
THE SHELL LEAKS FILES — 21 NOVEMBER 2026
Archive reference: SLF-2007-125
The Sakhalin Papers CXV: Three Offshore Platforms, One Environmental Directive — An Independent Investigation into Sakhalin II’s Post-Shell Record
In 2024, Russia’s federal environmental regulator inspected Sakhalin II’s three offshore platforms and identified a violation requiring corrective action. No fine was imposed, and the operator reported that the matter was corrected. But the company’s original environmental report also records rising air emissions, increased industrial waste, substantial environmental expenditure and continuing monitoring of endangered gray whales. A separate Russian appellate judgment, delivered in September 2025, provides an unusually detailed account of disputed drilling-equipment maintenance and an alleged offshore discharge. Examined alongside authenticated Shell filings and contemporaneous reporting, these documents offer a more detailed picture of environmental oversight after Shell lost operational influence in April 2022 — while revealing important limits to what can independently be verified.
AN INDEPENDENT DOCUMENTARY INVESTIGATION
By the Donovan–Shell Archive
Researched and drafted with assistance from ChatGPT. Based on Sakhalin Energy’s original 2024 ESG report, authenticated Shell SEC filings, Russian regulatory disclosures, a published appellate court judgment, contemporaneous Russian reporting and international scientific and conservation records.
Publication date: 21 November 2026
Collection: The Sakhalin Papers — Shell, Gazprom and Russia
Previous instalment: SLF-2007-124 — The Assets Russia Inherited
INTRODUCTION: WHAT THE INSPECTORS FOUND — AND WHAT THE PUBLIC RECORD DOES NOT SAY
In 2024, Russia’s Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources, Rosprirodnadzor, conducted an environmental inspection of Sakhalin II’s three offshore platforms.
The inspection covered Piltun-Astokhskaya-A, better known as Molikpaq, Piltun-Astokhskaya-B and Lunskaya-A.
These are the principal offshore production installations serving the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye oil and gas fields in the Sea of Okhotsk.
The inspection was not an allegation made by an environmental campaign organisation.
Its occurrence was acknowledged by the project’s operator, Sakhalin Energy LLC, in its original Non-Financial ESG Report 2024.
On page 99, the company reported that the regulator had identified a violation and issued a directive requiring corrective action.
The company also reported two important qualifications.
No fine was imposed.
Corrective measures were implemented during 2024.
Those facts deserve recognition.
But the published report does not identify the precise provision breached, the particular offshore installation involved, or the detailed corrective action undertaken.
It does not reproduce the regulator’s inspection report or directive.
Consequently, the public material examined establishes that a violation was reported.
It does not independently establish its precise nature or severity.
Nor does it establish that serious environmental damage occurred.
This distinction is fundamental.
The 2024 report is a substantial corporate publication. It contains environmental figures, descriptions of monitoring programmes and information about regulatory supervision.
It demonstrates that the replacement operator continued reporting on environmental matters after Shell’s withdrawal.
But corporate reporting and independent verification are not the same thing.
The document establishes what Sakhalin Energy disclosed.
Whether every conclusion can be independently confirmed requires examination of the underlying regulatory records, monitoring results and scientific evidence.
A separate Russian court judgment adds an unexpected dimension.
In September 2025, the Fifth Arbitration Appellate Court considered a dispute between Sakhalin Energy and a drilling contractor.
The operator alleged failures involving equipment maintenance, replacement parts and offshore safety.
The court rejected the relevant allegations as inadequately substantiated.
It also examined an alleged discharge from drilling equipment.
That judgment is particularly valuable because it distinguishes allegations from judicial findings.
The two records — the 2024 environmental report and the 2025 court judgment — concern different proceedings.
They must not be conflated.
Together, however, they help illuminate the operation and oversight of Sakhalin II following the replacement of its original operator.
Principal source: Sakhalin Energy — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024, pages 98–99 (PDF).
sakhalinenergy.ru
PART ONE: THE THREE PLATFORMS
1. Molikpaq — Piltun-Astokhskaya-A
Molikpaq was the first offshore production platform to operate as part of Sakhalin II.
Originally constructed for Arctic operations, the platform was adapted for use on the northeastern Sakhalin shelf.
Commercial oil production began in 1999.
The platform represented an important early stage in the development of Russian offshore oil production.
Its design and operation reflected the demanding conditions of the Sea of Okhotsk, including sea ice, severe weather and the logistical difficulties of maintaining an offshore industrial installation.
Molikpaq subsequently became part of the larger integrated production system developed under Sakhalin II’s second phase.
The platform remained operational after the 2022 restructuring.
2. Piltun-Astokhskaya-B
The PA-B platform was constructed as part of Sakhalin II’s major second-phase development programme.
It supports production from the Piltun-Astokhskoye field.
The platform is an important component of the integrated oil and gas production system.
Its construction occurred during the years when Shell was the project’s principal international shareholder.
The environmental questions surrounding offshore construction, subsea pipelines and marine ecosystems were among the matters examined by independent organisations during that period.
3. Lunskaya-A
The Lunskaya-A platform produces hydrocarbons from the Lunskoye field.
Its principal importance lies in supplying natural gas to the project’s onshore processing and LNG export infrastructure.
Like PA-B, it was developed during the major second-phase construction programme.
Sakhalin Energy’s 2024 report confirms that all three platforms remained central to the operating project.
The report also describes maintenance, drilling and equipment-inspection activities carried out during the year.
These are substantial industrial facilities operating in a sensitive marine environment.
Their continued operation requires environmental management, technical maintenance, emergency preparedness and compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements.
Original operator source: Sakhalin Energy — Production Facilities.
Производственные объекты
PART TWO: THE 2024 REGULATORY INSPECTION
4. The official inspection acknowledged by the operator
The most important passage appears on page 99 of the original ESG report.
Sakhalin Energy identified the inspecting authority as the Far Eastern Interregional Directorate of Rosprirodnadzor.
The inspection covered the three offshore platforms, classified as Category I facilities under Russia’s environmental regulatory system.
That classification refers to the potential environmental impact associated with the facilities.
It does not mean that each platform had committed a serious violation.
Following the inspection, the regulator issued a directive requiring the correction of an identified violation.
The company stated that corrective action was completed during 2024.
No fine was imposed.
This is a significant disclosure, but it has clear evidentiary limits.
The report does not identify the breached regulatory requirement.
It does not state whether the violation concerned documentation, monitoring procedures, permits, emissions, waste handling or another environmental-management matter.
It does not attribute the violation to a particular platform.
And it does not reproduce the independent regulator’s final verification of the corrective action.
Therefore, the existence of a directive is established through the operator’s published account.
The precise findings underlying that directive remain unverified from the original inspection file.
A directive without a fine is not proof of serious pollution. Equally, the absence of a fine does not mean that the regulator found no violation.
Both conclusions would misrepresent the company’s disclosure.
5. The permit record provides a separate regulatory trail
The public website of Rosprirodnadzor contains notices concerning applications by Sakhalin Energy for comprehensive environmental permits during 2024.
These include notices dated 17 July and 12 September 2024 concerning applications accepted for consideration.
Such notices demonstrate that the replacement operator was participating in the relevant Russian environmental-permitting procedures.
However, acceptance of an application is not necessarily the same as the final grant of a permit.
Nor does an application notice establish that every associated facility met every environmental condition.
The complete permitting record would require examination of the relevant decisions, the facilities covered and any supporting documentation.
The notices should not be confused with the separate 2024 offshore inspection directive.
Regulatory source: Rosprirodnadzor — Comprehensive Environmental Permit Notices, Far Eastern Interregional Directorate.
Выдача комплексного экологического разрешения
PART THREE: WHAT SAKHALIN ENERGY SPENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
6. Environmental expenditure increased
The operator’s 2024 report contains a detailed financial table on page 98.
It records approximately 4.631 billion roubles in current environmental-protection expenditure during 2024.
The equivalent figure for 2023 was approximately 3.624 billion roubles.
The reported increase was therefore approximately 1.008 billion roubles, or about 27.8%.
The table divides the expenditure into several categories.
The largest category was protection and reclamation of land and the protection of surface water and groundwater, including offshore areas.
That category accounted for approximately 3.669 billion roubles during 2024.
Other spending included wastewater collection and treatment, waste management, atmospheric protection, biodiversity conservation and radiation safety.
The company explained that the increase reflected several factors.
These included environmental-permit documentation, expanded drilling operations, emergency-response arrangements and additional environmental services.
The report therefore establishes substantial environmental spending.
But it must be understood correctly.
The expenditure covered Sakhalin Energy’s operations as a whole.
It was not restricted to the three offshore platforms.
Nor was it described as a contribution to the eventual decommissioning fund examined in preceding instalments.
The figures demonstrate that the company incurred current environmental-management expenditure.
They do not establish that every future closure liability was fully financed.
7. Environmental payments were a separate category
The same report identifies payments for adverse environmental impact.
The total for 2024 was approximately 5.77 million roubles.
That compared with approximately 6.40 million roubles in 2023.
These amounts are distinct from the billions spent on environmental-protection activities.
They concern payments made under the relevant environmental charging arrangements.
The operator reported that approximately 63% of its 2024 adverse-impact payments related to above-limit charges.
It attributed this principally to increased pollutant discharges into water bodies.
That is an important disclosure.
It should not be overlooked.
But the calculation applies to the relevant company-wide payment categories.
The material does not establish that all the additional discharges originated from the offshore platforms.
Nor does it demonstrate that the 2024 inspection directive related to those payments.
The financial data establishes environmental spending and regulatory payments. It does not independently identify the cause of the offshore inspection violation.
sakhalinenergy.ru
PART FOUR: AIR EMISSIONS AND INDUSTRIAL WASTE
8. The reported increase in air pollutants
The original report contains a table identifying gross air emissions during 2021–2024.
The total for 2023 was approximately 15,780 tonnes.
For 2024, it was approximately 18,180 tonnes.
That represented an increase of about 15.2%.
The table separately identifies carbon oxides, nitrogen oxides, methane, sulphur dioxide and other pollutants.
The operator attributed changes in the figures partly to the inventory and permitting of emission sources during 2024, changes in operating conditions and hydrocarbon production.
These explanations must be considered when interpreting the trend.
An increase in recorded emissions may reflect changes in operating activity, measurement coverage or reporting methodology.
It cannot automatically be interpreted as a proportional increase in environmental harm.
However, it remains a material change in the company’s disclosed environmental indicators.
The figures also require careful classification.
They concern gross emissions of listed air pollutants.
They should not be represented as the project’s total greenhouse-gas emissions or its complete carbon footprint.
Those are separate reporting measures.
Primary source: Sakhalin Energy ESG Report 2024, page 93, Gross Air Emissions Table.
sakhalinenergy.ru
9. Industrial waste increased during 2024
The report also records a substantial increase in industrial waste.
Waste generated during 2023 amounted to approximately 15,170 tonnes.
In 2024, the figure increased to approximately 20,258 tonnes.
The increase was approximately 33.5%.
The company attributed much of this movement to expanded drilling operations at the three offshore platforms.
That is a more direct connection between the platforms and a reported environmental indicator.
But the increase does not itself establish unlawful waste disposal.
The report describes procedures for waste collection, processing, treatment, transport and disposal.
It also identifies methods used to manage drilling waste.
These included the injection of certain drilling waste into deep geological formations.
The operator stated that monitoring of the relevant disposal areas did not identify unacceptable adverse environmental effects.
Such findings are useful.
However, they remain operator-reported conclusions unless independently corroborated by the underlying regulator and laboratory records.
The waste figures therefore provide evidence of changing operational activity and environmental-management demands.
They do not prove that the 2024 regulatory directive concerned waste management.
Primary source: Sakhalin Energy ESG Report 2024, pages 96–97, Waste Management.
sakhalinenergy.ru
PART FIVE: THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
10. What the operator’s monitoring programme reported
The environmental report contains a substantial section addressing marine biological monitoring.
This work concerned the areas surrounding the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye fields, together with the coastal waters associated with the project’s export facilities.
The monitoring covered seawater quality, bottom sediments, biological communities and potential effects associated with offshore operations.
The company reported that petroleum hydrocarbon concentrations in seawater and sediments remained within the relevant assessment criteria.
It stated that the available measurements did not indicate significant adverse effects upon bottom-dwelling biological communities.
The report also described comparisons with baseline conditions and earlier monitoring results.
These are relevant environmental observations.
But the distinction between observation and independent scientific confirmation is essential.
The reported results are evidence of what the operator measured and concluded.
The public summary does not reproduce every individual laboratory result, sampling location, analytical method, uncertainty range or independent validation record.
Without those details, a third party cannot fully reconstruct the monitoring conclusions.
That limitation does not establish that the results are wrong.
It means that a complete independent assessment would require the underlying scientific data.
Primary source: Sakhalin Energy ESG Report 2024, pages 113–114, Monitoring of Marine Biota and Its Habitat.
sakhalinenergy.ru
PART SIX: THE GRAY WHALE RECORD
11. The environmental controversy that predates Shell’s withdrawal
Sakhalin II’s environmental history cannot be separated from the controversy over gray whales feeding off the northeastern coast of Sakhalin Island.
The relevant waters form an important seasonal feeding area for the Sea of Okhotsk population of gray whales.
During the years of Shell’s involvement, environmental organisations raised concerns about seismic surveys, offshore construction, industrial activity and shipping.
Those concerns led to extensive scientific and conservation discussions.
The International Union for Conservation of Nature became involved through arrangements concerning the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel.
The panel examined potential risks and measures intended to reduce impacts from industrial activities.
In July 2015, IUCN described an independent observer appointed to monitor the implementation of protective arrangements during a Sakhalin seismic survey.
IUCN identified measures concerning survey timing, marine mammal observation, separation distances and the suspension of operations when whales approached the relevant safety zones.
That historical record is important.
It demonstrates that the whale-conservation issue was the subject of international attention during Shell’s participation.
It also establishes that monitoring and mitigation measures were developed in response to identified risks.
Independent institutional source: IUCN — Independent Observer Follows Whale Protection During Sakhalin Offshore Survey, 9 July 2015.
IUCN
12. The 2024 report records 397 identified whales
Sakhalin Energy’s 2024 report provides new information concerning its ongoing whale-monitoring programme.
The company reported that 397 individual gray whales had been registered in the Sakhalin photographic catalogue by the end of 2024.
The corresponding totals were 352 in 2021, 363 in 2022 and 375 in 2023.
The report also stated that 190 individual whales were photographed during the 2024 field season.
Of those, 22 were new identifications.
These figures are significant.
They indicate continuing monitoring and an expanding photographic identification catalogue.
But they require an important scientific qualification.
A cumulative catalogue of identified whales is not the same as a census of the number of whales alive in a particular year.
The catalogue includes animals recorded over time.
Its increasing total can reflect newly identified individuals, changes in monitoring effort and other factors.
It cannot simply be represented as proof that the living population increased from 352 to 397 between 2021 and 2024.
The operator reported that long-term monitoring indicated a generally favourable population trend.
That conclusion should be attributed to the company and the scientific work underlying its reporting.
A fully independent population assessment would require the relevant demographic analysis, survival estimates, survey methodology and identification records.
The distinction matters because this is a sensitive conservation issue.
It would be misleading to suggest that increased catalogue registrations automatically establish the absence of industrial impacts.
It would be equally misleading to dismiss the continuing monitoring programme without examining its scientific results.
Primary source: Sakhalin Energy ESG Report 2024, pages 115–116, Gray Whale Monitoring.
sakhalinenergy.ru
13. Independent research confirms that the risks were real subjects of study
A peer-reviewed scientific paper published in October 2022 examined gray whale density during seismic surveys near the Sakhalin feeding grounds.
The study identified offshore oil and gas activities as sources of potential disturbance.
It discussed seismic surveys alongside other industrial activities capable of affecting whales and their habitat.
That is relevant independent scientific evidence.
It should not be interpreted as proof that all offshore activity necessarily caused measurable harm.
Nor does it establish the environmental condition of the Sakhalin II area in 2024.
But it demonstrates that the scientific questions raised during the Shell era concerned identifiable risks rather than merely hypothetical objections.
Scientific source: Gailey and colleagues — Gray Whale Density During Seismic Surveys Near Their Sakhalin Feeding Ground, Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 18 October 2022.
DOI
PART SEVEN: THE COURT RECORD REVEALS A SEPARATE OFFSHORE SAFETY DISPUTE
14. The drilling contractor litigation
A separate documentary record concerns the operation of Sakhalin II’s offshore drilling equipment after the restructuring.
The case is identified as A59-4381/2023.
It arose from a contractual dispute between Sakhalin Energy LLC and KCA Deutag Drilling LLC.
The proceedings concerned drilling services provided under a contract originally dated 28 September 2011.
The contractor sought payment for outstanding services.
Sakhalin Energy brought counterclaims concerning alleged contractual failures and losses.
In April 2025, the Sakhalin regional arbitration court partly upheld the contractor’s claim.
The operator appealed.
The Fifth Arbitration Appellate Court issued its full judgment on 22 September 2025.
The judgment is particularly useful because it records the parties’ allegations, the relevant contractual provisions and the court’s assessment of the evidence.
15. What Sakhalin Energy alleged
The operator argued that the contractor had failed to maintain the necessary standards in servicing offshore drilling equipment.
Its allegations concerned the supply of original spare parts, equipment inspections, personnel qualifications, maintenance procedures and compliance with contractual requirements.
The operator maintained that the alleged shortcomings could increase the risk of equipment failure, interruption of operations and industrial accidents.
These were serious allegations.
But they were allegations advanced by a litigant.
They were not findings of the court.
The distinction becomes particularly important when examining the judgment’s reasoning.
The appellate court considered the evidence and rejected the relevant allegations as grounds for the substantial damages claimed.
It noted that replacement components had been used in circumstances affected by sanctions and the reduced availability of original equipment.
The court also considered evidence that Sakhalin Energy had approved the involvement of alternative suppliers.
It found insufficient evidence that the substitution of components had adversely affected equipment performance or caused the losses claimed.
The court treated assertions concerning potential future risks as insufficient to establish defective contractual performance.
This is a significant judicial qualification.
The case documents an operational dispute. It does not establish that the offshore platforms had become unsafe or that defective equipment caused environmental damage.
16. The alleged offshore discharge
The court considered another allegation of direct environmental relevance.
Sakhalin Energy alleged that a mixture of water and hydrocarbons had escaped from drilling equipment onto a platform deck and overboard.
The appellate judgment examined a drilling report dated 23 August 2023.
According to the record discussed by the court, approximately 30 litres of drilling-related liquid mixed with seawater had spilled onto the platform deck.
The report did not establish that the material had gone overboard.
The court also noted the absence of an identified adverse environmental effect in the relevant record.
That is an important finding.
The court did not accept the operator’s broader allegation on the evidence presented.
This does not amount to an independent scientific analysis of the entire offshore environment.
Nor does it establish that no other spill incidents ever occurred.
It establishes the court’s findings concerning a particular disputed incident.
The date is also important.
The incident considered in the contractual litigation occurred in August 2023.
The Rosprirodnadzor inspection described in the ESG report occurred in 2024.
No authenticated evidence examined connects the 2023 contractual incident with the separate 2024 regulatory directive.
They must remain separate.
17. The judicial outcome
The appellate court ordered Sakhalin Energy to pay approximately 814.9 million roubles and $47.46 million, with the dollar amount payable in roubles at the applicable exchange rate.
It also upheld the termination of the drilling-services contract.
The operator’s substantial damages counterclaim was rejected.
The judgment therefore confirms that the contractor dispute was financially significant.
It also shows that the court distinguished speculative assertions about equipment risk from proven contractual damage.
The findings are relevant to the documented operating history of the three platforms.
But the court was deciding a commercial dispute.
It was not conducting a comprehensive environmental inspection.
It did not determine the nature of the separate 2024 Rosprirodnadzor violation.
Original judicial record: Fifth Arbitration Appellate Court — Case A59-4381/2023, judgment dated 22 September 2025, reproduced by SudAct.
Sudact
Contemporaneous reporting: Interfax — Court Encourages Settlement Between KCA Deutag and Sakhalin II Operator, 11 November 2024.
Interfax.ru
PART EIGHT: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AFTER SHELL’S DEPARTURE
18. The original operator and the replacement company must be distinguished
Shell’s authenticated SEC filings establish that it lost significant influence over Sakhalin Energy from 1 April 2022.
The company attributed that loss of influence to the resignation of its executive directors and the withdrawal of managerial and technical personnel.
Russia subsequently established a replacement operating company.
Shell objected to the purported transfer arrangements and did not apply for an interest in the new entity.
These facts are important when considering responsibility for events occurring in 2023 and 2024.
Shell was a major participant in the original development.
It helped establish the project’s operating infrastructure and environmental-management arrangements.
Its historical decisions remain legitimate subjects of documentary investigation.
But the post-2022 operator was a separate Russian company.
Its conduct cannot simply be attributed to Shell as though Shell continued directing its activities.
The 2024 regulatory inspection occurred well after Shell reported losing significant influence.
The 2025 drilling-services judgment concerned the replacement operator.
No evidence examined establishes that Shell directed the relevant post-restructuring decisions.
Authenticated primary source: Shell plc — Third-Quarter 2022 Financial Report, SEC Exhibit 99.2.
SEC
EDITORIAL ANALYSIS
19. The 2024 report demonstrates continuity — not the absence of environmental problems
The available evidence establishes that Sakhalin II continued operating under an identifiable environmental-management framework after Shell’s departure.
The replacement operator published substantial environmental information.
It recorded expenditure.
It described marine monitoring programmes.
It reported regulatory inspections.
And it acknowledged a violation requiring corrective action.
That is evidence of continuing environmental administration.
It would be wrong to suggest that all environmental oversight disappeared in 2022.
However, the existence of environmental reporting does not independently establish that every activity complied with the applicable requirements.
The regulator identified a violation in 2024.
The company reported that it was corrected.
Without the original directive and closure records, the precise nature of the breach remains unknown.
The proper conclusion is therefore neither that the replacement operator was environmentally negligent nor that its performance was flawless.
It is that the published record contains evidence of active oversight, a disclosed violation, reported corrective action and unresolved details requiring further examination.
20. An external management-system audit has a limited meaning
The 2024 ESG report also states that the Russian Register Certification Association conducted an external assessment of the company’s occupational health and safety and environmental-management systems.
According to the operator, the audit confirmed compliance with the relevant management-system standards, including GOST R ISO 14001-2016.
This is favourable evidence concerning the company’s management arrangements.
It should be acknowledged.
But certification of an environmental-management system does not constitute independent verification that no pollution occurred or that every regulatory obligation was satisfied at every facility.
The scope of management-system auditing differs from that of a regulator investigating a specific compliance matter.
Consequently, the operator’s account of a favourable external audit is not necessarily inconsistent with its separate disclosure of a regulatory directive.
Both can be true.
That distinction is important when interpreting corporate environmental reports.
21. The most important missing evidence
The investigation identifies several categories of documentation needed to establish the complete position.
The first is the original 2024 Rosprirodnadzor inspection report.
That would identify the specific facilities, regulatory requirements and observations involved.
The second is the corrective-action directive.
The third is the operator’s response and the regulator’s records confirming whether the required action was accepted.
The fourth is the underlying environmental-monitoring data, including sampling locations, laboratory results and comparisons with applicable standards.
The fifth is the complete technical and scientific record supporting the gray whale population assessments.
These documents would allow a more detailed evaluation.
The published ESG report provides a useful starting point.
It is not a substitute for those underlying records.
The September 2025 court judgment provides separate authenticated evidence concerning operational disputes.
But it cannot resolve the missing environmental-inspection details.
DOCUMENTARY FINDINGS
The investigation establishes that Sakhalin Energy’s replacement Russian operator continued environmental reporting during 2024.
Its original ESG report identifies the three offshore platforms as Category I facilities subject to Russian federal environmental supervision.
The operator reported that Rosprirodnadzor conducted a scheduled inspection during 2024.
A violation was identified and a directive requiring corrective action was issued.
The operator stated that no fine was imposed and that corrective measures were completed during the year.
The precise nature of the violation has not been established from the original inspection file.
The operator recorded approximately 4.631 billion roubles in current environmental expenditure in 2024, compared with approximately 3.624 billion roubles in 2023.
Its reported gross air emissions increased from approximately 15,780 tonnes to 18,180 tonnes.
Reported industrial waste increased from approximately 15,170 tonnes to 20,258 tonnes.
Those figures concern different environmental indicators and cannot be interpreted as measurements of the same impact.
The operator attributed changes partly to operating activity, drilling and updated monitoring or permitting arrangements.
Its marine-monitoring programme reported findings broadly consistent with environmental assessment criteria.
Those conclusions have not been independently reconstructed from the complete original sampling and laboratory records.
The company’s gray whale photographic catalogue reached 397 registered individuals by the end of 2024.
That figure is cumulative and is not equivalent to a census of the living whale population.
The historical IUCN record confirms that offshore industrial activities and gray whale protection were subjects of international scientific monitoring during Shell’s involvement.
A Russian appellate judgment delivered in September 2025 documents a separate dispute concerning offshore drilling services and equipment maintenance.
The court rejected the operator’s relevant allegations of defective performance and associated damages as inadequately substantiated.
The judgment also examined an alleged 2023 offshore discharge and did not establish that the relevant liquid had entered the sea or caused an identified adverse environmental effect.
The court proceedings were separate from the 2024 regulatory inspection.
Shell’s authenticated SEC filings establish that it lost significant influence over the original Sakhalin operator from 1 April 2022.
No authenticated evidence examined establishes that Shell directed the replacement operator’s environmental decisions during 2023 or 2024.
No final judicial determination establishing serious pollution resulting from the 2024 inspection violation has been identified.
No allegation of deliberate environmental wrongdoing by Shell or the replacement operator is advanced.
CONCLUSION: WHAT THE POST-SHELL ENVIRONMENTAL RECORD REALLY SHOWS
Sakhalin II’s environmental history is inseparable from Shell’s long involvement in the project.
The original development generated controversy concerning offshore construction, industrial risks, marine ecosystems and the protection of gray whales.
Those subjects attracted international scientific scrutiny.
They also led to substantial monitoring and mitigation arrangements.
When Shell lost significant influence in 2022, the industrial infrastructure remained.
The offshore platforms continued operating.
Environmental risks did not disappear.
But the available evidence demonstrates that a new operating structure assumed responsibility for managing them.
The replacement operator published substantial environmental information.
It reported billions of roubles in expenditure.
It maintained programmes concerning marine pollution, waste, biodiversity and gray whales.
And it acknowledged an environmental directive issued following a federal inspection.
The reported absence of a fine and completion of corrective action are important facts.
They should not be omitted.
Equally, the precise nature of the violation remains unresolved in the documents examined.
The original inspection records have not been independently authenticated.
The operator’s marine-monitoring conclusions cannot yet be completely reconstructed from the public summary.
And the gray whale photographic figures require careful scientific interpretation.
The separate drilling contractor litigation provides another lesson.
It demonstrates why allegations concerning offshore safety should not automatically be treated as established facts.
The Russian appellate court rejected the relevant claims of defective contractual performance.
It also examined an alleged discharge and found that the evidence did not establish the broader environmental allegation.
That judicial finding deserves the same attention as any allegation adverse to an operator.
The purpose of a documentary investigation is to establish what the records prove, not to select only those parts that support a predetermined conclusion.
The strongest finding from the available evidence is therefore balanced.
Sakhalin II remained subject to environmental reporting and regulatory supervision following Shell’s departure. The replacement operator disclosed an environmental violation in 2024, reported its correction and recorded substantial environmental spending. However, the original inspection findings and complete supporting scientific data are necessary before the precise environmental significance of those disclosures can be independently established.
That conclusion neither absolves the project of every possible environmental problem nor attributes unproven wrongdoing to its former or current shareholders.
It identifies what has been documented.
And it preserves the distinction between corporate disclosure, regulatory action, scientific assessment and judicial findings.
For the Donovan–Shell Archive, this matters because Sakhalin II is not merely a story about who owned the project.
It is also a story about the continuity of industrial and environmental obligations.
Shell played a major role in developing the facilities.
Gazprom subsequently obtained majority control.
Russia replaced the original operator in 2022.
Yet the same offshore environment continued to require protection.
The three platforms remained.
The regulatory obligations continued.
And the historical environmental questions did not become irrelevant simply because the corporate structure changed.
The available evidence supports a continuing story of environmental management, monitoring and scrutiny — but not a complete independently verified account of every environmental outcome.
That is where further documentary investigation is justified.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTARY SOURCES
1. Sakhalin Energy LLC — Non-Financial ESG Report 2024. Original corporate report identifying the 2024 offshore inspection, environmental expenditure, emissions, waste management, marine monitoring and gray whale programme. Particularly relevant are printed pages 93, 96–99 and 113–117. Original report (PDF).
2. Rosprirodnadzor — Far Eastern Interregional Directorate. Official regulatory notices concerning applications for comprehensive environmental permits, including applications submitted by Sakhalin Energy during 2024. Regulatory notices.
3. Fifth Arbitration Appellate Court — Case A59-4381/2023. Original Russian judicial decision concerning the drilling-services dispute between KCA Deutag Drilling LLC and Sakhalin Energy LLC. Full judgment dated 22 September 2025. Published court judgment.
4. Interfax — 11 November 2024. Contemporaneous reporting concerning the contractor litigation and the court’s efforts to encourage settlement. Interfax report.
5. Shell plc — Third-Quarter 2022 Financial Report. Authenticated SEC disclosure concerning Shell’s loss of significant influence and its objections to the Russian restructuring. Original SEC filing.
6. International Union for Conservation of Nature — 9 July 2015. Original institutional report concerning independent observation and whale-protection measures during a Sakhalin seismic survey. IUCN report.
7. Gailey and colleagues — 18 October 2022. Peer-reviewed study concerning gray whale density during seismic surveys near the Sakhalin feeding grounds. Scientific publication.
8. Sakhalin Energy — Environmental Reporting and Performance Indicators. Official explanation of the operator’s environmental data collection and reporting systems. Company reporting methodology.
9. Donovan–Shell Archive — 20 November 2026. SLF-2007-124, examining the transfer of Sakhalin II’s assets and contractual obligations into the replacement Russian operating structure. Previous instalment.
DOCUMENTARY DISCLAIMER
This investigation examines environmental and regulatory information concerning Sakhalin II following Shell’s withdrawal from operational involvement.
Sakhalin Energy LLC’s Non-Financial ESG Report 2024 is an original corporate publication and is authenticated as a document issued by the replacement operator.
Its statements are attributed to that company.
The report has not been treated as independent confirmation of every environmental conclusion contained within it.
The 2024 inspection, violation, directive, absence of a fine and reported corrective action are described in accordance with the operator’s published account.
The complete original Rosprirodnadzor inspection report, directive and final corrective-action verification have not been independently obtained.
The investigation therefore does not identify the nature or severity of the violation beyond what the authenticated company report supports.
The environmental expenditure and emissions figures are treated as operator-reported data.
They are not represented as independently audited measurements of environmental damage.
The gray whale photographic catalogue is distinguished from a census of the living whale population.
Scientific findings and institutional conservation assessments are attributed to their original sources.
The Russian appellate court judgment is treated as an original judicial record of the contractual proceedings and the court’s findings.
Allegations made by the litigants are distinguished from the court’s conclusions.
The contractual dispute is not represented as determining the 2024 environmental inspection findings.
Shell’s historical role in developing Sakhalin II is distinguished from the activities of the replacement operator after the 2022 restructuring.
No evidence examined establishes that Shell directed the relevant post-2022 environmental-management decisions.
The investigation does not allege that Shell, Gazprom, Sakhalin Energy LLC, KCA Deutag Drilling or any other party deliberately caused environmental damage, concealed a regulatory violation or falsified monitoring results.
No final court judgment establishing such conduct in relation to the matters examined has been authenticated.
Editorial observations concerning the need for independent verification are distinguished from established factual findings.
Shell plc, Sakhalin Energy LLC, Gazprom, Rosprirodnadzor, the relevant scientific organisations and other interested parties are invited to supply original regulatory documents, monitoring records, factual corrections and responses for fair consideration.
The website’s general disclaimer also applies.
NEXT IN THE SHELL LEAKS FILES
SLF-2007-126 — THE SAKHALIN PAPERS CXVI
The Gray Whale Evidence — What 397 Identifications Really Reveal About Shell’s Sakhalin Environmental Legacy
The gray whales feeding off northeastern Sakhalin became one of the most controversial environmental subjects associated with Shell’s development of Sakhalin II.
International conservation specialists examined the potential effects of offshore construction, seismic surveys, shipping and other industrial activities.
Shell and its partners supported substantial scientific monitoring.
The International Union for Conservation of Nature became involved through the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel.
Independent observers examined particular operations.
Environmental organisations challenged aspects of the project.
And Shell’s relationship with the international scientific process became an important part of the historical controversy.
The replacement operator’s 2024 environmental report offers a further chapter.
It identifies 397 individual gray whales registered in the Sakhalin photographic catalogue.
It reports 190 whales photographed during the 2024 field season, including 22 new identifications.
But those figures raise an important question.
Does the expanding photographic catalogue demonstrate a genuinely recovering population?
Or does it primarily reflect the continuing accumulation of identification records?
The next investigation will examine the available IUCN material, peer-reviewed scientific research, original Shell-era conservation disclosures and the more recent monitoring figures.
It will distinguish population estimates from photographic-identification totals.
It will examine what the historical scientific assessments actually concluded about industrial disturbance.
And it will consider how the monitoring arrangements developed during Shell’s participation continued after the project’s restructuring.
No claim will be made that Shell caused a particular population decline without supporting evidence.
Equally, reported population improvement will not be treated as proof that offshore industrial activities had no environmental effects.
The central documentary question will be:
What does the scientific record actually establish about Sakhalin’s gray whales, the risks associated with Shell’s original development, and the value of the monitoring programme continued by the replacement operator?
The next investigation will follow the underlying evidence, distinguish scientific findings from corporate interpretation and identify the questions that remain unresolved.
The Sakhalin Papers continue.
























