THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 16 OCTOBER 2026
SLF-2007-089
The Sakhalin Papers LXXIX: The Baltic Explosions — Nord Stream’s Destruction, the Ukrainian Connection and the Trial That Could Rewrite the History
Four years after underwater explosions devastated the Nord Stream gas pipelines, a German court has begun hearing a criminal case that may finally establish who carried out one of Europe’s most consequential acts of infrastructure sabotage. On 14 October 2026, a former Ukrainian military officer appeared before the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg, accused of helping organise the operation. German federal prosecutors allege that Ukrainian military personnel acted on instructions from Ukrainian state authorities. Ukraine denies responsibility, and the defendant contests the allegations. The proceedings follow years of competing accusations involving Russia, the United States and Ukraine. For Shell shareholders, however, one authenticated corporate disclosure establishes an important and frequently overlooked fact: Shell had already written down its entire $1.126 billion Nord Stream 2 loan before the explosions occurred. The documentary record now connects the destruction of the pipelines, the international investigations, the subsequent criminal proceedings and Shell’s financial exposure — while leaving the ultimate determination of criminal responsibility to the court.
Archive reference: SLF-2007-089
Publication date: 16 October 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Principal documentary sources: Shell’s first- and third-quarter 2022 financial disclosures; Swedish Prosecution Authority records, 2022–2024; Danish Security and Intelligence Service statement, February 2024; German Federal Court of Justice decision, December 2025; German Federal Prosecutor’s indictment announcement, July 2026; Hamburg Higher Regional Court decisions, September–October 2026.
Contemporaneous reporting: Reuters, Associated Press, The Guardian, The Washington Post and German public-service broadcasting.
Scientific evidence: Seismological observations from September 2022 and the United Nations Environment Programme’s 2025 assessment of methane emissions.
Evidence classification: Confirmed physical events; authenticated company disclosures; official investigative findings; allegations contained in a criminal indictment; contested claims about state responsibility; separately identified editorial analysis.
Introduction: The explosion that became an international mystery
The previous instalment, SLF-2007-088, examined the escalating confrontation surrounding Nord Stream 2.
Shell had committed substantial financing to the Russian-controlled pipeline.
The United States had repeatedly threatened sanctions.
Germany had resisted American interference in European energy policy.
Construction was eventually completed in September 2021, but the pipeline never received the authorisation necessary to commence commercial operations.
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Germany halted certification.
Shell announced its intention to withdraw.
In May 2022, Shell disclosed a $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan.
That appeared to bring the company’s financial involvement in the project to an end.
But the physical infrastructure remained beneath the Baltic Sea.
Then, on 26 September 2022, powerful underwater explosions damaged both Nord Stream pipeline systems.
The incident immediately generated accusations, denials and speculation.
Russia alleged Western involvement.
American officials denied responsibility.
Other commentators suggested Russia might have destroyed its own infrastructure.
Investigative reporting subsequently identified possible Ukrainian involvement.
For several years, no criminal trial established the responsibility of any individual.
That situation changed in October 2026.
The proceedings now underway in Hamburg provide the first major opportunity for a court to examine a specific criminal prosecution arising from the explosions.
The documentary record must nevertheless be approached carefully.
Evidence that the pipelines were deliberately destroyed is not the same as proof identifying the perpetrators.
Likewise, a prosecutor’s allegation that an operation was directed by a foreign government is not equivalent to a final judicial finding that the government concerned ordered it.
Those distinctions govern this instalment.
1. September 2022: Explosions beneath the Baltic Sea
On Monday, 26 September 2022, seismic monitoring stations recorded unusual disturbances in the Baltic Sea near the Danish island of Bornholm.
The Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland subsequently confirmed that its monitoring equipment had detected events consistent with underwater explosions.
The disturbances were recorded at approximately 02:03 and 19:03 local time.
Swedish and Danish authorities received reports of major gas leaks.
The damage affected three of the four individual pipeline strings making up the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 systems.
Nord Stream 1 comprised two pipelines.
Nord Stream 2 also comprised two.
Both Nord Stream 1 strings were damaged, together with one of the Nord Stream 2 strings.
The remaining Nord Stream 2 string was not ruptured by the explosions.
The distinction is important because contemporary reporting sometimes referred collectively to the destruction of both pipeline systems without explaining the condition of their individual strings.
Nord Stream 1 had previously carried substantial volumes of Russian natural gas to Germany.
Russia had already stopped deliveries through the system before the explosions.
Nord Stream 2 had never entered commercial service.
Nevertheless, the pipelines still contained pressurised gas.
The explosions caused enormous quantities of gas to escape into the Baltic Sea.
The escaping gas produced vast areas of turbulence and bubbles visible from aircraft.
Images released by Danish and Swedish authorities became defining photographs of the incident.
The immediate physical destruction was beyond reasonable dispute.
What remained uncertain was the identity of those responsible.
Primary scientific record: Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland — Seismic Observations, 29 September 2022. GEUS’ publikationer
2. November 2022: Swedish investigators confirm explosives
Swedish authorities began investigating shortly after the explosions.
The Swedish Prosecution Authority treated the incident as suspected gross sabotage.
Investigators examined the damaged infrastructure and surrounding seabed.
They collected physical objects and other potential evidence.
On 18 November 2022, prosecutor Mats Ljungqvist announced that analysis had identified explosive residues on several foreign objects recovered from the scene.
This was a decisive evidential development.
The investigation was no longer confined to interpreting seismic signals or examining unusual pipeline damage.
Physical evidence supported the conclusion that explosives had been used.
The Swedish prosecutor characterised the incident as gross sabotage.
However, the announcement did not identify the perpetrators.
Nor did it establish which government, organisation or individuals had organised the attack.
The distinction between confirming deliberate destruction and attributing responsibility remained essential.
Authenticated source: Swedish Prosecution Authority — Sabotage Confirmed at Nord Stream, 18 November 2022.
3. The environmental consequence: An enormous methane release
The explosions caused environmental damage beyond the physical destruction of the pipelines.
Methane is the principal component of natural gas.
It is also a powerful greenhouse gas.
The scale of the Nord Stream release was initially uncertain.
Early estimates varied considerably because researchers lacked complete information about the volume of gas remaining in the pipelines, the amount dissolving in seawater and the quantity ultimately reaching the atmosphere.
Subsequent scientific research produced a substantially revised assessment.
On 15 January 2025, the United Nations Environment Programme reported findings from research published in Nature.
The researchers estimated that approximately 465,000 metric tonnes of methane, with an uncertainty of about 20,000 tonnes, had entered the atmosphere.
The study combined several measurement and modelling techniques.
These included satellite observations, airborne measurements and atmospheric analysis.
The researchers characterised the release as the largest recorded methane emission from a single short-duration event of its kind.
The assessment also placed the incident in context.
Despite its extraordinary scale, the release represented approximately 0.1 per cent of global human-caused methane emissions in 2022.
That qualification is important.
The Nord Stream explosions caused a major environmental incident, but they were not responsible for a substantial proportion of annual global methane emissions.
The scientific evidence establishes the environmental consequences of the pipeline damage.
It does not identify who placed the explosives.
Primary sources: United Nations Environment Programme — Pipeline Blasts Released Record-Shattering Amount of Methane, 15 January 2025 and Nature — Methane Emissions from the Nord Stream Subsea Pipeline Leaks.
4. The accusations begin: Russia, the United States and Ukraine
The political consequences of the explosions were immediate.
The pipelines had long been controversial.
Washington had opposed Nord Stream 2 because it believed the project increased European dependence upon Russian gas and weakened Ukraine’s position as an energy transit country.
Russia regarded Nord Stream as important infrastructure for its energy exports.
Germany had originally supported Nord Stream 2 but suspended certification following Russia’s actions against Ukraine.
Those competing interests created fertile ground for speculation.
Russia accused Western countries, including the United States and Britain, of involvement.
Both governments rejected allegations of responsibility.
Other commentators suggested that Russia might have had motives to damage the infrastructure, although the available evidence did not establish that conclusion.
In February 2023, American investigative journalist Seymour Hersh published allegations attributing responsibility to an operation organised by the United States with Norwegian assistance.
The White House, CIA and Norwegian authorities rejected those allegations.
Hersh’s account relied heavily upon an unidentified source.
The report therefore constituted a serious allegation, not an authenticated finding of criminal responsibility.
It should neither be accepted as fact solely because of its author’s reputation nor excluded from the historical record simply because governments denied it.
Its evidential limitations must be identified.
Meanwhile, other investigative journalists were pursuing leads pointing towards Ukraine.
Contemporaneous reporting: Washington Post — Intelligence Officials Suspect Pro-Ukrainian Saboteurs, 7 March 2023. Democracy Now!
5. June 2023: The first detailed intelligence disclosures
On 6 June 2023, The Washington Post published an important investigation by Shane Harris and Souad Mekhennet.
The report examined intelligence concerning an alleged Ukrainian plan to attack the Nord Stream pipelines.
According to the newspaper, a European intelligence service had obtained information about a possible Ukrainian operation before the September 2022 explosions.
That information was reportedly shared with the CIA.
The reported plan involved a small group of divers and a maritime operation targeting the pipelines.
The newspaper said the intelligence identified possible military involvement.
However, the original intelligence reporting did not establish that the operation actually took place.
Nor did it prove that the persons described in the intelligence report carried out the subsequent explosions.
The newspaper itself identified discrepancies between the reported plan and the eventual attack.
Nevertheless, the publication was significant.
It provided detailed reporting suggesting that intelligence concerning a possible Ukrainian operation existed before the explosions.
Dutch reporting subsequently identified the Netherlands’ Military Intelligence and Security Service as the agency said to have supplied the warning.
The Dutch service did not publicly authenticate every detail of those reports.
The material therefore occupied an intermediate evidential category.
It was more specific than unsupported political speculation.
But it remained intelligence-related reporting rather than a criminal conviction or a judicial finding.
Contemporaneous sources: The Washington Post — US Had Intelligence of Detailed Ukrainian Plan to Attack Nord Stream, 6 June 2023 and DutchNews — Dutch Secret Service Tipped Off CIA About Nord Stream Plan, 13 June 2023.
6. February 2024: Sweden closes its investigation
On 7 February 2024, Sweden’s Prosecution Authority announced that it was closing its criminal investigation.
This decision was widely reported.
But its legal significance requires explanation.
Sweden did not conclude that the explosions had been accidental.
Nor did Swedish investigators announce that the incident had never involved sabotage.
The investigation had examined whether Swedish citizens or Swedish territory were involved in the attacks.
Prosecutor Mats Ljungqvist explained that the investigation had not identified circumstances sufficient to establish Swedish jurisdiction.
The authority concluded that there was no basis for continuing the Swedish criminal proceedings.
Importantly, Sweden confirmed that it had cooperated extensively with Germany.
Material capable of being used as evidence had been supplied to German investigators.
Consequently, closure of the Swedish investigation did not terminate the wider European inquiry.
Germany continued its investigation.
The Swedish record illustrates why documentary precision matters.
An investigation closed for jurisdictional reasons is not the same as a finding that no crime occurred.
Primary source: Swedish Prosecution Authority — Investigation Concerning Gross Sabotage Against Nord Stream Closed, 7 February 2024.
7. February 2024: Denmark also closes its investigation
Denmark announced its decision on 26 February 2024.
The investigation had been undertaken by Copenhagen Police in cooperation with the Danish Security and Intelligence Service.
The authorities concluded that the pipelines had been subjected to deliberate sabotage.
However, they determined that there were insufficient grounds to pursue a criminal case in Denmark.
The Danish authorities also referred to cooperation with international partners.
Again, closure of the investigation was not an exoneration of any particular suspect.
It was a decision concerning the continuation of criminal proceedings within Denmark.
Two national investigations had therefore ended without prosecutions.
But both supported the conclusion that the incident involved deliberate destruction.
Germany remained the principal country pursuing criminal accountability.
Authenticated source: Danish Security and Intelligence Service — Nord Stream Investigation Concluded, 26 February 2024.
8. German investigators reconstruct an alleged maritime operation
German investigators focused increasingly upon the possible use of a rented sailing yacht.
The vessel became widely identified in reporting as the Andromeda.
According to German prosecutorial allegations, the yacht had been hired from a company in Rostock using false identity documents and intermediaries.
Investigators examined evidence concerning the vessel’s movements, its occupants and possible connections with the explosive devices.
The allegations eventually developed into a detailed reconstruction of the operation.
The German authorities suspected that a group including professional divers, a skipper and an explosives specialist had travelled into the Baltic Sea.
The group allegedly transported explosives towards the area of the pipelines near Bornholm.
Divers were then said to have attached explosive devices fitted with timers to the pipelines.
German prosecutors now allege that the devices were placed before 22 September 2022.
The explosions occurred on 26 September.
The alleged reconstruction is significant because it describes a specific method, vessel and group of participants.
But it remains the prosecution’s case.
The existence of a detailed reconstruction does not automatically establish that each element has been proved.
Questions concerning identification, forensic evidence, witness testimony, communications and the defendant’s alleged role must be examined during the criminal proceedings.
Official account: German Federal Prosecutor — Indictment Concerning the Nord Stream Explosions, 2 July 2026.
9. August 2025: The arrest of Serhii K.
A major development occurred on 21 August 2025.
Italian police arrested a Ukrainian national identified in German official documents as Serhii K.
The arrest took place in the province of Rimini.
German authorities had issued a European Arrest Warrant.
The suspect, subsequently named publicly during extradition proceedings as Serhii Kuznietsov, was alleged to have participated in the sabotage operation.
He challenged his transfer to Germany.
In November 2025, however, he was extradited.
German prosecutors maintained that he had held a coordinating or leadership position in the alleged operation.
The case then moved into the German judicial system.
The arrest was an important investigative milestone.
But it did not establish guilt.
The suspect retained the presumption of innocence.
10. December 2025: Germany’s Federal Court of Justice examines the evidence
On 10 December 2025, Germany’s Federal Court of Justice considered a challenge to the suspect’s detention.
Its decision was publicly announced on 15 January 2026.
The Third Criminal Panel rejected the detention challenge.
The court concluded that the available evidence supported a strong suspicion sufficient for continued detention.
It also accepted that there was a risk of flight.
The decision addressed several legal questions.
These included Germany’s jurisdiction over the alleged conduct and whether the suspect could rely upon immunity or protections associated with military operations.
The court reasoned that the alleged destruction had consequences within Germany because the pipelines terminated on German territory.
It also considered whether covert action against civilian infrastructure could be justified under the law of armed conflict.
The court’s reasoning was significant.
However, it must be interpreted according to the stage of proceedings.
The judges were deciding whether the conditions for pre-trial detention were satisfied.
They were not delivering a final judgment following a completed criminal trial.
Their assessment of strong suspicion did not amount to a conviction.
The distinction remains essential.
Authenticated judicial source: German Federal Court of Justice — Decision StB 60/2025, Announced 15 January 2026.
11. June 2026: German prosecutors file formal criminal charges
On 30 June 2026, Germany’s Federal Prosecutor filed an indictment against Serhii K.
The official announcement followed on 2 July.
The indictment alleged offences including causing explosions, destroying infrastructure, disrupting public services and participation in a war crime involving an attack upon civilian objects.
For the first time, the prosecution publicly set out a detailed allegation concerning Ukrainian state involvement.
According to the Federal Prosecutor, the defendant had served as an officer in the Ukrainian army in 2022.
The indictment alleged that he and other military personnel developed the plan on instructions from Ukrainian state agencies.
Its alleged purpose was to prevent Russian gas deliveries through Nord Stream and reduce Russia’s ability to finance its war through natural gas revenues.
The prosecutors identified the defendant as the alleged leader of the operational group.
They described the use of false identity documents, a rented yacht and explosives placed on the seabed.
These allegations were unusually consequential.
They directly implicated Ukrainian state authorities in a destructive operation against energy infrastructure serving Germany.
But the indictment did not amount to a judicial finding that the Ukrainian government had ordered the attack.
Nor did it establish the personal responsibility of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Ukraine continued to deny involvement.
The evidential position was therefore substantially more developed than it had been in 2022.
A named defendant had been charged.
A detailed prosecution theory had been published.
And the authorities had moved beyond anonymous accusations towards a formal judicial process.
Nevertheless, the allegations remained to be tested.
Primary legal source: Federal Prosecutor’s Office — Indictment Filed Regarding the Nord Stream Gas Pipelines Explosions, 2 July 2026.
12. August 2026: Another suspect arrested in Croatia
On 19 August 2026, German prosecutors announced a further arrest.
A Ukrainian national identified as Vladimir Z. was detained in Pula, Croatia, under a European Arrest Warrant.
The authorities described him as a trained diver.
They alleged that he belonged to the group responsible for placing explosives on the pipelines.
The suspect had previously been arrested in Poland in 2025.
A Polish court refused Germany’s extradition request in October that year.
The subsequent Croatian arrest demonstrated that the German investigation remained active.
The suspect contested extradition.
He had not been convicted of any offence arising from the explosions.
The authorities’ allegations concerning his involvement are separate from the question of whether the defendant currently on trial in Hamburg is guilty.
Official prosecution record: German Federal Prosecutor — Arrest in Croatia, 19 August 2026.
13. September 2026: Hamburg accepts the indictment
On 2 September 2026, the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court decided that the prosecution against Serhii K. could proceed to trial.
The court identified sufficient suspicion to justify opening the main proceedings.
The case was assigned reference 3 St 2/26.
The court subsequently announced hearing dates beginning on 14 October 2026.
Further sessions were scheduled through December, with additional dates expected in January and February 2027.
This was an important procedural development.
The prosecution had passed the legal threshold required for trial.
The judges had not determined the defendant’s guilt.
The proceedings would now permit the allegations to be examined in open court.
Primary source: Hamburg Higher Regional Court — Indictment Admitted for Trial, September 2026.
14. An extraordinary ruling: The pipeline companies cannot join the criminal prosecution
Another important development occurred shortly before the trial began.
On 30 September 2026, Hamburg’s Higher Regional Court rejected applications by Nord Stream AG and Nord Stream 2 AG to participate as additional complainants in the criminal proceedings.
The decision was announced on 2 October.
The companies had sought to join the proceedings under provisions of German criminal procedure allowing qualifying injured parties to participate in prosecutions.
The court concluded that the necessary special circumstances had not been demonstrated.
The companies argued that the destruction had caused severe economic consequences.
The court acknowledged substantial repair costs.
But it did not accept that those costs established the exceptional financial vulnerability required for participation under the relevant provision.
The judges distinguished the physical damage caused by the explosions from wider commercial consequences arising from political decisions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
This distinction is particularly relevant to the Shell archive.
The pipeline operators’ inability to obtain participation rights in this criminal trial does not mean that the explosions caused no financial loss.
Nor does it establish that the explosions were lawful.
The ruling concerned the companies’ procedural entitlement to join the prosecution.
The court also explained that the criminal proceedings were not intended to provide a comprehensive investigation of every possible civil claim or the wider political history.
The decision left open the possibility of renewed applications if circumstances changed.
Separate civil remedies were not eliminated merely because the criminal applications were refused.
Nevertheless, the ruling underlines an important legal principle.
The financial collapse of Nord Stream 2 and the physical destruction of its infrastructure were connected to the same geopolitical crisis, but they were not identical events with identical legal consequences.
Authenticated judicial source: Hamburg Higher Regional Court — Applications by Nord Stream Companies Rejected, 2 October 2026.
15. 14 October 2026: The trial begins
On Wednesday, 14 October 2026, Serhii Kuznietsov appeared before the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg.
The defendant was represented by lawyers who challenged the prosecution’s case and sought dismissal of the charges.
According to the Associated Press, the proceedings attracted substantial international media attention.
The charges were presented in court.
The defendant did not give a substantive response to the allegations during the opening session.
His lawyers argued that he was prevented from discussing certain matters because of continuing military obligations.
They maintained that restrictions associated with Ukrainian military secrecy compromised his ability to defend himself.
The defence also contested the prosecution’s characterisation of the pipelines as civilian infrastructure.
Its argument was that Nord Stream had served Russian strategic interests and helped provide financial resources to Moscow.
That raises a complex issue concerning the application of international humanitarian law to energy infrastructure during armed conflict.
The mere fact that infrastructure provides revenue to a government engaged in war does not automatically determine its legal status as a military objective.
Equally, the classification of an installation as civilian or military cannot be resolved solely through political statements.
The relevant legal standards and facts require judicial examination.
The defence therefore disputes both the factual allegations and aspects of the prosecution’s legal interpretation.
Germany’s Federal Prosecutor continues to maintain that the defendant participated in a criminal operation.
The court has not yet delivered its verdict.
The next hearing is scheduled for 27 October 2026.
Contemporaneous reporting: Associated Press — Ukrainian Former Officer’s Lawyers Seek Dismissal as Nord Stream Trial Opens, 14 October 2026 and The Guardian — Ukrainian Soldier Led Team of Divers, Court Hears, 14 October 2026. AP News
16. The essential Shell document: The financial loss preceded the explosions
The most directly relevant document for Shell shareholders is not a German criminal indictment.
It is Shell’s own financial disclosure.
On 5 May 2022, Shell published its first-quarter results.
The company reported that its decision to withdraw from Russian activities had required reassessment of the recoverability of its Nord Stream 2 loan.
The outcome was a complete write-down of $1.126 billion.
This occurred nearly five months before the explosions.
The financial consequences of the sabotage therefore cannot be described as the cause of Shell’s original loan impairment.
The distinction is confirmed by another Shell document.
Shell’s third-quarter 2022 report
In its third-quarter financial results, published in October 2022, Shell expressly acknowledged the rupture of one Nord Stream 2 pipeline string.
The company recorded that the incident had caused a gas leak and significant damage.
It also reported that investigations were underway.
Crucially, Shell stated that the rupture had no additional financial impact in the third quarter because the loan had already been fully written down in the first quarter.
This disclosure is exceptionally important to the documentary chronology.
It establishes the company’s accounting treatment at the time.
Shell’s loss was recognised following Russia’s invasion and the company’s withdrawal announcement.
The physical destruction occurred later.
Consequently, it would be misleading to suggest that the explosions themselves caused Shell’s previously recognised $1.126 billion loss.
That does not mean the explosions were commercially insignificant.
They damaged infrastructure that had required enormous investment.
They also created consequences for the pipeline operators and the wider European energy system.
But those consequences must be distinguished from Shell’s documented accounting position.
Authenticated Shell records: Shell plc — First Quarter 2022 Unaudited Results and Shell plc — Third Quarter 2022 Unaudited Results.
17. What the documentary record establishes — and what remains unresolved
Four years after the explosions, the evidence can be divided into distinct categories.
Established physical facts
The Nord Stream pipelines suffered severe damage on 26 September 2022.
Seismic monitoring detected events consistent with underwater explosions.
Swedish investigators recovered material bearing explosive residues.
Both Sweden and Denmark concluded that the pipelines had been deliberately sabotaged.
Scientific research established that the ruptures caused an exceptionally large methane release.
These matters are supported by official investigative and scientific records.
Established judicial developments
German authorities arrested a Ukrainian suspect in August 2025.
The Federal Court of Justice upheld his pre-trial detention.
Federal prosecutors filed a formal indictment in June 2026.
Hamburg’s Higher Regional Court authorised the trial in September.
The court rejected applications by the two Nord Stream companies to join the criminal proceedings as additional complainants.
The trial commenced on 14 October 2026.
These are established procedural facts.
Allegations awaiting determination
German prosecutors allege that Serhii K. led or coordinated a group responsible for placing the explosives.
They allege that the operation was undertaken by Ukrainian military personnel acting on instructions from Ukrainian state agencies.
They allege that the objective was to prevent Russian gas revenues from supporting the war against Ukraine.
The defendant disputes responsibility.
Ukraine denies state involvement.
These matters remain contested.
Matters not established by the cited record
There has been no final criminal judgment convicting Serhii K.
The German proceedings have not established the personal involvement of President Zelenskyy.
The documents examined do not establish that the United States or Britain organised the explosions.
Nor do they establish that Shell knew about the alleged sabotage plan before the attack.
No evidence examined for this instalment establishes that Shell participated in planning, financing or facilitating the destruction.
The investigation should therefore not be presented as proof of allegations extending beyond the charges currently before the German court.
COMMENTARY: The Sabotage May Have Destroyed the Pipes, but Politics Had Already Destroyed the Project
There is an important historical distinction between the destruction of Nord Stream’s physical infrastructure and the collapse of its commercial prospects.
By September 2022, the project had already encountered an extraordinary succession of obstacles.
The United States had imposed sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG.
Germany had halted certification.
Russia had invaded Ukraine.
Shell had announced its withdrawal.
Shell had recognised a $1.126 billion write-down.
Nord Stream 2 had never entered commercial service.
The pipeline was therefore already commercially stranded when the explosives detonated.
The explosions transformed that position into physical destruction.
But they did not create the original geopolitical conflict.
That conflict had existed for years.
The infrastructure had become a symbol of European divisions over Russia, energy security and Ukraine.
The criminal proceedings now create a further complication.
German prosecutors allege that individuals associated with Ukraine, a country receiving substantial German military and economic assistance, participated in destroying infrastructure connected with Germany’s energy supply.
The allegation is politically explosive.
But a criminal trial must not become a substitute for political argument.
The court must determine the defendant’s responsibility according to evidence and law.
The broader question of international relations is separate.
Germany can continue supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression while independently investigating a suspected crime affecting German interests.
Those positions are not inherently incompatible.
Likewise, Ukraine’s legitimate right to defend itself against invasion does not automatically establish the legality of every operation that might be undertaken in pursuit of that objective.
That is precisely why legal scrutiny is necessary.
The danger of retrospective certainty
Historical analysis becomes unreliable when subsequent events are treated as proof that earlier decisions had only one possible outcome.
Nord Stream 2 was completed despite considerable sanctions pressure.
Its supporters believed that commercial operation remained possible.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine then fundamentally changed the circumstances.
The later explosions added another layer of consequences.
Looking backwards, it may now appear obvious that financing Nord Stream 2 involved extraordinary risks.
But identifying substantial risk is not the same as proving that a particular outcome was inevitable.
The proper documentary approach is to reconstruct what was known, when it became known and how the consequences developed.
That is particularly important when examining Shell’s conduct.
A major financial loss is not, by itself, proof of unlawful management decisions.
Nor does the absence of a judicial finding eliminate legitimate questions about the assessment of geopolitical risk.
The archive can establish Shell’s financing commitment, the public warnings, the withdrawal decision and the eventual write-down.
Determining whether management appropriately assessed those risks internally would require further evidence.
The Sakhalin Connection: Two Russian Energy Projects, Two Different Forms of Political Exposure
The broader Sakhalin Papers have documented Shell’s long and difficult relationship with major Russian energy developments.
Sakhalin-2 exposed Shell to Russian regulatory pressure and the transfer of control to Gazprom.
Nord Stream 2 exposed Shell to political opposition from Western governments and increasing sanctions pressure.
The circumstances were different.
The underlying commercial problem had similarities.
In both cases, large energy investments became entangled in decisions taken by governments pursuing strategic objectives.
Those objectives could override commercial expectations.
Shell was a substantial participant in Sakhalin-2 through equity ownership.
It was a financier of Nord Stream 2.
The legal structures were different.
But both investments ultimately became affected by the geopolitical relationship between Russia and the West.
The Nord Stream explosions also demonstrate that the consequences can continue long after a company has recognised a financial loss.
Shell’s loan was written down in the first quarter of 2022.
The pipelines were destroyed in September.
The criminal investigation developed over the following years.
And in October 2026, a major trial began.
The commercial loss had already been recognised.
The historical and legal consequences were still unfolding.
Conclusion: A Criminal Trial Begins, but the Historical Record Must Remain Open
The destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines was one of the most significant incidents involving European energy infrastructure in recent decades.
It occurred during an international crisis created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The immediate physical evidence supported the conclusion that the pipelines had been deliberately attacked.
But identifying those responsible proved far more difficult.
Sweden and Denmark investigated before closing their criminal proceedings.
Germany continued.
Investigators developed allegations concerning a rented yacht, divers, explosives and Ukrainian military personnel.
Arrests followed.
A formal indictment was filed.
And on 14 October 2026, the first major criminal trial began in Hamburg.
The prosecution now alleges that the operation was undertaken on instructions from Ukrainian state authorities.
That is a serious and specific allegation.
It has not yet been proved in a completed criminal trial.
The defendant contests the case.
Ukraine denies responsibility.
For Shell shareholders, one further fact should remain prominent.
Shell’s $1.126 billion Nord Stream 2 loss was recognised before the pipelines were destroyed.
That accounting distinction is established by the company’s own financial disclosures.
The destruction of the pipelines did not cause the original impairment.
But the episode forms part of the wider history of Shell’s exposure to Russian energy projects and the political decisions that ultimately undermined their commercial foundations.
The Hamburg proceedings may provide further authenticated evidence concerning responsibility for the explosions.
They may also leave important questions unresolved.
The independent archive must therefore continue recording developments without treating accusations as verdicts.
The explosions are established facts. The criminal responsibility of the accused remains for the court to determine.
That is where the documentary record stands on 16 October 2026.
PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES
The following records are provided for independent examination. Their evidential status is identified to distinguish company disclosures, official findings, allegations and journalism.
1. Shell plc — First Quarter 2022 Financial Results
Shell First Quarter 2022 Unaudited Results — Original Company PDF
Authenticated company record confirming Shell’s complete $1.126 billion write-down of its Nord Stream 2 loan before the September explosions.
2. Shell plc — Third Quarter 2022 Financial Results
Shell Third Quarter 2022 Unaudited Results — Original Company PDF
Authenticated company record acknowledging the Nord Stream 2 rupture and explaining why it produced no additional third-quarter financial impact.
3. Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland — September 2022
Seismic Evidence Concerning the Nord Stream Explosions
Contemporaneous scientific observations concerning the underwater disturbances.
4. Swedish Prosecution Authority — 18 November 2022
Confirmed Sabotage at Nord Stream
Official announcement reporting the discovery of explosive residues on objects recovered from the scene.
5. Swedish Prosecution Authority — 7 February 2024
Closure of the Swedish Nord Stream Investigation
Primary record establishing the jurisdictional reasons for closing the investigation and the transfer of relevant evidence to German authorities.
6. Danish Security and Intelligence Service — 26 February 2024
Official Danish Investigation Statement
Confirms that Danish authorities concluded the incident involved deliberate sabotage but lacked sufficient grounds to pursue a Danish criminal prosecution.
7. United Nations Environment Programme — 15 January 2025
Scientific Assessment of Methane Released by the Nord Stream Explosions
Independent scientific assessment of the atmospheric methane emissions caused by the ruptures.
8. German Federal Court of Justice — January 2026
Decision Concerning the Detention of a Nord Stream Suspect
Authenticated judicial decision addressing reasonable suspicion, German jurisdiction, immunity and continued pre-trial detention.
9. German Federal Prosecutor — 2 July 2026
Indictment Concerning the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Explosions
Principal official source identifying the criminal allegations against Serhii K., including the prosecution’s claim concerning instructions from Ukrainian state agencies.
10. Hamburg Higher Regional Court — September 2026
Official Confirmation That the Nord Stream Prosecution Will Proceed to Trial
Court announcement confirming the opening of proceedings, case reference and hearing schedule.
11. Hamburg Higher Regional Court — 2 October 2026
Ruling Rejecting the Pipeline Companies’ Applications to Join the Criminal Proceedings
Authenticated judicial record explaining the refusal of additional complainant status and the distinction between physical damage and wider political consequences.
12. Associated Press — 14 October 2026
Ukrainian Former Officer’s Lawyers Seek Dismissal as Nord Stream Trial Opens
Contemporaneous courtroom reporting documenting the first hearing, prosecution allegations and defence submissions.
13. The Guardian — 14 October 2026
Ukrainian Soldier Led Team of Divers, Court Hears
Independent reporting of the opening proceedings and the dispute concerning the alleged military operation.
14. The Washington Post — 6 June 2023
US Had Intelligence of Detailed Ukrainian Plan to Attack Nord Stream
Investigative reporting concerning intelligence allegedly received before the explosions. The intelligence reporting is not treated as a judicial finding.
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND LEGAL DISCLAIMER
This instalment distinguishes established physical events, authenticated corporate disclosures, official investigative findings, contested intelligence reporting, prosecutorial allegations and judicial decisions.
Statements concerning Ukrainian state involvement are attributed to German federal prosecutors.
They do not constitute findings of guilt by the trial court.
Serhii K. is presumed innocent unless and until convicted in accordance with law.
Ukraine’s denial of responsibility is recorded.
Competing allegations concerning Russian, American or British involvement are not presented as established facts.
The Hamburg trial remains ongoing.
The court decisions concerning pre-trial detention, admission of the indictment and participation rights do not amount to a final determination of criminal responsibility.
Shell’s financial involvement is established through its own disclosures. No claim is made that Shell participated in or had advance knowledge of the sabotage.
Editorial commentary is clearly separated from the documentary record.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES
SLF-2007-090 — The Sakhalin Papers LXXX: Who Pays for a Dead Pipeline? Nord Stream’s Financial Aftermath, the Operators’ Legal Claims and Shell’s Vanished Investment
The pipelines were completed.
They never delivered the commercial future originally envisaged for Nord Stream 2.
Shell wrote down more than a billion dollars.
The infrastructure was subsequently sabotaged.
And the companies responsible for the pipelines have now been refused permission to participate as additional complainants in the German criminal trial.
But the financial story does not end there.
What became of Nord Stream 2 AG’s obligations to its creditors?
What possibilities remained for recovering money from the project?
What did the pipeline operators claim was the cost of repairing the damage?
Could criminal proceedings establish facts relevant to future civil compensation claims?
And how should Shell’s recognised financial loss be distinguished from the subsequent destruction of the infrastructure?
The next instalment will examine the documentary trail concerning Nord Stream’s financial and legal aftermath.
It will consider the position of the operators, the interests of their creditors, the effect of sanctions and the limits of possible legal remedies.
It will also return to a question central to this collection.
When an international energy project collapses under the weight of geopolitical events, who ultimately bears the financial consequences?
For Shell shareholders, Nord Stream 2 provides a particularly substantial historical example.
The project was financed.
The infrastructure was built.
The anticipated commercial operation never began.
And the accounting loss was recognised before the pipelines were physically destroyed.
The next chapter follows the money — and the legal attempts to recover it.
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