Shell has been trying to sell its 37.5% interest in Germany’s strategically important PCK Schwedt refinery for years. A 2021 deal was thwarted by Rosneft. A 2023 agreement with Prax collapsed. Now, according to Bloomberg reporting carried by Reuters, advanced negotiations with Poland’s Unimot have also ended without a sale.
By John Donovan
There are corporate disposals, difficult corporate disposals — and then there is Shell’s 37.5% stake in the PCK Schwedt refinery.
Shell has been attempting to get out of this particular German refining investment for years.
Unfortunately for Shell, the stake appears remarkably reluctant to leave.
Reuters reported on 27 August 2026, citing Bloomberg and people familiar with the matter, that Shell has ended negotiations with Polish energy group Unimot over a possible sale of its 37.5% interest in the refinery. According to Bloomberg, the talks began in 2023, were still at an advanced stage as recently as February 2026, but ended months ago. Shell declined to comment to Reuters, while Unimot had not responded when Reuters published its report. (in.marketscreener.com)
If this sounds vaguely familiar, it should.
Shell has been trying to sell the same stake for so long that the failed disposals are beginning to resemble a franchise.
The refinery Shell keeps trying to leave
PCK Schwedt is no obscure industrial asset.
Situated in Brandenburg, northeast of Berlin, it is one of Germany’s largest refineries. PCK itself says it processes around 12 million tonnes of crude annually and supplies approximately 90% of the petrol, jet fuel, diesel and heating oil consumed in Berlin and Brandenburg. (pck.de)
Shell owns 37.5%.
Rosneft is the majority shareholder, with 54.17%, while Eni has the remaining 8.33%. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Germany’s break with Russian energy dependence, Berlin placed Rosneft’s German holdings under federal trusteeship. Rosneft therefore remained the legal owner while the German state assumed effective control. (live.euronext.com)
This transformed an already complicated refinery shareholding into something approaching an international corporate Rubik’s Cube.
Shell would quite like to sell.
Germany has strategic concerns.
Rosneft has ownership rights.
Potential buyers come and go.
And the refinery continues supplying Berlin.
Attempt number one: Alcmene
In July 2021, Shell announced that it had agreed to sell its entire 37.5% interest to Alcmene GmbH, part of the Liwathon Group.
Shell described the proposed disposal as another milestone in its strategy of reducing its global refining portfolio to a smaller number of integrated core sites.
Completion was expected during the second half of 2021.
There was, however, an inconvenient provision in the refinery’s ownership arrangements.
The other shareholders had pre-emption rights.
Rosneft exercised them. (rosneft.com)
Exit number one: blocked.
Shell remained the proud owner of 37.5% of a refinery it had announced it was selling.
Attempt number two: Prax
Fast-forward to December 2023.
Shell had found another buyer.
This time it was Britain’s Prax Group.
Shell issued a formal announcement saying it had agreed to sell the 37.5% interest. Completion was expected during the first half of 2024, subject once again to regulatory approval and the rights of the other shareholders.
Shell described the agreement as:
“another important milestone”
in creating a more focused refining portfolio. (shell.de)
Perhaps Shell should consider retiring the word milestone.
A year later, the Prax transaction collapsed.
Shell and Prax announced in December 2024 that, after consideration, they had decided not to proceed. No reason was publicly given, although Rosneft-related legal complications had continued to surround the asset. (ft.com)
Exit number two: unsuccessful.
Shell still owned 37.5%.
Enter Unimot
Now we arrive at the latest candidate.
Polish energy company Unimot emerged as a possible buyer, and Bloomberg reported that negotiations with Shell had reached an advanced stage by February this year.
That sounds encouraging.
Unfortunately, Bloomberg now reports that those discussions subsequently ended.
Neither the Reuters report nor the Bloomberg information it cites establishes why the negotiations failed. There is no disclosed sale price, no publicly stated disagreement over valuation and no confirmed regulatory intervention that killed this particular negotiation.
That distinction matters.
It would therefore be wrong to say that Rosneft blocked the Unimot transaction, that German authorities prevented it, or that Unimot walked away because of a particular problem.
At present we simply don’t know.
What we do know is that Shell still appears to own the stake it has repeatedly attempted to dispose of. (in.marketscreener.com)
The geopolitical complication
Shell’s problem is considerably more interesting than an ordinary unwanted refinery investment.
PCK Schwedt became strategically sensitive after Russia invaded Ukraine.
Historically, its location connected it to the Russian Druzhba pipeline. Rosneft’s majority ownership consequently became politically problematic when Germany sought to reduce its dependence on Russian energy.
Berlin responded by placing Rosneft’s German business under trusteeship rather than simply transferring ownership away from the Russian company. (live.euronext.com, pck.de)
Thus Shell finds itself as a minority shareholder in an important German refinery whose majority shareholder is a Russian oil company but whose majority stake is controlled by the German government.
Try fitting that neatly into a sales brochure.
FOR SALE: 37.5% OF MAJOR GERMAN REFINERY.
Excellent location.
Strategic infrastructure.
Supplies most of Berlin and Brandenburg.
One careful previous owner.
Majority partner: Rosneft.
Majority partner’s shares: controlled by German government.
Previous sales: complicated.
Interested parties should bring lawyers.
There is nothing wrong with Shell wanting out
It is important not to manufacture a scandal where there isn’t one.
Shell has publicly explained its rationale for selling Schwedt for years.
The company has been reducing its global refining footprint and concentrating investment on larger integrated Energy and Chemicals Parks connected to its trading, chemicals and marketing operations. When it announced both the Alcmene and Prax transactions, Shell explicitly placed Schwedt within that strategy. (shell.de)
Shell is also a non-operating minority shareholder in PCK.
So the desire to dispose of the investment is commercially understandable and predates much of the present geopolitical mess.
The comedy lies not in Shell wanting to sell.
It lies in how extraordinarily difficult selling has proved.
The refinery that keeps coming back
There is something almost boomerang-like about Schwedt.
2021: Shell agrees to sell.
Rosneft exercises its pre-emption right.
2023: Shell agrees to sell again.
The Prax transaction eventually collapses.
2026: Advanced negotiations with Unimot.
Those talks also end.
And after every episode:
37.5% — Shell.
For a company renowned for disposing of billions of dollars of assets around the world, Schwedt has proved remarkably adhesive.
A rather awkward Russian echo
There is another reason this story is interesting from a Shell historical perspective.
The company that spent years extricating itself from Sakhalin II and subsequently wrote down its Russian interests following the invasion of Ukraine remains commercially entangled, albeit as a minority investor, with a strategically important refinery majority-owned by Rosneft.
The situations are obviously very different.
Shell’s Schwedt holding predates the Ukraine war; it has repeatedly attempted to sell it; and Rosneft’s majority stake is currently under German state trusteeship.
So this is emphatically not evidence that Shell is deliberately maintaining some strategic Russian partnership.
Quite the reverse: the repeated attempted sales demonstrate Shell’s desire to exit.
But that is precisely what makes the situation so striking.
Shell doesn’t appear to be having difficulty deciding whether to leave.
It is having difficulty successfully leaving.
What happens now?
That is the important unanswered question.
Reuters’ report does not identify another prospective buyer, and Shell declined to comment on the reported end of the Unimot negotiations. (in.marketscreener.com)
Shell could presumably continue searching for a purchaser.
Unimot negotiations could conceivably be revived under different circumstances, although there is currently no evidence that will happen.
Or the ownership structure surrounding Rosneft and the German trusteeship could change in a way that alters the commercial landscape.
For now, however, the position seems remarkably familiar.
Shell wants a smaller, more focused refining portfolio.
Schwedt isn’t supposed to be part of it.
And Schwedt remains part of it.
The Shell Schwedt Disposal Department
One can only imagine the induction programme.
Welcome to Shell.
Your assignment: sell our 37.5% stake in PCK Schwedt.
“But didn’t somebody already do that?”
Yes.
Several times.
“Did any of the sales complete?”
No.
“Who’s the majority shareholder?”
Rosneft.
“Russia’s Rosneft?”
Yes.
“Who controls its shares?”
Germany.
“Didn’t Rosneft once exercise pre-emption rights?”
Yes.
“Didn’t Shell subsequently agree a deal with Prax?”
Yes.
“What happened?”
It collapsed.
“And Unimot?”
Talks ended.
“So what exactly am I supposed to do?”
Sell the refinery stake.
Welcome aboard.
The serious conclusion
Behind the amusement lies an important piece of European energy infrastructure caught at the intersection of corporate portfolio strategy and geopolitics.
PCK says nine out of ten cars in Berlin and Brandenburg effectively depend upon fuel produced at Schwedt. (pck.de)
Shell has been consistently trying to dispose of its minority interest as part of a broader refinery rationalisation programme. The first announced disposal encountered Rosneft’s pre-emption right. The subsequent Prax agreement failed. Now Bloomberg reports that the latest negotiations with Unimot have also ended. (in.marketscreener.com, rosneft.com)
There is presently no evidence that Shell has changed its underlying desire to exit.
There is simply one stubborn problem.
Finding an exit that actually stays open.
Shell was approached by Reuters about the latest Bloomberg report and declined to comment. Unimot had not responded to Reuters when its report was published. The reason the latest negotiations ended has not been publicly established.
Site wide disclaimer applies.
I can also create a suitably satirical Schwedt “FOR SALE — AGAIN” image for this one.
*This website and sisters royaldutchshellgroup.com, shellnazihistory.com, royaldutchshell.website, johndonovan.website, shellnews.net, and shellwikipedia.com, are owned by John Donovan - more information here. There is also a Wikipedia segment, the Shell DPA Files, "Shell and the Spies", the Shell Leaks files, as well as books written and published by John Donovan - Kindle eBooks. Timeline of the Donovan Shell Feud. Toxic History of Royal Dutch Shell Group. Shell and the Donovans: The Full Media Record — 550+ Articles, 110 Books, 40 Years. *All created and supported by internet wizz, Nick Gill.
