Posts under ‘Bill Campbell’

Published below is self-explanatory email correspondence involving Keith Ruddock, General Counsel, Upstream International, Shell International B.V. The emails are followed by a statement from Bill Campbell, the former HSE Group Auditor of Shell International. His statement is the subject of the emails.

By John Donovan

Shell and its lawyers have had advance sight of what you are about to read and therefore the opportunity to seek an injunction to prevent publication, but have not done so. Our most recent email to Shell on this matter is published at the foot of the article.

Royal Dutch Shell trickery over UK Data Protection Act (DPA)

As long term prominent critics of Shell management, my father (Alfred) and I have found some of the information supplied to us by Shell under the Data Protection Act law to be very revealing. Some would say astonishing.

For example, revelations about Shell:

• Setting up an aggressive counter-measures team directed against us and our website: royaldutchshellplc.com
• Returning to invisible investigations directed against us
• Mounting a global spying operation against Shell employees in connection with our website

Revelations will follow shortly about Shell’s behind the scenes machinations in relation to Wikipedia articles focused on Royal Dutch Shell.

In reaction to the damage done to Shell’s reputation from DPA information supplied to us in 2007, the oil giant has used every underhand trick imaginable to limit damage from new information supplied a few weeks ago. Some of the relevant evasive tactics adopted by Shell are covered in the correspondence links provided.

In order to locate/retrieve electronically stored information relating to us, Shell would logically run an automated search on our surname. This means that if Shell systematically used some formulation of code/abbreviation to identity us, instead of using our surname, such information would not be found.

On 23 August 2007, during correspondence regarding DPA issues relating to Shell internal emails and documents supplied to us at that time, I made the following request to David Sanger of Shell International Limited legal department:

“Please also supply any information which refers to either or both of us by any code name(s) now used by Shell.”

I raised this issue after receiving a tip off from a Shell insider that certain people at Shell were deliberately avoiding the use of our surname in documents and emails.

As can be seen in the detailed chain of events set out below, while the correspondence on this issue was still in progress, with denials on behalf of Shell that any such ploy was being used, Shell emails were sent in which the use of our surname was systematically and deliberately avoided.

This was achieved by the use of multiple abbreviations of our surname and the deliberate deletion of our surname from an extract of an article. By a lucky fluke, someone blundered by adding a separate file reference at the foot of the relevant stored emails (probably at a later date). The file reference, not the emails,  contained our surname. Otherwise we would know nothing about the existence of the relevant emails about us. This means that there may be a large volume of information produced on the same devious basis, which has not been disclosed to us by Shell.

Looking at what has recently been supplied, it would also explain a greatly reduced volume of salient Shell documents and emails after the time we received the tip off in 2007. Much of the latter information supplied seems to have been generated in the U.S. where Shell Oil lawyers and media folk had not been briefed on the ploy being used to avoid Shell complying with the DPA.

Although Shell might argue that the use of multiple abbreviations of our surname is not the same as using code names, this would be disingenuous. The basic tactic – the use of a form of identification signifying our surname, without actually using our surname, has the same result. As indicated, a search of electronically stored information using our surname would not retrieve documents prepared on that devious basis.

We believe that the relevant communications involve senior people at Shell. One of these individuals may have a self-serving motive in keeping secret a twisting of facts about our past history with Shell, evident in many Shell internal documents we have seen.

MORE DETAILED INFORMATION

When I raised the code names issue with Shell on 23 August 2007, I was surprised to receive a response from a law firm Simmons & Simmons suddenly retained by the company. While their response letter dated 5 September 2007 dealt with some DPA issues, it neglected to deal with the question of Shell’s use of code names.

Some related extracts from my email response to Simmons & Simmons dated 8 September 2007:

We will also inform the Commissioner that we have reason to believe Shell are using a codename strategy to try to evade its statutory duty of releasing more information; it is our understanding from the IC’s office that we are entitled to any information that refers to us or by which we can be identified, even if it is not by name. We further understand that it is an offence under that act to knowingly take steps to withhold information.

The codename issue is serious; we understand that if the Commissioner thinks your client has tried to evade the relevant provisions of the Act, he will write to Shell and require them to release all that information to the Information Commissioner and to us.

We raised the codename issue in our last communication to your client. Instead of an answer, we received your letter which completely ignores the question..

On 10 September 2007, my father sent an email to RDS Plc Company Secretary Michiel Brandjes, containing a draft of an email being sent to over 600 UK MP’s. The draft email contained the following passage:

Following a tip-off, we also asked if Shell has attempted to evade its DPA obligations by subsequently using codenames instead of our surnames: another serious matter if true.

An email from my father to Shell EP General Counsel Keith Ruddock contained the following comments relating to the use of code names:

Like Mr Sanger, Mr Allen and Mr Brandjes, you have chosen not to provide an answer to the codenames issue. Three lawyers have all ducked a simple question. That makes us more than suspicious.

Any of you could have simply stated

Your information about the use of codenames is incorrect. No codenames have been used in relation to you or your father.

but were self-evidently unable or unwilling to do so.

Under the circumstances I believe it is reasonable for us to conclude that the insider information on the subject of code names is correct.

Nonetheless, I will ask one last time for a straight-forward answer to a straight-forward question.

Has Shell ever substituted a codename(s) for the Donovan surname for either my son or I, or for both of us?

We are delaying the email to MP’s while we give Shell this last opportunity to answer this question.

We received a response letter from Simmons & Simmons dated 12 September 2007 from which the following salient extracts are taken:

You also intend to write to the Information Commissioner stating your belief that our client is employing code names in order to avoid its obligations under the Act. As stated in our letter of 05 September 2007, our client has complied fully and in good faith with its obligations under the Act. For the avoidance of doubt, we are instructed that our client has not used code names for the purposes you allege or at all in relation to you or Mr Alfred Donovan.

We confirm that our client has not relied on the exemption of self-incrimination in responding to your SAR. We request that you inform any third parties with whom you have communicated, or intend to communicate, on this issue of this fact and of those set out above in relation to code names and the identity of third persons.

On 13 September 2007 my father confirmed to Mr Ruddock that in the light of the letter from Simmons & Simmons, the reference to Shell using code names to avoid its obligations under the Data Protection Act would be removed from the email to MP’s and that the issue would not be raised with the Information Commissioner.

However, as a result of documents Shell supplied in response to my 2009 SAR application, it has become apparent that the denials by Shell were disingenuous.

Shell internal emails sent on 31 August 2007 just a few days after we first raised the matter, provide evidence that Shell lawyers were indeed deliberately following a strategy to avoid the use of our surname.  The code names were less than sophisticated, amounting to various abbreviations of our surname, but with the same objective. This was done systemically over twenty times in the relevant emails, including the use of “D’S”, “D’s”, “Alfred D”, “Ds”, “John D” and “Mr D”.

The clincher that it was a deliberate strategy to avoid DPA law was the removal of the Donovan name from an extract from an article quoted in the email sent at 15.13 on 31 August.

“A 90 year old war veteran, Alfred D——-, created a gripe website focused on Shell which, in an extraordinary alliance with the so-called “Kremlin attack dog” Oleg Mitvol, has cost the oil giant billions of dollars and as a by-product, changed the course of history.

We would never have known about these Shell emails except for the fact that some one blundered by adding a file reference code, probably at a later date, at the foot of the page:

« File: 2006 – 01 – Alfred Donovan.doc» «File: 2007 – 02 – Donovan Campaign Against Shell.doc »

Consequentially, there may well be a large volume of emails and documents on which the same strategy was used, on which a file reference was not added.

I note that a number of “Focal Point” documents produced by Shell contain an assurance to Shell management in relation to these matters, as as per the example dated 16 October 2007:

Did you avoid disclosing certain information to the Donovans in response to their Data Protection Act requests?

We complied fully with the Data Protection Act request while making legitimate use of the ability under the Act to withhold information in certain limited circumstances, for example where it is legally privileged or to protect the identities of third parties. We also informed the RDSplc website that we do not use codewords in internal documents relating to their activities.

The Shell internal emails on 31 August 2007 prove otherwise.

Under the circumstances, we have asked Shell to carry out a search using all of the multiple code/abbreviations which we now know for certain have been used instead of our surname.

EMAIL FROM JOHN DONOVAN TO SHELL 24 JANUARY 2010

From: John Donovan <john@shellnews.net>
Date: 24 January 2010 20:31:24 GMT
To: Gavin.white@shell.com
Cc: michiel.brandjes@shell.com, peter.p.voser@shell.com, robert.allen@simmons-simmons.com
Subject: Royal Dutch Shell trickery over UK Data Protection Act (DPA)

Dear Mr White

Printed below is a revised draft article we plan to publish on Tuesday morning, 26 January 2010.

The text will be amended in the light of any development before then.

If you wish to supply comment for unedited publication as part of the article, please let us have your comments by Tuesday am.

Please also let me know if you will be carrying out a search using the various Shell code/abbreviations used as a substitute for our surname, which has confirmed the tip off we received from a Shell insider.

If you need more time to consider this matter, you only have to say so.

If I receive nothing from you by Tuesday am, the article will be published and a formal complaint filed with The Information Commissioners Office covering this and all other DPA related issues previously raised with Shell.

Best Regards

John Donovan

NO RESPONSE THUS FAR FROM SHELL

LEAFLET CURRENTLY BEING GIVEN TO SHELL EMPLOYEES OUTSIDE SHELL CENTRE

Shell offshore workers died as a result of Brinded’s “Touch F*** All” safety regime

Published by John Donovan of royaldutchshellplc.com Oct 2009

A criminal investigation is currently underway in Scotland relating to alleged corruption allegations involving Shell and officials of the Health & Safety Executive. The investigation follows an email a retired former HSE Group Auditor of Shell International sent to over 600 UK Members of Parliament.

Bill Campbell explained in his email (reprinted below) how the lives of Shell employees working on the Brent Bravo oil platform in the North Sea were lost after Shell senior management put production and profits before safely.

Senior officials at Royal Dutch Shell Plc had sight of Campbell’s email before it was sent. Campbell received cross-party support for his calls for an investigation.

THE BILL CAMPBELL EMAIL TO UK MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

Subject: This could be the most important whistleblower email you have ever received.

Some unfortunate Royal Dutch Shell workers have already lost their lives. More lives are at stake.

My name is Bill Campbell. I am a former Group Auditor of Shell International. I am writing to you on a matter of conscience in an effort to avert the inevitability of another major accident in the North Sea. The consequences could potentially impact on families in many constituencies, including your own.

As Royal Dutch Shell and the Health & Safety Executive would acknowledge, I am an expert on safety matters relating to offshore oil and gas platforms. In 1999, I was appointed by Shell to lead a safety audit on the Brent Bravo platform. The audit revealed a platform management culture that basically gave a higher priority to production than the safety of Shell employees. To our astonishment we discovered that a “Touch F*** All” policy was in place. Worse still, safety records were routinely falsified and repairs bodged.

I personally brought the shocking situation to the attention of senior management including Malcolm Brinded, the then Managing Director of Shell Exploration & Production. I revealed that ESDV leak-off tests were purposely falsified, not once but many times and that Brent Bravo platform management had admitted responsibility for the dangerous practices being followed. In response to my team ringing alarm bells, management pledged to rectify the serious problems, which had been uncovered. When I later complained that the pledges were not being kept, I was removed from my oversight function.

Four years later, a massive gas leak occurred on the platform. Two workers lost their lives. I have no doubt at all that the inaction of the relevant Asset Manager, the General Manager, the Oil Director and Malcolm Brinded, contributed in some part to the unlawful killing of two persons on Brent Bravo in September 2003.

Shell subsequently pleaded guilty to breaches of the HSE regulations and a record-breaking £900,000 fine was imposed. I thought this would bring about a real change in policy to put the emphasis on safety.

Unfortunately I was wrong. Although I supplied the evidence related to 1999, and the fact that there had been a collapse in controls of integrity from 1999 to 2003 on all 16 of Shell’s North Sea offshore installations covered in a post fatality integrity review to the HSE for review by the Procurator Fiscal, none of this evidence was presented before the Sheriff at the subsequent Inquiry. The situation is explained in a letter to the Procurator Fiscal and the Sheriff (on 24th February 2007).

Shell management has engaged in spin to try to pretend that it is getting to grips with its safety problem. However, its atrocious safety record – the worst in the North Sea in terms of accidental deaths and absolute number of enforcement actions – tells a different story. This fact has resulted in a number of newspaper articles.

I have had meetings with senior Shell people including its CEO Mr. Jeroen van der Veer. I regret to say that I have found him to be economical with the truth. He prefers to support cover-up and deceit rather than confronting the underlying problems. Brinded is now Executive Director of Shell Exploration & Production. He believes in burying evidence.

My family and friends would probably prefer me to give up on this matter and enjoy my retirement after so many years working for Shell.

However, by writing to every MP in the UK, no one can ever say that I did not do my best to avert an inevitable further major accident event in the North Sea. When it happens (I pray that I am wrong) I will make this warning communication available to the media together with the vast amount of evidence in my possession.

At least my conscience is clear. I have done everything possible to ring the alarm bells about Shell management and its unscrupulous attitude to the safety of its employees.

Yours sincerely

Bill Campbell (EMAIL ENDS)

Internal correspondence we obtained from Shell under the Data Protection Act revealed that Shell had set up a countermeasures team to combat our joint campaign with Bill Campbell for Shell offshore employee safety. It was clear from the internal emails that Shell had been panic stricken by the prospect of a Campbell/Donovan campaign. Shell EP General Counsel Keith Ruddock wrote to Campbell’s solicitors desperately doing his best to kill the prospective alliance. A stated aim in the internal emails was to “detach” Campbell from the Donovans. The revelations generated newspaper headlines: “Shell on back foot as ‘gripe’ site’ alleges safety concerns” (Daily Mail) and “Pressure on Shell over safety of platforms” (Daily Telegraph).

Jeroen van der Veer was later quoted in a Guardian article in August 2007 as being “hurt” by our criticism over Shell’s safety record. Yet on 1 Feb 08, Channel 4 News led its broadcast with a 7-minute package: “Shell North Sea Safety Concerns”. On 23 Feb 08, Shell pleaded guilty at Chester Crown Court to safety offences’ arising from a potential “near disaster” at Stanlow Refinery arising from a lethal gas leak. In March 08, an UpstreamOnline article revealed that Shell had received more HSE legal notices than any other operator working in the UK North Sea. It also reported that two Brent field lifeboats, one on Brent Bravo, had to be removed from service because they were in a dangerous condition. In early October 09, an HSE Prohibition Notice was served on Shell after a potentially deadly gas leak on Shell Brent Charlie platform.

We are therefore forced to conclude that despite a Shell “safety czar” (Kieron McFadyen) being appointed, it was just another example of empty Shell PR propaganda. In reality, nothing has changed. A reckless attitude to safety issues remains the key feature of the unscrupulous reign of Shell EP / Upstream International Executive director, Malcolm “TFA” Brinded.

I formally request that you please send me the information which I am entitled to under section 7 (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 in relation to my dealings with Shell since the act came into force. This is to include all documents, reports, communications, correspondence, transcripts and any other information held by Shell, which contain my name, or information which relates to me.

Richard Wiseman, Royal Dutch Shell Plc Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer (Photo supplied by him for display on this website)

EMAIL MESSAGE SENT BY JOHN DONOVAN TO OVER 400 SENIOR SHELL EXECUTIVES

Congratulations!

I am writing to offer our best wishes on your appointment/new title, as announced on our website royaldutchshellplc.com within the lists of Shell senior executive appointments we published on 22 June and 3 August.

The unauthorised publication of leaked Shell confidential information on our site has become a news event in its own right, regularly reported by The Wall Street Journal and other news organisations.

In a front page lead story in the Financial Times, our site was credited with breaking news of the restructuring plans of Peter Voser. Our role was acknowledged in many other news stories including, for example, the London Evening Standard which reported:

“Meanwhile, staff flocked to Royaldutchshell.com to attack the group’s management.”

Reuters also acknowledged “The Royaldutchshellplc.com website was the first to reveal news of the planned restructuring.”

Our insider sources know that we will protect anonymity.  If you ever feel the need to supply information, please contact me and I will advise on setting up secure communications.

SHELL BLOG

Comments posted by Shell employees on our “Shell Blog” have been quoted in many news articles.

If you want to keep in touch with uncensored grassroots opinion of Shell stakeholders, I would strongly recommend regular visits to the facility, as the comments are often insightful and reflect all shades of opinion. Why not post your own views? You can do so anonymously. What do you think about Shell executives being forced to reapply for their jobs? What do you make of the callous comment by Peter Voser that asking staff to reapply had been “an interesting exercise“?

You are also welcome to supply Shell related articles for unedited publication under your own name. We have published numerous articles on this basis from eminent Shell retirees, Shell executive Paddy Briggs, Shell International HSE Group Auditor, Bill Campbell, and Royal Dutch Shell Global Chief Petroleum Engineer, Iain Percival.

The Shell Blog has replaced “Tell Shell”, the official Shell Internet forum for open and lively debate, “temporarily suspended” (permanently) after we exposed the secret censorship of postings considered too open and too lively.

Shell General Counsel Richard Wiseman (now RDS Plc Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer) confirmed to us in an email dated 11 November 2005 Shell’s censorship of Tell Shell postings.

In the same email, Mr Wiseman stated:

The extraordinary tolerance shown to your internet activities ought to demonstrate better than anything else the fact that we are uninterested in, and unmoved by, your current activities

Richard Wiseman subsequently, at his own initiative, sent us an updated photograph of himself to display on our website.

In a further development revealing the truth, as opposed to the spin, we found out from documents obtained under the Data Protection Act that Shell set up a team in an attempt to counter our activities. The relevant internal email exposes the hostility towards us and the fact that it is is held in check by fear of reprisal on our part. If you find this difficult to believe, read the email.

So much for being uninterested and unmoved!

SAKHALIN-2

General David Patton resigned as Project Director of SEIC after we obtained a leaked email from him to his troops, which ended up as a major story in the FT newspaper. It was not however just a question of Shell being once again humiliated and its reputation damaged. Shell also lost a ton of money – literally billions of dollars – as a direct result of our intervention in the Sakhalin-2 project. The Russian government minister Oleg Mitvol publicly acknowledged our pivotal role in supplying leaked Shell internal email correspondence which turned out to be the only evidence he had to support a threatened $10 billion lawsuit against Shell. The evidence, which included high level Shell internal emails, cost Shell its majority stake in the venture.

THE FUTURE

Given the number of disgruntled employees certain to be generated from the latest transformation process, we anticipate even more leaks and revelations in coming months.

We look forward to our continued role as the unofficial Shell website for Shell employees and will contact you with news of interesting developments from time to time.

In the meantime, we wish you well in your new appointment.

Best Regards,

John Donovan

By Bill Campbell (above), retired HSE Group Auditor, Shell International

On the subject of the integrity of Royal Dutch Shell Chairman, Jorma Ollila, raised by former Shell executive, Paddy Briggs, the information below was copied to Nokia yesterday, it should be self explanatory, if Nokia do not act they could find themselves guilty by association:

The attached information explains why Royal Dutch Shell along with the UK Oil Industry Health and Safety Regulator the HSE are currently being investigated by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in Scotland.

Mr Ollila is very much aware of this and can explain the details.

I raised these matters a long time ago (in 2007) with Ollila at the time he joined Shell, and his reply is also attached.

The reply from Ollila so contradicts the facts determined by the prosecutors in their ongoing investigation that it puts Ollila in personal jeopardy as being complicit in covering up alleged criminal offences.

You need to bring this to the attention of your Board.

Ollila has committed his organisation in RDS to co-operate with the investigation by the CPS and the Police.

I have for some weeks been asking Ollila to issue a statement that he now accepts that the press releases made by Shell in June 2006 were false and misleading, ignored the findings of their own internal investigation, and were highly defamatory to me.

He has refused to do this although this repeated failure supports my case put to the CPS and Grampian Region (Aberdeenshire) Police that Ollila be considered complicit in the covering up of criminal offences by his Executive Directors, what is termed as an *accessory after the fact.  That is usually defined as – whoever, knowing that an offence has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact; one who knowing a felony to have been committed by another, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon in order to hinder the felon’s apprehension, trial, or punishment

This has implications to the good reputation of Nokia because Ollila is in simple terms your employee, an employee who sits at the pinnacle of the governance process not only of Shell but of Nokia, and a fellow not shy at being critical of the wrongdoing of others.

I note your Values, Code of Conduct etc etc as per your web site and all I would ask of Nokia in this matter is to honour your public statements.

The best way to get to the crux of all this unholy mess is simply to ask Ollila would he be prepared to reiterate the statements made on his behalf and that of the RDS board, see attached letter in 2007? I think you will find he would not.

Is he prepared in any way, shape or form to defend his reputation by taking action against me for defamation?  Surely he would do this if they were of no substance.  Again the answer I am sure will be no.

So the longer Ollila pontificates the more deeply into the mire he is engulfed and this will have implications for Nokia if you do not make any efforts to protect your reputation.

Perhaps your Board can get Ollila to look at this more objectively and help him to comprehend that it is not just his reputation that is at risk, not just that of RDS also, but through association Nokia.

Bill Campbell

Further email to Nokia from Bill Campbell sent 5 August 2009

http://royaldutchshellplc.com/

Correspondence and articles in this website are picked up regularly by Industry watchers and investment groups, note the comments about Ollila made by me and others, if you wish to reduce the risks to your reputation you need to act timeously

Bill Cambpell

EMAIL RESPONSE FROM MICHIEL BRANDJES ON BEHALF OF JORMA OLLILA

Dear Mr Campbell,

Thank you for your email of 20th July to Mr Olilla. As I indicated to you in my email of 5 September, 2008, as this matter has been referred to the Grampian Police and the Procurator Fiscal, it would be wholly inappropriate for us to engage in any direct communication with you in relation to it. We are, of course, happy to cooperate fully with the relevant authorities in any investigation.

Best Regards,

Michiel Brandjes 
Company Secretary and General Counsel Corporate 
Royal Dutch Shell plc

(Also read related article… “Shell not a “hoodlum organisation” says its Company Secretary, Michiel Brandjes”)

Shell Brent Bravo fatalities – why a criminal investigation is in progress

By Bill Campbell, former HSE Group Auditor, Shell International

On the 3rd of September 1999 an Audit was carried out on the Brent Bravo installation.  Subsequently a further 6 audits were completed on other North Sea installations operated at that time by Shell Expro, a subsidiary of Shell UK Ltd.

The results of these combined audits was presented to Shell management on 22nd October 1999 and the opinion of the audit was that there were serious deficiencies in the management of health and safety offshore.

Audit findings in the main try to avoid apportioning blame but the consensus opinion was that the cause of what was verified to be a negative safety culture both onshore and offshore was due to the drivers and messages emanating from the then Managing Director Malcolm Brinded.

Brinded did not take these findings well and took action to dismiss the Lead Auditor who was an SIEP employee and savaged the rest of the team who were Shell Expro employees all but one being internal auditors.

The consequences of all this proved fatal (see ongoing explanation) because the audit, still in its early stages lost focus, was disheartened and essentially was unable to exercise any influence on the behaviours witnessed at the time.

The SIEP lead Auditor recommended in 1999  that the Brent Field Management team be suspended from duty pending an investigation into their conduct, but this recommendation was not carried out.  An investigation into these matters carried out in 2004/5 led by the then Group Chief Internal Auditor Jakob Stausholm found that Brinded had considered the removal of the Brent Asset Manager.  He had declined to do this however because he was concerned that this decision would have a negative effect on that individuals mental stability.

The most important information provided by Stausholm supported by Richard Sykes was that they could find no evidence that the short term immediate actions to reduce risks on Brent Bravo were ever undertaken.  They also reported that the longer-term actions to correct the negative behaviour within the organisation had been effectively truncated whilst only 20% complete.

These findings were presented on 25th July 2005, in the C16 building of the headquarters to the then CEO Jeroen Van der Veer in the presence of his legal counsel Beot Hess. A general discussion ensued as to whether the failure of Shell Expro to react positively to the 1999 findings contributed directly or indirectly to the subsequent deaths on Brent Bravo in September 2003.  The only significant contribution made by the CEO was that whatever the consequences no blame, in his opinion, could or should be apportioned to the Shell Directors Brinded and Finlayson.  To quote his words verbatim he said Directors don’t sign permits.  It was clear from this statement that he considered that the deceased had been liable in great part for their own misfortune because they had gone into the enclosed shaft to repair a leaking temporary repair without a permit.

Let’s consider the evidence as to why the failure to follow-up on the 1999 findings proved to have fatal consequences?

The Fatal Accident Inquiry into the Brent Bravo deaths reported that the deceased had entered the shaft to effect repairs to a temporary patch on the liquid drain line from a degassifier vessel.  This vessel had been for a prolonged period knowingly operated with a faulty level control valve and a downstream ESD valve known to be in a failed condition.  When the patch gave way a significant volume of rich hydrocarbons flooded into the enclosed space causing the death of two persons through asphyxiation.  In 1999 a principal concern on Brent Bravo was that the main test separator was being operated in the same condition.  The behaviour of operating production equipment knowingly whilst it was in a dangerous condition had clearly not been corrected in the prolonged period between 1999 and 2003.

In 1999 the Audit reported that violation of the permit system was common. In 2003 a Shell investigation post the fatalities found that to carry out work under the so called operation envelope, in essence by-passing the permit system, have become common practice not only on Brent Bravo but throughout the field.

In 1999 the Audit reported that ESDV were being regularly operated when they had failed their leak-off tests and in some cases the performance results of these tests had been falsified.  The Shell investigation post the fatalities indicated that to operate ESDV in this manner had occurred on at least ten installations and false reporting of performance results was common.  The Sheriff reported that the failure of the specific ESDV in line with the degassifier vessel significantly contributed to the amount of gas entering the enclosed space.  This ESDV was but one of 14 ESDV on that specific installation which had failed during tests carried out during the shutdown process in August only weeks before the fatalities.

Lastly, in 1999 the Audit found lack of essential controls in the management of temporary repairs.  Many repairs were not listed on any register and were not pre-approved by a technical authority.  The Shell investigation post the fatalities in 2003 found some 30 other repairs on Brent Bravo and circa 500 in the field some 50% of which had not been approved.  By November 2003 a number of these repairs were found to be materially defective similar to the repair on the degassifier rundown line which according to the Sheriff was the initiating event leading to the deaths.

When all this came under public scrutiny in June 2006 following a BBC Frontline Scotland programme and following considerable coverage in the Oil Industry paper Upstream Shell vehemently rejected any suggestion of wrongdoing.  In the press release it stated that it had vigorously pursued the 1999 audit findings and made significant progress in improving safety on its offshore installations between 1999 and 2003 and absolutely refuted any suggestion that it had operated any of its installations in a dangerous condition.

This press release ignored in its entirety the findings of Stausholm and Sykes.  According to Stausholm despite his efforts he and Sykes were ignored, coerced and bullied into silence to protect the reputation of the Company, but specifically of the Directors who in 1999 so patently failed their duty of care to their many employees offshore.

This matter was raised in an official complaint to the new RDS Chairman Jorma Ollila in 2007 but the request for him to investigate the conduct of his CEO and Executive Director on these matters was ignored.

The reply from the Chairman and the information passed to him initiating that reply were passed along with other corroborating evidence some time ago to Grampian police.

This had resulted in a major investigation by the Scottish Crown Prosecution Service led by the Area Procurator Fiscal for Grampian assisted by the Area Procurator Fiscal for Central region.  They have indicated that they consider the allegations as very serious and could if proved valid highlight criminal corruption and obstruction of justice by HSE officials and Shell Directors.

Because investigations are ongoing not much more needs to be or can be said at this time.  The justification for such an investigation is clearly based on the clear contradiction between what the investigators have ascertained to be the facts and what actions were taken, or not taken, by both Shell and the enforcing authority, the HSE both in 1999 and 2003.

For example, none of the evidence that degradation of Shell facilities had been sustained over a prolonged period of time was presented at the Fatal Accident Inquiry, either by the HSE or Shell.  Thus a Sheriff, operating blind, did not get to the root cause of the fatalities.  The boundary of his Inquiry being set by events only a few weeks previously on Brent Bravo and he was not made aware of information that the same failures co-existed on 16 other offshore installations.

The investigation authorities have clearly established beyond reasonable doubt, both from evidence from an internal HSE investigation, and from the Shell post fatalities investigation shared with HSE officials in November 2003, by the then Shell Expro Production Director Greg Hill, that from 1999 till 2003 there was a sustained and significant decline in the technical integrity of some 17 Shell installations including Brent Bravo.

Specifically, in the latter case that the four principal causative factors so apparent in 2003 were identical to the failures listed above and verified by Audit to exist in 1999.

The credibility of Jorma Ollila therefore is called very much into question as to whether he was an accessory after the fact in the cover-up of all this or whether he was duped and misled by the executives reporting on these matters to him.

Jorma Ollila has indicated in the last few days that RDS will fully co-operate with the investigating authorities.  He has personally not raised, or indicated his intention to raise any objections, legal or otherwise, to what is contained in this Note, all of which he is aware of.  I have specifically requested that he pass a copy of the 2005 Stausholm/Sykes findings to them.  I am not privy to whether he has done this or not.

EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SHELL RELATING TO THIS MATTER WILL BE PUBLISHED ON FRIDAY 31 July 2009

By John Donovan

As is plain from the Wikipedia article Royal Dutch Shell safety concerns, Shell has an appallingly bad track record in relation to protecting the safety of its employees. Shell’s notorious “Touch F*** All” safety culture resulted in the deaths of Shell offshore employees in an explosion on the Brent Bravo North Sea platform, and a huge fine imposed on Shell by the Scottish courts. 

Bill Campbell, the former Health and Safety Group Auditor of Shell International has campaigned against what he considers to be criminal negligence by Shell management in putting profits before safety. He has written to every UK Member of Parliament. 

The Wikipedia article cites many pledges by senior Shell management to address Shell’s abysmal safety record. 

On 31 August 2007, The Guardian newspaper published an article profiling Jeroen van der Veer (above), the Chief Executive of Royal Dutch Shell Plc. The article by Guardian journalist Terry Macalister stated in reference to Van der Veer: “He also makes clear he was hurt by the coverage of another fiasco – when a Shell consultant, Bill Campbell, blew the whistle on safety breaches in the North Sea.”

The admittance’s of wrongdoing and being stung by criticism, makes the news published recently on the London Fire Brigade website even more astonishing. Under the headline: “Shell fined record sum for fire safety breaches”, a press release reports that Shell International has received a record-breaking fine of £300,000 plus £45,000 in costs after pleading guilty to serious breaches of fire safety regulations. That’s over $550,000 USD. 

The safety lapses at the Shell Centre in London were so severe that the London Fire Brigade served a prohibition notice on Shell which restricted the use of the building. Assistant Commissioner Steve Turek said;

“Shell failed to respond properly to their risk assessment for three and a half years and had it not been for the fires which led to the inspection, it could have been considerably longer. Had Shell acted upon the findings of the 2003 risk assessment at the time, they would have avoided putting their staff at risk.”

Sentencing of Shell International Limited took place at Inner London Crown Court on 2 June 2009 after Shell pleaded guilty to three breaches of safety regulations.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Shell senior execs should spend time dealing with employee safety issues rather than devoting it to inflating and trying to defend Fat Cat pay packages, including unearned bonus payments and grossly inappropriate pension pots. Unfortunately, greed wins out over the lives of mere employees. 

Some of the above are extracts from the London Fire Brigade Press Release. There are also extracts from the Wikipedia article. 

By Alfred and John Donovan

On Monday we will publish Shell internal documents and correspondence with Malcolm Brinded providing evidence of how this brainy man,  who remains at number 2 in the Shell hierarchy, sanctioned corrupt practices, deceit, theft and other illegal action involving a conspiracy of Shell managers. This dishonest activity was also condoned by Richard Wiseman, the former Shell Legal Director now laughingly given the job of Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer at Royal Dutch Shell Plc. The Shell UK legal team Wiseman controlled played a key role in a corrupted Shell tender process. 

Evidence assembled by Bill Campbell, the highly respected former HSE Group Auditor of Shell International confirms that Brinded, a ruthless operator, also has the blood of Shell offshore employees on his hands.  The evidence relating to Shell’s notorious and deadly “Touch F*** All” safety culture on the Brent Bravo North Sea Platform, includes tape recorded conversations with senior Shell officials.

Richard Wiseman accused us in an email last Friday of running a provocative hateful campaign against him. We do not hate him or anyone else. We do object to the hypocrisy of Shell management preaching honesty, integrity and transparency in speeches, with the same deceitful propaganda pledges in the Shell Business Principles, while building a shameful track record of doing the exact opposite.  It is deeds not words which count. 

We are prepared as always to defend our deeds and words in Court. 

We were amused to see that the Dow Jones article confirming incoming CEO Peter Voser’s plans for Shell, as first revealed to the world on this website, cited royaldutchshellplc.com as being the official Shell “Company Web site”.  Incidentally, according to our insider sources (famed globally for their reliability), Shell moved forward its media and public announcements of the Voser changes in response to the news being published on the unofficial company website.  The one which tells the truth. 

How did we end up with the dotcom domain name for Royal Dutch Shell Plc? Ask Richard Wiseman who has publicly boasted he was the conductor of the legal orchestra responsible for creating the new company out of the ashes of the Shell Transport/Royal Dutch structure destroyed by the reserves fraud. 

During its failed attempted to grab the domain name in proceedings via The World Intellectual Property Organisation, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited argued that we would use the domain name to embarrass and humiliate the company.  They at least got that one right.