Disclosure: The author owns the domain name shellbpplc.com. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, authorised by, or connected to Shell plc, BP p.l.c., or any proposed combined entity. The domain is mentioned here solely for transparency in the context of commentary about public speculation concerning any possible Shell/BP combination.
SHELL AND BP: WILL THE BIGGER OIL SHARK BITE?
BP has lost another chair, Shell has already had to deny bid chatter once, and Britain’s two oil giants share a long history of partnership, fossil-fuel controversy, apartheid-era baggage and private-intelligence nastiness. So is this the moment Shell finally takes a bite — or just another City fantasy with crude oil on its shoes?
PART ONE: THE FACT-BASED TABLOID DEEP DIVE
There are corporate wobble moments.
Then there is BP removing its chair after barely eight months, spooking investors, triggering yet another governance drama and handing the City’s rumour mill a fresh barrel of aviation fuel.
Albert Manifold was supposed to be part of BP’s reset. Instead, on 26 May 2026, BP announced that its board had unanimously decided he should no longer serve as chair and director with immediate effect. The company cited serious concerns relating to governance standards, oversight and conduct. Ian Tyler was appointed interim chair while the search began for yet another permanent successor.
For a company already trying to persuade investors that it is not a malfunctioning strategy machine wearing a green scarf over an oil-stained suit, this was not ideal.
And so the inevitable question has returned: might Shell take advantage of the chaos and pounce on BP?
Or, to put it in proper tabloid terms: is BP now wobbling so hard that Shell’s boardroom predators are licking their dividend-scented lips?
BP: FROM GREEN DREAM TO BOARDROOM SOAP OPERA
BP’s problem is not merely one departing chair.
It is cumulative instability.
The company has spent years trying to decide what it wants to be when it grows up. Under Bernard Looney, BP made a dramatic push toward lower-carbon energy and pledged to reduce oil and gas production. Then came investor impatience, weaker relative performance, activist pressure, strategic backtracking and a retreat toward the familiar comfort blanket of hydrocarbons.
Looney left in 2023 after BP said he had not been fully transparent about past relationships with colleagues. Murray Auchincloss followed as chief executive. Helge Lund, associated with BP’s earlier transition strategy, announced he would step down. Albert Manifold arrived as the new chair. Then Manifold was gone after eight months. Meg O’Neill was brought in as chief executive to sharpen the company’s focus on performance and capital discipline.
If this were a Netflix series, it would be called Succession: Crude Edition.
The market hates uncertainty, and BP has been serving uncertainty like a buffet. Strategy? Changed. Chair? Changed. CEO? Changed. Climate pitch? Changed. Investor mood? Irritated. Takeover gossip? Constantly reheated.
That is why Shell’s name keeps appearing in the background like a shark fin at a corporate beach party.
SHELL HAS ALREADY DENIED IT — WHICH, IN THE CITY, MEANS EVERYONE KEEPS TALKING ABOUT IT
In June 2025, Shell issued a formal statement under the UK Takeover Code after media speculation linked it with a possible offer for BP. Shell said it had not been actively considering making an offer, had made no approach, and that no talks had taken place.
That was clear. Very clear.
Naturally, it did not kill the speculation.
Because Shell and BP are not random strangers on a bus. They are Britain’s two giant hydrocarbon institutions. They overlap historically, commercially, politically and culturally. The idea of combining them has haunted City gossip for decades.
Then came reports that Shell’s own M&A team had previously pushed an internal proposal to acquire BP, only for Shell chief executive Wael Sawan and finance leadership to block it. If accurate, that matters. It suggests the idea was not merely pub talk among oil analysts; it may have been explored seriously enough inside Shell to create internal friction.
Shell may not have pulled the trigger. But the gun, metaphorically speaking, appears to have been taken out of the cabinet and inspected.
WHY BP LOOKS TEMPTING
BP has assets Shell would understand instantly.
Oil. Gas. Trading. LNG. Deepwater. Retail. Refining. Chemicals. Global infrastructure. A vast brand. A battered valuation. A boardroom in flux. A strategy being dragged back toward the hydrocarbon mainstream.
For Shell, the theoretical attraction is obvious.
A takeover of BP could create a European supermajor of truly monstrous scale. It could bulk up reserves and production. It could deepen trading capacity. It could provide overlap-driven cost savings. It could allow Shell to consolidate UK oil-and-gas royalty into one enormous corporate beast.
There is also the valuation argument. BP has often traded at a discount to US supermajors and sometimes to Shell. For a predator with patience and a strong balance sheet, a wounded rival with excellent assets and governance bruises can look like opportunity wrapped in embarrassment.
In takeover-speak, instability can become “strategic optionality.”
In plain English: when the neighbour’s roof is leaking, the property developer starts measuring the garden.
WHY SHELL MIGHT STILL WALK AWAY
But let us not get carried away.
A Shell-BP takeover would be gigantic, messy and politically explosive.
First, there is the sheer size. BP may be weakened, but it is not a corner shop. Buying it would be one of the biggest oil-sector deals in history. Financing, integration, debt, asset sales and execution risk would all be enormous.
Second, there is antitrust. A combined Shell-BP would raise serious competition questions in multiple markets: fuel retail, trading, refining, upstream assets, LNG, aviation fuels, lubricants and more. Regulators in the UK, EU, US and other jurisdictions would not simply wave through the creation of a British oil Godzilla because the City fancied some excitement.
Third, there is politics. BP is not merely a company. It is a national industrial symbol, a pension-fund staple and a geopolitical creature with deep roots in British corporate history. Shell is now UK-headquartered, but a takeover could still ignite arguments about jobs, energy security, decommissioning liabilities, tax, North Sea exposure and strategic control.
Fourth, there is timing. Shell’s current strategy under Wael Sawan has focused on capital discipline, shareholder returns and high-grading the portfolio. A BP takeover would be the opposite of tidy. It would be a corporate python swallowing a distressed elephant, then explaining to investors that indigestion is a form of growth.
And fifth, there is BP’s baggage.
A Shell-BP deal would not merely combine assets. It would combine liabilities, lawsuits, climate scrutiny, decommissioning obligations, legacy reputational scandals and two vast archives of “please don’t mention that” corporate history.
THE STRATEGIC QUESTION: WOULD SHELL RATHER BUY BP OR WAIT FOR IT TO BLEED MORE?
If Shell genuinely wants BP, it has a dilemma.
Move too early, and it pays too much while absorbing governance chaos. Move too late, and BP may stabilise under new leadership, regain investor confidence, sell assets, improve cash flow and become more expensive.
The departure of Manifold may create a short-term opening, but not necessarily the best long-term one. Shell might prefer to wait. Let BP’s new interim chair and permanent successor struggle with strategy, activists, valuation, investor patience and internal morale. Let the market price the uncertainty. Let BP dispose of awkward assets. Let the political noise settle.
In predator language: do not pounce while the prey is flailing if the swamp around it is full of regulators.
Shell may also prefer selected asset deals rather than a full takeover. Buying pieces is cleaner than swallowing the whole beast. A refinery here, upstream interest there, LNG alignment elsewhere. Full corporate mergers are glamorous in headlines and murderous in execution.
The oil industry likes megadeals, but it likes cash discipline more — at least this week.
THE ACTIVIST INVESTOR ANGLE
BP’s recent history cannot be separated from investor pressure.
Activist investors and frustrated shareholders have pushed BP to simplify, improve returns, and focus more firmly on oil and gas. Climate-focused investors and campaigners have criticised the company for weakening transition commitments and reducing transparency. In other words, BP has managed the impressive trick of annoying both the “more oil” crowd and the “less oil” crowd at the same time.
That is quite an achievement. Usually companies have to work hard to alienate every side of a strategic argument.
A takeover by Shell could be sold to some investors as a solution: bigger, stronger, more disciplined, more efficient. But it could also create another nightmare: massive integration risk just when investors say they want discipline.
Shell shareholders may ask a blunt question: why buy BP’s drama when Shell can simply keep buying back its own shares?
That question may be the takeover killer.
SHELL AND BP: THE OLD MARRIAGE BEFORE THE NEW RUMOUR
The irony is that Shell and BP have been corporate bedfellows before.
Shell-Mex and BP Limited was a joint marketing venture formed in the early 1930s, combining Shell and BP’s UK marketing operations during difficult economic conditions. For decades, the two brands shared infrastructure and commercial machinery in Britain before eventually going their separate ways.
So the idea of Shell and BP under one roof is not entirely science fiction. There is historical precedent, albeit not at the full corporate takeover scale now imagined by City speculators.
The old Shell-Mex and BP partnership belongs to a different age: petrol stations, postwar motoring, imperial oil networks and British corporate establishment power. But it remains a useful reminder that these two companies have long been intertwined.
The question now is whether history repeats as merger — or merely as rumour wearing a fresh tie.
THE UNCOMFORTABLE SHARED HISTORY: APARTHEID, OIL AND MORAL FLEXIBILITY
Shell and BP also share darker historical shadows.
Both companies operated in and around apartheid-era South Africa, a period when oil supply was politically charged because apartheid South Africa lacked sufficient domestic oil and depended heavily on imports, refining and sanctions-busting routes. Anti-apartheid campaigners repeatedly targeted oil companies for helping sustain the apartheid economy.
Shell became a particular focus of international protest, especially in the 1980s, with campaigners alleging that oil supply helped keep the apartheid system functioning. BP too was part of the broader oil landscape connected with South Africa during that era. The historical record is complex, but the moral picture is not flattering.
For today’s corporate communications departments, this history is about as welcome as a tar ball on a white carpet.
If Shell and BP ever combined, critics would not merely see a business transaction. They would see the merger of two companies with overlapping records of fossil-fuel expansion, contested environmental conduct, anti-activist intelligence controversies and historic operations entangled with some of the ugliest politics of the twentieth century.
A Shell-BP megadeal would therefore not be just a merger. It would be a museum of reputational liabilities with a trading desk attached.
THE HAKLUYT CONNECTION: WHEN BIG OIL DISCOVERED SPOOKY OUTSOURCING
Then there is Hakluyt.
Hakluyt & Company, the private intelligence-linked advisory firm founded by former intelligence figures, has long been associated in reporting with corporate intelligence work for major companies. Past reports alleged that Shell and BP used Hakluyt in connection with monitoring environmental campaigners, including Greenpeace-related activity. BP was later separately reported by openDemocracy to have hired Hakluyt to monitor climate campaigners.
This matters because Shell and BP’s shared history is not merely one of petrol pumps and joint ventures. It is also a history of powerful corporations treating activists, critics and environmental campaigners as threats to be managed.
Let us be careful here. Not every allegation is the same as a court finding. Companies often describe such activity in softer terms such as research, risk intelligence or stakeholder monitoring. But the public is entitled to draw a very sharp ethical distinction between understanding campaign risk and deploying private-intelligence techniques against civil society critics.
The fossil-fuel industry has often complained that activists are disruptive.
It has been rather less eager to explain why peaceful campaigners have sometimes found themselves treated like hostile intelligence targets.
If Shell and BP ever merged, the Hakluyt overlap would not be a footnote. It would be a neon sign flashing: SAME CLUB, SAME METHODS, SAME OLD CORPORATE PARANOIA.
CLIMATE: THE ELEPHANT IN THE REFINERY
A Shell takeover of BP would also be a climate story, whether Shell wanted it to be or not.
Both companies have retreated from earlier green-tinged enthusiasm toward a more fossil-fuel-centred investment pitch. Shell has emphasised value, performance and disciplined capital allocation. BP has backed away from its earlier production-cutting ambitions and moved closer to the oil-and-gas core.
A merger would likely be sold as creating a stronger energy company able to invest through the transition. Critics would hear something else: a supercharged fossil-fuel consolidation play designed to protect hydrocarbon cash flows while the planet burns through another decade of polite disappointment.
The combined company would be a colossus of oil, gas, trading and legacy emissions exposure. Campaigners would attack it instantly. Climate litigants would study it. Regulators would scrutinise it. Politicians would posture. Institutional investors would pretend to look grave while checking the dividend math.
And the company would reply with the usual hymn sheet: reliable energy, shareholder value, transition, discipline, resilience, security, affordability, blah blah barrels.
COULD BP’S CHAIRMAN CHAOS MAKE A BID MORE LIKELY?
Yes — but only at the margins.
Manifold’s forced departure weakens BP’s optics. It adds governance uncertainty. It may make some investors more open to a clean strategic alternative. It could embolden analysts and advisers who think BP should be broken up, merged, sold or forced into more radical restructuring.
But a takeover does not become easy simply because a chair has been removed.
Shell would still need to justify the price. It would still need to persuade its own investors. It would still need to navigate regulators. It would still need to decide whether BP’s liabilities are worth the prize. It would still need to integrate two massive companies with overlapping cultures and reputational landmines.
So the correct answer is this: BP’s turmoil makes takeover speculation more credible, but not necessarily a bid more probable.
The City loves drama. Boards prefer deniability.
THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME
The most likely near-term outcome is more smoke, not necessarily fire.
Shell will continue to say it is focused on performance. BP will insist it has the right strategy and leadership. Analysts will keep publishing “could Shell buy BP?” notes. Bankers will quietly run numbers. Journalists will keep a close eye on share prices. Activists will prepare furious statements just in case. Investors will calculate whether a deal creates value or merely creates an oil-slicked monster with a compliance department the size of Belgium.
Meanwhile, BP’s new leadership structure will try to stabilise the company. If it succeeds, takeover fever may cool. If it fails, the gossip will become louder.
Shell does not need to pounce immediately. It can watch. It can wait. It can deny. It can let BP squirm. It can let others test the political temperature. It can keep its hands clean while the market does the dirty speculation for it.
That may be the most Shell-like strategy of all.
THE FINAL VERDICT: POSSIBLE, TEMPTING, TOXIC
Would Shell consider a BP takeover if BP remains weak and cheap enough?
It would be astonishing if nobody in or around Shell ever considered it. The industrial logic exists. The valuation argument exists. The history exists. The overlap exists. The opportunity may exist.
Will Shell actually do it?
That is far less certain.
A Shell-BP takeover would be the corporate equivalent of pouring crude oil into a fireworks factory and calling it synergy. It might create enormous financial power. It might also create political outrage, regulatory obstruction, investor nerves, climate backlash and a balance sheet full of inherited trouble.
But the speculation will not die, because BP keeps giving it oxygen.
A forced chairman exit. A battered governance story. A strategic U-turn. A weakened valuation. A rival with cash, scale and history.
The City can smell blood.
And Shell, whatever it says publicly, knows exactly what wounded prey looks like.
PART TWO: SPOOF SHELL PR/SPIN SECTION
“WE ARE NOT ACTIVELY CONSIDERING POUNCING, MERELY OBSERVING THE CARCASS WITH DISCIPLINE”
Shell’s Imaginary Department of Strategic Denial wishes to clarify that the company is not actively considering making an offer for BP, is not passively considering making an offer for BP, and is certainly not standing outside BP headquarters wearing a bib and holding a knife and fork.
We are focused entirely on performance, capital discipline, shareholder distributions and pretending that every City banker with a merger spreadsheet is acting alone.
Any suggestion that Shell might be interested in a weakened rival with global assets, a bruised valuation and an oil-and-gas strategy increasingly similar to our own is pure speculation.
We have no comment on speculation.
We also have no comment on why the speculation is so delicious.
Shell respects BP’s independence, governance process and right to experience repeated boardroom drama without our assistance. Should circumstances change, we will of course continue to respect all applicable rules while looking thoughtfully at the horizon like a responsible predator.
At Shell, we do not pounce.
We optimise opportunities.
PART THREE: SPOOF BOT-REACTION / COMMENT SECTION
🤖 BOT COMMENT #1: “THIS IS NOT A TAKEOVER RUMOUR”
It is a strategic adjacency monetisation scenario involving two historically compatible hydrocarbon ecosystems.
🤖 BOT COMMENT #2: “BP IS PERFECTLY STABLE”
It has only changed strategy, chair, chief executive and investor mood. What more stability do you people want?
🤖 BOT COMMENT #3: “SHELL AND BP HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON”
Apart from oil, gas, Britain, global fossil-fuel empires, Shell-Mex and BP, apartheid-era controversy, climate criticism, activist surveillance controversies and shareholder obsession. Totally different.
🤖 BOT COMMENT #4: “HAKLUYT WAS JUST RESEARCH”
Exactly. And a balaclava is just a hat with ambition.
🤖 BOT COMMENT #5: “A MERGER WOULD HELP THE ENERGY TRANSITION”
Yes, because nothing says decarbonisation like creating a larger fossil-fuel leviathan with more lawyers, more lobbyists and a bigger dividend machine.
🤖 BOT COMMENT #6: “REGULATORS WILL LOVE IT”
Who would object to one giant oil company swallowing another giant oil company during a climate crisis? Sounds relaxing.
🤖 BOT COMMENT #7: “INVESTORS WANT DISCIPLINE”
They want discipline, unless indiscipline comes with synergies, buybacks and a slide deck promising “value creation.”
DISCLAIMER
This article is opinion and commentary based on publicly available reporting, company statements, historical sources and current market speculation. It is satirical in tone but intended to remain grounded in verified facts. No takeover bid by Shell for BP is asserted as fact. Any discussion of a possible bid is speculative analysis based on market reporting, corporate history and current circumstances. Allegations concerning historical conduct, apartheid-era controversy or private-intelligence activity are presented as reported or alleged by cited sources and should not be read as new factual findings by this publication. This article is not financial advice, investment advice, legal advice or a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security. Readers should consult original sources and professional advisers where appropriate. Site wide disclaimer also applies.
SUGGESTED IMAGE CONCEPT
A satirical tabloid-style illustration of BP headquarters as a storm-battered oil rig with a large “CHAIR VACANT” sign swinging in the wind. In the foreground, a giant Shell-branded shark in a business suit circles beneath the platform, carrying a briefcase labelled “STRATEGIC OPTIONALITY.” BP executives are shown juggling resignations, oil barrels and governance reports, while City bankers on a nearby boat wave merger spreadsheets. In the background, ghostly signs read “Shell-Mex and BP,” “Hakluyt,” “Apartheid-era baggage,” and “Climate backlash.” Style: dramatic, high-contrast, investigative front page, darkly comic, no real person likenesses
Author disclosure: For transparency, the author owns shellbpplc.com. The domain is unaffiliated with Shell plc or BP p.l.c. and should not be understood as evidence that any takeover, merger, bid, approach, or corporate transaction is occurring.
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