material, together with the now well-known wiretapped conversation between then Shell CEO Ben van Beurden and CFO Simon Henry, illustrated how deeply intelligence expertise had become embedded within Shell’s handling of the affair.

Although Shell and its executives were ultimately acquitted in the Milan proceedings in 2021, the trial exposed an extensive corporate intelligence apparatus operating around one of the company’s highest-risk international projects.

Global Witness, investigative journalists, and this website have all documented the central role played by former intelligence personnel in the affair.

The Equalize scandal

In 2025, Milan anti-mafia prosecutors uncovered what has been described as one of Italy’s largest corporate espionage investigations.

At its centre was Equalize, a Milan-based private intelligence and due diligence company.

According to prosecutors, Equalize built an enormous database of confidential information by obtaining data illegally from government systems, including:

• the Italian State Police (SDI) database;
• Ministry of Interior records;
• tax authority databases;
• suspicious financial transaction reports; and
• numerous other confidential government sources.

Investigators reportedly seized what they described as an “infinite archive” containing hundreds of thousands of confidential files relating to politicians, senior business figures, journalists and other public personalities.

The investigation alleged that Equalize’s clients used these unlawfully obtained records for corporate intelligence purposes.

Shell named among corporate clients

Italian media reports and subsequent investigations identified Shell among approximately 400 Equalize clients.

It is important to make a careful distinction.

Being identified as a client does not itself establish that Shell knew how any information had been obtained or that Shell committed any criminal offence. The criminal allegations concern the activities of Equalize and those accused of operating the network.

However, prosecutors alleged that Equalize supplied clients with confidential information obtained through unlawful access to government databases.

According to multiple reports, one objective relevant to Shell and ENI concerned obtaining material relating to witnesses connected with the OPL 245 proceedings.

The allegations therefore sit squarely within the broader pattern examined throughout this evidence audit: the use of sophisticated intelligence resources to support corporate legal and commercial objectives.

A recurring pattern

Italy also illustrates another recurring theme already seen elsewhere in this series.

Rather than relying solely upon traditional corporate security departments, major investigations repeatedly reveal the involvement of:

• former intelligence officers;
• former senior police officials;
• specialist private intelligence firms;
• cyber-intelligence capabilities; and
• sophisticated investigative networks.

Whether examining Hakluyt, Control Risks, CAS, or now Equalize, the pattern is remarkably consistent.

The individuals and organisations may differ.

The methods evolve.

But the underlying objective remains strikingly similar: obtaining strategic information that provides commercial, legal or political advantage.

Assessment

Italy represents one of the strongest documented examples of the convergence between corporate security, private intelligence and major international litigation.

The Equalize investigation remains ongoing, and the ultimate legal findings will be determined by the Italian courts.

Nevertheless, the combination of:

• the OPL 245 intelligence evidence;
• Shell’s use of former MI6 personnel;
• the Milan prosecution disclosures;
• the Equalize investigation; and
• the naming of Shell among Equalize’s corporate clients,

makes Italy one of the most significant chapters in the wider story of Shell and intelligence gathering.

Evidence Rating: HIGH

Key sources: Global Witness; Intelligence Online; Movendi International; Italian prosecutorial material relating to the Equalize investigation; reporting by Il Fatto Quotidiano and other Italian media; RoyalDutchShellPlc.com reporting on OPL 245 and Shell’s former MI6 advisers.

Given the fact that the Equalize proceedings are still ongoing, I would explicitly state that “the investigation is continuing and no findings of criminal liability have been made against Shell in relation to the Equalize allegations.”

14. Saudi Arabia? — Shell and the covert financial machinery of the Al-Yamamah arms deal

Saudi Arabia belongs in this audit only with an important qualification.

There is solid documentary evidence that Shell participated in the oil machinery underpinning the Al-Yamamah arms agreement between the British and Saudi governments. There is not, on the presently available evidence, proof that Shell itself conducted espionage, surveillance or covert intelligence operations in Saudi Arabia on behalf of BAE Systems, the British Government or the Saudi royal family.

What makes the episode relevant to this series is the extraordinary combination of corporate oil trading, state secrecy, allegations of corruption, intelligence cooperation and the use of national security to terminate a criminal investigation.

The documented Shell connection

Al-Yamamah was a series of enormous arms agreements under which Britain supplied Saudi Arabia with Tornado aircraft, Hawk trainers and associated military services. A central part of the financing structure involved Saudi crude oil being lifted and sold on international markets.

A confidential British government document from 1986 recorded that Shell and BP entered three-year contracts to lift approximately 300,000 barrels of oil per day, with provisions allowing the arrangement to continue if the arms purchases had not yet been fully paid for. Other declassified correspondence refers explicitly to British officials working with Shell, BP, British Aerospace and government departments to negotiate the oil arrangements with Saudi authorities. (⁠shellnews.net)

The essential structure was also acknowledged in Parliament. During a House of Commons debate in February 2007, MPs described an oil-barter arrangement in which oil was marketed initially by Shell and BP, with the proceeds routed through the Ministry of Defence to BAE Systems. (⁠Hansard)

PBS Frontline subsequently reported that the Saudi oil sales created a substantial pool of money in a British-controlled account outside the normal Saudi defence budget. The financial arrangements were surrounded by exceptional secrecy, including a 1992 National Audit Office investigation whose report was withheld from Parliament and has never been published in full. (⁠PBS)

Shell was therefore not merely an oil company doing unrelated business somewhere in Saudi Arabia. It was one of the commercial actors used to convert Saudi crude oil into the money stream financing one of the largest and most controversial arms agreements in British history.

The corruption investigation and the intelligence ultimatum

The Serious Fraud Office investigated allegations that enormous payments and commissions connected with Al-Yamamah had been used to benefit Saudi officials and intermediaries.

In December 2006, the SFO investigation was discontinued. The official justification was the need to protect national and international security. Tony Blair’s government supported the decision amid warnings that Saudi Arabia might withdraw intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation if the inquiry continued. The legality of the termination was challenged through the courts, but the decision ultimately survived. (⁠House of Commons Library)

This is the principal reason Saudi Arabia has a legitimate place in an evidence audit concerning Shell, secrecy and intelligence.

The record does not show Shell agents spying on campaigners or whistleblowers in Saudi Arabia. It does show that Shell helped operate the oil side of a deeply secret state programme whose corruption investigation was stopped after intelligence cooperation was placed on the scales.

That distinction must be maintained.

The allegations against Shell and BP

In September 2009, RoyalDutchShellPlc.com published allegations attributed to a Saudi insider associated with BAE Systems. The source alleged that Shell and BP had done more than market oil and had helped move Al-Yamamah proceeds through international financial systems and into American investments and banking channels.

The source claimed to possess documentation and was said to have supplied information to United States authorities. These were exceptionally serious allegations. They were allegations, however—not judicial findings—and no criminal charge establishing money laundering by Shell or BP resulted. (⁠Royal Dutch Shell Plc  .com)

The terminology therefore matters. It would be unsafe to state as fact that Shell “laundered” Al-Yamamah money. The defensible formulation is that a purported BAE insider accused Shell and BP of facilitating the movement of proceeds generated by the oil-for-arms mechanism.

Shell’s documented role in lifting and marketing the oil is independently supported. Knowledge of, or participation in, corrupt payments is not.

What the US prosecution established—and what it did not

After the British investigation was terminated, the United States Department of Justice pursued BAE Systems.

In 2010, BAE pleaded guilty to knowingly making false statements to US government agencies and accepted a criminal fine of $400 million. The prosecution concerned BAE’s representations about its anti-corruption controls and payments to third parties. It was not a conviction of Shell or BP and did not judicially establish that either oil company knowingly handled bribe money. (⁠Department of Justice)

The distinction is crucial:

BAE’s wrongdoing in the US case is a matter of court record.

Shell’s participation in the oil-lifting and marketing structure is documented.

The allegation that Shell knowingly laundered corrupt Al-Yamamah proceeds remains unproven.

Why this belongs in the spying series

This Saudi chapter is not a conventional corporate-surveillance case. There is presently no adequate evidence that Shell recruited spies, monitored activists or ran an intelligence operation in connection with Al-Yamamah.

It is instead an example of Shell operating inside a commercial structure protected by the highest levels of governmental secrecy. When investigators approached the financial foundations of the arrangement, the inquiry was stopped in the name of intelligence and national security.

The relevance is therefore institutional rather than operational.

Al-Yamamah demonstrates how a major oil company could become embedded in a state-controlled system involving arms procurement, secret accounts, Saudi royal interests, British ministers, defence contractors and intelligence relationships—while the public and even Parliament were denied a complete account of how the machinery worked.

Evidence assessment

Confirmed: Shell and BP negotiated contracts to lift and market Saudi oil used to finance the Al-Yamamah programme.

Confirmed: The oil proceeds were routed through a British government-controlled financial structure and used to pay BAE Systems.

Confirmed: The SFO investigation into alleged corruption was terminated in December 2006 on national-security grounds amid concern about Saudi intelligence cooperation.

Confirmed: BAE Systems later pleaded guilty in the United States to making false statements and paid a $400 million criminal fine.

Alleged but not established: A BAE insider accused Shell and BP of helping move or “launder” Al-Yamamah proceeds through international and American financial systems.

Not established: That Shell itself conducted espionage, surveillance or covert intelligence operations in Saudi Arabia or in connection with Al-Yamamah.

Provisional conclusion

Saudi Arabia should be included—with a question mark and an explicit warning against exaggeration.

The evidence establishes Shell as part of the oil-and-financial infrastructure of Al-Yamamah. It also establishes that the wider affair was protected by extreme secrecy and that a British corruption investigation was stopped after intelligence and national-security consequences were invoked.

That is enough to justify inclusion in a broader audit of Shell’s proximity to intelligence, secrecy and covert state power.

It is not enough to accuse Shell of spying in Saudi Arabia.

Evidence rating: AMBER — confirmed participation in the concealed commercial and financial infrastructure of a state arms programme; no proven Shell espionage.

Site wide disclaimer also applies.

15. Brazil

Evidence Rating:

Moderate

Shell’s Brazilian operations have long required sophisticated political-risk and security management because of environmental protests, indigenous land-rights disputes, organised crime, offshore infrastructure protection and corruption investigations.

Unlike some other jurisdictions, there is currently no publicly documented “smoking gun” showing Shell itself directing unlawful espionage in Brazil. However, the operating environment has historically involved close interaction between multinational energy companies, government security agencies and specialist intelligence providers.

Brazil’s 2026 Federal Police Operation Veil of Maya, which targeted an extensive network of shell companies allegedly used to conceal beneficial ownership and facilitate criminal activities, highlighted the increasingly sophisticated security and intelligence environment surrounding major corporations operating in the country. While Shell was not identified as a target of the operation, the investigation demonstrated the complex corporate structures and intelligence risks confronting multinational energy companies.

Brazil has also seen repeated allegations that intelligence gathering has been directed at:

• indigenous communities;
• environmental campaigners;
• labour organisers;
• offshore infrastructure threats; and
• organised criminal activity affecting energy assets.

As elsewhere, Shell’s Corporate Affairs Security (CAS), together with external intelligence advisers, would almost certainly have maintained extensive political-risk assessments and stakeholder intelligence.

Relevant themes

• Political-risk intelligence
• Environmental protest monitoring
• Infrastructure security
• Organised crime assessments
• Government liaison

---

16. Kazakhstan

Evidence Rating:

Moderate

Kazakhstan represents one of the world’s most politically sensitive oil-producing regions.

Shell is a major participant in the North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC), which manages the enormous Kashagan oil field alongside Eni, ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies and other partners.

The consortium has experienced:

• multi-billion-dollar environmental claims;
• repeated regulatory disputes;
• production suspensions;
• nationalisation concerns;
• geopolitical tensions involving Russia and Central Asia.

Operating in this environment inevitably requires sophisticated business intelligence and political-risk monitoring.

Corporate security specialists routinely analyse:

• regulatory developments;
• government decision making;
• sanctions;
• corruption risks;
• state security developments;
• industrial espionage threats.

There is no public evidence that Shell itself engaged in unlawful espionage in Kazakhstan. However, Kashagan illustrates the type of geopolitical environment in which major oil companies rely heavily upon intelligence gathering, security analysis and specialist advisers.

---

17. Oman

Evidence Rating:

Moderate

Shell has maintained a major presence in Oman for decades through its historic shareholding in Petroleum Development Oman (PDO).

Oman’s political system places significant emphasis upon internal stability and state security.

Corporate security within the country’s strategic oil sector has traditionally involved close liaison between energy companies and state authorities responsible for protecting critical infrastructure.

Security priorities have included:

• pipeline protection;
• industrial sabotage;
• labour unrest;
• terrorism;
• tribal disputes;
• cyber security.

Although there is no publicly available evidence demonstrating unlawful surveillance by Shell in Oman, security cooperation between multinational operators and government agencies has historically been considerably closer than would normally be expected in many Western democracies.

The country therefore represents another example of Shell operating within a highly intelligence-driven security environment.

---

Hakluyt & Company — Shell’s Intelligence Partner

Evidence Rating:

Very Strong

No discussion of Shell’s intelligence activities would be complete without examining Hakluyt & Company.

Hakluyt was established in 1995 by former senior MI6 officers following discussions with senior figures from Shell and BP who believed Britain’s largest multinationals required their own discreet intelligence capability.

Unlike conventional security consultancies, Hakluyt recruited former officers from:

• MI6
• MI5
• GCHQ
• the Foreign Office
• military intelligence

Its purpose was not physical security but strategic intelligence gathering.

The firm became notorious after Greenpeace exposed undercover operative Manfred Schlickenrieder, who infiltrated environmental organisations while gathering intelligence ultimately connected with work undertaken for Shell and BP.

The episode became one of the best-known examples of corporate intelligence operations entering the public domain.

Equally significant was the unusually close overlap between Shell and Hakluyt leadership.

Examples include:

• Sir Peter Holmes simultaneously serving as a Shell director while becoming President of the Hakluyt Foundation.
• Sir William Purves  serving as Chairman of Hakluyt while also sitting on the board of Shell Transport and Trading.
• “Lord John Kerr, former diplomat, Shell director and Hakluyt-linked figure.
• Numerous former intelligence officers moving between Hakluyt and Shell’s Corporate Affairs Security organisation.

The Donovan archive also contains evidence showing striking operational links between Hakluyt and Shell.

In one documented instance, correspondence sent to Shell’s head of Corporate Affairs Security generated an automatic out-of-office reply originating from Hakluyt, suggesting an unusually close working relationship.

Perhaps most significantly, when Shell admitted that investigators had been deployed against the Donovan family during the 1998 surveillance operation, the company did not disclose to police, journalists or the Donovan family that senior Shell directors simultaneously occupied key positions within Hakluyt.

Whether individual executives themselves knew of those connections remains an open historical question.

Taken together, the corporate overlap, shared personnel and documented Greenpeace infiltration place Hakluyt at the very centre of any examination of Shell’s intelligence network.

---

Shell Corporate Affairs Security (CAS)

Evidence Rating:

Very Strong

Before becoming Shell Global Security, the company’s principal intelligence function was Corporate Affairs Security (CAS).

CAS was not simply a corporate guarding department.

Its responsibilities included:

• political-risk analysis;
• activist monitoring;
• executive protection;
• cyber intelligence;
• business continuity;
• counter-intelligence;
• liaison with government agencies;
• investigation of internal leaks;
• protection of global assets.

Internal documents disclosed over many years demonstrate that CAS monitored websites, campaign organisations and whistleblowers who were perceived as creating reputational or operational risk for Shell.

The Donovan archive contains numerous references to CAS personnel participating in investigations concerning the family’s activities over many years.

The available evidence also indicates extensive cooperation between CAS and outside organisations including:

• Hakluyt & Company;
• specialist cyber-security organisations;
• law firms;
• external investigators;
• government security agencies where appropriate.

Former intelligence personnel—including ex-MI6 officers—were recruited into Shell’s wider security structure, illustrating the increasingly blurred distinction between state intelligence expertise and corporate security management.

The available evidence does not establish that every CAS activity was improper. Like other multinational energy companies, Shell had entirely legitimate reasons for maintaining sophisticated security capabilities in countries facing terrorism, kidnapping, cyber attacks and sabotage.

The controversy arises where those capabilities appear to have extended beyond protecting assets and employees into monitoring campaigners, critics, journalists and whistleblowers.

That distinction lies at the heart of the longstanding debate surrounding Shell’s intelligence operations.

Inside CAS: Shell’s Intelligence-Led Security System

Evidence Rating:

Very Strong

One of the most important questions raised throughout this evidence audit is whether Shell’s Corporate Affairs Security (CAS) function operated merely as a conventional corporate security department or whether it evolved into a sophisticated intelligence organisation drawing upon government agencies, military expertise and specialist intelligence methodologies.

The documentary record strongly supports the conclusion that, by the late 2000s, CAS had adopted an explicitly intelligence-led approach to protecting Shell’s global operations.

That fact alone should not be regarded as improper. Major multinational companies operating in conflict zones inevitably require sophisticated security capabilities. The more important question is how those capabilities were structured, how intelligence was gathered, how it was used, and whether appropriate safeguards existed to ensure such activities remained proportionate and consistent with Shell’s published commitments on human rights and stakeholder engagement.

Shell’s Own Intelligence Model

Perhaps the clearest evidence comes not from whistleblowers or journalists but from Shell’s own internal documentation.

A CAS presentation describing the Intelligence & Assessment Team (I&AT) sets out what it calls an “intelligence led security” model. The process begins with understanding business objectives before moving into “horizon scanning via all-source information collection,” followed by threat identification, targeted information collection, analysis and action where required.

JAD Shell CAS .pdf

The accompanying process diagram identifies primary information sources that include:

• government security and intelligence agencies;
• CAS Regional Security Adviser networks;
• commercial security companies; and
• specialist security information providers.

Secondary sources include:

• other corporate security departments;
• media;
• academic institutions and think tanks;
• NGOs;
• Shell internal sources; and
• internet search engines and databases.

JAD Shell CAS .pdf

The document concludes that intelligence-led security represented “one of the emerging areas of focus for leading corporate security departments” and states that CAS was on its way to becoming “one of the leaders.”

JAD Shell CAS .pdf

These are Shell’s own words.

A Global Intelligence Function

Other internal correspondence demonstrates that CAS operated internationally through regional security managers and specialist intelligence personnel.

Emails relating to Shell’s Iraq operations discuss:

• predictive intelligence;
• tactical intelligence (TACINT);
• signals intelligence (SIGINT);
• human intelligence (HUMINT);
• liaison with military intelligence (“J2”);
• intelligence assessments;
• predictive threat calendars; and
• continuous threat monitoring for operational decision-making.

JAD Shell CAS .pdf

The terminology mirrors that commonly used within military and government intelligence organisations rather than conventional corporate security departments.

Again, this does not of itself demonstrate wrongdoing. It does, however, illustrate the sophistication of the intelligence methodologies employed.

Contemporary Insider Correspondence

The archive also contains email correspondence from April 2011 between the Donovans and a former senior member of Shell’s Corporate Affairs Security organisation.

The former insider stated that he had worked within CAS between 2003 and 2009, including roles in The Hague, and described extensive interaction with Shell’s assessment and intelligence teams and regional security managers.

JAD Shell CAS .pdf

In those contemporaneous emails, he made a number of claims, including that:

• Shell maintained close relationships with British and American intelligence communities during his period of service;
• meetings took place involving senior Shell executives and intelligence personnel concerning geopolitical security matters;
• some sensitive communications were deliberately conducted outside ordinary Shell email systems using alternative communication methods; and
• Corporate Affairs Security devoted considerable effort to intelligence gathering relating to security risks and internal investigations.

JAD Shell CAS .pdf

These statements are presented here as the account of a former senior CAS insider. While the correspondence itself is authentic, individual assertions should be read in that context unless independently corroborated.

The Human Dimension

The archive also contains contemporaneous correspondence illustrating the personal consequences experienced by some security professionals working in high-risk environments.

One email chain records concern among colleagues after the former CAS insider disclosed that he had suffered a serious mental health crisis and was receiving treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder following years of work connected with Iraq, Nigeria and other security assignments.

JAD Shell CAS .pdf

This correspondence serves as a reminder that corporate security work in conflict environments can have profound human consequences for those carrying it out.

Why This Matters

Corporate intelligence gathering is not, in itself, unusual.

Major international energy companies operate in regions affected by terrorism, organised crime, civil unrest and armed conflict. Sophisticated security and intelligence capabilities are therefore unsurprising.

The issue examined throughout this evidence audit is different.

It concerns where legitimate corporate security ends and where intelligence gathering directed towards critics, campaigners, whistleblowers or other non-violent stakeholders may begin.

That distinction is central to understanding many of the historical controversies surrounding Shell’s security operations.

Documentary Assessment

Taken together, the CAS documents provide some of the strongest documentary evidence currently available regarding the structure and operation of Shell’s internal security organisation during this period.

They demonstrate:

• a formal intelligence-led security methodology;
• reliance upon multiple intelligence sources;
• structured threat assessment processes;
• extensive international coordination;
• integration of specialist intelligence functions into corporate decision-making; and
• the use of professional intelligence terminology throughout operational planning.

They do not, by themselves, establish improper conduct.

They do, however, provide an important framework for understanding many of the country-specific episodes examined elsewhere in this evidence audit, including Nigeria, Ireland, Iraq, Libya, the Netherlands and the United States.

---

Editorial Note

This section relies primarily on authenticated internal Shell documents and contemporaneous correspondence preserved within the Donovan archive, supplemented where appropriate by publicly available reporting. Care has been taken to distinguish between documentary evidence, independently verifiable facts and statements made by a former senior CAS insider in contemporaneous correspondence. Readers should assess each category of evidence accordingly.

JAD Shell CAS .pdf

Intelligence Network Overview

This ties together CAS, Hakluyt, former MI6 officers, NCFTA, GCHQ connections, FBI-linked cooperation, Corporate Security, Shell Global Security, regional security managers and outside law firms into a single diagram or narrative. It would help readers understand that the article is not alleging one vast conspiracy, but documenting a network of relationships—some publicly acknowledged, some established through documentary evidence, and others inferred from overlapping personnel and organisational structures.

China?

 

---

Companies, firms and organisations linked to Shell-related intelligence or security activity

A. Strongly documented external intelligence connection

Hakluyt & Company

The most important name in the Shell espionage record.

Hakluyt was:

• Founded by former MI6 officers.
• Staffed and advised by former intelligence officers, diplomats and senior establishment figures.
• Used by Shell and BP to obtain intelligence concerning environmental organisations.
• Reportedly responsible for deploying Manfred Schlickenrieder undercover.
• Closely connected with senior Shell figures through directorships, shareholdings or governance roles.

The Hakluyt Foundation

An associated oversight or governance body.

Shell-linked figures associated with Hakluyt or the foundation included:

• Sir Peter Holmes, former chairman of Shell Transport and Trading.
• Sir William Purves, Shell director and Hakluyt chairman.
• Lord John Kerr, former diplomat, Shell director and Hakluyt-linked figure.

The exact dates and offices should be checked against Companies House filings before publication in a definitive table.

Holdingham Group Limited

The corporate group under which the modern Hakluyt business has operated. It should be listed when tracing Hakluyt’s subsequent corporate structure, although that does not establish that every Holdingham activity involved Shell.

B. Identified undercover operative

Manfred Schlickenrieder

A German investigator and filmmaker reportedly used by Hakluyt to penetrate environmental networks.

Reported aliases or operational identities included personas intended to make him appear sympathetic to campaigners. His targets reportedly included Greenpeace, the Body Shop and organisations active over Nigeria and Shell.

C. Irish private-security contractors

Integrated Risk Management Services — I-RMS

Employed in connection with the Corrib project. Associated with:

• Site and personnel security.
• Filming and monitoring demonstrators.
• Intelligence concerning protest activity.
• Escorting and protecting construction operations.
• Interaction with Garda operations.

OSSL

A Corrib contractor and whistleblower organisation rather than primarily an intelligence agency.

OSSL personnel claimed knowledge of:

• Shell security arrangements.
• Sensitive dealings with the Gardaí.
• Surveillance-related concerns.
• Threats and pressure following their dispute with Shell.

Its allegations should be clearly attributed to OSSL and not presented as judicial findings.

D. Internal Shell organisations

Shell Corporate Affairs Security — CAS

Shell’s internal corporate-security function was involved in:

• Threat assessments.
• Investigations.
• Intelligence gathering.
• Monitoring critics and campaigners.
• Coordination with outside investigators and security contractors.
• Liaison with law-enforcement and government bodies.

Shell Corporate Security

The broader security organisation operating nationally and internationally. Its remit has included:

• Protective security.
• Fraud and misconduct investigations.
• Political and security intelligence.
• Executive protection.
• Crisis response.
• Counter-surveillance.
• Monitoring threats to Shell personnel, property and reputation.

Shell Global Security

A term used for parts of Shell’s group-wide security capability. Functions may have changed name and structure over time.

Business Integrity Department

An internal investigations and compliance unit associated with:

• Employee misconduct investigations.
• Fraud and corruption inquiries.
• Whistleblower cases.
• Evidence gathering and interviews.

It is not a spy firm, but its work overlaps with corporate intelligence and internal surveillance.

Shell Legal

Shell’s internal and external lawyers have, in some cases, commissioned or received investigative information. Legal privilege can make the identity and remit of contractors difficult to establish publicly.

E. Government and state-security bodies appearing in the record

These organisations should not automatically be described as acting for Shell. Their relevance arises from intelligence sharing, security cooperation, former personnel or alleged alignment of interests.

MI6 — Secret Intelligence Service

Relevant because:

• Hakluyt was founded by former MI6 personnel.
• Shell employed former MI6 officers.
• Senior Shell management discussed the employment of former intelligence personnel.
• John Copleston, identified as a former MI6 officer, worked for Shell and appeared in OPL 245 correspondence.

There is no public proof that Hakluyt was formally operating as an MI6 front, and that allegation was denied.

MI5

Potentially relevant through domestic-security liaison and former personnel, but a specific operational Shell link should be documented before inclusion in any definitive allegation.

Bundesnachrichtendienst — BND

Germany’s foreign-intelligence service has been mentioned in accounts of Manfred Schlickenrieder’s background and activities. That does not by itself prove that the BND jointly conducted the Shell assignment.

Nigerian Police Force

Provided security in areas where Shell operated and interacted extensively with Shell subsidiaries.

Nigerian military and security services

Relevant to the Ogoni and Niger Delta record, including the violent suppression of opposition to oil operations. The extent of Shell’s knowledge, requests, payments or influence has been the subject of litigation and controversy.

Garda Síochána

The Irish police service deployed large numbers of officers around the Corrib project. Allegations involved surveillance of protesters, information exchange and an excessively close relationship with Shell interests. Some allegations were investigated or denied.

South African State Security Agency and predecessor bodies

Relevant through leaked intelligence reporting concerning environmental campaigners and foreign organisations. The existence of intelligence concerning Shell-related protests does not necessarily establish that Shell commissioned it.

United States government and law-enforcement bodies

Shell security personnel have maintained conventional contacts with federal and local agencies. Specific allegations concern attempts to obtain information about critics through government contacts; those claims require supporting correspondence or testimony.

(ACTUALLY UPDATED 13 July 2026)

F. Campaigning organisations reported as targets or subjects of intelligence

These organisations were generally targets, not Shell partners:

• Greenpeace International
• Greenpeace Germany
• The Body Shop
• Shell to Sea
• Friends of the Earth
• Amnesty International
• Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People — MOSOP
• Project Underground
• Milieudefensie
• Niger Delta community and human-rights organisations
• Anti-apartheid and South African environmental organisations

The original Hakluyt reporting specifically identified Greenpeace, the Body Shop and other environmental groups as subjects of intelligence collection for Shell and BP.

Consolidated country list

On the available material, the countries most reasonably included in a Shell spying and intelligence register are:

1. United Kingdom
2. Germany
3. Nigeria
4. Ireland
5. Malaysia
6. Norway
7. South Africa
8. United States
9. Russia
10. Netherlands
11. Canada
12. Australia

The first eight have identifiable episodes or allegations that can support dedicated country chapters. Russia, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia are better described at present as jurisdictions involving intensive Shell security, strategic intelligence or activist monitoring unless more specific covert-operation evidence is produced.

The strongest, least ambiguous core of the entire story remains the triangle formed by Shell, Hakluyt and former British intelligence personnel, followed by the separate country-specific records involving Nigeria, Corrib, Malaysia, Norway, South Africa and Shell’s US security establishment.

Related

Sir Henri Deterding’s Secret Service: How Shell’s Intelligence Habit Began at the Top

ChatGPT INFORMATION ENDS

John Donovan prompt to Claude: Please list countries in which the oil giant Shell has been associated with spying, spies, intelligence gathering, security, espionage, covert operations? Also list companies, firms linked with Shell in such activity.

Reply by Claude:

Here’s a consolidated list, organized by how well-sourced each is. I’d keep these distinctions visible in anything published — an outside reader (or Shell’s lawyers) will test the weakest link first.

Countries

Independently corroborated (mainstream press, leaked documents, court/wiretap evidence)

• Nigeria — OPL 245/Malabu wiretap evidence, MI6-linked advisors (John Copleston, Guy Colegate), WikiLeaks cables on ministry infiltration
• South Africa — 2015 “Spy Cables” leak (Al Jazeera/Guardian) on SSA targeting of Greenpeace’s Kumi Naidoo; 1980s “Neptune Strategy” (Pagan International)
• UK/Germany (Hakluyt–Greenpeace) — Sunday Times, June 2001, on Hakluyt infiltrating Greenpeace and The Body Shop’s network on behalf of Shell and BP; the German petrol-station firebombing cited as Shell’s own stated rationale
• Italy — OPL 245 bribery trial (wiretap evidence originated in Nigeria negotiations, prosecuted in Milan)
• UK/US (Donovan case) — Reuters-reported SAR-disclosed emails on monitoring of Donovan’s website, referencing an NCFTA meeting

Alleged, with documentary or witness support but not independently adjudicated

• Norway — Nyhamna Nyhamna surveillance/photography allegations, leaked Arnesen email, SAFE union complaint
• Ireland — Corrib pipeline: Garda-investigated private security surveillance complaint (Irish Times, 2008), UN Special Rapporteur concern
• Malaysia — Dr John Huong case: surveillance, burglary and intimidation allegations that were never tested in open court (settled, NDA signed)
• Netherlands — appears only as one of the jurisdictions from which group litigation was brought against Huong, not a surveillance allegation in its own right

Not found in any sourced material (worth noting explicitly if you publish a list, so you’re not implicitly claiming more than you have): China, Russia, the Middle East, Brazil, the Philippines, Kazakhstan.

Companies / firms linked to alleged Shell intelligence activity

• Hakluyt & Company — private intelligence firm founded by former MI6 officers; publicly reported (Sunday Times, Hakluyt’s own Wikipedia entry) as having gathered intelligence on Greenpeace for Shell and BP; former Shell chairman Sir Peter Holmes served as president of its foundation
• Pagan International — Washington D.C. corporate intelligence/PR firm, authored the 1986 “Neptune Strategy” for Shell Oil targeting anti-apartheid coalitions
• NCFTA (National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance) — referenced in Donovan SAR-disclosed emails as a body Shell met with regarding the royaldutchshellplc.com site; described as FBI-adjacent, not itself an intelligence agency
• Shell’s internal Corporate Affairs Security (CAS) — not a separate firm, but the in-house unit at the centre of most of these allegations, staffed in part by former MI6 personnel (e.g., Ian Forbes McCredie)
• Unnamed private security contractors — cited in the Ireland (Corrib, Glengad-based firm) and South Africa (Wild Coast) cases, but not named in the sourced reporting

One caution: several of these — the “Neptune Strategy,” the NCFTA meeting, the Norway photographs — rest on a single leaked document or one-sided account rather than multi-source corroboration. If this list is going into a published piece, I’d flag those as “alleged, single-source” rather than folding them in at the same evidentiary weight as the Hakluyt/Greenpeace story, which has three independent legs (Sunday Times reporting, Hakluyt’s own Wikipedia admission, and academic literature)

John Donovan: Will publish exactly as you have stated. Please suggest a headline?

A few options, varying in tone:

1. “Mapping Shell’s Spying Allegations: The Countries, the Companies, and the Evidence Behind Each”
2. “From Nigeria to Norway: Shell’s Global Trail of Spying and Surveillance Allegations”
3. “Hakluyt, Pagan International, CAS: The Companies Behind Shell’s Alleged Intelligence Operations”
4. “Shell and the Spies: A Country-by-Country Evidence Audit”

I’d lean toward #1 or #4 — both signal upfront that this is a sourced, tiered accounting rather than a blanket accusation, which matches how you’re actually presenting it (and holds up better if challenged). If you want something with more punch for social sharing, #2 works but slightly overstates uniformity across cases that don’t have equal evidentiary weight.

CLAUDE REPLY ENDS

John Donovan prompt to Bing:  Please list countries in which the oil giant Shell has been associated with spying, spies, intelligence gathering, security, espionage, covert operations? Also list companies, firms, organisations linked with Shell in such activity.

Bing reply:

^*This website and sisters royaldutchshellgroup.com, shellnazihistory.com, royaldutchshell.website, johndonovan.website, shellnews.net, and shellwikipedia.com, are owned by John Donovan - more information here. There is also a Wikipedia segment, the Shell DPA Files, "Shell and the Spies", the Shell Leaks files, the Independent Shell Archive, as well as books written and published by John Donovan - Kindle eBooks. Timeline of the Donovan Shell Feud. Toxic History of Royal Dutch Shell Group. Shell and the Donovans: The Full Media Record — 550+ Articles, 110 Books, 40 Years. ^*All conjured up by internet wizz, Nick Gill.