By the late 1990s, Shell was not merely defending itself against litigation. It was managing a reputational crisis that went to the heart of its public commitments to transparency, ethics and corporate governance. What makes that period especially troubling is not only what Shell did, but who, quietly, was positioned on both sides of the curtain.
A Letter Sent in Good Faith
In April 1998, a formal letter was sent to a senior non-executive director of Shell Transport and Trading Company plc. Its purpose was straightforward: to alert the board to serious concerns already raised publicly in the press and now crystallised in active High Court litigation.
The letter enclosed mainstream business media coverage and supporting documentation. It alleged that Shell’s senior executive management had, over a prolonged period, obstructed the flow of material information to non-executive directors and shareholders alike. It appealed explicitly to the recipient’s independent oversight role.
There was nothing covert about the communication. It was signed, dated, transparent, and professional. At the time, the sender had no reason to believe that the recipient occupied any other role that might compromise objectivity.
What was not disclosed — and could not reasonably have been known — was that this same Shell director was simultaneously a shareholder and senior figure within Hakluyt, a private intelligence firm whose client list included Shell itself.
The Architecture of a Conflict
By 1998, Hakluyt was not an incidental consultancy. It was a specialist firm founded by former senior intelligence officers, offering discreet corporate intelligence, influence mapping and strategic information services. Shell was among its early and most significant clients.
Crucially:
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One Shell director held a leadership position within Hakluyt’s associated foundation, nominally described as an “oversight” body
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Another senior Shell figure served as chairman of Hakluyt & Co
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Neither role was publicly disclosed to shareholders engaging Shell through formal governance channels
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Both men were presented, outwardly, as independent guardians of Shell’s ethics and accountability
This dual positioning matters. Not because it proves misconduct — but because it nullifies independence.
An oversight function cannot meaningfully operate where the overseer has a financial and fiduciary interest in a firm providing covert services to the organisation under scrutiny.
Oversight Without Visibility
The Hakluyt Foundation was presented as a form of ethical or governance counterweight — a reassurance that intelligence work was being conducted responsibly.
Yet to those outside the arrangement, including litigants, shareholders and even other directors, this structure was invisible.
The result was an accountability vacuum:
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Concerns raised formally with Shell’s board could be indirectly exposed to a firm specialising in confidential intelligence
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The complainants were never informed of this exposure risk
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No firewall was declared
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No conflict was acknowledged
There is no evidence that Hakluyt was directly involved in the Donovan litigation. That is stated plainly.
But the conditions for concern were undeniably present.
The Atmosphere on the Ground
While this governance entanglement remained hidden, Shell’s external legal posture hardened.
At one stage, Shell’s solicitors issued communications that went beyond robust defence and into overtly threatening territory — including threats purportedly made on behalf of third parties they did not represent.
Separately, a manuscript supplied to Shell in the context of settlement discussions was circulated onward by Shell to other parties. That act — and what followed — became central to the eventual repudiation of the 1999 settlement.
These actions did not occur in isolation. They took place in an environment where:
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Information was tightly controlled
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Power asymmetry was aggressively leveraged
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Those challenging Shell faced pressure rather than engagement
Whether or not intelligence professionals played any role is ultimately secondary. What matters is that Shell had embedded, within its highest governance structures, individuals with undisclosed interests in a covert intelligence capability.
What Shareholders Were Never Told
Shell’s public narrative in the late 1990s emphasised ethics, openness and reform. Internally, however, shareholders were not informed that:
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Directors responsible for ethical oversight had parallel interests in a private intelligence firm
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That firm counted Shell as a client
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The firm specialised in precisely the kinds of activities that, if deployed against litigants or critics, would never be visible or provable
This is not an allegation of espionage in a specific case.
It is an indictment of governance design.
Why This Still Matters
Both individuals at the centre of this overlap are now deceased. That fact removes any possibility of clarification, explanation or accountability.
But the record remains.
So do the unanswered questions:
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How many other companies operated similar undisclosed arrangements?
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How often were “independent” directors anything but?
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And how many litigants, campaigners or shareholders were unknowingly navigating corporate structures reinforced by private intelligence capability?
The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. But the absence of disclosure is evidence of something else entirely.
Conclusion: A Silence That Speaks
Parts 1 and 2 documented disappearance — missing articles, vanishing references, historical erasure.
Part 3 documents silence: the silence of conflicted oversight, undisclosed interests, and governance that looked outwardly clean while privately entangled.
Readers may draw their own conclusions.
But one conclusion is unavoidable:
Shell’s relationship with Hakluyt was not peripheral.
And it was not neutral.
It sat unacknowledged at the very point where accountability was meant to reside.
ARTICLE ENDS
SHELL CONNECTION WITH HAKLUYT & COMPANY LIMITED
Email from Alfred Donovan sent to several hundred UK Members of Parliament 26/27 May 2004 (Subject: HAKLUYT – THE COMMERCIAL ARM OF MI6?)
LETTER FAXED BY ALFRED DONOVAN TO HAKLUYT & COMPANY LIMITED 2 JUNE 04
Letter from Intelligence and Security Committee to Alfred Donovan 2 June 2004
Email to Alfred Donovan from Mike Webster, Solicitor Church of England Legal Office 3 June 2004
Faxed letter from Alfred Donovan to Hakluyt & Company Limited 4 June 2004
Letter from Alfred Donovan to the UK Intelligence and Security Committee 4 June 2004
Email from Hakluyt & Company Limited to Alfred Donovan 7 June 2004
Faxed letter from Alfred Donovan to Sir Mark Moody-Stuart 7 June 2004
Email from Mike Webster, Solicitor, Church of England Legal Office to Alfred Donovan 7 June 2004
Letter from Alfred Donovan to HM Queen Elizabeth II 7 June 2004
Letter from Hakluyt & Company Limited to Alfred Donovan 8 June 2004
Faxed letter from Alfred Donovan to Hakluyt & Company Limited 8 June 2004
Letter from Intelligence and Security Committee to Alfred Donovan 9 June 2004
Letter on behalf of HM Queen Elizabeth II 14 June 2004
Letter from Alfred Donovan to UK Intelligence and Security Committee 14 June 2004
Letter From UK Intelligence and Security Committee to Alfred Donovan 15 June 2004
Letter from Church of England 22 June 2004
Hakluyt/Shell Transport Accounts (Sir Peter Holmes & Sir William Purves were directors of Shell Transport and also at the same time directors of Hakluyt which undertook undercover ops during the same period for Shell.
The Hakluyt Foundation Report and Financial Statements year ended 30 June 1998 (Sir Peter Holmes appointed director 30 September 1997)
The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c. Annual Report 1997 (Sir Peter Holmes and Sir William Purves shown as directors)
The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c. Annual Report 1998 ((Sir Peter Holmes and Sir William Purves shown as directors)
The Hakluyt Foundation Report & Financial Statement year ended 30 June 1999 (Sir Peter Holmes a director)
The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c. Annual Report and Accounts 2000 (Sir Peter Holmes and Sir William Purves shown as directors)
Hakluyt & Company Limited Financial Statements for the Year Ended 30 June 2003 (signed by director/shareholder Sir William Purves)
Hakluyt & Company Limited 363s Annual Return signed 23 December 2003 (Sir William Purves director)
The Hakluyt Foundation Trading Account & Balance Sheet 30 June 2002 to 30 June 2003 (Sir William Purves director)
Hakluyt & Company Limited Report and Financial Startments year ended 30 June 2007 (Sir William Purves director)
The Hakluyt International Advisory Board 363s Annual Return signed 7 August 2007 (Sir William Purves director)
Hakluyt & Company Limited 363s Annual Return signed Jan 2008 (Sir William Purves 50,000 shares – largest shareholder?)
The Hakluyt Foundation 363s Annual Return Declaration signed 7 August 2002 (Sir William Purves director)
ACCOUNTS INFORMATION ENDS
Related press articles about Shell/Hakluyt connection and undercover operations
Sunday Times: MI6 ‘firm’ spied on green groups: 17 June 2001
Article below includes admission by Shell about an “Enquiry Agent”
Promotions expert claims Shell stole his Smart card idea: Sunday Telegraph 6 June 1999
Evidence that Hakluyt recruits journalist as spies: July 2008
This website and sisters royaldutchshellgroup.com, shellnazihistory.com, royaldutchshell.website, johndonovan.website, shellnews.net, and shellwikipedia.com, are owned by John Donovan - more information here. There is also a Wikipedia segment.
EBOOK TITLE: “SIR HENRI DETERDING AND THE NAZI HISTORY OF ROYAL DUTCH SHELL” – AVAILABLE ON AMAZON
EBOOK TITLE: “JOHN DONOVAN, SHELL’S NIGHTMARE: MY EPIC FEUD WITH THE UNSCRUPULOUS OIL GIANT ROYAL DUTCH SHELL” – AVAILABLE ON AMAZON.
EBOOK TITLE: “TOXIC FACTS ABOUT SHELL REMOVED FROM WIKIPEDIA: HOW SHELL BECAME THE MOST HATED BRAND IN THE WORLD” – AVAILABLE ON AMAZON.
