THE SHELL LEAKS FILES
SLF-2007-031
The Sakhalin Papers XXI: “We Do Not Respond in Public to Anonymous Allegations” — Shell’s Internal Corruption Response
A June 2007 complaint, Shell’s private deliberations — and the unanswered question of what “proper channels” meant
Archive reference: SLF-2007-031
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal record: Shell internal emails of 25–26 June 2007 concerning allegations forwarded by John Donovan to Shell Exploration & Production General Counsel Keith Ruddock
Supporting record: Contemporaneous Donovan–Ruddock correspondence; Shell Sustainability Report 2007; Reuters reporting; later Shell “Focal Point” material; Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin)
Evidence standard: The Shell emails and Shell’s response are treated as documentary facts. The underlying accusations against named individuals remain allegations. Neither Shell’s refusal to provide a substantive public answer nor the absence of a located rebuttal establishes that the allegations were true.
Introduction
On 25 June 2007, Shell was confronted with another potentially explosive set of allegations from Sakhalin Island.
They arrived only days after the departure of David Greer, Sakhalin Energy’s Deputy Chief Executive, whose leaked “Pipeliners All!” email had become an international embarrassment after the Financial Times exposed its extensive borrowing from General George S. Patton. Reuters reported Greer’s resignation on 21 June, while Shell declined to say whether the leaked memo had caused it.
Four days later, John Donovan emailed Keith Ruddock, General Counsel of Shell Exploration & Production.
The new source was described as a contractor on Sakhalin Island.
The allegations concerned diesel-supply contracts, environmental-response work, Sakhalin Energy Chief Executive Ian Craig, an official identified as Dmitry Goncharenko, Sakhtransbunker and Sakhalin Oil Company.
They were allegations of potentially serious misconduct.
And they were not proved.
What makes this episode important to The Shell Leaks Files is not that the accusations can now be declared true.
They cannot.
The importance lies in what happened inside Shell after they arrived.
The resulting correspondence, later obtained from Shell through Data Protection Act subject-access requests, records senior personnel discussing how the company should answer.
Their preferred response was not a factual rebuttal of the accusations.
It was a policy position.
Shell would not respond publicly to anonymous allegations.
If allegations came through the “proper channels,” Shell said, they would be investigated.
That raises the central question of this file:
What did Shell mean by “proper channels” — and what evidence exists that these allegations ever entered them?
1. The Documentary Provenance Is Unusually Strong
The internal Shell correspondence examined here forms part of the archive obtained from Shell in December 2009, March 2010 and April 2011 following subject-access applications made by Alfred and John Donovan under the UK Data Protection Act.
The archive itself records that names and other information were redacted by Shell before disclosure.
That provenance matters.
These are not recreated emails supplied anonymously years later.
They are documents represented in the archive as material disclosed by Shell itself in response to statutory data requests.
Shell’s own internal correspondence also confirms that it had previously supplied sizeable quantities of material under such requests. An internal email dated 11 July 2007 said UK Legal was preparing two substantial binders of correspondence which Shell was obliged to provide under the Data Protection Act.
The June 2007 exchange can therefore be examined as part of Shell’s own documentary record.
2. The Allegations Arrived on the Morning of 25 June
At 09:22 on 25 June 2007, Donovan wrote to Keith Ruddock.
Copies were sent to senior Shell figures including Chief Executive Jeroen van der Veer, Chairman Jorma Ollila, Malcolm Brinded, Richard Wiseman and Sakhalin Energy’s Jim Niven. The correspondence was subsequently published contemporaneously on 26 June.
The email said a contractor on Sakhalin Island had made allegations concerning the transfer of diesel-supply business from Sakhtransbunker to Sakhalin Oil Company without a tendering exercise.
The source alleged improper financial motives involving Ian Craig and Dmitry Goncharenko.
The contractor also claimed that the Sakhalin Prosecutor was preparing a case concerning the disputed work and alleged that environmental-response responsibilities for diesel spills in Aniva Bay had been assigned without competitive tender.
These accusations were serious.
They were also unsupported by documentary proof in the material sent to Shell.
No tender file was attached.
No bank records were supplied.
No prosecutorial filing was produced.
No judgment or regulatory finding substantiating the allegations has been identified in the records examined for this instalment.
They therefore remain allegations attributed to the contractor.
3. Donovan Asked Shell for a Denial Before Publishing
The approach to Shell was not framed as an announcement that wrongdoing had been proved.
It explicitly gave Shell an opportunity to respond.
The 25 June email asked for a categorical denial of the accusations, including the claim involving the Sakhalin Prosecutor, before a decision was made about publication or supplying the correspondence to journalists.
That distinction is important.
The documentary sequence was:
an allegation was received;
Shell was notified;
Shell was asked to respond;
publication was temporarily held back;
and only afterwards was the exchange published.
Whatever view one takes of the underlying campaigning relationship, the contemporaneous correspondence establishes that Shell was given an opportunity to put its position before the accusations were released publicly.
4. Keith Ruddock Initially Asked for Time
At 12:51, Keith Ruddock replied.
He said he had only just seen the email because he had been in a meeting and asked Donovan to delay publication while he reviewed it and prepared a response.
That is significant because it shows that the allegations were not simply ignored at the point of receipt.
Shell’s Exploration & Production General Counsel acknowledged them and sought time.
What happened inside Shell during the next few hours is preserved in the later DPA material.
5. Inside Shell, a Standard Formula Was Proposed
At 15:02, an internal email circulated the allegations under a subject referring to alleged corruption.
The sender asked whether the proposed response was acceptable.
Twenty-three minutes later came the internal answer.
Rather than address the diesel contract, environmental-response work, Craig, Goncharenko or the alleged prosecutor action individually, a Shell employee proposed using a standard response to Donovan requests.
The substance was that Shell did not respond publicly to anonymous allegations, but that allegations brought through the correct internal route would be thoroughly investigated.
Then came the revealing communications objective.
The writer suggested repeated use of the formula might eventually mean:
“he’ll stop trying in the end.”
That sentence does not establish that Shell intended to suppress a legitimate investigation.
But it does establish that the internal discussion was not solely about the merits of the allegations.
It was also about managing repeated approaches from Donovan.
6. The Following Morning, the Language Became More Dismissive
At 07:58 on 26 June, another internal Shell email circulated under the subject:
“Legally Privileged and Confidential: Sakhalin.”
It alerted recipients to the new allegation arriving through Donovan.
The message said Shell planned a short response so that it would not have to engage with every “wild and anonymous accusation” reaching the company through that route.
Again, this is evidence of Shell’s attitude to the incoming allegations.
It is not evidence about whether the allegations themselves were true or false.
An accusation may be wild and false.
It may be exaggerated.
It may be partly correct.
Or it may identify something requiring investigation.
The adjective used internally does not determine the evidence.
7. Shell’s Public Answer Followed at 09:19
At 09:19 on 26 June, Ruddock sent the formal response.
On Sakhalin Energy, he said Shell’s policy was not to respond publicly to anonymous allegations and added that allegations submitted through the appropriate channels would be thoroughly investigated.
That was the answer.
Shell did not say:
the diesel-contract allegation is false;
Ian Craig has received no improper benefit;
Dmitry Goncharenko has received no improper benefit;
there was a competitive tender;
Sakhtransbunker lost the work for identified commercial reasons;
Sakhalin Oil Company obtained the work through a documented procurement procedure;
or no prosecutor action exists.
Neither did Shell say that any of those propositions was true.
It simply declined to enter into the substance publicly.
That is a crucial evidential boundary.
8. A Confidential Source Is Not Necessarily an Anonymous Source
Donovan replied at 10:02.
He disputed Shell’s description.
The source, he said, was not anonymous to the Donovan operation; the individual’s identity was being withheld because of a stated fear of retaliation.
Donovan said the information would now be passed to a news organisation provided the source’s identity could be protected.
This creates an important semantic distinction.
A source may be confidential to the publisher while remaining anonymous to the subject of the allegation.
Both descriptions can therefore be true simultaneously.
The Donovan operation may have known who the source was.
Shell apparently did not.
From Shell’s perspective, that created an obvious investigative problem: the company could not interview or assess a person whose identity had not been supplied.
From the source’s perspective, disclosure of identity to the company being accused could have defeated the very protection being sought.
Neither problem is unusual in whistleblowing.
The unresolved question is how a company is supposed to bridge the two.
9. Shell Actually Had Confidential Reporting Channels in 2007
The phrase “proper channels” might sound vague today.
Shell’s own contemporaneous reporting shows that formal channels did exist.
The Shell Sustainability Report 2007 states that the company had operated a global helpline and website since 2005through which staff and business partners could confidentially report suspected infringements of the law or Shell’s Business Principles.
Shell said the facility was administered by an independent external specialist and operated continuously.
Nearly 40 per cent of suspected infringements reported in 2007 came through that helpline, while the remainder were raised directly with line management or human-resources departments.
This is an important addition to the June correspondence.
There really was a formal compliance infrastructure to which Ruddock’s phrase could plausibly have referred.
10. But Ruddock Did Not Identify the Channel
The difficulty is that the 26 June response did not tell Donovan what the “proper channels” were.
It did not provide a helpline number.
It did not direct the source to a compliance officer.
It did not offer a confidential interview.
It did not identify an investigator.
It did not ask the contractor to submit material anonymously through Shell’s independent reporting system.
And the internal emails examined here do not record the allegation being forwarded into that system.
That does not prove that no referral took place.
There may have been communications outside the surviving DPA material.
There may have been records withheld on privilege, third-party privacy or other grounds.
An internal investigation could have occurred without appearing in this archive.
But the records presently available do not establish one.
11. The Source Appears to Have Been in a Category Shell’s System Was Designed to Reach
This point deserves careful qualification.
The Donovan email described the source as a contractor on Sakhalin Island.
Shell’s 2007 Sustainability Report says its global reporting mechanism was available to staff and business partners.
That creates an obvious possibility that a contractor connected with Sakhalin II could have had access to an authorised reporting route.
But the evidence does not establish:
whether this particular source worked directly for Sakhalin Energy;
whether the source worked for a subcontractor several tiers removed;
whether the individual knew about Shell’s helpline;
whether the individual trusted it;
whether the person used it;
or whether Shell regarded the individual as falling within its reporting system.
Those matters cannot be filled in retrospectively.
12. Shell Publicly Claimed a Serious Anti-Corruption System
The wider 2007 Shell record makes the issue more interesting.
Under the heading “Living By Our Principles,” Shell described business integrity as including “zero tolerance of bribes and fraud.”
The company said cases of bribery and fraud were reported to the Audit Committee of the Royal Dutch Shell plc board.
For 2007 Shell reported 112 violations and said relationships had been ended with 151 staff and contractors as a consequence.
It also reported cancellation of 35 contractor relationships for failures to adhere to Business Principles, although half of those cases involved health, safety, security and environmental standards rather than necessarily corruption.
Those figures are important because they demonstrate that Shell’s compliance system was not merely theoretical.
Investigations occurred.
Consequences occurred.
Contracts were terminated.
People left.
The unanswered issue is narrower:
Did the specific Sakhalin allegations transmitted on 25 June 2007 ever enter that machinery?
The surviving file does not tell us.
13. Shell’s Public Compliance Position and Its Communications Position Were Different Things
The internal documents reveal two parallel systems operating at once.
The first was compliance.
Shell publicly said concerns could be submitted confidentially, investigated and escalated.
The second was communications management.
The June emails show personnel considering how to avoid repeated public exchanges with Donovan.
Those two objectives are not inherently contradictory.
A company can legitimately decide not to litigate allegations in public while still investigating them internally.
Indeed, that may often be sensible.
But the documentary record becomes incomplete when the public answer says an allegation will be investigated through proper channels and no surviving document shows either:
what channel was required;
whether the complainant was directed to it;
or whether an investigation followed.
That gap should be recorded as a gap — not filled with speculation.
14. The Internal Position Hardened Later in 2007
By 16 October 2007, Shell had formalised a broader communications position in a confidential “Focal Point” brief concerning the Donovan campaign.
The brief said Shell fundamentally disagreed with the factual basis and interpretation of much of the material underlying Donovan allegations and generally refrained from commenting on individual issues.
It also recorded Shell’s legal position that a failure to rebut or comment should not be interpreted as acceptance of any allegation.
This is highly relevant to the June episode.
It means that later readers should not interpret Shell’s non-denial of the Craig allegations as an admission.
Shell expressly rejected that logic.
The same October brief explained that Shell regarded extended engagement as unproductive because it believed information supplied would be portrayed negatively or used to draw conclusions beyond its natural meaning.
By then the June preference for a terse formula had become part of a more systematic policy of limited engagement.
15. “Ignore” Was Also Being Discussed
The DPA archive records another email dated 9 July 2007.
By then yet another allegation had arrived through the Donovan website.
The internal discussion considered several response options.
One contributor said:
“I prefer to just ignore.”
The writer described that as broadly consistent with Shell’s earlier approach, except where certain matters had made a more proactive response necessary.
This does not mean Shell ignored every allegation internally.
It concerns the public-response strategy.
But it reinforces the documentary picture.
By the summer of 2007, Shell personnel were actively attempting to reduce the amount of public engagement generated by the stream of allegations reaching them through the website.
16. That Strategy Cannot Be Used to Validate the Accusations
There is a tempting but invalid argument here.
Shell did not deny the allegations.
Therefore they must have been true.
The documents do not support that conclusion.
Shell had a documented policy reason for avoiding detailed responses.
Its October issues brief expressly warned that non-response was not acceptance.
Accordingly, no responsible historical account should write:
Shell refused to deny corruption because it knew the accusations were true.
There is no evidence for that proposition.
The defensible statement is:
Shell chose not to answer the allegations substantively in public and said allegations submitted through proper channels would be investigated.
That is what the record establishes.
17. Nor Can Shell’s Promise of Investigation Be Treated as Proof That an Investigation Occurred
The opposite inference is equally unsafe.
Shell said allegations reaching it through proper channels would be thoroughly investigated.
Therefore these allegations must have been investigated.
Again, the documents do not establish that.
There is no located case-reference number.
No investigator is identified.
No witness interview is recorded.
No procurement file is appended.
No conclusion is documented.
No disciplinary decision has been located.
And no later Shell record in the DPA index examined for this instalment records a finding concerning Sakhtransbunker, Sakhalin Oil Company, Craig or Goncharenko. The June material remains the principal appearance of those names in relation to the allegations.
The correct finding is therefore:
Investigation not established.
Not:
No investigation occurred.
18. Ian Craig Continued in Office
Subsequent contemporaneous reporting provides another useful caution against over-interpreting the allegations.
On 3 September 2007, Energy Intelligence reported that Craig remained head of Sakhalin Energy and was discussing a gradual transition toward Gazprom-nominated management following Gazprom’s acquisition of control.
Craig said he expected to step down after LNG shipments began, as part of that transition.
This does not disprove the June allegations.
Nor does it establish that Shell had cleared him.
But it does demonstrate that, more than two months after the allegations were transmitted, Craig remained publicly in charge of Sakhalin Energy and was planning an orderly management transition associated with Gazprom’s new controlling position.
That is part of the contemporaneous record and should be included alongside the accusations.
19. The Claimed Prosecutor Case Remains Unsubstantiated Here
One of the most specific claims supplied by the contractor was that a Sakhalin prosecutor was already pursuing action involving Craig and Goncharenko.
That proposition should have been independently testable.
Yet the material examined for this instalment contains no court filing, prosecutorial statement or independent contemporaneous report establishing the alleged case.
The Shell documents record the allegation.
The Donovan correspondence records the allegation.
Neither proves the alleged prosecution existed.
Accordingly, it must remain classified as:
claimed by the source; not independently established in this archive.
20. There Was Plenty of Genuine Official Scrutiny Around Sakhalin II
It is important not to confuse absence of proof for these particular accusations with absence of official scrutiny around Sakhalin II generally.
The project was subject to extraordinary environmental, regulatory and political controversy.
The English High Court later recorded that approximately $650 million of UK export-credit support had been sought for Sakhalin II and that the project posed potentially significant environmental effects, particularly involving the endangered Western Grey Whale.
Mr Justice Mitting also recorded that the ECGD application was withdrawn on 29 February 2008 before any decision on support was made.
The case concerned disclosure of governmental environmental information.
It did not determine the June 2007 corruption allegations.
It did not adjudicate the Sakhtransbunker dispute.
It did not adjudicate Sakhalin Oil Company’s conduct.
It did not adjudicate Craig’s conduct.
It did not adjudicate Goncharenko’s conduct.
The existence of one form of official scrutiny cannot be used to manufacture findings in another.
21. The Court Case Does, However, Reinforce the Importance of Transparency
The High Court litigation arose because Friends of the Earth sought interdepartmental UK government correspondence concerning proposed support for Sakhalin II.
The Information Tribunal had ordered disclosure.
ECGD appealed.
Mr Justice Mitting dismissed the appeal.
The litigation therefore belongs in this story for a limited reason.
It demonstrates that questions of transparency surrounding Sakhalin II were significant enough to produce formal litigation over access to government information.
But the court did not become an investigator of every allegation surrounding the project.
That distinction mirrors the central lesson of this instalment:
publication, concern and scrutiny are not the same thing as proof.
22. The Same Day, Shell Was Also Discussing the Website Itself
There was another remarkable thread running through 25 June 2007.
While Shell personnel were discussing how to answer the Sakhalin allegations, they were simultaneously discussing the Donovan website and possible legal action.
A separate Shell internal email that afternoon stated support for Donovan’s right to free speech, even where anti-Shell, while distinguishing that from alleged intellectual-property infringement or defamation.
The writer concluded that litigation might not be worthwhile even if Shell had a good prospect of winning.
That document is important for what comes next in the archive.
Because at almost exactly the same time, hosting companies were receiving complaints concerning use of the Shell Pecten.
One hosting provider threatened suspension.
Another account was temporarily deactivated.
And Ruddock subsequently confirmed that Shell had challenged what it regarded as unauthorised use of its trademark.
Those events deserve their own file.
Documentary Findings
Established
On 25 June 2007, John Donovan sent Shell Exploration & Production General Counsel Keith Ruddock allegations supplied by a person described as a Sakhalin contractor.
The allegations concerned diesel-supply arrangements, environmental-response work and named individuals including Sakhalin Energy Chief Executive Ian Craig and Dmitry Goncharenko.
Donovan asked Shell for a categorical denial before deciding whether to publish the allegations or pass them to media organisations.
Ruddock initially asked that publication be delayed while he reviewed the allegations.
Internal Shell correspondence then proposed a standard policy response rather than a substantive rebuttal.
A further Shell email the following morning described the planned response as intentionally terse and referred dismissively to anonymous accusations reaching Shell through Donovan.
Ruddock subsequently stated publicly that Shell did not respond publicly to anonymous allegations but that allegations brought through proper channels would be thoroughly investigated.
Donovan replied that the source was known to him but wished to remain confidential because of fear of retaliation.
Shell’s own 2007 Sustainability Report establishes that a confidential global reporting helpline and website for staff and business partners had existed since 2005.
Shell said the system was independently administered and used to report suspected infringements of law or its Business Principles.
Later Shell internal material formalised a policy of generally avoiding comment on individual Donovan allegations and expressly stated that silence should not be interpreted as acceptance.
Reasonable inference, but not established fact
Shell’s reference to “proper channels” may have included the confidential global helpline, line management, human resources or other compliance routes described in its 2007 Sustainability Report.
That is a reasonable inference from Shell’s contemporaneous compliance system.
But the June correspondence itself does not define the phrase or direct the source to any identified mechanism.
The fact that the source was described as a contractor may mean the person fell within a category able to use Shell’s confidential reporting facilities.
The available evidence does not establish that individual’s exact contractual status or eligibility.
Not established
It is not established that Ian Craig engaged in corrupt conduct.
It is not established that Dmitry Goncharenko engaged in corrupt conduct.
It is not established that diesel-supply work was improperly removed from Sakhtransbunker.
It is not established that Sakhalin Oil Company received work through an unlawful or corrupt process.
It is not established that environmental-response contracts were improperly awarded.
It is not established that either Craig or Goncharenko received improper financial benefits.
It is not established from the records examined that the Sakhalin Prosecutor filed the proceeding claimed by the source.
It is not established that Shell investigated these precise allegations.
Nor is it established that Shell failed to investigate them.
No court judgment located for this instalment adjudicates those accusations.
Commentary
The most revealing sentence in this file is not an accusation.
It is a procedure.
Shell said that allegations arriving through the correct route would be investigated.
That is, on its face, an entirely defensible corporate position.
Large companies cannot publicly litigate every accusation emailed to their lawyers, journalists or chief executives.
They need processes.
They need investigators.
They need confidentiality.
They need evidence.
They need safeguards for the accused as well as for whistleblowers.
Shell’s own 2007 report demonstrates that such machinery existed.
The company had a confidential helpline.
It used an external service provider.
Reports could be made by staff and business partners.
Shell publicly claimed zero tolerance of bribery and fraud.
It recorded investigations and disciplinary consequences.
So far, so good.
The documentary tension lies somewhere else.
When a contractor’s allegations actually reached Shell’s senior legal operation, the surviving emails show considerable attention being paid to how little Shell should say publicly.
One internal objective was to avoid encouraging further approaches.
Another was to minimise the need to answer repeated allegations.
That may have been sensible media strategy.
It tells us nothing by itself about the truth of the allegations.
But the archive does not contain the corresponding compliance trail that would close the circle.
Where was the referral?
Who assessed it?
Was the source invited to use the helpline?
Was the source asked for evidence?
Was Sakhalin Energy compliance notified?
Was a procurement review undertaken?
Was the prosecutor claim checked?
Was the matter closed as unsupported?
Perhaps those records once existed.
Perhaps they still do.
Perhaps the allegations never satisfied whatever threshold Shell required before an investigation began.
The responsible conclusion is not to invent an answer.
It is to identify the missing document.
That is what distinguishes documentary history from polemic.
The accusation is preserved.
Shell’s internal response is preserved.
Shell’s compliance policy is preserved.
The investigative outcome is not.
Source Record
The principal internal Shell material comes from the DPA archive, which states that the documents were obtained from Shell in December 2009, March 2010 and April 2011 following subject-access applications by Alfred and John Donovan. The archive notes that Shell redacted names and other information.
The key 25 June 2007 internal exchange records circulation of the allegations and discussion of a standard response under which Shell would decline public comment on anonymous claims while stating that appropriately submitted allegations would be investigated.
The 26 June internal email records the intention to give a terse response so that Shell would not have to answer every accusation arriving through Donovan.
The contemporaneous Donovan–Ruddock correspondence published on 26 June 2007 preserves the original approach, Ruddock’s request for time, his eventual response and Donovan’s statement that the source was known to him but required confidentiality.
The Shell Sustainability Report 2007 independently establishes that Shell had operated a global confidential helpline since 2005 for staff and business partners and records the company’s contemporary approach to bribery, fraud, Code of Conduct compliance and contractor discipline.
Reuters provides the immediate contemporary context of David Greer’s departure on 21 June 2007, four days before the new Sakhalin allegations were sent to Shell.
Energy Intelligence reported in September 2007 that Ian Craig remained Chief Executive of Sakhalin Energy and planned to step down in connection with the gradual transition from Shell-nominated to Gazprom-nominated management.
The later 16 October 2007 Shell Focal Point brief records the company’s broader communications policy: Shell generally declined to engage with individual Donovan allegations and explicitly stated that failure to comment should not be construed as acceptance.
The relevant court record is Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] EWHC 638 (Admin). It records the proposed UK export-credit support for Sakhalin II, environmental concerns and withdrawal of the application before a funding decision. The case concerned environmental-information disclosure and made no determination concerning the corruption allegations examined here.
Archive disclaimer: This instalment records serious allegations concerning identifiable persons and companies because those allegations form part of authenticated Shell correspondence and the contemporaneous historical record. The allegations are not presented as established fact. Shell’s refusal to provide a detailed public rebuttal does not constitute an admission, and Shell’s stated policy that allegations submitted through proper channels would be investigated does not establish that an investigation of these particular claims occurred.
Site wide disclaimer also applies.
Next Archive File
SLF-2007-032 — The Sakhalin Papers XXII: The Pecten Complaint — Shell, the Hosting Companies and the Day the Website Went Dark
While Shell’s lawyers were deciding how to answer the Sakhalin allegations, another dispute was unfolding simultaneously.
On 22 June 2007, a hosting company told the Donovans that a complaint from the owner of the Shell trademark had created unacceptable risk and warned that the account could be shut down.
On 25 June, another hosting account was deactivated.
Ruddock initially said Shell was unaware of the MyHosting issue.
The next morning he confirmed that Shell had challenged what it regarded as unauthorised use of the Shell Pecten, describing that challenge as standard trademark-protection policy.
But Shell’s own internal correspondence from the same day adds another layer.
One Shell employee wrote that Donovan’s right to free speech should be respected, even where the content was anti-Shell, while distinguishing that right from intellectual-property infringement or defamation.
The same email concluded that litigation might not be worthwhile even if Shell had a good chance of succeeding.
The documentary questions are obvious.
Who made the trademark complaints?
What exactly did Shell ask the hosting companies to do?
Why did one provider temporarily deactivate the site?
Was closure of the website Shell’s objective — or merely a consequence of routine trademark enforcement?
And what do Shell’s own internal emails reveal about the difference between protecting the Pecten and suppressing criticism?
SLF-2007-032 will reconstruct the June 2007 hosting dispute from the contemporaneous correspondence — separating the documented trademark complaint from the much larger allegation that Shell was trying to silence the website itself.
*This website and sisters royaldutchshellgroup.com, shellnazihistory.com, royaldutchshell.website, johndonovan.website, shellnews.net, and shellwikipedia.com, are owned by John Donovan - more information here. There is also a Wikipedia segment, the Shell DPA Files, "Shell and the Spies", the Shell Leaks files, as well as books written and published by John Donovan - Kindle eBooks. Timeline of the Donovan Shell Feud. Toxic History of Royal Dutch Shell Group. Shell and the Donovans: The Full Media Record — 550+ Articles, 110 Books, 40 Years. *All created and supported by internet wizz, Nick Gill.
