THE SHELL LEAKS FILES: 9 OCTOBER 2026
SLF-2007-082
The Sakhalin Papers LXXII: The Partnership Survives — Shell Returns to Gazprom as Sanctions Tighten
On 23 May 2014, five weeks after Ben van Beurden met Vladimir Putin outside Moscow, Shell’s chief executive met Gazprom chairman Alexey Miller again — this time at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. Russia’s annexation of Crimea had already triggered Western sanctions. Yet the two companies were discussing further cooperation, including expansion of Sakhalin II. Within weeks, the United States and European Union would impose much more consequential restrictions on Russian finance and energy technology. Shell’s response was revealing: it would comply with applicable sanctions, but it was not abandoning its Russian business. The surviving corporate records, contemporary reporting and government documents show how the Gazprom partnership continued through the gathering political crisis.
Archive reference: SLF-2007-082
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers
Principal authenticated records: Gazprom corporate announcements of 23 February, 23 May and 30 September 2014; Royal Dutch Shell plc Annual Report and Form 20-F 2014; US Treasury sanctions announcements of 16 July and 12 September 2014; EU Council Regulation 833/2014.
Contemporaneous reporting: Associated Press, 30 April 2014; Reuters and RIA Novosti, July–September 2014; Interfax, 19 September 2014; UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office report on the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, published 1 June 2014.
Judicial context: District Court of The Hague, MH17 judgments, 17 November 2022, used solely to establish the historical and legal context of the July 2014 disaster.
Evidence standard: Official corporate records establish meetings, ownership interests and publicly announced proposals. Journalistic reports of Shell statements are attributed to their sources. Sanctions are described according to their scope at the relevant date, not according to restrictions introduced subsequently. No allegation is made that Shell breached sanctions or was involved in the destruction of flight MH17.
Introduction: Five weeks after Putin
The previous Shell Leaks File ended on Good Friday, 18 April 2014.
Ben van Beurden, recently appointed chief executive of Royal Dutch Shell, had travelled to Vladimir Putin’s Novo-Ogaryovo residence outside Moscow.
The meeting occurred barely a month after Russia annexed Crimea.
Western governments had condemned the annexation.
The United States and European Union had begun imposing sanctions.
Yet Shell’s chief executive was seeking Kremlin support for expanding the Sakhalin II liquefied natural gas project.
The Kremlin transcript recorded Putin responding favourably.
Van Beurden presented Shell as a long-term Russian investor with ambitions extending beyond its existing operations.
That meeting might reasonably have been interpreted as an exceptional diplomatic encounter arranged before the crisis worsened.
But what happened next demonstrates that it was not an isolated occasion.
On 23 May, van Beurden returned to discussions with Gazprom’s chairman.
The two companies were still exploring expansion.
And this time the meeting occurred within an international economic forum that had itself become a symbol of Russia’s growing political isolation.
1. The 23 May meeting is documented by Gazprom
The primary record is a Gazprom announcement published at 12:35 on 23 May 2014.
Its title was:
“Gazprom and Shell look at possible expansion of cooperation within Sakhalin II.”
The announcement confirms that Alexey Miller and Ben van Beurden held a working meeting during the St Petersburg International Economic Forum.
According to Gazprom, the discussions covered strategic cooperation, including geological exploration, production, hydrocarbon processing, international marketing and LNG.
Particular attention was given to possible expansion of cooperation connected with Sakhalin II.
This was not merely a journalist reporting an unconfirmed conversation.
It was a contemporaneous corporate announcement identifying both executives, the occasion and the subjects discussed. Gazprom
The distinction matters.
We cannot reconstruct every private exchange between the two executives.
But the public record establishes that Shell’s interest in expanding its Russian activities continued after the April Kremlin meeting.
2. What Gazprom and Shell were actually discussing
The commercial centrepiece remained Sakhalin II.
By 2014, Sakhalin Energy had been exporting LNG for approximately five years.
Its liquefaction plant at Prigorodnoye had two production trains with an original combined design capacity of 9.6 million tonnes annually.
Gazprom’s 23 May announcement recorded that the project had produced 10.8 million tonnes of LNG and 5.4 million tonnes of oil in 2013.
The ownership structure was equally important.
Gazprom held 50 per cent plus one share.
Shell held 27.5 per cent minus one share.
Mitsui held 12.5 per cent.
Mitsubishi held 10 per cent.
Those proportions reflected the restructuring completed in 2007, when Shell surrendered majority control following the extraordinary regulatory and commercial confrontation documented earlier in this series. Gazprom
Shell therefore remained a substantial investor.
But it could no longer determine Sakhalin Energy’s future independently.
A third LNG train would require cooperation with Gazprom and agreement among the project participants.
Additional gas resources would also be needed to support any significant expansion.
Gazprom controlled potentially relevant resources elsewhere around Sakhalin.
That gave the Russian company considerable commercial leverage.
Shell brought international LNG expertise, technology, marketing experience and investment capabilities.
The relationship remained mutually useful.
It was also politically sensitive.
3. The February roadmap was not a construction decision
The May discussion followed an agreement signed in Sochi on 23 February 2014.
At that meeting, Miller and van Beurden signed a memorandum-roadmap providing for preparation of front-end engineering and design documentation for a third Sakhalin II LNG train.
Van Beurden welcomed Gazprom’s approach to expanding the plant and emphasised Sakhalin II’s importance as an LNG supplier to Asia.
Gazprom highlighted growing Asian demand.
These statements reveal the commercial logic behind Shell’s continued engagement.
The Asia-Pacific LNG market appeared to offer substantial opportunities.
Sakhalin II already possessed operating infrastructure, export facilities and established customers.
Expansion could potentially build upon those advantages. Gazprom
But the documentary distinction is essential.
A memorandum authorising engineering preparation is not a final investment decision.
It does not prove that all financing, gas-supply arrangements, construction contracts or government approvals were in place.
Nor does it establish that the third train was certain to be built.
The documents demonstrate corporate intention and preparatory activity.
They do not demonstrate an irrevocable construction commitment.
4. Shell’s finance chief had already sounded a warning
There is another contemporary record that complicates the picture.
On 30 April 2014, less than two weeks after van Beurden’s meeting with Putin, Shell chief financial officer Simon Henryaddressed Russia during a discussion of the company’s financial results.
Associated Press reported that Shell would continue managing existing Russian operations but was reluctant to begin new investments while the political situation remained uncertain.
Henry said the company was unlikely to embark upon new Russian investments in the immediate future.
He also defended van Beurden’s meeting with Putin against suggestions that the visit meant Shell was taking sides in the Ukraine crisis. Washington Examiner
Was Shell contradicting itself?
Not necessarily.
There is an important difference between maintaining an established investment, conducting preliminary engineering for an existing project’s expansion and committing substantial capital to a completely new venture.
The April and May statements can be reconciled on that basis.
Nevertheless, they expose the tension within Shell’s Russian strategy.
Its financial management was acknowledging political risk.
Its chief executive was continuing discussions about commercial opportunity.
Shell wanted to preserve options.
It did not yet want to surrender the possibility of expansion.
5. St Petersburg became a political stage
The setting of the May meeting deserves particular attention.
The St Petersburg International Economic Forum took place between 22 and 24 May 2014.
The event had long served as an important gathering of Russian and international business leaders.
But in 2014 it occurred during an international confrontation.
A contemporary report prepared by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, published on 1 June 2014, provides valuable independent context.
The report recorded that fewer senior international participants attended than in previous years.
It also described how Putin used the forum to criticise Western sanctions and appeal directly to international business interests.
According to the British diplomatic account, Putin thanked the Western companies that attended for maintaining what he characterised as an independent and responsible position despite political pressure.
He argued that sanctions harmed the businesses and economies of the countries imposing them.
He also emphasised Russia’s continuing desire for cooperation with European companies. GOV.UK
The political usefulness of Western corporate attendance was therefore explicit.
Putin wanted to demonstrate that Russia was not economically isolated.
Western companies that continued participating in Russian investment discussions helped reinforce that message, whether they intended to or not.
Shell’s meeting with Gazprom occurred within this environment.
That does not establish that van Beurden endorsed Putin’s political arguments.
It establishes that Shell continued its commercial discussions at an event whose political significance was recognised by the British government at the time.
6. Russia was turning towards China
Two days before the Shell–Gazprom meeting, another major energy development had occurred.
On 21 May 2014, Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation signed a long-term agreement for Russian gas supplies to China.
Gazprom described the contract as a historic agreement.
It provided for annual deliveries of 38 billion cubic metres of gas under a 30-year arrangement.
The agreement formed part of the development of Russia’s eastern gas infrastructure, including what became known as the Power of Siberia pipeline. Gazprom
That agreement was separate from Sakhalin II.
It should not be presented as a Shell contract or as proof that the proposed third Sakhalin train would supply the Chinese pipeline system.
But it demonstrates the wider strategic setting.
Gazprom was strengthening its position in Asian energy markets.
At the same time, Shell was pursuing further LNG cooperation with Gazprom on Sakhalin.
The commercial incentives were substantial.
Russia was seeking new export opportunities.
Shell wanted access to growing Asian gas demand.
Neither company wished to abandon a relationship that had already produced a major operating LNG complex.
7. July 2014: sanctions become much more serious
The sanctions environment changed significantly during July.
On 16 July 2014, the US Treasury announced restrictions targeting major Russian financial institutions and energy companies.
The measures included restrictions on certain new financing involving:
Gazprombank.
VEB.
Rosneft.
Novatek.
These were sectoral sanctions designed to limit access to US capital markets.
They did not impose a blanket prohibition upon every commercial transaction involving Russian energy companies.
Nor did the July measures amount to a comprehensive ban on Shell’s existing Sakhalin II operations. U.S. Department of the Treasury
A distinction frequently lost in retrospective accounts is particularly important here.
Gazprombank and Gazprom were not interchangeable legal entities.
Restricting financing involving Gazprombank did not automatically prohibit every transaction with Gazprom itself.
Similarly, restrictions upon Rosneft or Novatek did not automatically prohibit Sakhalin LNG exports.
The precise entity, transaction, date and applicable sanctions jurisdiction mattered.
This was not an academic distinction.
For companies such as Shell, the legal boundaries determined which activities could continue and which required modification, suspension or termination.
8. The following day: the MH17 catastrophe
On 17 July 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was destroyed over eastern Ukraine.
All 298 passengers and crew died.
The aircraft had departed Amsterdam for Kuala Lumpur.
The tragedy profoundly affected the Netherlands, where Shell was historically headquartered and where many of the victims lived.
Subsequent investigations established that the aircraft was brought down by a Buk surface-to-air missile.
On 17 November 2022, the District Court of The Hague convicted three defendants in connection with the destruction of the aircraft and the murder of those aboard. A fourth defendant was acquitted.
The judgments are preserved in the official MH17 court archive. Court MH17
This judicial context must be handled carefully.
The MH17 proceedings did not concern Shell’s commercial operations.
They made no finding that Shell was involved in the attack.
The relevance to this instalment is historical and political.
After MH17, relations between Russia and the Netherlands deteriorated further.
The political cost of continuing business relations with Russian state enterprises became increasingly difficult to ignore.
Shell’s commercial challenge was now considerably more complicated than it had been during van Beurden’s April visit.
9. Shell’s July response: business strategy unchanged
The contemporary Donovan archive preserves a particularly revealing report from this period.
On 26 July 2014, the archive reproduced a RIA Novosti dispatch dated 25 July.
RIA Novosti reported that an unnamed representative of Shell’s press service had said the company intended to continue operating in Russia despite Western sanctions.
The reported position was that Shell was monitoring the sanctions but had not changed its existing Russian business strategy.
The article identified both upstream and downstream operations.
It also referred to Shell’s established relationships with Gazprom and Gazprom Neft.
This contemporary reproduction is an important historical source.
But the evidential distinction should be retained.
It preserves a statement attributed by RIA Novosti to an unnamed Shell representative.
It is not an independently authenticated internal Shell policy memorandum. Royal Dutch Shell Group .com
Fortunately, the same general corporate position was subsequently reported through additional sources.
10. September: Shell’s Russian chairman confirms the strategy
On 19 September 2014, Shell’s senior representative in Russia, Olivier Lazare, spoke at an economic forum in Sochi.
Reuters reported that Shell intended to continue its Russian activities while complying with Western sanctions.
Lazare said the company’s strategy in Russia had not changed, although Shell was assessing the implications of the restrictions.
The Russian news agency Interfax independently reported the same position.
Lazare emphasised Shell’s longstanding presence in Russia and its preference for a long-term approach to investment.
He also said the company was concentrating on current operations. La Tribune
These reports provide corroboration of the general position recorded by RIA Novosti in July.
Shell was not announcing a wholesale withdrawal.
It was attempting to maintain its existing position while operating within the legal boundaries of the sanctions regime.
The distinction between maintaining operations and authorising new investment remained central.
11. The September sanctions targeted particular technologies and projects
The restrictions became more significant on 12 September 2014.
The US Treasury announced further measures targeting Russian finance, energy and defence-related entities.
Of particular importance to Shell’s broader Russian interests was Directive 4.
It prohibited specified goods, services and technology from being supplied by US persons, or from the United States, in support of certain Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore and shale projects with the potential to produce oil.
The named Russian companies included Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegas and Rosneft.
The Treasury explained that the measures were intended to impede Russia’s development of technologically demanding future oil resources.
It also expressly distinguished those restrictions from a prohibition on the current supply and sale of Russian energy. U.S. Department of the Treasury
The European Union introduced corresponding restrictions through its own sanctions framework, including Regulation 833/2014 and subsequent amendments. Eur-Lex
For Shell, the implications depended upon the activity.
Conventional Sakhalin LNG production was not necessarily subject to the same restrictions as a new Arctic offshore oil venture.
An established gas-processing operation could continue under circumstances in which a new unconventional oil project might encounter serious legal obstacles.
The legal position required project-specific examination.
That is why it would be inaccurate to say that the September sanctions automatically prohibited Shell’s entire Russian business.
Equally, it would be inaccurate to claim that the restrictions were irrelevant to Shell’s future ambitions.
They affected important categories of technology and potential cooperation involving Russian energy companies.
12. Gazprom Neft made the distinction especially important
Shell’s Russian exposure extended beyond Sakhalin II.
The company also had a longstanding relationship with Gazprom Neft.
Earlier Shell Leaks Files examined Shell’s participation in Salym Petroleum Development and the companies’ interest in unconventional oil development.
In April 2013, Gazprom and Shell had also signed a memorandum addressing possible cooperation in exploration and development on Russia’s Arctic continental shelf and certain deepwater areas elsewhere.
Gazprom’s May 2014 announcement still identified that memorandum as part of the relationship’s background.
That is a significant documentary detail.
It shows that the parties’ broader ambitions included precisely the types of technically challenging activity that Western sanctions would subsequently begin restricting. Gazprom
But the chronology is crucial.
A memorandum signed in 2013 cannot retrospectively constitute a breach of restrictions introduced in September 2014.
Nor does the existence of that memorandum establish that any prohibited activity occurred after the restrictions took effect.
The stronger conclusion is that Shell’s options were narrowing.
The company could continue established activities where lawful.
But some potential new projects had become considerably more difficult.
13. ExxonMobil provides an instructive comparison
The effect of the September restrictions can be seen in what happened to another Western oil major.
ExxonMobil was working with Rosneft on Arctic offshore exploration.
Following the new sanctions, Reuters reported on 19 September 2014 that ExxonMobil would wind down drilling in the Russian Arctic.
The US authorities had provided a short extension to enable the company to cease operations safely.
This was a practical consequence of the sanctions regime rather than merely a political statement. Voice of America
Shell’s position was different.
Its principal existing Russian investment was the Sakhalin II LNG project, which was already producing and exporting gas.
The company therefore had a substantial continuing commercial interest that was not automatically eliminated by restrictions designed principally to impede certain new oil developments.
This helps explain why Lazare could speak about maintaining Shell’s Russian strategy while other Western oil activities were being suspended.
It does not mean Shell was unaffected.
It means the restrictions affected different projects differently.
14. Shell’s commercial relationship survived
By the end of September 2014, the sequence was clear.
Van Beurden had visited Putin in April.
He had met Miller in May.
Shell’s finance chief had expressed caution about new Russian investment.
Western sanctions had expanded.
Flight MH17 had been destroyed over Ukraine.
US restrictions had reached major Russian financial institutions and selected energy activities.
The European Union had introduced its own economic measures.
And Shell’s Russian leadership continued publicly defending the company’s long-term business strategy.
The existing Sakhalin II project provided a powerful commercial incentive to maintain cooperation.
Gazprom controlled the venture.
Shell still held a valuable minority interest.
The LNG plant was operating.
Expansion remained under consideration.
Neither company had concluded that the political crisis required their commercial relationship to end.
The contemporaneous reporting supports that conclusion.
It does not establish that Shell was prepared to disregard the law.
Indeed, the September reporting specifically recorded the company’s intention to comply with applicable sanctions.
The important distinction is between continuing lawful commercial engagement and breaching sanctions.
Only the former is established by the documents examined here.
Documentary Findings
Established by official corporate records
23 February 2014: Gazprom and Shell signed a memorandum-roadmap covering preparation of front-end engineering documentation for a proposed third Sakhalin II LNG train.
18 April 2014: Ben van Beurden met Vladimir Putin and discussed Shell’s Russian investments and expansion ambitions.
23 May 2014: Van Beurden met Alexey Miller at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum.
Gazprom’s official announcement confirms that the parties discussed strategic cooperation and possible expansion connected with Sakhalin II.
Gazprom remained Sakhalin Energy’s controlling shareholder. Shell held approximately 27.5 per cent.
The Sakhalin II LNG plant was an established operating asset, not a speculative project awaiting first production. Gazprom
Established by government records
The US Treasury imposed significant Russian financial and energy-sector restrictions in July 2014.
Further measures introduced in September targeted specified deepwater, Arctic offshore and shale-oil activities involving named Russian companies.
The European Union introduced its own sectoral restrictions.
These measures were specific in their application and did not constitute a comprehensive prohibition on every Western commercial transaction involving Russia.
The contemporary British diplomatic record also establishes that the St Petersburg forum was politically sensitive and that Putin publicly welcomed continued Western business engagement. U.S. Department of the Treasury
Established by contemporaneous reporting
Associated Press reported Simon Henry’s caution concerning new Russian investment on 30 April 2014.
RIA Novosti reported in July that Shell intended to maintain its existing Russian business strategy.
Reuters and Interfax reported in September that Olivier Lazare continued to support Shell’s long-term Russian activities while acknowledging the need to comply with sanctions.
These reports independently support the conclusion that Shell was seeking to maintain commercial continuity despite growing political restrictions. Washington Examiner
Established by subsequent judicial proceedings
The District Court of The Hague established criminal responsibility in the MH17 case against three defendants.
That judgment provides authoritative context for the political crisis following 17 July 2014.
It does not establish wrongdoing by Shell.
The MH17 proceedings and Shell’s Russian commercial activities were legally separate matters. Court MH17
Not established
The documents do not establish that Shell violated US or EU sanctions during the period examined.
They do not establish that van Beurden supported Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
They do not establish that discussions about Sakhalin II expansion amounted to a final investment decision.
They do not establish that Putin directed Shell’s commercial decisions.
They do not establish that Shell participated in or had responsibility for the destruction of flight MH17.
They do not establish that every proposed Shell–Gazprom Arctic or unconventional oil project proceeded.
And they do not establish that Shell’s entire Russian business was prohibited by the sanctions introduced in 2014.
Commentary: The Commercial Logic of Staying
The most revealing aspect of this instalment is not simply that Shell continued dealing with Gazprom.
It is the consistency of that decision across a rapidly deteriorating political environment.
Shell’s chief executive had told Putin that the company wanted to expand.
Its finance chief had subsequently warned against rushing into new investments.
The distinction was commercially rational.
Preserving a producing asset is not the same as committing billions to a new one.
Sakhalin II was already generating LNG revenues.
Its infrastructure existed.
Customers were receiving its products.
Shell’s minority interest remained valuable.
Abandoning that investment would have involved considerable commercial consequences.
Nor would unilateral withdrawal necessarily have changed the Russian state’s ownership or control of the project.
These were real considerations for Shell’s management.
But there was another side.
In 2006, Russian regulatory pressure and the negotiations surrounding Gazprom’s entry had demonstrated how political authority could affect the company’s investment.
Shell had surrendered control of Sakhalin Energy.
By 2014, however, it was once again seeking Russian government support to expand the same project.
That reversal deserves emphasis.
The company that had experienced the consequences of Russia’s determination to control strategic energy resources had chosen to deepen its relationship with the Russian state company that benefited from the restructuring.
This was not necessarily irrational.
From Shell’s perspective, Gazprom controlled resources and infrastructure that were essential to future growth.
The relationship offered commercial opportunities that Shell could not reproduce merely by insisting upon more favourable political circumstances.
But the dependence also created strategic vulnerability.
The more Shell invested in a relationship requiring cooperation with Russian state enterprises, the harder it became to separate ordinary commercial decisions from geopolitical developments.
The St Petersburg forum illustrated that dilemma.
Putin publicly thanked Western companies for maintaining their engagement.
Shell had its own reasons for attending and continuing discussions.
Yet the same corporate participation could serve Russian political purposes by demonstrating that important Western businesses remained willing to cooperate.
The documents do not establish Shell’s intentions beyond those it expressed.
They do establish that the political consequences of commercial activity could extend beyond those intentions.
There is also an important lesson concerning sanctions.
Western restrictions in 2014 were not designed as an immediate, comprehensive severance of every business relationship with Russia.
They developed incrementally.
They targeted individuals, institutions, financing arrangements, technology and particular categories of energy development.
Companies were therefore required to operate within an evolving legal framework.
Some activities continued.
Others became restricted.
Still others were suspended.
For Shell, this left room to maintain Sakhalin II while reconsidering more technically demanding or politically sensitive projects.
That distinction helps explain the company’s conduct.
But it also explains why the relationship endured.
Shell did not have to choose in 2014 between complete withdrawal and complete disregard of sanctions.
It could preserve existing investments, continue permitted discussions and postpone major decisions.
That was the strategy reflected in the contemporary record.
Whether it was politically wise is a separate question.
The later history of Russia, Ukraine and Shell’s own investments would make that question increasingly difficult.
For the purposes of this documentary archive, however, the conclusion should remain anchored to what the sources establish.
Shell continued seeking commercial opportunities with Gazprom during 2014.
It did so while publicly committing to sanctions compliance.
The Russian government valued continued cooperation with Western companies.
And the commercial partnership around Sakhalin II survived another major international crisis.
At least for the time being.
Principal Documentary Sources
Gazprom — 23 May 2014
The central primary document confirming the meeting between Alexey Miller and Ben van Beurden and identifying the subjects discussed.
Gazprom: Possible expansion of cooperation within Sakhalin II
Gazprom — 23 February 2014
The memorandum-roadmap concerning engineering preparation for the proposed third Sakhalin II LNG production train.
Gazprom: Roadmap for Sakhalin II third train
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office — 1 June 2014
Contemporaneous assessment of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, including Putin’s comments on sanctions and the participation of Western companies.
UK Government: St Petersburg International Economic Forum
US Department of the Treasury — 16 July 2014
Official announcement of restrictions affecting Gazprombank, VEB, Rosneft and Novatek.
US Treasury: Sanctions announced on 16 July 2014
US Department of the Treasury — 12 September 2014
Official announcement detailing the expansion of financial and energy restrictions, including Directive 4.
US Treasury: Expanded sanctions of 12 September 2014
European Union — Council Regulation 833/2014
The regulatory framework governing specified trade, finance and technology restrictions connected with Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Associated Press — 30 April 2014
Contemporary reporting of Simon Henry’s caution concerning new Russian investments and Shell’s stated intention to maintain existing operations.
AP report: Shell cautious about new Russian investments
RIA Novosti — 25 July 2014
Contemporary reporting of Shell’s intention to maintain its existing Russian business strategy, preserved by the Donovan archive.
Shell Leaves Business Strategy for Russia Unchanged Despite Sanctions
Reuters — 19 September 2014
Contemporaneous account of Olivier Lazare’s statements about Shell’s Russian strategy and sanctions compliance.
Reuters: Shell and Total continue Russian operations
Interfax — 19 September 2014
Independent contemporary reporting of Lazare’s remarks.
Interfax: Sanctions have not yet affected Shell’s Russian operations
District Court of The Hague — 17 November 2022
Official MH17 judgments, used exclusively to establish the subsequent judicial findings concerning the July 2014 tragedy.
District Court of The Hague: MH17 judgments
Royal Dutch Shell plc — Annual Report and Form 20-F 2014
Shell’s own corporate reporting for the year, filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission in March 2015.
Royal Dutch Shell: 2014 Form 20-F
Archive disclaimer: This instalment relies upon contemporary corporate announcements, government records, historical journalism and subsequent judicial material. Gazprom statements establish what the company publicly reported, not the complete content of private negotiations. Statements attributed to Shell representatives are identified according to their published sources.
The judicial material concerning MH17 does not implicate Shell. No breach of sanctions by Shell is alleged or established in the records examined here. The commercial motives and political implications discussed in the commentary are interpretations, not findings of fact.
Site-wide disclaimer also applies.
NEXT: The Partnership Deepens — Shell and Gazprom Meet Again as Sanctions Take Hold
The September sanctions had created a new legal environment.
But the Shell–Gazprom relationship had not ended.
On 30 September 2014, Alexey Miller and Ben van Beurden met again at Gazprom’s headquarters.
Gazprom’s official announcement recorded that the two executives discussed their existing and future cooperation, particularly LNG production at Sakhalin II.
The company emphasised the potential for increasing LNG output from the project.
This meeting took place only eighteen days after the United States introduced its expanded restrictions on Russian energy technology. Gazprom
That timing raises important questions.
Was Shell still pursuing the proposed third LNG train?
How did the new sanctions affect the project’s prospects?
Could Gazprom obtain the additional gas needed for expansion?
And how would the relationship between Shell and Russia’s state-controlled energy companies develop as Western restrictions became more demanding?
The next Shell Leaks File will examine the 30 September 2014 meeting and the continuing effort to expand Sakhalin II — revealing how Shell and Gazprom sought to preserve their LNG ambitions while the political and legal obstacles surrounding their partnership continued to grow.
*This website and sisters royaldutchshellgroup.com, shellnazihistory.com, royaldutchshell.website, johndonovan.website, shellnews.net, and shellwikipedia.com, are owned by John Donovan - more information here. There is also a Wikipedia segment, the Shell DPA Files, "Shell and the Spies", the Shell Leaks files, as well as books written and published by John Donovan - Kindle eBooks. Timeline of the Donovan Shell Feud. Toxic History of Royal Dutch Shell Group. Shell and the Donovans: The Full Media Record — 550+ Articles, 110 Books, 40 Years. *All created and supported by internet wizz, Nick Gill.
