THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 30 OCTOBER 2026
SLF-2007-103
The Sakhalin Papers XCIII: The Discounted Cargo — Shell’s Russian Oil Purchase, Ukraine’s Protest and the Apology That Followed
By John Donovan — 30 October 2026
On 28 February 2022, Shell announced that it would withdraw from its major Russian joint ventures following the invasion of Ukraine. Four days later, the company purchased a cargo of Russian crude oil at a record discount of $28.50 per barrel below the Brent benchmark. Ukraine’s foreign minister publicly challenged the transaction. Shell initially defended its decision, promising to direct profits towards humanitarian relief. On 8 March, chief executive Ben van Beurden apologised and announced a much wider withdrawal from Russian oil and gas. The surviving Shell statements, Reuters reports and contemporaneous records reveal how the controversy unfolded — and why the distinction between legal compliance and corporate responsibility became impossible to ignore.
Archive reference: SLF-2007-103
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-102, The Russian Exit, 29 October 2026
Evidence classification: Shell corporate statements; contemporaneous Reuters and Bloomberg reporting; energy-market transaction reporting; UK and EU sanctions records; contemporary Donovan–Shell archive material. Editorial assessments are identified separately.
Introduction: The purchase that complicated Shell’s Russian withdrawal
On 28 February 2022, Shell publicly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and announced its intention to withdraw from major partnerships involving Gazprom.
The announcement included Sakhalin II, Salym Petroleum Development, the Gydan exploration venture and Shell’s involvement in financing Nord Stream 2.
Chief executive Ben van Beurden presented the decision as a matter of corporate conviction.
It appeared to mark the beginning of the end of Shell’s long commercial relationship with Russian state-controlled energy interests.
But four days later, on Friday, 4 March, Shell purchased Russian crude oil.
The transaction was commercially significant because Russian oil was becoming increasingly difficult to sell in international markets.
It was politically controversial because the Russian military was continuing its assault on Ukraine.
And it was particularly awkward for Shell because the company had just made a prominent public declaration that it intended to disentangle itself from major Russian investments.
The transaction became a major international news story.
Ukraine’s government protested.
Shell defended its decision.
The company offered to use profits from its remaining Russian oil processing for humanitarian assistance.
Then, on 8 March, Shell apologised and announced an expanded withdrawal from Russian hydrocarbons.
The fundamental documentary question is not whether Shell bought the oil. Its own statements establish that it did.
The question is how Shell justified the purchase, what the transaction actually involved and why the company’s position changed so quickly.
The answers are unusually well documented. Shell
1. The warning signs appeared before the cargo was purchased
The controversy did not begin on 4 March.
On Thursday, 3 March 2022, Bloomberg reported that Shell was continuing to purchase Russian oil and gas despite its announcement that it intended to withdraw from major Russian investments.
The report was based on information from a person briefed on the matter.
According to Bloomberg, Shell was discussing the situation with governments and intended to comply with applicable regulatory requirements.
The report also explained that the company’s trading activities were distinct from its ownership interests in Russian energy developments.
Shell was one of the world’s largest oil and gas traders.
Its commercial activities extended far beyond its equity investments in Sakhalin II and other Russian projects.
This distinction is essential.
The 28 February announcement concerned withdrawal from specified equity partnerships and Nord Stream 2.
It was not an unconditional declaration that every existing purchase or supply contract involving Russian hydrocarbons had been cancelled immediately.
That made the company’s continued trading activity commercially explainable.
It did not necessarily make it publicly acceptable.
The Bloomberg report was preserved by RoyalDutchShellPlc.com on 3 March, before the discounted cargo transaction became public.
This provides a valuable contemporaneous reference.
The archive was already recording concerns about Shell’s continuing Russian purchases before the controversy reached its peak.
Contemporary archive: Shell Is Said to Continue Purchasing Russian Oil and Gas — 3 March 2022.
2. Friday, 4 March: The transaction
On 4 March 2022, Reuters correspondent Julia Payne reported that Shell had purchased a cargo of Russian crude oil from Swiss commodity trader Trafigura.
The transaction occurred through the S&P Global Platts trading assessment process.
The oil was Russian Urals crude, one of the country’s principal export grades.
The reported pricing differential was extraordinary.
Shell purchased the cargo at:
Dated Brent minus $28.50 per barrel
This requires careful explanation.
The figure was not the total purchase price.
It represented a discount of $28.50 per barrel against the Dated Brent benchmark used in physical crude-oil pricing.
The actual price depended upon the relevant benchmark and contractual pricing terms.
Reuters reported that the cargo was scheduled to load from Baltic ports between 14 and 18 March.
Trafigura had previously offered the cargo at a substantially smaller discount.
As the market became increasingly reluctant to handle Russian crude, the discount widened.
The transaction therefore demonstrated the effect of Russia’s invasion upon international oil trading.
Russian producers and traders were encountering difficulties securing buyers, finance, shipping and insurance.
Those difficulties existed even where particular transactions had not been expressly prohibited by sanctions.
The result was a sharp reduction in the price buyers were prepared to pay for Russian crude.
Shell agreed to purchase the cargo in those circumstances.
The transaction was reported by Reuters on the evening of 4 March and subsequently examined by S&P Global Commodity Insights. Investing.com UK
3. What did the discount mean financially?
The $28.50 discount attracted immediate attention.
But it would be incorrect to treat that amount automatically as profit earned by Shell.
An oil trader’s financial result depends upon more than the difference between the purchased crude’s price and an international benchmark.
Transport costs, insurance, financing, contractual arrangements, refinery yields, processing costs and the selling prices of refined products can all affect the eventual outcome.
The discount established that Shell had secured crude at a price substantially below the benchmark.
It did not establish the company’s realised net profit from the transaction.
S&P Global reported that some market participants estimated Shell could make approximately $25 million from the deal.
That was a market estimate, not a verified accounting result published by Shell.
Nor does the contemporaneous transaction report, by itself, establish that the cargo was subsequently loaded and delivered exactly as originally scheduled.
The available records confirm the purchase and the planned loading arrangements.
A complete cargo-level audit would require the relevant transaction documents, shipping records and settlement information.
These distinctions matter because Shell subsequently promised to direct profits associated with its remaining Russian oil processing towards humanitarian assistance.
Without an independently verified accounting of those profits, it would be misleading to present the market estimate as the sum actually earned or donated.
Primary market reporting: S&P Global Commodity Insights — Shell Says Controversial Russian Crude Purchase Was Intended to Ensure European Refinery Supply, 5 March 2022.
4. Ukraine’s foreign minister intervenes
The following day, Saturday, 5 March, Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, publicly challenged Shell.
His criticism was reported by Reuters.
Kuleba asked whether Russian oil did not smell of Ukrainian blood.
The accusation was direct and politically powerful.
Ukraine was fighting a war against Russian forces.
Its government was seeking international sanctions and economic pressure against Moscow.
Purchases of Russian energy products were therefore not viewed solely as ordinary commercial transactions.
They were also seen as potential sources of revenue for the Russian economy.
The Ukrainian objection concerned the moral and political consequences of continuing to purchase Russian oil during the invasion.
It did not amount to a judicial determination that Shell had acted unlawfully.
That distinction is important.
Kuleba was speaking as a senior representative of a government under military attack.
He was making a public political and moral challenge.
The fact that a transaction could comply with the sanctions then applicable did not answer the objection he was raising.
Shell now faced two different questions.
Was it legally permitted to buy the cargo?
And was it appropriate to do so?
Those questions would dominate the controversy. Investing.com UK
5. Shell’s defence: Europe’s refineries needed oil
Shell issued a formal statement on 5 March 2022.
The company acknowledged purchasing the cargo.
It explained that its decision had been influenced by concern about European energy supplies.
Shell argued that refineries needed uninterrupted access to crude oil to continue producing petrol, diesel and other essential products.
It also stated that alternative cargoes would not have arrived quickly enough to avoid potential disruption.
This was the central commercial justification.
The company was not defending the Russian invasion.
Nor was it arguing that purchases of Russian oil should continue indefinitely.
It was saying that the immediate removal of Russian crude from Europe’s energy supply system involved serious operational difficulties.
Shell also referred to discussions with governments concerning energy security.
The company said it had understood that Russian energy flows could continue temporarily while alternatives were developed.
This was a significant qualification.
Shell was presenting its conduct as consistent with the prevailing regulatory and energy-security environment.
It was not claiming to have received a specific government order requiring the purchase of the particular Trafigura cargo.
No such instruction is established by the documents examined for this instalment.
Shell’s explanation may have reflected genuine supply-chain difficulties.
However, the public statements do not independently establish that this precise purchase was the only commercially viable way to prevent a particular refinery disruption.
That would require additional evidence concerning crude inventories, alternative supply offers, refinery requirements and logistics.
The distinction is between Shell’s stated reason for the transaction and independent verification that no suitable alternative existed.
Authenticated corporate source: Shell — Statement on the Purchase of Russian Crude Oil, 5 March 2022.
6. The humanitarian fund: Shell’s first response to the criticism
Shell’s statement on 5 March included another undertaking.
The company said it would commit profits associated with the limited Russian oil it still needed to purchase to a dedicated humanitarian fund.
It proposed working with aid organisations to determine how the money could best assist people affected by the war in Ukraine.
Reuters reported the announcement that evening.
The development was also covered by other news organisations.
The proposal attempted to address the accusation that Shell was benefiting financially from Russian oil purchases while Ukraine was suffering the consequences of Russia’s invasion.
It was an unusual response.
Shell was effectively acknowledging that even a commercially defensible transaction could generate a financial benefit that had become politically and morally controversial.
But the proposed fund did not resolve every question.
A commitment to allocate profits is not the same as evidence that a particular amount was subsequently transferred.
The public statements examined here do not establish the final realised profit on the disputed cargo.
Nor do they establish a verified payment amount attributable specifically to that transaction.
The distinction should be maintained.
What is authenticated is Shell’s commitment to humanitarian assistance. The precise financial outcome of the cargo is not established by these statements.
RoyalDutchShellPlc.com preserved the contemporary reporting.
The archive includes coverage from 5 March and Reuters reporting published on 7 March.
These records show how the controversy developed before Shell issued its formal apology.
Contemporary archive references: Shell Pledges Russian Oil Profits to Ukraine Relief After Backlash — 5 March 2022and Shell to Put Profits From Russian Oil Trade Into Ukraine Aid Fund — 7 March 2022.
7. The legal position: A controversial transaction was not necessarily a prohibited one
This is one of the most important distinctions in the entire episode.
Reuters reported on 5 March that the transaction did not breach the Western sanctions then applicable.
That finding must be understood in its historical context.
Sanctions against Russia were developing rapidly.
Restrictions affecting banking, finance, individuals, transportation and other economic activities were being introduced or expanded.
But a comprehensive prohibition on purchasing Russian crude oil had not yet been implemented across the relevant European markets.
On 8 March, the United Kingdom announced that it would phase out Russian oil imports by the end of 2022.
The Office for National Statistics subsequently confirmed that imports remained permitted during the transition period, although businesses were encouraged to find alternative suppliers.
The European Union adopted its sixth sanctions package on 3 June 2022.
That package introduced major restrictions on Russian oil imports, with phased implementation and specified exceptions.
These later measures should not be applied retrospectively to establish the legal status of a transaction concluded on 4 March.
The publicly available reporting supports the conclusion that the cargo purchase was not prohibited by the Western sanctions then in force.
However, that is not the same as a judicial ruling concerning every aspect of the transaction.
No court judgment specifically determining the legality of this purchase has been identified among the sources examined for this instalment.
The evidence therefore supports a clear distinction: the transaction attracted intense political criticism despite contemporaneous reporting that it did not violate the applicable sanctions.
Sources: euronews; UK Office for National Statistics — The Impact of Sanctions on UK Trade with Russia; and Council of the European Union — Sixth Sanctions Package, 3 June 2022.
8. Tuesday, 8 March: Shell apologises
On 8 March 2022, Shell issued a further corporate announcement.
This time the company’s position was substantially different.
Ben van Beurden acknowledged that the Russian crude purchase had been wrong.
His apology included the words:
“was not the right one and we are sorry.”
The statement retained Shell’s explanation that security of energy supplies had influenced the original decision.
But it no longer relied upon that explanation as a sufficient defence.
Shell now announced its intention to withdraw from involvement in all Russian hydrocarbons.
This extended well beyond its previously announced withdrawal from particular equity partnerships.
The new commitments included an immediate halt to spot purchases of Russian crude oil.
Shell also undertook not to renew term contracts.
It announced that it would change its crude-oil supply chain to remove Russian volumes as quickly as possible.
The company acknowledged that the physical location and availability of alternative supplies could make the process difficult.
It warned that some refineries might have to reduce their operating rates.
Shell also announced the closure of its Russian service stations, aviation-fuel operations and lubricants business.
Finally, it committed to a phased withdrawal from Russian petroleum products, pipeline gas and LNG.
These were substantial additional undertakings.
The scope of Shell’s intended withdrawal had expanded significantly in the eight days since the original announcement.
The March 8 statement was issued by Shell itself and distributed through GlobeNewswire.
It remains one of the most important primary documents relating to the episode.
Authenticated corporate source: Shell plc — Shell Announces Intent to Withdraw From Russian Oil and Gas, 8 March 2022.
9. What changed between 5 and 8 March?
The surviving documents establish a change in Shell’s public position.
They do not establish every internal discussion that produced it.
On 5 March, Shell defended the purchase by emphasising refinery requirements and European energy security.
It promised to direct relevant profits towards humanitarian relief.
On 8 March, it expressly apologised and announced a broader withdrawal.
The intervening period saw intense public criticism and rapidly developing government responses.
Ukraine’s foreign minister had challenged the purchase.
International media coverage had drawn attention to the unusually large discount.
Governments were considering additional restrictions on Russian energy imports.
Shell was also confronting the reputational consequences of maintaining Russian oil purchases after announcing its intention to leave major Russian partnerships.
Contemporaneous reporting clearly connects the broader public controversy with Shell’s subsequent change of position.
Nevertheless, the available evidence does not establish that any single factor was exclusively responsible.
The company’s Board may have considered operational, commercial, legal, diplomatic and reputational issues.
Without authenticated internal memoranda or minutes recording those deliberations, the precise weight attached to each consideration remains uncertain.
The strongest documentary conclusion is therefore narrower than a definitive assertion about motive.
Shell initially defended the purchase, faced substantial public criticism, then apologised and announced broader restrictions on its Russian hydrocarbons business.
That sequence is established.
The full internal decision-making process is not. euronews
10. The energy-security dilemma was real, but so was the reputational damage
Shell’s commercial explanation should not be dismissed without examination.
European refineries were dependent upon complex international crude-oil supply chains.
Different crude grades have different physical characteristics.
Refineries are configured to process particular combinations of feedstocks.
Substituting one grade for another can involve adjustments to operations, costs and product yields.
The location of available supplies also matters.
A cargo obtainable at a favourable price is not necessarily interchangeable with oil located elsewhere.
Shell’s warning that replacement supplies could take time was therefore technically plausible.
The company also made clear that its broader withdrawal would create operational difficulties.
But the energy-security argument did not settle the issue.
The Ukrainian government was seeking to reduce financial flows to Russia.
Western companies were facing pressure to restrict commercial activity that might benefit the Russian economy.
Shell’s purchase occurred while Russian oil was being offered at increasingly substantial discounts because many buyers were avoiding it.
That context gave the transaction a political significance beyond its ordinary commercial value.
The difficulty for Shell was not simply that it purchased Russian crude.
It was that it did so immediately after a prominent announcement condemning Russia’s invasion and declaring its intention to withdraw from major Russian interests.
The distinction between equity investments and commodity trading was real.
But the broader public did not necessarily view them as unrelated.
The company consequently faced a problem familiar in corporate governance.
A transaction may be commercially rational and legally permissible while remaining inconsistent with the expectations created by a company’s public statements.
This is an editorial assessment of the documented circumstances, not a finding of unlawful or dishonest conduct.
11. An important clarification: The apology did not terminate every existing contract
Shell’s 8 March announcement contained qualifications that are sometimes overlooked.
The company said it would immediately stop spot purchases of Russian crude.
It also said it would not renew term contracts.
But that did not mean every previously contracted delivery was instantly cancelled.
The distinction was commercially and legally significant.
Spot purchases generally concern individual transactions arranged for relatively prompt delivery.
Term contracts involve continuing arrangements under which agreed quantities may be delivered over longer periods.
Companies can cease entering new spot transactions while still facing obligations under previously signed contracts.
Shell’s subsequent statements acknowledged the difficulty of unwinding these arrangements.
On 7 April 2022, reporting based upon the company’s operational update recorded that Shell continued to face obligations associated with oil purchased under contracts concluded before the invasion.
Shell maintained that it was legally required to take delivery under certain existing arrangements.
This should not be confused with a new decision to purchase additional Russian crude on the spot market after 8 March.
The contractual distinction is central to an accurate chronology.
The apology was immediate.
The transition away from existing commercial arrangements was not.
The company’s own subsequent disclosures demonstrate that the two processes operated on different timescales. Royal Dutch Shell Plc .com
12. The contemporary Donovan–Shell archive: A particularly valuable record
One of the advantages of researching this episode in 2026 is that RoyalDutchShellPlc.com preserved contemporaneous material as events unfolded.
The archive contains relevant reports published on 3, 5, 7 and 8 March 2022.
These include coverage originating with Bloomberg, Reuters, The Telegraph, the BBC and Sky News.
The contemporary publications matter because they allow the sequence to be reconstructed without relying exclusively upon later historical accounts.
They show that Shell’s continuing Russian purchases were being reported before the discounted cargo became a major controversy.
They show the company’s initial defence of the purchase.
They record the Ukrainian government’s criticism.
They document Shell’s humanitarian-fund announcement.
And they preserve the subsequent apology and expanded withdrawal commitments.
For The Shell Leaks Files, this is a useful example of the value of maintaining contemporary records.
The individual news reports are not secret Shell documents.
They are contemporary evidence of what was publicly reported and what Shell was saying at the time.
The distinction should remain clear.
A corporate statement is evidence of the company’s publicly declared position.
A Reuters report is evidence of what its journalists established or attributed to sources.
A government statement is evidence of the government’s position.
Together, these sources provide a stronger historical account than any one category alone.
The existence of multiple reports does not automatically make every claim independently verified.
Where several reports reproduce the same Shell announcement, they ultimately depend upon the same primary corporate source.
But where independent market reporting identifies transaction details not supplied in Shell’s public statement, it can materially expand the evidential record.
That is precisely what happened with the Trafigura cargo.
DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS
Established facts
Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
Shell announced its intention to leave major Russian equity partnerships and Nord Stream 2 on 28 February.
Bloomberg reported on 3 March that Shell was continuing to purchase Russian oil and gas.
On 4 March, Reuters reported that Shell had purchased a cargo of Russian Urals crude oil from Trafigura through the Platts trading process.
The reported price was $28.50 per barrel below Dated Brent.
The cargo was scheduled to load from Baltic ports between 14 and 18 March.
Ukraine’s foreign minister publicly criticised Shell’s purchase on 5 March.
Shell confirmed the purchase and explained that the decision reflected concerns about European refinery supplies.
On 5 March, Shell announced that it would commit relevant profits from its remaining Russian oil processing to a humanitarian fund.
On 8 March, Ben van Beurden apologised for the purchase.
Shell announced an immediate halt to Russian crude spot purchases and undertook not to renew term contracts.
It also announced plans to withdraw from Russian petroleum products, pipeline gas and LNG in a phased manner.
These facts are supported by Shell’s original statements and contemporaneous independent reporting.
Financial matters requiring qualification
The $28.50 figure was a price discount relative to a benchmark, not Shell’s established profit per barrel.
The estimated financial benefit discussed by some market participants was not a verified Shell accounting figure.
The documents examined do not establish the final realised profit on the particular cargo.
They do not establish a specific humanitarian payment attributable exclusively to that cargo.
Nor do they independently establish the cargo’s eventual delivery and processing history.
Legal matters
Contemporaneous Reuters reporting stated that the purchase did not violate the Western sanctions then applicable.
Subsequent UK and EU restrictions on Russian oil should not be retrospectively applied to the March 4 transaction.
The evidence examined does not identify a court finding that Shell acted unlawfully in purchasing the cargo.
Nor does it identify a judicial determination resolving every legal issue associated with the purchase.
Matters not established
The available public documents do not identify every individual who authorised the transaction.
They do not establish whether the decision received specific approval from Shell’s Board.
They do not establish that government officials instructed Shell to purchase the particular cargo.
They do not independently demonstrate that no alternative crude supply was obtainable.
They do not establish that Shell purchased the cargo for the purpose of profiting from the invasion.
They also do not establish that humanitarian donations were used to conceal unlawful conduct.
Such allegations would require additional evidence.
EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
A corporate apology that deserves to remain in the historical record
The events of March 2022 present an unusually revealing example of the tension between commercial operations and corporate declarations.
Shell’s initial announcement was clear.
The company condemned Russia’s invasion.
It intended to leave its major Russian partnerships.
But the company continued to operate within an international energy market in which Russian crude remained a significant source of supply.
The Trafigura cargo demonstrated that tension.
Shell’s traders obtained oil at a substantial discount.
Its management initially justified the purchase through the need to maintain energy supplies.
Ukraine’s government challenged the transaction.
The resulting controversy exposed the difference between what Shell was legally permitted to do and what the company considered appropriate after further reflection.
Shell eventually acknowledged that the purchase had been wrong.
The apology should not be overlooked.
Nor should it be treated as establishing misconduct beyond what Shell actually admitted.
Ben van Beurden apologised for the decision to purchase Russian crude in those circumstances.
He did not admit that the transaction violated sanctions.
He did not acknowledge an unlawful agreement.
He did not concede that the company had deliberately financed Russian military operations.
Those distinctions are fundamental.
But the apology remains significant precisely because Shell was not simply responding to a finding that it had broken the law.
The company was responding to criticism about the wider consequences and appropriateness of its commercial decision.
That makes this episode relevant to the history of Shell’s corporate governance and public accountability.
It also raises questions that go beyond March 2022.
How should a multinational energy company balance its contractual responsibilities with an international crisis?
When does legal compliance cease to be a sufficient basis for deciding whether a transaction should proceed?
What responsibility does a company have to explain the commercial implications of decisions presented publicly as matters of principle?
And how quickly can an international trading organisation change its operations when the political environment changes dramatically?
The historical record does not provide simple answers.
It does, however, establish what Shell said, what it did and how its publicly declared position developed.
That is the purpose of this series.
The significance of the eight-day sequence
Between 28 February and 8 March 2022, Shell’s public position on Russia underwent a considerable transformation.
Its first announcement concerned particular investments.
The second controversy concerned a specific crude-oil purchase.
The third development concerned a proposed humanitarian fund.
The final announcement expanded the withdrawal to Russian hydrocarbons generally.
These were not identical decisions.
They were successive stages in Shell’s response to an unprecedented geopolitical and commercial crisis.
The most important documentary conclusion is that Shell’s decision to withdraw from major Russian investments preceded its decision to stop purchasing Russian crude on the spot market.
The distinction explains the apparent contradiction that caused such intense public criticism.
It also explains why Shell’s apology, although significant, did not immediately end every contractual relationship involving Russian oil and gas.
The events deserve to be understood in their proper sequence.
The record is sufficiently important without exaggeration.
PRINCIPAL SOURCES
The following documents and contemporaneous reports form the evidential foundation of this instalment.
1. Shell plc — Media Statements Concerning the War in Ukraine, 28 February–8 March 2022
Shell’s authenticated corporate record contains the original withdrawal announcement, its 5 March defence of the Russian crude purchase and the 8 March apology and expanded withdrawal commitment.
Read Shell’s original statements
2. Reuters — Shell Buys Cargo of Russian Crude Loading Mid-March From Trafigura, 4 March 2022
Julia Payne’s contemporary report identifies Trafigura, the Platts trading process, the $28.50-per-barrel discount and the scheduled Baltic loading window.
3. S&P Global Commodity Insights — Shell Says Controversial Purchase Was Intended to Ensure Refinery Supply, 5 March 2022
Contemporary market reporting explaining the circumstances of the trade, the widening Urals discount and the company’s stated supply concerns.
4. Reuters — Shell to Put Profits From Russian Oil Trade Into Ukraine Aid Fund, 5 March 2022
Ron Bousso’s report documents Ukraine’s criticism, Shell’s defence of the purchase and its undertaking concerning humanitarian assistance.
5. Shell plc — Shell Announces Intent to Withdraw From Russian Oil and Gas, 8 March 2022
The formal corporate announcement containing Ben van Beurden’s apology and the expanded commitments concerning crude oil, petroleum products, pipeline gas and LNG.
Read Shell’s 8 March announcement
6. Office for National Statistics — The Impact of Sanctions on UK Trade With Russia, 24 August 2022
An official retrospective explanation of the UK government’s March 2022 decision to phase out Russian oil imports and the subsequent effect on UK trade.
7. Council of the European Union — Sixth Sanctions Package, 3 June 2022
The official EU record explaining the subsequent restrictions on Russian crude oil and petroleum products, including the phased implementation periods.
8. RoyalDutchShellPlc.com — Shell Is Said to Continue Purchasing Russian Oil and Gas, 3 March 2022
The contemporary Donovan–Shell archive record preserving Bloomberg’s report that Russian energy purchases were continuing after Shell’s announcement concerning its Russian investments.
Read the original archive entry
9. RoyalDutchShellPlc.com — Shell Pledges Russian Oil Profits to Ukraine Relief After Backlash, 5 March 2022
The contemporary archive’s coverage of Shell’s initial justification and proposed humanitarian response.
Read the original archive entry
10. RoyalDutchShellPlc.com — Shell Sorry and Pledges to Stop Buying Russian Oil, 8 March 2022
The contemporary BBC report preserved in the Donovan–Shell archive, documenting the apology and Shell’s revised position.
Read the original archive entry
Documentary disclaimer
This instalment is based on authenticated Shell corporate statements, contemporaneous Reuters and Bloomberg reporting, S&P Global commodity-market reporting, official UK and EU records and contemporary material preserved by RoyalDutchShellPlc.com.
The purchase of a Russian crude-oil cargo on 4 March 2022 is established by Shell’s own statements and independent reporting.
The quoted pricing differential is distinguished from the cargo’s actual selling price and from any realised trading profit.
Shell’s stated concerns about European refinery supplies are reported as the company’s explanation, not as an independently verified finding that no alternative supplies existed.
The Ukrainian government’s criticism is identified as a political and moral objection rather than a judicial determination.
Contemporaneous reporting concerning the transaction’s compliance with sanctions is distinguished from any court ruling.
The company’s humanitarian-fund commitment is not presented as evidence of a verified payment amount.
The instalment does not allege that Shell deliberately violated sanctions, unlawfully financed Russian military operations or knowingly entered the transaction for an improper purpose.
The distinction between Shell’s withdrawal from Russian equity investments, its subsequent decision to cease spot crude purchases and its continuing contractual obligations is maintained throughout.
Editorial commentary is identified separately from documentary findings.
Relevant corrections, additional primary records and responses from Shell or other interested parties are welcome.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES
SLF-2007-104 — The Sakhalin Papers XCIV: The Blending Loophole — Russian Oil in Shell’s Supply Chain After the Apology
Shell apologised on 8 March 2022.
It promised to stop buying Russian crude on the spot market.
It also committed to withdrawing from Russian hydrocarbons more broadly.
But seven weeks later, on 27 April, Reuters reported another development.
Shell had continued to accept certain refined petroleum products containing Russian-origin material, provided the Russian component remained below 50%.
The arrangement involved provisions in the company’s trading contracts.
Reuters subsequently reported that Shell had tightened its purchasing conditions to exclude refined products containing any Russian-origin material, including blended fuels.
A Shell spokesperson confirmed the change.
This raised another important documentary question.
If Shell had announced its intention to withdraw from Russian hydrocarbons in March, why were trading arrangements involving Russian-origin blended products still being revised in late April?
The answer requires an examination of the difference between crude-oil origin, refined-product origin, commodity blending, contractual definitions and sanctions compliance.
It also requires distinguishing the existence of contractual purchasing provisions from proof that particular cargoes were actually delivered under them.
The next instalment will examine the Reuters investigation, Shell’s response, the contemporaneous trading conditions and the wider difficulties of removing Russian-origin petroleum from international supply chains.
The apology was public. The supply chain was far more complicated.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
The next investigation begins with Reuters’ report of 27 April 2022: Shell Tightens Restrictions on Russian Oil Buying.
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