THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 20 NOVEMBER 2026

THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 20 NOVEMBER 2026

Archive reference: SLF-2007-124

The Sakhalin Papers CXIV: The Assets Russia Inherited — An Independent Investigation into Shell’s Environmental Obligations and the Missing Decommissioning Fund

When Russia replaced Sakhalin II’s original operator in August 2022, it did more than change the company’s ownership. Presidential Decree No. 416 and its implementing regulations transferred the project’s operating rights and obligations to a new Russian company while placing major industrial assets in state ownership. But what happened to the financial arrangements intended to pay for the eventual closure of the offshore platforms, pipelines and LNG facilities? An examination of the original Russian legal instruments, authenticated Shell SEC filings, Japanese shareholder announcements, historical audit reporting and Sakhalin Energy’s 2024 environmental report establishes how responsibility was formally transferred — while revealing why the funding of Sakhalin II’s eventual decommissioning remains a question requiring further documentary evidence.

AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION

By the Donovan–Shell Archive

Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT. Based on authenticated Shell regulatory filings, original Russian legal instruments, corporate disclosures from Mitsui and Mitsubishi, contemporaneous reporting, an identified Moscow court record and original Sakhalin Energy environmental reporting.

Publication date: 20 November 2026

Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia

Previous instalment: SLF-2007-123 — The $2.5 Billion Decommissioning Question

INTRODUCTION: OWNERSHIP CHANGED — BUT THE INFRASTRUCTURE REMAINED

On 30 June 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Presidential Decree No. 416.

The decree fundamentally changed the corporate and legal arrangements governing Sakhalin II, one of the world’s largest integrated oil and liquefied natural gas developments.

The original operator was Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd, incorporated in Bermuda.

Its shareholders included Gazprom, Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi.

Shell had announced its intention to withdraw from the project following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

By April, it had lost significant influence over the original company.

Russia’s subsequent intervention established an entirely different operating structure.

Under the decree, a newly created Russian limited liability company would assume the original operator’s rights and obligations under the 1994 production-sharing agreement.

The project property developed under that agreement would pass into Russian state ownership.

The replacement company would receive the right to use those assets.

The distinctions were legally and financially significant.

Russia was not merely buying Shell’s shares.

It was replacing the legal entity responsible for implementing an agreement that had governed the development for almost three decades.

But the transfer created an important documentary question.

If the new company inherited the original operator’s obligations, did it also inherit the financial resources needed to meet the project’s eventual environmental and decommissioning liabilities?

The distinction matters because Sakhalin II includes substantial offshore platforms, wells, pipelines and processing infrastructure.

Those installations will eventually require closure, dismantling, restoration or some other approved form of end-of-life treatment.

The preceding investigation established that Russia’s Accounts Chamber had questioned the adequacy of the project’s decommissioning-funding arrangements.

A 2008 newspaper investigation described a dispute over potential closure expenditure estimated at approximately $2.5 billion.

In 2015, the Accounts Chamber reportedly stated that the investors had voluntarily agreed to establish a fund, although its size remained under negotiation.

The subsequent outcome was not established.

The 2022 restructuring therefore deserves examination from a different perspective.

The original legal instruments are now available.

They contain detailed provisions concerning the transfer of property, contractual obligations, financial records, personnel, licences and regulatory procedures.

They provide a substantial answer to the question of who was intended to operate the project after August 2022.

But the documents examined do not identify the amount of any dedicated decommissioning fund or independently reconcile the treatment of such a fund under the transfer arrangements.

That is the central issue in this investigation.

PART ONE: WHAT RUSSIA’S PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ACTUALLY TRANSFERRED

1. The original legal instrument

Presidential Decree No. 416 was issued on 30 June 2022.

Its title concerns special economic measures in the fuel and energy sector in response to actions by foreign governments and international organisations.

The decree cited threats involving economic security, public safety and the possibility of natural or technological emergencies.

It also alleged that certain foreign persons had failed to fulfil obligations associated with the Sakhalin II production-sharing agreement.

Those were assertions made by the Russian government as part of the legal justification for its intervention.

They are not independently established findings of wrongdoing by Shell.

The decree then prescribed the creation of a replacement company.

Paragraph 1(a) provided that the new Russian limited liability company would receive the original operator’s rights and obligations.

It also required the replacement company to conduct its activities in accordance with the production-sharing agreement.

This provision is especially important.

Russia did not simply announce that the former agreement had ceased to exist.

Instead, it established a mechanism intended to continue the agreement through a different corporate entity.

The wording of the decree was designed to preserve the project’s contractual framework while replacing the company responsible for performing it.

Primary legal source: Russian Presidential Decree No. 416, 30 June 2022, paragraph 1(a).

rulaws.ru

 

2. The distinction between property ownership and operating control

Paragraph 1(b) addressed the project’s industrial property.

It provided that property created under the production-sharing agreement would be transferred into ownership of the Russian Federation.

The property would simultaneously be made available to the replacement operator for use without charge for the period specified by the agreement.

Paragraph 1(c) addressed other property belonging to the original operator.

That property would pass to the replacement company.

This created two different categories.

The Russian Federation would own the principal project property covered by the first provision.

The replacement operating company would acquire other property under the second.

The difference is significant.

Ownership of an offshore platform is not necessarily identical to responsibility for operating, maintaining or eventually dismantling it.

Those responsibilities can be allocated through contracts, licences, legislation and regulatory approvals.

The original decree therefore establishes the intended division of property interests.

It does not, by itself, provide a complete itemised account of every environmental liability associated with each asset.

Nor does it specify the amount of money available to meet future decommissioning expenditure.

The legal distinction between ownership and operational responsibility remains central to the investigation.

PART TWO: THE GOVERNMENT’S IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS

3. Government Resolution No. 1369

On 2 August 2022, the Russian government adopted Resolution No. 1369.

This implemented Presidential Decree No. 416 and established the new company, Sakhalin Energy LLC.

The resolution provides more detailed information than the presidential decree alone.

Its provisions address the new company’s legal status, initial financial structure, personnel, assets and participation in the production-sharing agreement.

Paragraph 8 is particularly revealing.

It instructed the replacement company to prepare its opening balance sheet on the basis of the former company’s balance sheet.

The provision addressed the transfer of property and cash belonging to the former operator, apart from property assigned to federal ownership.

It also specified that separate transfer documents between the former and replacement companies were not required for the property covered by that particular arrangement.

This was an unusually direct mechanism for establishing the new operator’s financial position.

Rather than relying entirely upon a conventional negotiated corporate acquisition, the government prescribed how the replacement company’s opening accounts were to be constructed.

But the published resolution does not reproduce the resulting opening balance sheet.

It does not identify any separately funded decommissioning reserve.

And it does not provide a schedule reconciling historical restoration provisions against the new company’s corresponding accounts.

The distinction is important.

A legal instruction to transfer assets and obligations is evidence of the intended succession. It is not, without the underlying financial records, proof of the amount or adequacy of the resources transferred.

Primary legal source: Russian Government Resolution No. 1369, 2 August 2022, paragraphs 8–10.

Документы ленты ПРАЙМ: ГАРАНТ.РУ

 

4. The new company became a party to the 1994 agreement

Paragraph 9 of Resolution No. 1369 contains another important provision.

It states that the replacement company assumes the rights and obligations of the former operator under the production-sharing agreement signed on 22 June 1994.

The resolution also specifies that the agreement continues to be implemented under its existing terms, subject to the provisions of the new measures.

This is the strongest documentary evidence concerning contractual succession.

Under the Russian legal framework, Sakhalin Energy LLC became the entity responsible for implementing the production-sharing agreement.

If the original agreement contained applicable obligations concerning closure planning, environmental restoration or decommissioning, the general transfer provision is relevant to those obligations.

But an important limitation remains.

The complete executed production-sharing agreement, including all relevant amendments and detailed decommissioning arrangements, has not been independently reconstructed for this instalment.

Consequently, the general succession provision cannot establish the precise contents of every original obligation.

Nor does it determine whether separate obligations existed under other contracts or legal systems.

The documents establish broad contractual succession under Russian law. The precise financial content of every inherited decommissioning obligation remains a separate evidentiary question.

PART THREE: THE ASSETS WERE TRANSFERRED — BUT WHAT ABOUT THEIR LIABILITIES?

5. Transfer of industrial property

Resolution No. 1369 directed the Federal Agency for State Property Management to arrange the transfer of relevant project property into Russian ownership.

The assets were to be made available to the replacement operator for continued use.

The government also required the relevant authorities to reissue subsurface licences and other operating permits.

The measures were designed to preserve the continuity of oil and gas production.

The offshore platforms, pipelines, processing facilities and export infrastructure remained essential to the project’s commercial operations.

But a substantial industrial asset carries more than economic value.

It can also involve ongoing obligations concerning maintenance, safety, pollution prevention, waste management and eventual retirement.

Some obligations may arise from the production-sharing agreement.

Others may arise directly from environmental legislation or the terms of operating permits.

Still others may result from specific historical events or contractual undertakings.

The transfer of physical property therefore does not necessarily provide a complete answer to the allocation of liability.

It is necessary to distinguish three separate questions.

Who legally owns the infrastructure?

Who possesses the authority and responsibility to operate it?

And who must finance its eventual retirement?

The Russian decree and implementing resolution provide important answers concerning ownership and operation.

The complete financial answer concerning eventual closure is not established by those documents alone.

6. The new company’s financial structure

The implementing resolution established the replacement company’s initial registered capital at 10,000 roubles.

That nominal amount should not be confused with the project’s economic value or the replacement company’s total assets.

The same resolution provided for the transfer of substantial property and financial resources.

The company’s registered capital therefore tells us little, by itself, about its ability to finance decommissioning.

The company’s eventual financial capacity would depend upon its assets, liabilities, operating cash flows, contractual commitments and any dedicated reserves or guarantees.

The government also approved a company charter.

That charter recognised the company as a separate legal entity capable of owning property, acquiring rights, incurring obligations and participating in court proceedings.

It provided that the company was responsible for its obligations with its own property.

The general corporate provisions did not amount to a separately disclosed guarantee by the Russian government that every future environmental liability would be paid from federal funds.

Nor did they establish that every historical shareholder obligation would automatically become a direct personal obligation of the replacement company’s participants.

These distinctions are relevant when considering the eventual allocation of closure costs.

Primary source: Government Resolution No. 1369, including the original company charter.

Документы ленты ПРАЙМ: ГАРАНТ.РУ

 

PART FOUR: ENVIRONMENTAL OVERSIGHT WAS EXPRESSLY CONTINUED

7. A provision easily overlooked

One of the most relevant sections of Resolution No. 1369 appears in paragraph 13.

The Russian government instructed the responsible federal ministries to preserve continuity in existing and planned geological, environmental and other expert examinations.

That provision is important evidence of the government’s intended regulatory arrangements.

The authorities were not instructed simply to suspend environmental scrutiny because a new company had taken over operations.

The resolution expressly addressed the continuity of the relevant examination processes.

This does not establish that every outstanding environmental issue was satisfactorily resolved.

Nor does it prove that the replacement operator complied with every applicable environmental requirement.

But it demonstrates that regulatory continuity formed part of the published restructuring plan.

The distinction matters because the transfer took place during a period of exceptional political and economic disruption.

The decree and resolution sought to preserve the project’s operation.

They also made provision for the continuation of regulatory procedures.

The original documents therefore support the conclusion that Russia intended both contractual and regulatory continuity, rather than the abandonment of existing environmental oversight.

PART FIVE: SHELL DID NOT ACCEPT THE TRANSFER

8. The authenticated SEC record

Shell’s own disclosures provide a different perspective.

In its unaudited financial report for the third quarter of 2022, filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Shell described the Russian restructuring.

The company reported that it had lost significant influence over Sakhalin Energy from 1 April 2022.

Its executive directors had resigned.

Managerial and technical staff had been withdrawn.

Shell also recorded that it understood the transfer of the original operator’s licences, assets, rights and obligations to have been implemented on 17 August 2022.

But Shell did not accept the process as an ordinary consensual corporate transaction.

On 1 September 2022, Shell notified the Russian Federation that it would not seek an equivalent interest in the replacement company.

The company also objected to the purported transfers and reserved its legal rights and remedies.

This qualification is fundamental.

The Russian government had established a legal mechanism under its domestic law.

Shell disputed the consequences of that mechanism.

The resulting position cannot responsibly be described as though both sides agreed upon a conventional sale and transfer of obligations.

Authenticated primary source: Shell plc — Third-Quarter 2022 Financial Report, SEC Exhibit 99.2.

sec.gov

 

9. Shell retained a legal interest in the original company

The distinction remained visible in Shell’s later annual reporting.

Its 2025 Annual Report and Accounts, filed with the SEC on 12 March 2026, confirmed that Shell still held a 27.5% minus one share interest in the original Bermuda-incorporated company.

Shell also described the original company’s former operating rights as having purportedly passed out of its possession.

That wording reflects the contested nature of the restructuring.

It does not establish that Shell continued to control Sakhalin II.

Nor does it prove that Russia’s transfer arrangements would necessarily be recognised under every potentially applicable legal framework.

It establishes the position reported by Shell.

The company continued to identify its original shareholding, while the project was being operated through a different Russian entity.

This creates a distinction between continuing corporate ownership of an interest in the original company and actual operational control over the project.

It also means that questions concerning any surviving legal obligations of the original company cannot simply be answered by reference to the replacement operator’s activities.

Authenticated primary source: Shell plc — 2025 Annual Report and Accounts, SEC Form 20-F, Integrated Gas: Russia.

sec.gov

 

PART SIX: THE JAPANESE SHAREHOLDERS TOOK A DIFFERENT COURSE

10. Mitsui and Mitsubishi accepted participation

Shell’s decision was not followed by every foreign shareholder.

On 31 August 2022, Mitsui announced that the Russian government had approved its application to participate in the replacement company.

Mitsui explained that it had submitted its consent on 25 August.

The decision allowed it to proceed with arrangements for an interest corresponding to its previous 12.5% holding.

On 1 September 2022, Mitsubishi issued a separate announcement confirming that the Russian government had approved its application.

Mitsubishi had previously held a 10% interest.

It said that further discussions would address the shareholder arrangements and associated risks.

Both companies referred to the importance of maintaining stable energy supplies.

These original corporate announcements establish that the foreign shareholders made different decisions.

Shell rejected participation.

Mitsui and Mitsubishi sought to remain involved through the replacement Russian company.

That is important for understanding the post-2022 governance structure.

But the Japanese companies’ announcements do not disclose the detailed allocation of historical decommissioning liabilities.

Nor do they establish that the Japanese shareholders personally guaranteed a particular level of closure funding.

Their participation provides evidence of the project’s continuing international shareholder involvement.

It does not substitute for the underlying environmental and financial agreements.

Primary corporate sources: Mitsui — Sakhalin II Project Announcement, 31 August 2022 and Mitsubishi Corporation — Sakhalin II Project Announcement, 1 September 2022.

MITSUI & CO., LTD.+1

 

PART SEVEN: THE NEW OPERATOR’S ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT PROVIDES A FURTHER TEST

11. What Sakhalin Energy reported for 2024

The replacement operator’s Non-Financial ESG Report 2024 provides important evidence of its environmental activities after the restructuring.

The report contains detailed information about environmental management, regulatory inspections, pollution prevention, monitoring and associated expenditure.

One section is particularly relevant.

Pages 98–99 record current environmental protection expenditure during 2024.

The company reported spending approximately:

4.631 billion roubles

on environmental protection activities.

That compared with approximately 3.624 billion roubles during 2023.

The reported increase reflected several factors.

These included the preparation of documentation for environmental permits, increased drilling activity, emergency-response services and environmental monitoring.

The financial table also distinguished spending on air protection, wastewater management, waste disposal, biodiversity and the protection of land and water.

This is substantial operational environmental expenditure.

It demonstrates that the replacement operator continued to allocate resources to environmental management.

But the figure must be understood correctly.

The 4.631 billion roubles represented current environmental expenditure. It was not identified as money deposited into a dedicated future decommissioning fund.

It cannot therefore be used to establish that the project’s eventual closure costs were fully financed.

Primary corporate source: Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024, pages 98–99 (PDF).

sakhalinenergy.ru

 

12. Environmental regulators continued inspecting the platforms

The same report contains another useful disclosure.

In 2024, the Far Eastern Interregional Directorate of Rosprirodnadzor conducted a scheduled environmental inspection of the PA-A, PA-B and Lunskaya-A offshore platforms.

According to the company’s report, the regulator identified a violation requiring corrective action.

No fine was imposed.

The company stated that the necessary corrective measures were implemented during 2024.

These facts should be reported fairly.

The inspection establishes that the offshore platforms remained subject to federal environmental supervision.

The identification of a violation establishes that the regulator required corrective action.

But the report also states that the matter was corrected and that no fine was imposed.

The available material does not establish that the violation concerned decommissioning.

It should not be presented as evidence that the operator had failed to establish a closure fund.

Nevertheless, the inspection provides a useful contemporary checkpoint.

The replacement company was not operating entirely outside the published Russian environmental oversight system.

The documentary record shows ongoing regulatory activity. It does not, however, resolve the separate question of long-term decommissioning finance.

PART EIGHT: SHELL’S OWN ACCOUNTS ILLUSTRATE THE FINANCIAL DISTINCTION

13. Accounting for an obligation is different from financing it

Shell’s 2025 Annual Report and Accounts provides an important illustration of the difference between recognising an estimated liability and maintaining a fund to pay it.

Note 25 addresses decommissioning and other provisions.

At 31 December 2025, Shell reported approximately $18.8 billion in decommissioning and restoration provisions across its consolidated businesses.

The company explained that the timing and amounts involved remained uncertain.

Estimates were subject to changes in technology, expected expenditure, discount rates and other assumptions.

That is an authenticated financial disclosure.

But it concerns Shell’s worldwide consolidated operations.

It is not an identified Sakhalin II reserve.

Nor can it be interpreted as money held by the replacement Russian operating company.

The distinction is essential.

A company may recognise a liability in its financial statements.

The recognition does not necessarily mean it holds an equivalent amount of unrestricted cash.

A separate fund may exist to finance future obligations.

Alternatively, payment may depend upon future operating revenues, guarantees or other financial arrangements.

The legal succession established by Russia’s decree therefore needs to be accompanied by an examination of the actual financial accounts and agreements.

Those records would show whether a dedicated reserve existed, whether it was transferred, and who could control the money.

Primary corporate source: Shell plc — 2025 Form 20-F, Note 25: Decommissioning and Other Provisions.

sec.gov

 

PART NINE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PROVISION IS NOT THE SAME AS A DECOMMISSIONING FUND

14. Russia retained powers to investigate alleged damage

Presidential Decree No. 416 contained another relevant provision.

Paragraph 1(k) authorised financial, environmental, technological and other audits concerning activities associated with implementation of the production-sharing agreement.

The following provisions allowed the Russian government to determine alleged damage and identify persons responsible for compensation.

The decree also established arrangements for potential deductions from restricted proceeds associated with foreign shareholders’ interests.

Those provisions have already been examined in earlier Sakhalin Papers instalments concerning Shell’s disputed exit compensation.

They are relevant here for a different reason.

They demonstrate that Russia reserved powers to examine alleged historical damage associated with the project.

But the existence of an audit power is not evidence that damage was proved.

Nor does an arrangement permitting the recovery of compensation establish a dedicated reserve for decommissioning.

The two subjects are related to environmental and financial responsibility.

They are nevertheless distinct.

An environmental audit might examine particular acts or omissions.

A decommissioning fund is intended to provide resources for future closure expenditure.

The former cannot automatically be treated as satisfying the latter.

No completed audit finding establishing a quantified decommissioning-related liability against Shell under these provisions has been independently authenticated for this instalment.

Primary legal source: Presidential Decree No. 416, paragraph 1(k)–(m).

rulaws.ru

 

PART TEN: WHAT THE COURT RECORD ESTABLISHES

15. The Moscow proceedings concern different disputed obligations

The Russian prosecutor commenced proceedings against Shell-group entities in October 2024.

The case is identified as A40-241354/2024.

A Moscow Arbitration Court order dated 11 October 2024 accepted the claim for proceedings.

The case included several Shell entities.

Shell’s 2025 Form 20-F provides an authenticated account of the principal relief sought.

The prosecutor alleges that Shell unlawfully withdrew support from the original Sakhalin operating company.

The claim also seeks approximately €1.5 billion concerning alleged unpaid gas deliveries in 2022.

The prosecutor further seeks permission to apply money purportedly set aside for Shell’s Sakhalin equity compensation against part of the alleged debt.

Shell’s annual report states that the proceedings remain ongoing and that the financial consequences cannot reliably be estimated.

These are contested claims.

They do not establish that Shell is legally responsible for the sums sought.

Nor do they determine the eventual cost of dismantling Sakhalin II’s facilities.

The available initial court order is procedural.

It is not a final judgment on the merits.

No authenticated judgment in these proceedings has been identified as establishing the allocation or adequacy of Sakhalin II’s decommissioning fund.

The litigation therefore provides evidence of surviving legal disputes following Shell’s withdrawal.

It does not resolve the specific environmental-financing question examined here.

Judicial source: Moscow Arbitration Court — Prosecutor General’s Office v Shell, Case A40-241354/2024, order dated 11 October 2024.

Jus Mundi

 

Authenticated Shell disclosure: Shell plc — 2025 Form 20-F, Note 32: Russia.

sec.gov

 

EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

16. The legal transfer was explicit — the financial reconciliation was not

The principal finding is a distinction between the clarity of the legal instruments and the limitations of the publicly examined financial record.

Russia’s decree was explicit about the replacement company’s succession to the original operator’s rights and obligations.

The implementing resolution was also detailed.

It addressed the new company’s creation, assets, opening balance sheet, operating licences, personnel and participation in the production-sharing agreement.

Those provisions leave little doubt about the structure Russia intended to establish under its domestic law.

But the documents examined do not include an itemised decommissioning liability schedule.

Nor do they provide the amount of any dedicated fund transferred to the replacement company.

That does not establish that the historical obligation disappeared.

The broad contractual succession provision points towards continuity of the obligations covered by the production-sharing agreement.

But proving the financing arrangements requires the underlying accounts and contractual documents.

Legal continuity and financial sufficiency are two different matters.

The decree addresses the first.

The present evidence does not fully establish the second.

17. The earlier decommissioning dispute gives the transfer additional significance

The preceding investigation documented an earlier disagreement over decommissioning finance.

The Russian Accounts Chamber reportedly questioned the absence of an agreed fund in 2008.

In 2015, it reported that investors had agreed voluntarily to establish one.

But negotiations concerning the fund’s size were continuing.

The 2022 restructuring occurred against that historical background.

If a fund had subsequently been established, its treatment during the transfer would be important.

An independently verifiable reconciliation should identify the amount accumulated, the entity holding the funds and the legal restrictions governing their use.

It should also establish whether the replacement operator received those assets or an equivalent enforceable financial entitlement.

If no dedicated fund existed, the relevant documents should explain how the new company intended to finance its eventual closure obligations.

Neither possibility can be assumed.

The present investigation has not established which arrangement applied.

The distinction is particularly important because the project continued operating and generating revenues after the restructuring.

Continuing commercial operations create opportunities to finance future liabilities.

But the existence of revenue is not itself proof that sufficient money has been reserved for eventual closure.

18. The environmental record supports a more balanced picture

The replacement operator’s 2024 ESG report provides substantial evidence of ongoing environmental activity.

It records expenditure.

It identifies regulatory supervision.

It describes environmental monitoring and corrective measures.

These are relevant facts.

They should not be disregarded merely because the operator is now under Russian control.

Equally, the existence of current environmental spending does not resolve the eventual cost of closing the project.

Environmental management during production and decommissioning at the end of production involve different financial requirements.

The report provides useful operational evidence.

It is not a complete audited statement of future closure obligations.

This is why the original decommissioning-fund question remains relevant.

19. What would complete the documentary record?

A definitive reconstruction would require several categories of evidence.

The first is the full production-sharing agreement, including any amendments or supplementary agreements concerning decommissioning and environmental restoration.

The second is the documentation resulting from the investors’ reported 2015 agreement to establish a fund.

The third is the original operator’s final financial position before the August 2022 transfer.

The fourth is the replacement company’s opening balance sheet and the associated schedules of transferred assets and liabilities.

The fifth is any subsequent independently audited statement identifying a decommissioning provision, dedicated fund, financial guarantee or other closure-financing arrangement.

The sixth is the relevant legal and regulatory documentation establishing how the eventual closure obligation will be enforced.

These documents would permit a meaningful reconciliation.

They would also make it possible to distinguish historical contractual obligations from liabilities arising during the replacement company’s subsequent operations.

Without them, any definitive claim that Shell escaped its decommissioning obligations, or that Russia assumed every liability without sufficient funding, would go beyond the authenticated evidence.

DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS

The investigation establishes that Presidential Decree No. 416 of 30 June 2022 prescribed the transfer of the original Sakhalin II operator’s rights and obligations to a replacement Russian company.

It also provided for major project assets to pass into Russian state ownership while remaining available for use by the new operator.

Government Resolution No. 1369 of 2 August 2022 implemented that arrangement.

The resolution required the replacement company’s opening balance sheet to be constructed from the former operator’s financial records.

It also provided for the continuation of the production-sharing agreement, the transfer of relevant licences and the continuity of environmental and other regulatory examinations.

Shell’s authenticated SEC disclosures confirm that the company lost significant influence over Sakhalin II from 1 April 2022.

They also establish that Shell refused to participate in the replacement company and objected to the purported transfers.

Shell’s 2025 Form 20-F confirms that it continued to report an ownership interest in the original Bermuda company.

Mitsui and Mitsubishi made different decisions, receiving Russian governmental approval to participate in the replacement operator.

The replacement operator’s 2024 environmental report records approximately 4.631 billion roubles in current environmental protection expenditure.

It also reports a scheduled federal environmental inspection of the three offshore platforms, a violation requiring correction, no fine, and corrective action during 2024.

The 2024 environmental expenditure was not identified as a payment into a dedicated decommissioning fund.

Shell’s 2025 consolidated accounts establish the existence of substantial worldwide decommissioning and restoration provisions.

Those figures do not identify a Sakhalin II closure reserve.

The original presidential decree authorised financial, environmental, technological and other audits associated with the production-sharing agreement.

No completed audit finding establishing a quantified decommissioning-related claim against Shell has been authenticated for this investigation.

The original court record concerning the Russian prosecutor’s claim against Shell establishes the existence of litigation.

It does not determine the specific historical decommissioning obligations examined here.

The published legal instruments establish the intended succession of contractual obligations under Russian law.

They do not, without the underlying financial records, independently establish the amount, sufficiency or exact treatment of any dedicated decommissioning fund at the time of transfer.

No finding of fraud, deliberate evasion of environmental liabilities or unlawful abandonment of a specific decommissioning obligation is advanced.

CONCLUSION: RUSSIA INHERITED MORE THAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

The Sakhalin II restructuring of 2022 was an extraordinary corporate intervention.

Russia replaced the original operator of a major international oil and gas development.

It transferred substantial project property into state ownership.

It established a new company to operate the facilities.

And it provided for the continuation of the original production-sharing agreement.

The legal instruments were detailed.

They addressed rights, obligations, assets, licences, employees and regulatory procedures.

But the historical question of future closure financing cannot be resolved from those provisions alone.

The issue had been raised many years earlier.

Russian government auditors had questioned the project’s decommissioning arrangements.

The investors subsequently agreed in principle to establish a fund.

Yet the surviving records examined do not establish the eventual agreed amount or the fund’s treatment during the 2022 restructuring.

The replacement operator’s later environmental reporting demonstrates continuing expenditure and regulatory supervision.

That deserves recognition.

But current environmental expenditure is not interchangeable with an independently verified reserve for dismantling offshore platforms and restoring industrial sites after production ends.

Nor should Shell’s worldwide accounting provisions be interpreted as a dedicated Sakhalin II fund.

The distinction is equally important when considering the remaining legal disputes.

Shell objected to the restructuring.

It retained an interest in the original Bermuda company.

And Russian proceedings concerning other disputed obligations have continued.

Those facts establish that the consequences of Shell’s withdrawal remain legally contested.

They do not establish the eventual allocation of every environmental liability.

The strongest documentary conclusion is therefore carefully limited.

Under its 2022 legal measures, Russia provided for the replacement operator to assume the original Sakhalin II operator’s rights and obligations under the production-sharing agreement. But the documents examined do not establish a complete independently verified reconciliation of the financial resources intended to meet the project’s eventual decommissioning costs.

That is an important distinction.

The absence of an independently examined reconciliation is not proof that the necessary arrangements do not exist.

It does not establish that the replacement company is unable to finance closure.

Nor does it establish that Shell or the other former shareholders improperly failed to meet an obligation.

But it identifies a material question in the historical record.

Major offshore oil and gas developments produce economic benefits over many years.

They also create obligations extending beyond the period of commercial production.

Those obligations do not cease to matter when a shareholder exits or the operator changes.

The financial history should therefore account for both the revenues generated and the liabilities associated with the infrastructure left behind.

For the Donovan–Shell Archive, this investigation adds a necessary chapter to the Sakhalin Papers.

The earlier instalments examined the cost of building the project, the recovery of expenditure, the revenues received by Russia and the disputed arrangements for future decommissioning.

The present instalment examines the legal transfer of the project itself.

Together, the documents establish a substantial historical chronology.

But one financial reconciliation remains incomplete.

Russia’s legal instruments transferred the project, its property interests and contractual obligations. Whether the funding arrangements for its eventual closure were fully and adequately carried forward remains a question for the underlying financial and contractual records.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

Russian Presidential Decree No. 416 — 30 June 2022. The original legal instrument establishing the replacement operating structure, including the transfer of contractual rights and obligations, the treatment of project property and the provisions concerning financial and environmental audits. Read the reproduced Russian legal text.

Russian Government Resolution No. 1369 — 2 August 2022. The implementing measure establishing Sakhalin Energy LLC, prescribing the opening balance-sheet arrangements and confirming succession under the production-sharing agreement. Read the original resolution and company charter.

Shell plc — 28 February 2022. Original corporate announcement of Shell’s intention to withdraw from its Russian equity partnerships, including Sakhalin II. Read Shell’s announcement.

Shell plc — Third-Quarter 2022 Financial Report. Authenticated SEC filing recording Shell’s loss of significant influence, its objection to the purported transfer and its refusal to obtain an interest in the replacement company. Read the SEC filing.

Mitsui & Co. — 31 August 2022. Original announcement confirming Russian governmental approval of Mitsui’s proposed participation in the replacement Sakhalin II operator. Read Mitsui’s statement.

Mitsubishi Corporation — 1 September 2022. Original announcement confirming approval of Mitsubishi’s application to participate in the replacement company. Read Mitsubishi’s statement.

Japan External Trade Organization — 4 July 2022. Contemporaneous Japanese institutional analysis of Presidential Decree No. 416 and its implications for foreign shareholders. Read JETRO’s report.

Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024. Original replacement-operator report documenting environmental expenditure, monitoring, regulatory inspections and corrective action. Particularly relevant are pages 98–99. Read the original report (PDF).

Shell plc — 2025 Annual Report and Accounts, filed 12 March 2026. Authenticated SEC filing confirming Shell’s continuing interest in the original Bermuda company, its consolidated decommissioning provisions and its disclosure of ongoing Russian legal proceedings. Read Shell’s 2025 Form 20-F.

Moscow Arbitration Court — 11 October 2024. Procedural order in Case A40-241354/2024 accepting the Russian prosecutor’s claim against Shell-group entities. Read the reproduced court order.

Donovan–Shell Archive — 19 November 2026. The preceding investigation examining the historical $2.5 billion decommissioning estimate and the Russian Accounts Chamber’s concerns about future closure financing. Read SLF-2007-123.

DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER

This investigation examines the legal restructuring of Sakhalin II in 2022 and the available evidence concerning the transfer and financing of environmental and decommissioning obligations.

Presidential Decree No. 416 and Government Resolution No. 1369 are treated as original Russian legal instruments establishing the domestic framework adopted by the Russian government.

Their provisions are described as measures under Russian law.

No conclusion is advanced that every consequence of those measures would necessarily be recognised under all other potentially applicable legal systems or investment agreements.

The complete executed 1994 production-sharing agreement and all amendments concerning decommissioning obligations have not been independently reconstructed for this instalment.

The general succession provisions are not treated as proof of the precise contents of every original environmental or financial obligation.

The replacement company’s complete opening balance sheet and supporting asset-and-liability schedules have not been independently examined.

The investigation does not establish whether a dedicated decommissioning fund existed immediately before the restructuring, whether any such fund was transferred, or the current amount of any reserve.

Shell’s worldwide decommissioning provisions are not represented as Sakhalin-specific funds.

The 2024 environmental figures are attributed to Sakhalin Energy’s published report.

They concern current environmental expenditure and are not treated as evidence of a fully financed future closure fund.

The 2024 regulatory inspection and corrective action are reported as described by the operator.

No conclusion is drawn that the identified violation concerned decommissioning or a failure to provide financial security.

Shell’s objections to the restructuring are attributed to its authenticated regulatory filings.

Its continuing ownership interest in the original Bermuda company is distinguished from operational control of Sakhalin II.

The Japanese shareholders’ decisions are attributed to their original corporate announcements.

The Russian prosecutor’s claims remain contested allegations.

The identified Moscow court order is procedural and does not establish liability for the decommissioning issues examined.

No independently authenticated final judgment allocating the specific historical decommissioning obligations among Shell, the former operator, the replacement operator and the Russian state has been identified.

No allegation is made that Shell, Gazprom, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sakhalin Energy or the Russian authorities deliberately concealed a decommissioning liability, unlawfully transferred an obligation or fraudulently failed to finance eventual closure.

Editorial observations about the desirability of transparent financial reconciliation are distinguished from established documentary facts.

Shell plc, the former Sakhalin Energy Investment Company, Sakhalin Energy LLC, Gazprom, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, the Russian Ministry of Energy, the Russian Accounts Chamber and other interested parties are invited to provide original documents, factual corrections or responses for fair consideration.

The website’s general disclaimer also applies.

NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES

SLF-2007-125 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CXV

The Three Offshore Platforms Under Inspection — What Sakhalin Energy’s Environmental Records Reveal After Shell’s Departure

Sakhalin II’s industrial infrastructure continued operating after the 2022 restructuring.

The replacement operator inherited responsibility for running offshore platforms, pipelines, production facilities and the LNG export complex.

It also inherited an extensive programme of environmental management and regulatory compliance.

The company’s 2024 ESG report provides a detailed account of that activity.

It records approximately 4.631 billion roubles in environmental expenditure.

It identifies significant spending on land and water protection.

And it confirms that Russia’s federal environmental regulator inspected the project’s three offshore platforms.

The inspection resulted in a directive requiring corrective action.

The company reported that the violation was corrected.

No fine was imposed.

But the report raises further documentary questions.

What exactly did the regulator identify?

Which environmental permits governed the three platforms?

What monitoring evidence supports the operator’s conclusions concerning offshore pollution and environmental impacts?

How did the company assess the condition of the surrounding marine environment?

And what can be established independently about the continuity of environmental oversight after Shell’s withdrawal?

The next investigation will examine the environmental reporting in greater detail.

It will distinguish operator-reported monitoring results from independently verified regulatory findings.

It will examine the historical environmental obligations associated with the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye fields.

It will also consider how the records distinguish ongoing environmental compliance from the separate obligations associated with future decommissioning.

No assumption will be made that a regulatory directive establishes serious pollution or wrongdoing.

Equally, the absence of a fine will not be represented as proof that every environmental concern was resolved.

The central documentary question: what do the original environmental reports and regulatory records establish about the condition and oversight of Sakhalin II’s offshore platforms after Shell lost operational influence?

The next investigation will follow the evidence, distinguish competing accounts and identify the documents still needed for an independent assessment.

The Sakhalin Papers continue.

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