SHELL LEAKS FILES: 6 OCTOBER 2026
SLF-2007-079
The Sakhalin Papers LXIX: “A Good and Reliable Partner” — The Arctic 30 Put Shell’s Gazprom Alliance to the Test
On 18 September 2013 Greenpeace activists attempted to scale Gazprom’s Prirazlomnaya platform in the Pechora Sea. The following day Russian authorities boarded the Dutch-flagged Arctic Sunrise in Russia’s exclusive economic zone. Twenty-eight Greenpeace activists and two freelance journalists were eventually detained and prosecuted. Within weeks Greenpeace was demanding that Shell sever its Arctic cooperation with Gazprom. Shell refused to disown its Russian partner. A spokesman called Gazprom a “good and reliable partner” — while simultaneously stressing that Shell had no involvement in Prirazlomnaya and no joint Arctic operation with Gazprom then under way. The distinction was legally important. Reputationally, it was much harder to maintain.
Archive reference: SLF-2007-079
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Royal Dutch Shell plc SEC filings concerning Sakhalin II and Shell’s 2013 Annual Report and Form 20-F; Gazprom corporate records concerning Russian Arctic cooperation and Prirazlomnoye
Contemporaneous reporting: ANP, NOS, The Washington Post, contemporary reporting preserved in the Donovan archive
Judicial and arbitral record: The Arctic Sunrise Case, ITLOS Case No. 22; Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia); later Bryan and Others v. Russia, European Court of Human Rights
Evidence standard: Shell’s commercial relationship with Gazprom, the Greenpeace protest, Russian boarding and detention of the Arctic Sunrise, international proceedings and the start of Prirazlomnoye production are treated according to corporate, governmental and judicial records. Greenpeace accusations against Shell are attributed to Greenpeace. Nothing identified here establishes that Shell ordered, requested or participated in the Russian security operation or prosecution.
Introduction
Five months earlier, Shell and Gazprom had signed a memorandum setting out principles for possible cooperation in exploration and development on Russia’s Arctic shelf.
Gazprom’s own corporate history records the agreement.
The relationship built from Sakhalin II was moving north.
Then came the Arctic Sunrise.
On 18 September 2013 Greenpeace mounted a protest at the Prirazlomnaya platform.
On 19 September Russian authorities took control of the Dutch-flagged Greenpeace vessel.
The ensuing confrontation rapidly ceased to be merely an environmental protest.
It became a diplomatic dispute.
Then an international law case.
And, for Shell, a test of what its increasingly close relationship with Gazprom meant when its Russian partner became the centre of a global controversy. Gazprom
1. The protest was directed at Gazprom — not Shell
The physical target of the September action was the Prirazlomnaya offshore platform in the Pechora Sea.
The licence for the Prirazlomnoye field belonged to Gazprom Neft Shelf, a wholly owned subsidiary of Gazprom Neft.
Shell did not own the platform.
Shell did not operate the field.
And Shell was not participating in Prirazlomnoye.
Those facts are essential because subsequent campaigning deliberately sought to pull Shell into a dispute arising from a Gazprom operation. Gazprom
The Greenpeace group nevertheless had a reason for doing so.
Shell and Gazprom had signed their Arctic cooperation memorandum only months earlier.
Whatever the legal separation between Prirazlomnaya and Shell, the two companies were publicly presenting themselves as prospective partners in further Russian Arctic development. Gazprom
2. Two activists tried to climb the platform
The later judicial record provides a relatively neutral reconstruction.
The European Court of Human Rights records that two Greenpeace activists launched from the Arctic Sunrise in small boats and climbed the Prirazlomnaya platform during the 18 September protest.
Russian forces intervened.
The following day Russian authorities boarded the Arctic Sunrise.
The vessel was subsequently taken to Murmansk, where the people on board were formally arrested. HUDOC
The group became known internationally as:
the Arctic 30.
They comprised:
28 Greenpeace activists
and
two freelance journalists. HUDOC
3. The ship was Dutch-flagged — and this became decisive
The Arctic Sunrise sailed under the flag of the Netherlands.
That fact transformed the dispute from a Russian criminal case into an interstate law-of-the-sea dispute.
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea records that on 4 October 2013 the Netherlands instituted arbitration against Russia concerning the boarding and detention of the vessel in Russia’s exclusive economic zone and the detention of those aboard. ITLOS
This point should be stated precisely.
The controversy was not simply about what happened on the platform.
It was also about what legal authority Russia possessed over a foreign-flagged ship beyond its territorial sea.
4. Russia initially treated the incident as piracy
The Russian authorities opened proceedings on suspicion of piracy.
Contemporaneous reporting recorded that the offence carried a potential maximum sentence of fifteen years.
The use of so grave a charge against environmental protesters immediately intensified international attention. Human Rights Watch
On 23 October 2013, the charges were reduced from piracy to hooliganism.
That did not immediately free the detainees.
They remained caught in the Russian criminal process while international pressure increased. Washington Post
The later European Court record confirms the same sequence: piracy charges, later reclassification to hooliganism, followed eventually by termination of the proceedings under an amnesty. HUDOC
5. Greenpeace then widened the target
By late October, Greenpeace was no longer concentrating exclusively on Gazprom and the Russian state.
It turned directly to Shell.
On 22 October 2013, Greenpeace announced that it had written to Shell calling upon the company to break its agreement with Gazprom concerning Arctic oil development.
The organisation argued that Shell should distance itself from Gazprom, citing both environmental concerns and the Arctic Sunrise affair. RD.nl
That was a campaigning position.
It was not evidence that Shell had responsibility for the arrests.
But it exposed a problem inherent in strategic partnerships.
A company cannot necessarily take the commercial benefits of a partner’s political access while remaining wholly insulated from the partner’s reputational controversies.
That is commentary.
The existence of Greenpeace’s demand is fact.
6. Shell’s response produced the defining phrase
Shell declined to engage publicly with the substance of Greenpeace’s letter.
But its spokesman did say something extremely revealing.
Gazprom, Shell said, was a:
“good and reliable partner.” RD.nl
Four words.
But read against the history of this archive, they are remarkable.
Seven years earlier, Shell had surrendered control of Sakhalin II during an extraordinary confrontation involving environmental enforcement, Russian state pressure and Gazprom’s acquisition of a controlling interest.
By October 2013, Shell was publicly describing Gazprom as reliable.
That does not establish what Shell executives privately thought.
It establishes what the company was prepared to say publicly while thirty Greenpeace-linked detainees remained in Russia.
7. Shell simultaneously drew a very sharp legal boundary
A month later Greenpeace staged another protest, this time at Shell premises in Rotterdam.
Shell’s response became more explicit.
Its spokesman stressed that Shell had:
no involvement in Prirazlomnaya;
no role in the events surrounding the platform;
and no joint Arctic operation with Gazprom then in progress. RD.nl
Shell explained that the earlier agreement with Gazprom was an expression of intention concerning possible future projects.
According to the spokesman, no concrete Arctic project had yet resulted from it. RD.nl
This was an important factual correction to some campaign rhetoric.
Shell and Gazprom had agreed to explore cooperation.
That did not mean Shell was operating Prirazlomnaya.
8. Shell said responsibility did not lie with it
The Shell spokesman’s position was unequivocal.
Greenpeace’s accusations linking Shell to Prirazlomnaya were, according to the company, wrong.
The underlying point was straightforward.
Gazprom operated the platform.
Russian authorities detained and prosecuted the activists.
Shell had done neither. RD.nl
A contemporaneous report preserved in the Donovan archive records Shell putting the separation even more emphatically, saying it had:
“zero point zero percent”
to do with the events in Russia. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
On the narrow question of operational responsibility for Prirazlomnaya, Shell had a strong factual basis for that distinction.
The harder question was whether its strategic partnership nevertheless gave it political or commercial influence.
9. Greenpeace said influence created responsibility
Greenpeace’s argument was not that Shell personnel had boarded the Arctic Sunrise.
Its argument was that Shell’s financial and strategic relationship with Gazprom gave Shell leverage.
The organisation sought to use that relationship as pressure.
By November it was directing protests at Shell filling stations and demanding that Shell publicly intervene over the Arctic 30. Contemporary archive material records demonstrations planned at more than 70 Shell petrol stations in the United Kingdom. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
In Rotterdam, Greenpeace activists displayed a large image of Dutch Arctic 30 member Faiza Oulahsen on Shell’s building.
NOS reported that Greenpeace was specifically protesting Shell’s cooperation with Gazprom. NOS
The campaign had therefore turned Shell’s partnership into a liability of association.
10. This distinction is central to the archive
There are three very different propositions here.
The first is established:
Shell had a substantial strategic commercial relationship with Gazprom.
The second is also established:
Shell was considering future Arctic cooperation with Gazprom.
The third is not established:
Shell caused or directed the Russian action against Greenpeace.
No document identified for this instalment supports that third proposition.
There is no Shell instruction to Russian security services.
There is no evidence that Shell requested the seizure of the vessel.
There is no court finding imposing responsibility on Shell for the detention of the Arctic 30.
That evidential boundary must remain intact.
11. The Dutch government made it a state-to-state dispute
Shell’s position was commercial.
The Netherlands took the dispute onto an entirely different plane.
On 4 October 2013, the Dutch government instituted arbitral proceedings against Russia under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
On 21 October, the Netherlands asked the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for provisional measures.
Russia responded that it did not accept the arbitration procedure in this case and did not intend to participate in the ITLOS proceedings, relying upon a declaration made when it ratified the Convention. ITLOS
That disagreement itself became part of the legal history.
12. ITLOS ordered release
On 22 November 2013, ITLOS issued its provisional-measures order.
The Tribunal ordered that the Arctic Sunrise and the detained persons be released upon the posting of financial security.
The Netherlands subsequently arranged a:
€3.6 million guarantee. ITLOS
This was an order for provisional measures.
It was not yet a final adjudication of the merits of the Netherlands’ case against Russia.
That distinction matters.
The full legal determination came later.
13. The international tribunal later found Russia had breached the Convention
The later arbitral record removes much of the legal ambiguity surrounding the seizure.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration acted as registry for the Annex VII tribunal.
Its official case record confirms that the tribunal issued an Award on the Merits in August 2015. PCA CPA
The PCA’s later official summary states that the tribunal found Russia had breached its obligations under the Law of the Sea Convention by boarding, investigating, arresting, detaining and seizing the Arctic Sunrise without Dutch consent and by arresting and prosecuting the Arctic 30.
It also found that Russia had failed to comply with the ITLOS provisional-measures order. PCA CPA Docs
This is an international arbitral finding concerning:
Russia.
It is not a finding against Shell.
14. The European Court later reached a human-rights judgment
There is now a second important judicial record.
In Bryan and Others v. Russia, decided on 27 June 2023, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously found violations of:
Article 5 — liberty and security
and
Article 10 — freedom of expression. ECHR
The Court found that the period during which Russian authorities controlled the ship before formal arrest amounted to an unrecorded deprivation of liberty.
It also found the subsequent detention arbitrary and held that the detention interfered unlawfully with the protesters’ freedom of expression. HUDOC
Again, the defendant was Russia.
The Court did not find Shell responsible.
15. The later judgments therefore sharpen, rather than blur, responsibility
With hindsight it is possible to state the legal record more confidently than journalists could in September 2013.
Russia’s actions were later found to breach international law.
The activists’ Convention rights were later found to have been violated.
But those legal conclusions make it even more important not to transfer responsibility casually from one actor to another.
Gazprom operated the platform.
Russian authorities conducted the boarding, detention and prosecution.
Greenpeace conducted the protest.
The Netherlands pursued international proceedings.
Shell was a strategic business partner of Gazprom considering future Arctic cooperation.
Those are different roles.
The documentary method requires that they remain different.
16. But Shell’s reputational exposure was real
Legal responsibility and reputational exposure are not the same thing.
Shell could truthfully say:
Prirazlomnaya is not ours.
It could truthfully say:
We are not conducting a joint Arctic operation there.
But it could not truthfully say:
Gazprom has nothing to do with us.
The companies had spent years deepening their relationship.
Shell had a 27.5 per cent interest in Sakhalin II after Gazprom acquired control under the December 2006 restructuring, an arrangement recorded in Shell’s SEC filing. SEC
And only months before the Arctic 30 incident, Gazprom and Shell had formally recorded their intention to cooperate on Russian Arctic exploration and development. Gazprom
That connection was sufficient for Greenpeace to make Shell part of the campaign.
17. Shell had chosen partnership as its Russian strategy
This is where the Arctic 30 episode reconnects directly with the Sakhalin Papers.
The commercial sequence was already established.
Shell lost control of Sakhalin II.
Shell stayed.
Sakhalin II became operational.
Shell and Gazprom signed long-term gas agreements.
They expanded their cooperation.
They signed a Strategic Global Cooperation Protocol.
They investigated new ventures.
Then they agreed principles for possible Arctic development.
The Arctic Sunrise crisis therefore did not involve a peripheral supplier or distant counterparty.
It involved the state-controlled company at the centre of Shell’s Russian strategy.
18. Shell did not abandon Gazprom
The clearest evidence lies not in an internal strategy paper but in conduct.
Greenpeace publicly called on Shell to break with Gazprom.
Shell did not do so.
Instead, its spokesman publicly characterised Gazprom as a good and reliable partner. RD.nl
Nor did the controversy prevent subsequent Shell-Gazprom commercial discussions.
Within months, the relationship would move back toward the very project where this story began:
Sakhalin II.
That continuation matters.
It shows that the Arctic 30 controversy, serious though it was, did not rupture Shell’s Russian strategy.
19. Meanwhile Prirazlomnaya moved from protest site to producing asset
On 20 December 2013, Gazprom announced that oil production had begun at the Prirazlomnoye field.
Gazprom described it as:
the first Russian project developing the Arctic shelf. Gazprom
The company said the field lay roughly 60 kilometres offshore in the Pechora Sea and that the platform had been designed for extreme Arctic conditions.
Alexey Miller declared that Gazprom intended to continue advancing in the Arctic. Gazprom
The production announcement came only three months after the Greenpeace protest that had triggered the Arctic 30 crisis.
The disputed platform had become an operating oil installation.
20. Greenpeace immediately connected the production milestone back to Shell
Greenpeace’s response to the 20 December start-up again brought Shell into the argument.
The organisation criticised Prirazlomnaya production and highlighted Gazprom’s separate exploration relationship with Shell, arguing that the partnership created financial and reputational risks for Shell and its investors. Greenpeace
That remained Greenpeace’s assessment.
It was not a regulatory or judicial finding.
But it demonstrates how thoroughly Shell’s corporate relationship had become part of the public Arctic controversy.
Sakhalin had created a partnership.
The Arctic had created a reputational linkage.
21. A striking contrast in Shell’s public posture
The company’s position by late 2013 contained two propositions that were both capable of being true.
First:
Shell was not responsible for Prirazlomnaya or for Russian treatment of the Arctic 30.
Second:
Gazprom remained a valued Shell strategic partner.
The difficulty was not logical.
It was political.
Shell wanted the commercial relationship separated from Gazprom’s conduct elsewhere.
Greenpeace wanted precisely the opposite.
That conflict — over where the moral perimeter of a corporate partnership begins and ends — became the real Shell dimension of the Arctic 30 story.
22. What the authenticated Shell record contributes
Royal Dutch Shell’s 2013 Annual Report and Form 20-F was filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on 13 March 2014.
It is the authenticated corporate record for the year in which these events occurred. SEC
The deeper historical corporate record is even clearer.
Shell’s own December 2006 SEC filing had announced Gazprom’s entry into Sakhalin Energy as leading shareholder, Shell’s reduction to 27.5 per cent and Shell chief executive Jeroen van der Veer’s statement that the new arrangement positioned Sakhalin II for further growth opportunities. SEC
By 2013, that relationship had evolved into proposed Arctic cooperation.
The Arctic 30 controversy therefore tested a partnership whose institutional roots extended directly back to the Sakhalin restructuring.
Documentary Findings
Established
Greenpeace activists protested at the Prirazlomnaya platform on 18 September 2013.
Russian authorities boarded the Dutch-flagged Arctic Sunrise on 19 September, and the thirty people associated with the vessel were detained. The later European Court record identifies the group as 28 Greenpeace activists and two freelance journalists. HUDOC
The criminal investigation initially concerned piracy and was later reclassified to hooliganism. Washington Post
Greenpeace publicly called on Shell to terminate its Arctic cooperation agreement with Gazprom.
A Shell spokesman declined to address the substance of the demand and described Gazprom as a “good and reliable partner.” RD.nl
Shell publicly stated that it had no involvement in Prirazlomnaya and that no concrete joint Shell-Gazprom Arctic project had emerged from their cooperation memorandum at that stage. RD.nl
The Netherlands instituted arbitration against Russia on 4 October 2013. ITLOS
ITLOS issued provisional measures on 22 November 2013, ordering release of the ship and detained persons subject to financial security. ITLOS
The later Annex VII tribunal found that Russia had breached its obligations under UNCLOS through the boarding, seizure, detention and prosecution and through non-compliance with the ITLOS order. PCA CPA Docs
The European Court of Human Rights later found violations of the Arctic 30’s rights to liberty and freedom of expression. ECHR
Gazprom began oil production from Prirazlomnoye on 20 December 2013. Gazprom
Established corporate separation
Prirazlomnaya was not a Shell asset.
Shell was not the field operator.
The licence was held by Gazprom Neft Shelf. Gazprom
Shell’s relationship with Gazprom consisted of other producing interests, most importantly Sakhalin II, and agreements concerning possible future cooperation including the April 2013 Russian Arctic memorandum. SEC
Established later judicial findings
The international legal findings described above were findings against the Russian Federation.
They were not judgments against Shell or findings that Shell participated in the boarding, arrest, detention or prosecution.
Not established
No evidence identified here establishes that Shell requested the Russian intervention against Greenpeace.
No evidence identified here establishes that Shell participated in planning the boarding of the Arctic Sunrise.
No evidence identified here establishes that Shell controlled Prirazlomnaya.
No court or arbitral finding identified here attributes Russia’s violations to Shell.
No evidence identified here establishes that the April 2013 Shell-Gazprom Arctic memorandum had produced an operational Russian Arctic joint venture by September 2013.
And no evidence identified here establishes that Shell’s description of Gazprom as a reliable partner represented the private views of every Shell director or executive.
Commentary
The phrase “good and reliable partner” deserves its place in the historical record because of when it was said.
Shell was under no legal obligation to pretend Gazprom did not exist.
Nor was it legally responsible simply because its partner became embroiled in an international controversy.
But by October 2013, Shell had made a strategic choice.
It had decided that Gazprom was sufficiently important to its Russian future that the relationship would survive even a controversy attracting international legal proceedings, diplomatic intervention and a global Greenpeace campaign.
That tells us something about the value Shell placed on Russian access.
Sakhalin II had taught Shell an uncomfortable lesson.
Possessing technology, capital and international expertise was not enough.
In Russia, access to strategic hydrocarbons depended upon relationships with institutions possessing political and legal authority.
Gazprom possessed that access.
Shell possessed capabilities Gazprom wanted.
The companies therefore had reasons to continue working together even when the relationship carried political and reputational costs.
The Arctic 30 episode exposed those costs unusually clearly.
Shell’s legal defence was strong:
this is not our platform.
Its reputational defence was weaker:
this is not our partner.
Because Gazprom plainly was its partner.
That is why Greenpeace targeted Shell.
It understood that the commercial architecture created after Sakhalin II connected the two companies even where ownership did not.
None of that makes Shell responsible for actions subsequently found unlawful by international tribunals.
The archive should not make that leap.
But neither should it ignore the historical significance of Shell’s decision to stand by the relationship.
When presented with an opportunity to distance itself publicly from Gazprom, Shell instead called it reliable.
And within weeks of Prirazlomnoye beginning oil production, Shell and Gazprom would be discussing something much closer to the heart of this documentary archive.
Not the Russian Arctic.
Not a Greenpeace ship.
But:
expansion of Sakhalin II itself.
Source Record
Royal Dutch Shell plc’s 2013 Form 20-F was filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on 13 March 2014 and provides the authenticated Shell corporate record for the year. SEC
US SEC — Royal Dutch Shell plc 2013 Form 20-F filing
Shell’s December 2006 SEC filing records Gazprom’s entry as leading shareholder in Sakhalin Energy, Shell’s reduced interest and Shell’s stated expectation of future project growth. SEC
US SEC — Shell filing on Gazprom’s entry into Sakhalin II
Gazprom’s official 2013 corporate chronicle records the memorandum between Gazprom and Royal Dutch Shell concerning possible hydrocarbon exploration and development on Russia’s Arctic shelf. Gazprom
Gazprom — Chronicle of Gazprom for 2013
The contemporaneous ANP report records Greenpeace’s demand that Shell break with Gazprom and Shell’s description of Gazprom as a “good and reliable partner.” RD.nl
ANP/RD — “Shell moet met Gazprom breken”, 22 October 2013
A further contemporaneous ANP report records Shell’s denial of involvement in Prirazlomnaya and its statement that no concrete joint Arctic project with Gazprom then existed. RD.nl
ANP/RD — Shell: not involved in Gazprom platform, 21 November 2013
NOS separately reported the Rotterdam Greenpeace protest and Shell’s position that it was not active with Gazprom in the Russian Arctic at that time. NOS
NOS — Greenpeace action at Shell Rotterdam, 21 November 2013
The official International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea case page records the Netherlands’ proceedings, Russia’s non-participation position and the Tribunal’s 22 November 2013 provisional-measures order. ITLOS
ITLOS — The Arctic Sunrise Case, Case No. 22
The Permanent Court of Arbitration case record contains the subsequent jurisdiction, merits and compensation awards in the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia). PCA CPA
Permanent Court of Arbitration — Arctic Sunrise Arbitration
The PCA’s official compensation press release summarises the earlier merits finding that Russia breached its UNCLOS obligations in its treatment of the vessel and the Arctic 30. PCA CPA Docs
PCA — Official Arctic Sunrise arbitration summary and compensation award
The European Court of Human Rights’ Bryan and Others v. Russia judgment records the later findings of violations of liberty and freedom of expression. ECHR
European Court of Human Rights — Bryan and Others v. Russia
Gazprom’s official 20 December 2013 announcement records the start of production at Prirazlomnoye. Gazprom
Gazprom — Start of oil production at Prirazlomnoye, 20 December 2013
The Donovan archive preserves contemporaneous reporting on Greenpeace’s widening campaign against Shell and Shell’s emphatic denial of involvement in the Russian arrests. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
Donovan archive — Arctic 30: Greenpeace turns on Shell, 13 November 2013
Archive disclaimer: Greenpeace allegations and campaign demands are identified as such and are not presented as judicial findings. International legal rulings against Russia are not attributed to Shell. A strategic cooperation memorandum is not treated as proof of an operating joint venture. Corporate statements are distinguished from established judicial and arbitral findings.
Site-wide disclaimer applies.
Next instalment
SLF-2007-080 — The Sakhalin Papers LXX: The Third Train — Shell Pushes to Expand the Project It No Longer Controlled
Just as the Arctic 30 affair was reaching its December climax, Shell’s attention was turning back to Sakhalin.
For months Shell’s Russia management had been warning that delay over expanding the Sakhalin II LNG plant risked missing favourable Asian gas prices.
On 23 December 2013, contemporaneous reporting recorded a breakthrough.
Gazprom chief Alexey Miller and outgoing Shell chief executive Peter Voser had agreed to recommend that Sakhalin Energy begin work toward the design of:
a third LNG production train. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
The project would soon pass to Shell’s new chief executive.
On 23 February 2014, Alexey Miller and:
Ben van Beurden
signed a formal roadmap in Sochi providing for preparation of front-end engineering and design documentation for the third Sakhalin II LNG train. Gazprom
Seven years after Shell lost control of Sakhalin II, it was pushing to make the project larger.
The next file will examine why Shell wanted a third train so badly, where the additional gas was supposed to come from, and how the expansion question brought Sakhalin II and Gazprom’s neighbouring Sakhalin III resources increasingly close together.
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