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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 25 SEPTEMBER 2026

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 25 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-068

The Sakhalin Papers LVIII: The Audit After the Spill — What Shell’s Lenders Were Being Told About Sakhalin II

In December 2005, an independent lenders’ audit of Sakhalin II Phase I entered the documentary record. A later German parliamentary motion, citing the report by name, said that two-thirds of 90 matters examined produced negative results concerning compliance with environmental standards. A separate submission by WWF, Friends of the Earth and The Corner House said the same audit criticised management of oil-spill response equipment and found that materials used after the Cristoforo Colombo accident had not been replaced. The audit itself has not been located in the publicly accessible sources reviewed for this file. Those descriptions must therefore remain attributed. But Shell’s own 2005 Sustainability Report independently acknowledges another serious compliance problem: contractors had not always followed the agreed safeguards for environmentally sensitive river crossings, forcing Sakhalin Energy to halt its winter work programme, retrain contractors and tighten monitoring.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-068
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal audit cited in the record: 2005 Lenders Tier III HSE Audit for Phase One, RSK ENSR, December 2005
Authenticated corporate source: The Shell Sustainability Report 2005
Lender records: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Phase I project record and 2005 Annual Report
Contemporaneous reporting: The Observer, June 2005; Financial Times, December 2005
Parliamentary records: German Bundestag Drucksache 16/1668; UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee evidence
Judicial record: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The underlying RSK ENSR audit has not been located in the publicly available record examined here. Statements about its findings are therefore attributed to the organisations and parliamentarians who cited it. Shell and lender statements are identified as such. No court ruled on the findings of the December 2005 audit. read more

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Shell and Partners Edge Toward Doubling LNG Canada — Just Weeks After Shell’s $16.5 Billion ARC Resources Bet

Sep 25th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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Shell and Partners Edge Toward Doubling LNG Canada — Just Weeks After Shell’s $16.5 Billion ARC Resources Bet

Shell and its partners appear to be moving rapidly towards one of the biggest LNG investment decisions in Canada since the original LNG Canada project was sanctioned.

According to a new report carried by the Financial Post, shareholders in the Shell-led LNG Canada project are poised to approve a doubling of the Kitimat export terminal’s capacity, potentially as soon as next week.

If the reported decision goes ahead, LNG Canada’s maximum production capacity would rise from approximately 14 million tonnes per annum to 28 million tonnes per annum. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 24 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 24th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 24 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-067

The Sakhalin Papers LVII: The Spill Before the Whale Fight — Cristoforo Colombo, Kholmsk and Shell’s Emergency System Put to a Real-World Test

On 8 September 2004, Typhoon Songda drove the dredger Cristoforo Colombo aground only metres from the shore at Kholmsk. The vessel was working within the Sakhalin II construction chain. Fuel tanks ruptured, oil reached the sea and shoreline, Russian prosecutors opened a criminal investigation, and environmental organisations demanded that Shell halt marine work. Sakhalin Energy insisted that the vessel was neither owned nor directly contracted by the company and that its emergency organisation responded rapidly. A later company presentation provides something unusually valuable: an hour-by-hour response chronology. It also revises the amount of oil said to have escaped dramatically downward from the roughly 190–200 tonnes reported at the time to a final company estimate of 28 tonnes.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-067
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Sakhalin Energy 2004 Annual Review; Sakhalin Energy presentation, Cristoforo Colombo Incident — 8th September 2004
Contemporaneous reporting: Energy Intelligence, Kommersant and contemporary Russian reporting
Legal record: Sakhalin environmental prosecutor’s criminal investigation under Article 252(2) of the Russian Criminal Code; subsequent civil claim against European Dredging Company
Related archive evidence: Rick Steiner’s 1999 Sakhalin oil-spill recommendations and the 2004–2005 environmental controversy
Evidence standard: Initial spill-volume estimates are distinguished from Sakhalin Energy’s later estimate. Statements by environmental organisations are attributed to them. Company response claims are tested where possible against Sakhalin Energy’s own detailed incident chronology. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 23 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 23rd, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 23 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-066

The Sakhalin Papers LVI: Before the Whale Panel — Rick Steiner, Exxon Valdez and the 78 Warnings Shell Faced Before Sakhalin II Phase 2

Yesterday’s file ended with Rick Steiner walking away from the scientific process surrounding Sakhalin II in August 2005. But that was not the beginning of his involvement with Sakhalin. Six years earlier, before Shell became the dominant shareholder and before the enormous Phase 2 development was sanctioned, Steiner and two fellow specialists had already examined the island’s oil industry. Their 1999 report contained 78 recommendations concerning public oversight, environmental monitoring, tanker safety, spill prevention, emergency response and liability. Steiner also delivered a separate warning based on a disaster he knew at first hand: Exxon Valdez.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-066
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal historical record: Dan Lawn, Rick Steiner and Jonathan Wills, Sakhalin’s Oil: Doing It Right, 1999
Supporting contemporary record: Rick Steiner, Oil Spills: Lessons from Alaska for Sakhalin, Hokkaido University Slavic Research Center, July 1999
Corporate context: Shell held 25% of Sakhalin Energy in 1999; it subsequently acquired Marathon’s 37.5% interest and became the dominant shareholder
Later corroborating records: UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee evidence; environmental-finance assessments; contemporary academic and industry records
Evidence standard: The criticisms and risk assessments made by Steiner, Lawn and Wills are attributed to their authors. They were expert recommendations, not findings by a court or regulator. Later events are not presented as proof that any particular warning would necessarily have prevented a particular incident. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 22 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 22nd, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 22 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-065

The Sakhalin Papers LV: The Scientist Who Walked Away — Rick Steiner’s Warning to Shell, the PA-B Tow-Out and the ISRP Resignation

On 14 July 2005, Independent Scientific Review Panel member Rick Steiner sent an urgent appeal directly to Royal Dutch Shell chief executive Jeroen van der Veer. The massive PA-B platform base was due to be towed to Sakhalin the following day. Steiner asked Shell to postpone it. He listed unresolved questions involving underwater noise, ship collisions, oil-spill preparedness, independent monitoring and the platform’s proximity to the feeding grounds of one of the world’s most endangered whale populations. Shell responded the next day. The tow-out went ahead. Six weeks later, Steiner resigned from the continuing scientific process.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-065
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal scientific record: IUCN Independent Scientific Review Panel report, 2005
Authenticated corporate record: The Shell Sustainability Report 2005
Contemporaneous correspondence: Rick Steiner to Jeroen van der Veer, 14 July 2005; Ian Craig, Sakhalin Energy, to Steiner, 15 July 2005; Steiner resignation email, 29 August 2005
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters-era coverage collected in the archive; The Guardian/Observer, March–September 2005
Judicial context: Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: Steiner’s scientific concerns and personal assessments are attributed to him. Sakhalin Energy’s responses are attributed to the company. ISRP conclusions are distinguished from Steiner’s individual position. Neither the panel nor Steiner possessed regulatory authority to stop Sakhalin II. read more

Shell Singapore Charged Over Pulau Bukom Oil Leaks and Alleged Reporting Delays

Sep 22nd, 2026

by John Donovan.

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Shell Singapore has been formally charged over two oil pollution incidents at its Pulau Bukom refinery, including allegations that the company failed to report the discharges to Singapore authorities without delay.

The charges, filed on 22 September 2026 under Singapore’s Prevention of Pollution of the Sea Act, relate to separate incidents in October and December 2024 at the Shell Singapore Energy and Chemicals Park on Pulau Bukom.

According to Channel NewsAsia, the first incident involved approximately 40 tonnes of oily mixture being discharged into Singapore waters through a hole in a pipeline within Shell’s refining facility at about 8am on 20 October 2024. (CNA)

The charge alleges that Shell did not notify the port master until approximately 12.55pm that day. (CNA) read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 21 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 21st, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 21 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-064

The Sakhalin Papers LIV: The Russian LNG Contract That Survived — Shell Announced Its Exit in 2022. Its 2025 Accounts Still List the Novatek Deal

In March 2022, Shell announced that it intended to withdraw from all Russian hydrocarbons, including LNG. Yet a long-term contract signed with Novatek in 2015 survived the withdrawal from Sakhalin, survived the disposal of Shell’s Russian retail business, and was still being reported by Shell in its 2025 Form 20-F, published in March 2026. Shell confirmed in 2023 that it was continuing to receive Yamal LNG cargoes under the agreement. The latest accounts confirm that the contract still exists — but do not establish whether Shell is still physically taking cargoes today. New European and British restrictions now place a significant regulatory deadline at the beginning of 2027.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-064
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: NOVATEK contract announcement, 4 June 2015; Shell Russia statements, February–March 2022; Shell Annual Reports 2022–2025; UK sanctions regulations and guidance; EU REPowerEU gas regulation
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, Interfax and Argus
Evidence standard: The existence of Shell’s long-term Novatek contract is established by Shell’s latest SEC filing. Continued physical receipt of Yamal LNG was confirmed by Shell in February 2023. No public evidence located for this instalment establishes that Shell continues taking individual Yamal cargoes in September 2026. Those are separate propositions and are treated separately below. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 20 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 20th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 20 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-063

The Sakhalin Papers LIII: The Missing LNG Cargoes — Shell’s Contract Was Supposed to Run Until 2028. Then It “Stood Terminated”

Shell entered the Sakhalin LNG business as both shareholder and buyer. Public agreements envisaged long-term deliveries through 2028. After Russia transferred Sakhalin II to a new domestic operator in 2022, Shell stopped receiving the cargoes. In February 2023 it said it was considering its legal options. Its subsequent annual report went further: Shell said the old Sakhalin Energy company had failed to perform, had thereby renounced the LNG purchase contract, and that the contract “stood terminated.” No public record located for this file establishes that Shell has since received compensation for the lost deliveries.

Archive reference: SLF-2007-063
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Shell Annual Report and Accounts 2022; Shell Form 20-F 2023; Shell Form 20-F 2025
Contemporaneous reporting: Interfax, Reuters, Energy Intelligence and S&P Global
Related legal record: Russian restructuring of Sakhalin II and the continuing Moscow proceedings examined in the previous instalment
Evidence standard: Shell’s characterisation of contractual renunciation is attributed to Shell. It is not presented as a judicial finding. No inference is made that the absence of a publicly identified damages award proves that no confidential arbitration, negotiation or settlement process ever existed. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 19 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 19th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 19 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-062

The Sakhalin Papers LII: The Type-C Account — How a 2022 Rouble-Payment Dispute Became a €1.5 Billion Claim Against Shell

Russia’s Prosecutor General is seeking approximately €1.5 billion from Shell Energy Europe over disputed 2022 gas payments — and wants approximately 94 billion roubles set aside for Shell’s Sakhalin compensation used against the claim. The two sums arise from different transactions. Moscow has joined them together in one closed-door lawsuit. Shell says liability remains uncertain. As of July 2026, the next reported hearing was not due until January 2027.

The previous instalment followed the 94.8 billion roubles attached to Shell’s former Sakhalin II interest.

The money did not simply reach Shell.

Instead, approximately 94 billion roubles became trapped inside Russia’s post-2022 financial machinery and subsequently appeared in a lawsuit concerning an entirely different commercial relationship:

pipeline gas supplied by Gazprom Export to Shell Energy Europe for Germany.

That distinction is essential.

The Russian claim now links:

Shell’s withdrawal from Sakhalin II; read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 18th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-061

The Sakhalin Papers LI: The Billion-Rouble Exit Price — Novatek, Gazprom and the US$1 Billion Shell Still Could Not Simply Collect

In April 2023, the Russian government put a precise price on the 27.5% Sakhalin II interest Shell had declined to take in the replacement Russian operator: 94.8 billion roubles. Novatek was approved as purchaser. Shell’s response was immediate — no money had been received and its legal rights remained intact. Eleven months later, Moscow cancelled the Novatek arrangement and substituted a Gazprom-owned company at exactly the same price. The stake changed hands. The cash did not simply pass to Shell. By 2024, the 94 billion-rouble pot had become entangled with restricted-account rules and a much larger Russian claim against Shell. The corporate exit announced in February 2022 had become a battle over who was entitled to the exit proceeds.

1. A price finally appeared

The previous instalment followed Shell out of the operating Sakhalin II project.

By April 2023, Moscow had reached the next stage.

Russian Government Order No. 890-r, dated 11 April 2023, approved the sale of the unclaimed 27.49999998621683%interest in the new Sakhalin Energy LLC for:

94.8 billion roubles

and designated Novatek Moscow Region LLC as purchaser. Interfax reported that the order had been published through Russia’s official legal-information system. (Interfax)

At the exchange rate quoted in contemporaneous Reuters reporting, that amounted to approximately US$1.16 billion. (Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com) read more

Shell Warns the World Is Running Out of Energy “Shock Absorbers” — 36 Million Tonnes of LNG Already Missing

Sep 18th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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Shell’s chief economist says global energy markets have so far absorbed an extraordinary loss of oil and LNG supply from the Middle East. But the mechanisms that cushioned the blow — weaker demand, inventory drawdowns, spare infrastructure and rising American production — are wearing thin. Europe enters winter with unusually low gas stocks. Asian buyers are already retreating from expensive LNG. And Shell warns that even reopening disrupted trade routes would not immediately restore normal conditions. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 17 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 17th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 17 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-060

The Sakhalin Papers L: The Exit — Shell Walks Away, Moscow Rewrites the Ownership and Sakhalin II Enters a New Era

On 28 February 2022, Shell announced that it would leave Sakhalin II. Within weeks its directors had resigned from the venture and its managerial and technical personnel were being withdrawn. Then the legal structure itself changed. A Russian presidential decree transferred the project’s licences, rights and obligations from the Bermuda-incorporated Sakhalin Energy Investment Company into a newly created Russian company. Shell declined to join it. The Japanese shareholders stayed. More than four years later, Shell still records an interest in the old Bermuda company — and the financial and legal consequences of the exit remain the subject of litigation in Moscow.

1. Four days that changed Shell’s Russian strategy

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

Four days later, on 28 February, Shell plc announced that its Board intended to withdraw from its joint ventures with Gazprom and related Russian entities.

The announcement specifically included:

Shell’s 27.5% minus one share interest in Sakhalin II;

its 50% interest in Salym Petroleum Development;

the Gydan Energy venture;

and its involvement in Nord Stream 2.

Shell said the decision had been taken in response to the invasion and that it would work through the commercial and energy-supply consequences while complying with sanctions. (Shell) read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 16 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 16th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 16 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-059

The Sakhalin Papers XLIX: “Unfinished Business” — Seventeen Years, 639 Recommendations and the End of the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel

In November 2021, the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel met for the last time. Its seventeen-year experiment in independent scientific oversight had changed pipelines, seismic-survey procedures, vessel management and corporate environmental practice. An independent evaluation concluded that it had materially reduced risks to the whales. Yet when the Panel closed, essential questions about prey, data access, cumulative impacts and long-term monitoring remained unresolved. Then Russia invaded Ukraine. Shell and Exxon began withdrawing. The institutional structure that had held companies, scientists, lenders, regulators and NGOs around the same table abruptly entered a different world.

1. The final meeting

The Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel held its 22nd and final meeting at IUCN headquarters in Gland, Switzerland, in November 2021.

It was the end of an experiment begun in 2004, when an Independent Scientific Review Panel was convened to assess the potential effects of Sakhalin II Phase 2 on the gray whales feeding off north-eastern Sakhalin.

The later WGWAP arrangement was unusual.

Sakhalin Energy helped finance the process.

IUCN administered it.

Independent scientists produced the recommendations. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 15th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-058

The Sakhalin Papers XLVIII: “A Philosophical Difference” — When Regulatory Compliance Was Not Enough for the Scientists

In November 2020, Sakhalin Energy and its independent scientific advisers arrived at an unusually candid point of disagreement. The company could satisfy Russian regulatory requirements and still fail to satisfy the evidential standards expected by the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel. The meeting record captured the difference in a phrase rarely encountered in corporate environmental reporting: there would always be a “philosophical difference” between conservation scientists and an oil company.

1. A meeting held in exceptional circumstances

The 21st meeting of the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel — WGWAP — took place by videoconference from 17 to 19 November 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic.

By then the Panel had spent well over a decade advising Sakhalin Energy on the protection of the endangered gray whales feeding off north-eastern Sakhalin.

Shell’s own Sustainability Report 2020 described WGWAP as an independent scientific panel established by IUCN to help mitigate environmental impacts. Shell stated that the Panel continued to advise Sakhalin Energy, in which Shell then held a 27.5% interest, and that WGWAP was preparing its final conclusions for release in 2021. (Shell) read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 14 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 14th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 14 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-057

The Sakhalin Papers XLVII: The Feeding Ground Was Losing Its Food — WGWAP’s 2019 Benthos Alarm

For fifteen years, oil companies operating off north-eastern Sakhalin financed a programme that measured the tiny bottom-dwelling animals on which gray whales depended. Then something changed. Amphipod biomass in the nearshore Piltun feeding ground began falling sharply in 2013 and reached the lowest level in the entire monitoring series in 2016. That same year, the industry-sponsored benthic programme ended. Three years later, the independent Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel issued an unusually stark public warning: the whales’ traditional nearshore feeding ground might be losing the capacity to support them.

1. The problem was beneath the whales

Much of the Sakhalin controversy had been visible above or within the water column.

Platforms.

Pipelines.

Ships.

Dredging.

Seismic airguns.

Fishing nets.

But the next warning came from the seabed.

Gray whales are benthic feeders. Off Sakhalin, they descend to the seafloor and consume large quantities of small invertebrates living in or immediately above the sediment.

In the shallow nearshore feeding area around Piltun Lagoon, one of the principal prey species was the amphipod Monoporeia affinis. read more

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 SEPTEMBER 2026

Sep 13th, 2026

by John Donovan.

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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-056

The Sakhalin Papers XLVI: One in Five Bore the Scars — When Fishing Nets Became the Next Major Threat

The western gray whales feeding off Sakhalin were recovering. Their IUCN status would soon improve. But another danger was becoming impossible to ignore. In 2013, Sakhalin Energy personnel photographed mothers and calves within 100 metres of newly deployed salmon nets near Piltun Lagoon. By 2018, peer-reviewed research found evidence of fishing-gear injury on 28 of 150 photographed whales — 18.7 per cent. The same research classified coastal salmon set nets near Piltun as presenting a “very high” entanglement risk. The documentary record also contains an important complication: this was not an impact caused by Shell’s oil and gas operations. Sakhalin Energy helped identify and report the threat.

1. The recovery did not remove the danger

The previous instalment ended with an apparently contradictory picture.

The whales feeding off north-eastern Sakhalin were increasing in number. By 2018 the IUCN would move the western subpopulation from Critically Endangered to Endangered.

Yet recovery did not mean security.

A small population recovering from historical commercial whaling remained vulnerable to relatively few avoidable deaths — particularly deaths of reproductive females and calves.

And one of the next dangers to emerge was not an oil platform, seismic airgun or tanker. read more

30 November 2023: Posted by John Donovan

The content below is sourced from current verifiable customer reviews of Shell Energy published on Trustpilot.
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THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 25 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-068

The Sakhalin Papers LVIII: The Audit After the Spill — What Shell’s Lenders Were Being Told About Sakhalin II

Shell and Partners Edge Toward Doubling LNG Canada — Just Weeks After Shell’s $16.5 Billion ARC Resources Bet

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 24 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-067

The Sakhalin Papers LVII: The Spill Before the Whale Fight — Cristoforo Colombo, Kholmsk and Shell’s Emergency System Put to a Real-World Test

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 23 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-066

The Sakhalin Papers LVI: Before the Whale Panel — Rick Steiner, Exxon Valdez and the 78 Warnings Shell Faced Before Sakhalin II Phase 2

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 22 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-065

The Sakhalin Papers LV: The Scientist Who Walked Away — Rick Steiner’s Warning to Shell, the PA-B Tow-Out and the ISRP Resignation

Shell Singapore has been formally charged over two oil pollution incidents at its Pulau Bukom refinery, including allegations that the company failed to report the discharges to Singapore authorities without delay.

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 21 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-064

The Sakhalin Papers LIV: The Russian LNG Contract That Survived — Shell Announced Its Exit in 2022. Its 2025 Accounts Still List the Novatek Deal

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 20 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-063

The Sakhalin Papers LIII: The Missing LNG Cargoes — Shell’s Contract Was Supposed to Run Until 2028. Then It “Stood Terminated”

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 19 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-062

The Sakhalin Papers LII: The Type-C Account — How a 2022 Rouble-Payment Dispute Became a €1.5 Billion Claim Against Shell

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 18 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-061

The Sakhalin Papers LI: The Billion-Rouble Exit Price — Novatek, Gazprom and the US$1 Billion Shell Still Could Not Simply Collect

1. A price finally appeared

94.8 billion roubles

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 17 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-060

The Sakhalin Papers L: The Exit — Shell Walks Away, Moscow Rewrites the Ownership and Sakhalin II Enters a New Era

1. Four days that changed Shell’s Russian strategy

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 16 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-059

The Sakhalin Papers XLIX: “Unfinished Business” — Seventeen Years, 639 Recommendations and the End of the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel

1. The final meeting

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 15 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-058

The Sakhalin Papers XLVIII: “A Philosophical Difference” — When Regulatory Compliance Was Not Enough for the Scientists

1. A meeting held in exceptional circumstances

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 14 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-057

The Sakhalin Papers XLVII: The Feeding Ground Was Losing Its Food — WGWAP’s 2019 Benthos Alarm

1. The problem was beneath the whales

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 13 SEPTEMBER 2026

SLF-2007-056

The Sakhalin Papers XLVI: One in Five Bore the Scars — When Fishing Nets Became the Next Major Threat

1. The recovery did not remove the danger

Sir Henri Deterding, resurrected!

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